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ABSTRACT 
Franco-Iraqi relations and Fifth Republic foreign policy, 1958-1990 
This study analyses the evolution of France's relations with Iraq since 1958. It seeks 
to understand the motivations behind French government, state and private sector 
interests in Iraq. This is done in the dual context of France's economic rivalry with 
other western powers in the Middle East, and the Iraqi state's attempts to follow an 
independent foreign policy while using its oil revenues to rapidly industrialise and 
arm itself. 
The text first charts France's rivalry with Britain in the ex-Ottoman empire and its 
fears of Anglo-American domination of oil supplies. It then demonstrates that while 
France's early links with Israel continued under President De Gaulle, by the mid- 
sixties they had been eclipsed by the commercial importance of trade with Arab 
states. The core text then focuses on France's relationship with Iraq since 1958, the 
year in which new governments came to power in both states. 
Despite the 1972 nationalisation of the Iraq Petroleum company, in which France 
had a 25% stake, French politicians and businessmen nevertheless gained favourable 
access to oil supplies, greatly increasing their exports of defence and high 
technology products, including a nuclear reactor, to Iraq during the seventies. The 
Iran-Iraq war (1980-88) intensified both bilateral trade links and the indebtedness of 
Iraq to France. By the mid-eighties what become a de-facto alliance generated 
severe problems for France's middle eastern policies, particularly towards Iran. 
The central themes of the study are the processes of foreign policy formation in 
France, and the extent and impact of economic interests underlying policy making. 
The thesis argues that substantial state ownership in France's oil, defence and 
aeronautical industries, coupled with the common interests and interpretations of a 
relatively homogeneous and interconnected corps of businessmen, politicians and 
civil servants, helps explain the continuity of French policy in the region. This is 
seen to be true despite the change of government, (from Gaullist to Socialist) in 
France in May 1981. 
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Introduction 
Franco-Iraqi relations and Fifth Republic foreign policy, 1958-1990 
1 Objectives 
vc 
This is a study of the making of French foreign policy in the context of France's 
relations with the Middle East. The main focus of the text is the decision making of 
successive Fifth Republic governments and administrations in so far as it shaped the 
evolution of relations between France and Iraq. The text focuses primarily on the first 
three decades of the Fifth Republic, from 1958 to 1990. 
The study has a series of overlapping objectives, but its overall aim is to evaluate the 
extent and impact of economic interests in shaping this bilateral relationship. How far 
do economic interests determine foreign policy? In this specific case, were France's 
aims, firstly to secure oil supplies and then increase exports of defense and aeronautical 
equipment, the determining factors in the development of relations between successive 
administrations in Baghdad and Paris? 
In order to ascertain as to whether economic forces were predominant, a variety of 
other factors are examined. These can be divided into three categories: 
" firstly broad geo-strategic considerations, notably de Gaulle and his 
successors' positioning of France in the cold war; 
" secondly the regional constraints and opportunities generated by French 
policy towards the Arab-Israeli and Iran-Iraq conflicts; 
" thirdly, narrower factors linked to the administrative and bureaucratic 
aspects of French decision making are examined. These include the personal and 
political affiliations which give cohesion to the elites involved in policy making. 
Overall, the text attempts to analyse the notion that French foreign policy making is 
somehow "different"; that it has unique characteristics differentiating both the policy 
process and its objectives from those of comparable OECD states. I examine this by 
looking at two aspects of this alleged specificity; the broad framework and 
vocabulary of Fifth Republic foreign policy on the one hand, and the often 
personalised and apparently secretive mechanisms of policy on the other. 
" Firstly the overall framework and broad goals of policy. De Gaulle 
established a unique profile and framework of French foreign policy in the 1960s, 
which has been maintained and refined by his successors. This provides a specific 
political context, heritage and vocabulary for subsequent Fifth Republic 
administrations, through which his Gaullist successors largely defined and 
differentiated themselves. This proved equally to be the case under the Socialist 
presidency of Francois Mitterrand post-1981, the constraints and continuities of Fifth 
Republic policy in the Middle East far outweighing any notion of ideological or 
practical policy reorientation. 
"A second, subsidiary objective is to evaluate the interplay of private 
and state interests influencing Fifth Republic foreign policy. In particular the way 
in which both private and state oil and armaments companies interacted with the 
foreign policy milieu is examined. It is here that the second alleged specificity of 
French foreign policy is analysed. Is there a uniquely French way of pursuing foreign 
policy, and if so, is this a general trait, or something specific to French policy in the 
Middle East... ? The continuity of French policy towards Iraq, despite numerous 
changes of political and administrative personnel in both France and Iraq, is 
explained in large part via the continuity, in terms of the shared outlooks and 
backgrounds, of the men involved in decision making 1. Relatively small groups of 
political and technical experts have occupied a succession of influential posts in 
successive Fifth Republic administrations. They span three distinct spheres, all 
important in terms of decision making towards Iraqi policy. The first of these 
spheres is formal government offices (ministries, ministerial cabinets etc. ). The 
' It is a curious and noteworthy fact that women (with the fleeting exception of Edith Cresson 
as minister of external trade in 1983... ) do not feature at all, in either this text, or indeed in the 
secondary literature used for any of the chapters. 
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second is the plethora of para-statal entities, which cover a variety of publicly-owned 
companies (such as Erap/Elf) and numerous quango-type regulatory and advisory 
bodies. The latter include institutions such as the colossal Delegation generale pour 
1 'armement (DGA, involved in arms research and export promotion), the Direction 
des carburants and Institut francais de petrole (Dica and IFP, supervising oil 
research and policy) or the Commissariat a1 'energie atomique (CEA, which 
oversees nuclear matters). The third sphere is companies in the private sector. 
However, as shall be seen, private companies such as Dassault Aviation have at 
times been more closely involved with foreign policy than entities in the state sector. 
Evidently the formal boundaries between spheres two and three have also shifted 
over the decades, notably during the nationalisation and subsequent re-sale of 
companies in the eighties. In essence, the text argues that it is the shared values and 
continuity of personnel, and their frequent shifting of jobs within and between these 
three spheres that have provided the coherence to French policy vis-a-vis Iraq over 
almost three decades. This point is further highlighted in Annex C which traces the 
careers of some of the key actors in policy formulation. 
The study is therefore primarily an analysis of French policy and decision making. 
However, as is explained below, the relationship with Iraq has been chosen because 
it has broader implications than being simply an interesting "case-study". The nature 
of France's relationship with Iraq necessarily prompts a secondary set of questions 
linked to the issue as to what extent France was chosen by Iraq. Iraq's leaders 
clearly envisaged that a partnership with France would advance their strategy of 
establishing an independent foreign policy, beholden to neither superpower, while 
using its oil revenues to industrialise rapidly and arm itself. 
2 The rationale of the study; why France, why its relationship with Iraq? 
The existing republics in both Iraq and France were established almost 
simultaneously in mid-1958. Apart from this chronological coincidence, at the time 
precious little linked the two countries. France was a pariah in the Middle East, due 
to the Suez invasion of 1956, war in Algeria and close relations with Israel. 
Economically, outside of the Maghreb, France was largely excluded from Arab 
markets by an Anglo-American dominance, particular in the oil sector. Yet the only, 
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very partial exception was in Iraq itself, where since the 1920s a French company 
held a 25% stake in Iraqi oil production. From this inauspicious beginning, by the 
late 1970s France had become Iraq's principal trading partner, supplying in 
particular military and nuclear technology. For France, privileged relations with Iraq 
helped open the gate to wider Arabian markets, allowing it both to weather the 
1973/74 oil price rise, and to become the world's third largest arms supplier to non- 
OECD states by 1980. 
It is the telling of this story, coupled with the fact that it has not been told elsewhere, 
which is the primary reason for focussing on the Franco-Iraqi relationship. In 
narrating the evolution of these ties over three decades, I also attempt to provide, in 
terms of themes, chronology and geography, a cross-cutting insight into French 
foreign policy making. 
As stated above, the burgeoning Franco-Iraqi relationship was just one element in a 
broader renaissance of Franco-Arab relations from the late sixties onwards. The 
thesis therefore attempts to situate Franco-Iraqi ties within the context of what I term 
the reinvention of French Arab policy 2. The thesis tries to provide an overview of 
the series of French policy decisions towards the Middle East, on which, as 
explained in the following section, there is only an exceedingly sparse, fragmented 
literature, even in French. These decisions evolved into what became known as 
"Gaullist" Arab policy, a rather loose set of ideas, draped across a very solid record 
of commercial success achieved under the governments of de Gaulle's successors, 
including Francois Mitterrand after 1981. It has been suggested that the ambivalence 
of France's stance during the 1990/91 Gulf crisis highlighted the inconsistencies and 
thus the end of this "Arab policy". Yet in fact the rhetoric and myths of France's 
post 1958 stance in the Middle East have become a durable part of external 
projection of France's extra-OECD policy. They both continue to be used 
throughout the 1990s by politicians of both left and right in the presentation of policy 
on the Middle East. 
2 The terms "French Arab policy" and "Franco-Arab relations" are used repeatedly in both the 
source materials and in the text. Both terms contain geographical and cultural ambiguities. In 
particular, in general what is being referred to is not Franco-Maghrebi relations; i. e. French relations 
with Moroccans, Algerians and Tunisians which have their own specific histories and considerable 
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3 Methodology and bibliographical note. 
The methodology of the work (in terms of how I went about it rather than what 
epistemological approach is used) was straightforward, being based primarily on as 
wide a reading as possible. As explained below, there is virtually no published 
secondary material on the subject of Franco-Iraqi relations themselves, and 
surprisingly little serious literature on broader Franco-Arab relations in either 
English or French 3. Unsurprisingly, the only exception to this are works on 
France's relationship with the Israel/Palestine conflict, and bilateral relations with 
states in the Maghreb. Despite the fact that it has frequently been through the prism 
of Franco-Israeli relations that broader policy towards the Middle East has been 
viewed, this literature is only of limited use, rarely making reference to French 
relations with individual Arab countries beyond the Maghreb 4. Chapter two, which 
provides a broad overview of policy towards the region, including Israel, in the 
1950s and 60s, discusses the relevant works. An important aspect of this text is that 
it provides some initial elements of a new reading of French policy towards the 
region, examining the manner in which policy towards Iraq and Arabian Gulf 
countries was, from the mid-seventies, elaborated as a component and complement 
to France's "Mediterranean policy" 5. 
The bulk of the secondary material used is therefore culled from a very wide range 
of sources, primarily periodicals and newspapers, obtained in Paris 6. As well as 
core reading on French politics, politicians and administration, books and dossiers 
with possible relevance to France's relationship with Iraq (i. e. on oil, energy, arms, 
nuclear, export promotion etc. ) were consulted in order to glean items of relevance to 
bibliographies. Rather the "Arab" here refers to the core countries of the Arab East, i. e. N. E Africa, 
the Levant, Arabia and the Gulf. 
3 Both Balta, P. Rulleau, C. La politique Arabe de la France depuis 1958, Sinbad, Paris, 1973, 
and Saint-Prot, C. La France et le renouveau arabe, Copernic, Paris, 1980, despite their flaws, are still 
widely quoted. See also; Fremaux, J. Le Monde Arabe et la securite de la France, Presses 
Universitaires de France, Paris, 1995. Nouschi, Andre. La France et le monde arabe, Vuibert, Paris, 
c 1994. 
4A significant exception to this is Kassir, S& Mardam-Bey, F., Itineraires de Paris a 
Jerusalem (2 Vols), Institut des etudes palestiniennes, Washington, 1992. 
5 The text by Cherigui, H. La politique mediterraneenne de la France : entre diplomatie 
collective et leadership. L'Harmattan, Paris, 1997, provides the best overview of the roots of this 
policy. 
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bilateral relations. Evidently this is a somewhat painstaking and idiosyncratic 
process. In attempting to thread together so many diverse influences on foreign 
policy, I may have missed, or misunderstood, significant aspects of the task. Having 
established a basic chronological and thematic framework, the information thus 
collected was then discussed with as wide a range of actors and observers as my 
meagre resources permitted. The bulk of the interviews were conducted in France in 
the summer of 1996, with some subsequent follow-up interviews. As such, both the 
text's chronological narrative, and the method of researching it are fairly 
straightforward. 
As already noted, the story presented here has not been told before, either in French 
or English languages. Despite the importance of the relationship, both politically 
and economically since the early 1970s, literature specifically on long-term Franco- 
Iraqi relations, be it books or mainstream periodical (newspaper and magazine) 
articles, was non-existent until 1990 7. However, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 
1990, and the subsequent internal French policy divisions during the 1990-91 
confrontation with Iraq, changed this. The sole book on the Franco-Iraqi 
relationship, Notre allie Saddam by Claude Angeli and Stephanie Mesnier, came out 
in early 1992. This book is typical of its genre, being an "instant" book of 
investigative journalism a la francaise. Despite occasional lapses into 
sensationalism, it is nevertheless an obligatory point of reference. Angeli occupies a 
unique position in the French political landscape and the book reflects his 
unparalleled range of contacts and Mesnier's background work. Claude Angeli was 
also generous with his time, encouragement and contacts with me 8. The period 
6 Notably from the Institut d'Etudes Politique (IEP) of Paris' extensive newspaper archives. 
This includes not just high street publications, but also academic journals. Journals such as 
Monde Arabe (Maghreb Mashreq), Cahiers du Orient etc., or defence literature , remaining silent on bilateral relations. However, surprising this may seem, it is far from unique. A very similar situation 
prevailed in terms of (the lack of academic and critical) writing about France's more substantial, and 
convoluted, policy in Africa until the 1990s. 
8 Claude Angeli and Stephanie Mesniers "Notre allie Saddam, O. Orban, Paris, c1992. Angeli 
was senior editor of Le Canard Enchaine, Paris' leading satirical weekly. Given Le Canard's 
reputation and contacts, although hastily written, the book was impeccably sourced. I saw only a 
small fraction of those interviewed by CA and SM and clearly lacked sufficient knowledge of the 
political context to accurately map the cross-cutting tides of political affiliations and eddies of 
contradictory dossiers associated with Iraq. Bearing in mind Roland Dumas' links with both Le 
Canard and the Iraq issue, my impression is that a) Angeli could in fact have published a far more 
explosive book had he so wished, and b), while in one way the story was too good to miss, it was 
probably individuals involved in the saga who prompted CA to begin the book. The desire to "set the 
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between August 1990 and the publication of the Angeli and Mesnier book also saw a 
good deal of coverage of the nature of Franco-Iraqi ties, both in Le Canard 
Enchaine, and other publications 9. August 1990-March 1991 was therefore a 
watershed not only in terms of French policy towards the Middle East, but also in the 
writing and reporting on France's Arab policy. This is true both for the brief 
polemic surrounding the soul-searching over "France's Arab policy" prompted by 
the war, but also broader press interest in, and investigation of Franco-Arab relations 
10 
Clearly just as there was an upsurge of interest in France's relationship with Iraq, so 
journalists and analysts in most western countries began to investigate ties with Iraq, 
resulting in a welter of literature on the "arming of Iraq". In Britain this prompted 
not only a series of books but the official Scott inquiry and report. Some of the books 
examining Iraq's military capabilities, included information on Franco-Iraqi links, 
and where possible I've cross referred this narrative with what have become the 
standard texts on "the arming of Iraq" in English. "1 
Given that part of the text's rationale is that it attempts to be an original contribution 
to French foreign policy analysis, evidently it also engages with and criticises both 
broader works on French foreign policy, detailed works on specific sectors and 
record straight" and settle scores after the bruising watershed of August 1990 was evident in several 
of those I interviewed in 1996. 
9 For a sample of such pieces, see: "France-Irak; l'argent et la corruption" (dossier, pp. 8-18), 
L'Evenement du Jeudi, 13.9.90. "Vignt ans d'irakophilie francaise", Le Monde 23.8.90 (Laurent 
Greilsamer). "Les acteurs du lobby pro-irakien", Quotidien du Paris, 10?. 9.90 (J-M Kalfleche). 
Commentaire sur un virage, Liberation 14.8.90 (Michel Tibon-Cornillot). 
10 The polemic is encapsulated in the then foreign minister, Roland Dumas' broadside against 
"Gaullist arab policy" in Le Monde 12.3.91, and Sammy Cohen's rebuttal, Le Monde 21.3.91. On the 
broader issue of Arab policy See Beau, N. Paris, Capitale Arabe, Seuil, Paris, 1995. In large part due 
to the publicity and disquiet prompted by 1990/91 after this academic and policy journals also began 
to cover France's relationship with the Middle East more regularly. A thesis comparing French and 
British reactions to the war was defended in the IEP in 1996. Published as Charrillon, F. La politique 
etrangere ä 1'epreuve du transnational; une etude des diplomaties francaises et britannique dans la 
guerre du Golfe, L'Harmattan, Paris, 1999. See also Roy, O. "Sur la politique arabe de la France", 
Monde Arabe, Paris, June 1991, pp. 15-20. Also an article with the same title, but by de Gaulle's 
foreign minister, Couve de Murville, M. "Sur la politique arabe de la France", Revue d'Etudes 
Palestinniennes, 39, Spring 1991, pp. 31-38. 
11 Darwish, A. & Alexander, G. Unholy Babylon : the secret history of Saddam's war, London : 
Gollancz, 1991. Timmerman, K. R. The death lobby : how the West armed Iraq, Houghton Mifflin, 
Boston, 1992. Timmerman's study kicks off with Saddam Hussein in France, in an uncannily similar 
way to Angeli's. 
themes within French foreign policy 12. However, to my knowledge, no work has 
attempted to focus on the interaction of different French policy domains (in this case, 
primarily oil and arms) on a specific country, certainly not in the Middle East. As 
explained in section one above, the text therefore tries to look at the specificities of 
French policy making via a practical examination of a very particular set of bilateral 
relations. 
Evidently it is not appropriate to provide a bibliographical essay on the nature of 
writing about French foreign policy more generally. Clearly there are numerous 
broader works on French foreign policy; these are cited where appropriate and the 
conclusion tries to make some wider points about the nature and shortcomings of 
such works. However, it should be noted at the outset that this literature is relatively 
fragmentary, particularly when compared with the volume of work on say British or 
US foreign policy. Accounts of French foreign policy are curiously partial, at least 
until the 1990s. Works in the French language following a fairly set format, either of 
the curricula taught in the Grandes Ecoles 13, or the fairly staid format of 
(occasionally quasi-hagiographic) conferences and books on the evolution of foreign 
policy under successive presidential mandates. Such books invariably have chapters, 
of very variable quality, on policy towards each region 14. Curiously, it has often 
been left to outsiders, writing in English, to provide a more critical overview 15. The 
reasons for this lie largely beyond this study, in part reflecting structures of academia 
and international relations in France, linked to struggles within French academia 
between disciplines, particularly law, political science and international relations 16. 
12 For example, on the arms trade, Kolodziej, E. A., Making and marketing arms : the French 
experience and its implications for the international system, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
1987, and the works of Pierre Nan on the oil and nuclear industries as well as Franco-Iranian 
relations. 
13 In particular, the numerous works of Alfred Grosser at the IEP; Grosser, A. Affaires 
exterieures : la politique de la France, 1944-1989, Flammarion, Paris, 1989. A similarly standard 
work is; Dalloz, J. Le France et le monde depuis 1945, Armand Colin, Paris, 1993. 
14 See: Cohen, S. Smouts, M. -C., La politique exterieure de Valery Giscard D'Estaing, FNSP, Paris, 
1985; Diallo, T. La politique etrangere de George Pompidou, libraire generale de droit, Paris, 1992; and, 
Vaisse, M., La Grandeur; politique etrangere du general de Gaulle 1958-1969, Fayard, Paris, 1998. 
15 Symptomatically, Vaisse's 1998 work, a new generation of archival studies, concludes by 
drawing on foreign works, notably Stanley Hoffman etc. Cerny, P. G. The politics of grandeur : 
ideological aspects of de Gaulle's foreign policy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1980. 
Kolodziej, E. A. French international policy under De Gaulle and Pompidou : the politics of grandeur, 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1974. 
16 These aspects of French IR publishing are evident to anyone with comparative experience of 
French foreign affairs. They are touched on in the essay by Girard, M, "the uncertainty of influence, 
France", pp. 51-63, in Girard, M. et al, Theory and practice in foreign policy making : national 
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One result of this is that often it has been the more instant and "investigative" 
writings referred to in the preceding paragraph which have in fact provided the 
initial, and in many cases enduring, insights into the underlying forces determining 
foreign policy. Evidently Notre Allie Saddam typifies this trend, and is exemplary in 
that it arose in part through extended investigation by journalists linked to one of the 
few publications systematically probing the underbelly of French politics 17 - 
Similarly, Pierre Pean's books - on France's relations with Africa, the oil industry, 
Franco-Iranian ties, corruption etc. - while initially sneered at by many, notably in 
universities, later came to be taken more seriously, indeed by the late nineties Pean 
was seen as a mainstream writer. 
This milieu of investigative journalism, and associated rash of more speculative and 
polemical works has thrown up a good deal of material of tangential use to this text. 
In the 1980s there was an rush of instant writing about foreign affairs and 
presidential politics, enhanced initially by Mitterrand's election and the 
intensification of both left and. right wing factionalism within politics. This was 
further amplified during the period of left-right cohabitation, in 1986-88. In 
particular this produced an exceedingly uneven and problematic series of books on 
the divisions within France's multifarious (and occasionally nefarious... ) secret 
18 services 
There is also a voluminous literature associated with the capture of French hostages 
in Lebanon during 1985-6, which is drawn on only very partially in chapter 7. A 
comprehensive sifting of all the available sources on this is beyond the scope of this 
text. Indeed one of the themes of French policy in the region in the eighties is that a 
perspectives .... , 
Pinter, New York, 1994. Also p. 154 in; Wallace, W. "Between two worlds... ", in 
Hill, C. & Beshoff, P. Two worlds of international relations ..., 
Routledge, London, 1994. 
17 Both the title and content of Angeli's "Notre Allie Saddam" consciously echoed Gilles 
Perrault's book on Franco-Morccan relations. Published in 1990 this was both a surprise best seller 
and subsequently had a significant impact on bilateral relations. Perrault, G. Notre ami le roi, 
Gallimard, Paris, 1990. 
18 Ockrent, C. Darts le secret des princes, interviews with de Marenches, Stock, Paris, c1986. 
Marion, P. Le Pouvoir sans visage : le complexe militaro-industriel, Calmann-Levy, Paris, 1990. 
Villeneuve, C. Peret, J. -P. histoire secrete du terrorisme: les juges de l'impossible, Plon, Paris, c1987. 
Guisnel, J. Violet B. Services secrets, le pouvoir et les services de renseignements sous Francois 
Mitterrand, La Decouverte/enquetes, Paris, 1988. See also Faligot, R. Krop, P. La Piscine; les 
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purely bilateral approach, looking only at Franco-Iraqi ties, provides a blinkered 
view of foreign policy, given the entangled nature of France's relationship with both 
Iran-Iraq, which was in part played out via Lebanon, hostage taking etc. 
Finally there are two spheres of writing specifically on Mitterrrand's two presidential 
terms of relevance to the text; firstly the memoirs and detailed writings claiming to 
be accurate records of decision making of the period 19. Secondly, there are now 
beginning to be more analytical works on the foreign policy of the eighties, some of 
which can clearly be linked to theories and ideas evident in English language foreign 
policy analysis and international relations 20 
4 The text's limitations 
There are four obvious limitations to the research and the resulting text in its current 
form: 
" Firstly, the examination of so many diverse aspects of bilateral 
relations necessarily limits both the depth of analysis on specific issues, and, 
hopefully to a lesser degree, the overall coherence of the text. Thus in attempting to 
evaluate the influence of France's oil industry, the armaments sector, as well as 
nuclear and civilian industries upon the foreign policy process, the text leaves itself 
open to the charge of inconsistency. 
" Secondly, as indicated in the preceding section, although the 
geographical and chronological scope of the text appears at first sight to be very 
clearly defined, a more systematic analysis of the Franco-Iraqi axis would in fact 
require delving deeper into French relations with other Arab and Middle Eastern 
states. In particular, given that Iran and Iraq were at war with each other between 
1980-88, Franco-Iranian relations. This in turn would enhance the broader aspect of 
services secrets francaises 1944-84, Seuil, Paris, 1985. Faligot, R. Kauffer, R. Au coeur de L'Etat 
l'espionage, Autrement, Paris, 1983, especially ch. 4 on P. Marion and Mitterrand. 
19 Attalli, J. Verbatim; Chronique des annees ... 
(3 Vols), Fayard, Paris, 1995. Favier, P. & 
Martin-Roland, M. La decennie Mitterrand (2 Vols), Seuil, Paris, 1995. Vedrine, H, Les mondes de 
Francois Mitterrand :ä 1'Elysee, 1981-1995, Fayard, Paris, 1996. 
20 Cohen, S. Mitterrand et ]a sortie de la guerre froide, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 
1998. A collection of papers and interventions of a round table in May 1997 evaluating foreign policy 
during Mitterrand's second septennat (1988-95). Many key figures in the administration were 
present. Hubert Vedrine's numerous interventions were given added significance by his, largely 
unanticipated, appointment, two weeks later, as Jospin's foreign minister. 
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the work in terms of its attempts to retrace the post-1962 "reinvention" of French 
policy in the region. 
"A third obvious limitation of the text is its lack of use of Iraqi sources. 
While the work is primarily an analysis of French policy making, it is evident that a 
fuller understanding of Iraqi perceptions and motivations would have greatly 
enhanced the study. Iraqis living in France have written little, and those based 
elsewhere, understandably do not see the French angle as crucial 21. Under normal 
circumstances, understanding Iraqi perceptions could have been done via interviews, 
however, the nineties have been anything but "normal circumstances" for most 
Iraqis. To a limited extent, some of the issues discussed here were discussed with 
Iraqis in London and Paris. The conditions of post-1991 embargo and sanctions 
meant there appeared little point in going to Baghdad and attempting to identify and 
interview people who had been central to Franco-Iraqi relations. 
" This in turn links to the final, and most obvious, shortcoming of the research 
and text, that it deals with issues which are too contemporary to be analysed in 
detail. The legitimacy and need for such a study surely cannot be queried, 
particularly given the lack of literature outlined above, and, as already explained, the 
text's attempts to contribute to broader analysis of French foreign policy. However, 
there is a second, more conjunctural problem given the post-1991 predicament of 
western relations with Iraq in general, and French policy towards Iraq in particular. 
The research and writing was undertaken, and to a certain extent framed in the very 
particular context of the present. For Iraqis that of sanctions, but also of France's 
singular stance among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. 
Indeed given the topicality and importance of this contemporary debate, most 
people, certainly all those outside of France, with whom this research was discussed 
in the latter half of the eighties, found it odd that the text be concerned primarily 
with the pre-1990 period, rather than the current post-sanctions situation. 
21 Several hundred Iraqis wrote theses in French universities during the 1980s. While many 
were in natural sciences, of those in social sciences, only a handful dealt with aspects of Franco-Iraqi 
relations, see Appendix E. 
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5 Structure of the thesis. 
The structure of the text is both chronological and thematic. 
Introduction 
Chapter 1 Anglo-French rivalry in the Middle East, the origins of France's 
oil industry and the formation of the Iraq Petroleum Company, 1914-39. This 
examines the rivalry between the great powers in the Ottoman Empire at the end of 
the first world war; the granting of sequestered German shares in the Turkish 
Petroleum Company to France, and the subsequent formation of the Compagnie 
francaise des petroles, which became the French component of what was established 
as the Iraq Petroleum Company after the discovery of oil in Kirkuk. 
Chapter 2 Emerging from Israeli and Algerian shadows: the foundations of 
Fifth Republic foreign policy in the Middle East 1956-1967. This provides a 
broad account of France in the Middle East during the 1950s and 60s. De Gaulle's 
resentment at both France's loss of the Levant and subsequent Anglo-American 
presence; the arming of Israel and the Algerian war meant that by the time the Fifth 
Republic was formed, France was a pariah in the region among Arab states. While 
maintaining an alliance with Israel, de Gaulle's foreign policy framework 
nevertheless provided for the reestablishment of relations with Arab countries from 
1962 onwards. This policy was greatly enhanced by de Gaulle's criticism of Israel 
in the June 1967 war. 
Chapter 3 French oil policy and relations with Iraq to 1972. The chapter 
examines the background to the re-establishment of relations with Iraq, 1958-63. The 
CFP's role in post-1961 IPC oil negotiations is then evaluated, with the specificity of 
the CFP's stance to Iraq vis-a-vis the other IPC partners highlighted. The impact of 
the June 1967 war upon Iraqi oil policy is examined. The aftermath of the war 
created an opportunity for French interests to work in Iraq and ERAP/Elf entered 
Iraq in late 1967. Finally the chapter examines the background and bilan of the Iraqi 
leader General Aref's February 1968 visit to France. 
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Chapter 4 Iraqi foreign policy, France and the nationalisation of Iraqi oil to 
June 1972. This chapter analyses the way in which the Franco-Iraqi relationship fitted 
within broader Iraqi foreign policy priorities, in particular Iraq's links with the Soviet 
Union. It then presents the events which led up to the June 1972 nationalisation of the 
IPC and Saddam Hussein's first visit to Paris in the weeks following nationalisation. 
Chapter 5 France and Iraq, commercial and military ties to 1979. Chapter 5 
examines the background to president George Pompidou's policy towards the Arab 
world via a presentation of his policy on the arms embargoes decreed by de Gaulle, 
and France's post-1969 relations with Libya. It then evaluates the crucial role that 
Pompidou's last foreign minister, Michel Jobert played in weaving together a more 
coherent energy policy with France's burgeoning relations with Arab countries such 
as Libya and Iraq. The chapter then looks at Jobert's unique contribution to the 
modernisation of the machinery of French foreign policy before going on to examine 
some of the writers and thinkers who were influential in crafting Gaullist approaches 
towards the Arab world. Finally chapter 5 presents the post-1974 policies of Giscard 
d'Estaing and Jacques Chirac towards Iraq. 
Chapter 6 Plus ca change... continuity under Mitterrand; Israel's 
destruction of Iraq's nuclear reactor, the impact of the Iran-Iraq war. This 
chapter firstly examines the Franco-Iraqi nuclear cooperation begun under Chirac 
and Giscard in 1975 and the way in which the composition of Franco-Iraqi trade 
increasingly involved military hardware by the late 1970s. The Iranian revolution 
and Iraq's launching of war against Iran in 1980 was to greatly increase this trend. 
Despite the fact that when in opposition Francois Mitterrand had criticised Franco- 
Iraqi ties, the chapter then analyses why it was that very quickly after his election in 
May 1981 Mitterrand endorsed France's de-facto alliance with Iraq. This stance was 
reinforced both by revolutionary Iran's hostility to France, and by the Socialist 
government's need to dissuade petro-dollar rich Arab gulf states from withdrawing 
funds from France (and thus further weakening the beleaguered Franc). The new 
administration therefore strove to prove that it was not considering a shift in either its 
policy towards Israel or Iraq. . 
Israel's bombing of the Iraq's Tammuz/Osiraq reactor 
presented Mitterrand with his first major foreign policy crisis and Iraqi calls for 
France to rebuild the reactor was a constant theme of relations from 1981 onwards. 
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Chapter 6 concludes by examining how, despite rising debts to France, Iraq managed 
to ensure increased supplies of advanced French weaponry during 1981-83 
Chapter 7 1984-90: "normalisation" with Iran and hostages in Lebanon, 
Iraqi debt, arms sales and cohabitation. This chapter presents the Iranian backlash 
to France's apparently unconditional support for Iraq in the war against Tehran. 
Following the appointment of Roland Dumas as foreign minister in 1984, the 
government attempted to mend fences with Iran. However, this proved a protracted 
and painful process, which was further complicated firstly by the taking of French 
hostages by Iranian proxies in Lebanon and then with the election of a right-wing 
government in France in March 1986. The 1986-88 period of political cohabitation 
creates an unprecedentedly complex pattern of foreign policy decision making. 
Despite rapprochement with Iran by 1988, Franco-Iraqi relations remain locked into 
a vicious circle of oil, debt and arms. Iraq was partially successful in leveraging 
additional arms supplies from France in exchange for barter payments of oil, despite 
mounting civil and military debts. However, by the time a Socialist administration 
returns to power as Mitterrand is elected for a second septennat in 1988, and the 
Iran-Iraq war ends, attempts by Dassault and the ministry of defence to upgrade 
relations remain overshadowed by problems of debt repayment. 
Conclusion Iraq and the specificities of French foreign policy; the same goals 
by different means? The conclusion reviews the aims established in this 
introduction, looking at the specificities of French Fifth Republic foreign policy 
making in terms of its policy objectives and both the mechanisms and processes of 
policy making. It also reviews what light the thesis has been able to shed upon 
debates about the nature of elites in French politics and the issue of military- 
industrial interests in policy making as well as what has been learned of the broader 
issue of what the thesis terms the reinvention of Arab policy during the Fifth 
Republic. 
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Anglo-French rivalry in the Middle East, the origins of France's oil industry 
and the formation of the Iraq Petroleum Company, 1914-39. 
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Anglo-French rivalry in the Middle East, the origins of France's oil industry 
and the formation of the Iraq Petroleum Company, 1914-39. 
1 Introduction 
Chapters one and two provide historical background necessary to the subsequent 
discussion of the evolution of France's relationship with Iraq during the Fifth 
Republic. Chapter one firstly examines the Anglo-French rivalry underpinning the 
division of the Ottoman Empire into respective spheres of influence after 1916. It 
then focuses specifically on the protracted negotiations over oil rights in 
Mesopotamia between 1916-28. These resulted in France acquiring a share in the 
Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC) whose rights over oil in what by 1921 became 
the kingdom of Iraq were eventually confirmed as an integral part of the post-war 
settlement. The French stake in the TPC prompted the creation of the Compagnie 
Francaise des Petroles, the French national oil company which by the late 1960s 
became known as TOTAL. The CFP became the central pillar of both the French oil 
industry in general and France's subsequent relationship with Iraq in particular. 
Chapter one locates the CFP's stake in Iraqi oil within two broader thematic 
contexts, both of which have bearing on more contemporary discussions of the 
French presence in Iraq. 
" The first theme is that of great power rivalry over oil resources. 
Whilst French attempts to establish itself as an oil producer occur against a broader 
background of commercial rivalry between Britain and the United States, we can see 
in this period the roots of French resentment at Anglo-American domination of 
Middle Eastern oil. The conclusive 1928 agreement over Iraqi oil exploration 
established the framework for subsequent oil development in the Middle East. In 
this the CFP was a relatively minor actor. 
" The second theme is the attempt, which runs throughout the thesis, to 
delineate the respective roles, weight and influence of state and private French 
interests in the making of foreign policy. In this case it is French politicians' 
uncertainties over the state's aims in the Near East following the defeat of the 
Ottoman Empire, coupled with domestic debate over the state's role in regulating oil 
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industry, which determine the nature of both the Compagnie francaise des petroles 
and its participation in the Iraq Petroleum Company. 
A superficial, retrospective glance at the key events in the areas of the Middle East 
which became Syria and Iraq in the decades following 1918 suggest a relatively 
straightforward evolution of the contours of political control and petroleum 
development in the Middle East. British forces' physical control of much of the 
region at the close of the war was translated into mandates over Transjordan, 
Palestine and Iraq. France gained control over Syria and what became Lebanon, 
although Cicilia, which had also been coveted by French colonialists, became part of 
the Turkish republic following Turkish-Greek hostilities in 1920-22 and the treaty of 
Lausanne signed in 1923. After some hesitation, in 1921 Britain opted for a 
monarchy in Iraq headed by King Faisal whom the French had summarily expelled 
from Syria the previous year. Whilst France had abandoned its claims over the oil- 
bearing province Mosul to the British in 1919, it was not until 1926 that the 
protracted dispute between Turkey and Britain over the province was settled in the 
latter's favour and Mosul was incorporated into Iraq. This in turn consolidated and 
clarified the terms of the pre-war concession of the Turkish Petroleum Company 
(TPC) in the region. Protracted negotiations over how firstly French and then 
American capital should be incorporated into the TPC were hastened by the 
discovery in 1927 of substantial oil deposits in Kirkuk. This then spurred a decision 
on how to resolve the prolonged disputes over both the internal modalities of the 
TPC's operations, and the routes that the pipelines needed to transport oil to the 
Mediterranean should take. 
Yet in 1918 none of these developments were inevitable. They emerged from a 
complex interplay of western interests competing to control former territories of the 
Ottoman Empire, on which there is already an extensive historiography. The process 
was characterised by two, inextricably intertwined trends. The first of these was 
Anglo-French diplomatic and economic rivalry fuelling attempts to create respective 
spheres of direct control and diplomatic influence out of the former provinces of the 
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Ottoman Empire. Elie Kedourie dubbed this dimension a "dialectic of rivalry" 
underpinning most of the negotiations and diplomatic manoeuvring over territory 
and oil during the period. Secondly there was the broader struggle to establish oil 
rights in the region. Prior to the 1914 war, this had been initially between rival 
European companies (essentially British and Dutch) but during the 1920s 
increasingly involved the incorporation of American economic interests into the 
division of the Middle East. It is necessary to briefly review these events both 
because they determined the specific nature of France's holding in the IPC, but also 
because they provided a broader backdrop to France's presence in the Middle East, 
without which decisions and presentation of policy under the Fifth Republic in the 
1960s cannot be understood. 
2 France's post-war oil problem 
The roots of French owned oil production and refining capacity lie in two apparently 
unrelated consequences of the 1914-18 war. The first was the evident military 
weakness arising from France's dependence upon foreign owned oil sources during 
the war. The second was the seizure of German-owned oil assets in the Ottoman 
Empire. These were sequestered by the British government and the idea then 
developed that Deutsche Bank shares, notably in the Turkish Petroleum Company, 
should be transferred to France following the war. 
The war meant that French political and business leaders became acutely conscious 
of their dependence upon foreign owned oil supplies. The war had heightened 
awareness amongst all the powers of the logistical and strategic importance of oil, 
particularly for naval power. Much of the British Navy was converted from coal to 
oil power in 1912-13 and in May 1914 the British government purchased a 
controlling share in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC, later AIOC, then 
British Petroleum) 2. Whilst this decision is frequently portrayed as having been 
I Kedourie, E. Great Britain, the other powers and the Middle East after world war I, p. 9, in 
Dann, U. (ed. ) the Great powers and the Middle East 1919-1939, Holmes and Meier, New York, 
1988. 
2 Ferrier, R. W. The history of the British Petroleum Company, Vol. 1, Cambridge University 
Press , 
Cambridge, 1982, ch. 5. 
1) 1) 
taken largely under the pressure from the then first Lord of the Admiralty, Winston 
Churchill, in reality it was the result of a collective decision by the admiralty and a 
gowing realisation and acceptance in government that henceforth the supplies of oil 
would form a key part of national security 3. The decision was crucial in shaping the 
British state's subsequent involvement in the oil exploration and production. It also 
influenced the way in which different departments of government perceived 
negotiations over Britain's post-war involvement in Mesopotamia, which by this 
time was believed to contain large deposits of oil. 
Whilst the British government had a direct stake in Anglo-Persian, which anyhow 
was largely owned by British capital, the French government had no such direct 
involvement with its domestic oil companies. French capital had been involved in 
oil interests in central Europe, notably Rumania. But oil in France was supplied via 
a cartel of small firms who imported from the Dutch, American and British 
companies who had begun producing oil in large quantities for the international 
market in the previous decade. These companies also had their own subsidiaries 
operating in France. Royal Dutch Shell, Anglo-Persian's principal rival in European 
markets, in particular was well established in France. As well as having subsidiaries 
in France, Royal Dutch Shell had several French shareholders, notably the 
Rothschild banking family. Subsidiaries of the large foreign companies operated 
alongside a host of far smaller, local firms who were primarily marketing agencies. 
France's naval and ground forces were totally dependent upon imported supplies 
under an agreement signed between the government and the cartel of local agents 
who relied upon foreign suppliers in 1914. 
France suffered, persistent oil shortages from mid-1917. These severely impeded its 
war effort. It is generally held that in December 1917 France's fighting capacity was 
saved from collapse by emergency oil deliveries from the USA. Certainly, following 
French premier Clemenceau's direct appeal for help from President Wilson, 
additional supplies were delivered to France. German submarines' disruption of 
3 Jones, G. The state and the emergence of the British oil industry, Macmillan, London, 1980, 
p. 27. 
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supplies, coupled with poor planning in France appear to have been the principal 
cause of the shortages. However, a more detailed analysis of France's oil stocks in 
1917/18 suggest that the real shortage was partially exaggerated and may be better 
understood in the context of France's attempts to lessen Standard Oil's dominance of 
their domestic market 4 
What is clear is that both the public and politicians' perceptions of the oil crisis of 
1917, and of France's acute dependence upon foreign, particularly American, sources 
of oil were to play a key role in subsequent French attempts to regulate the industry. 
However, the formulation of a coherent national oil policy was impeded by the 
vested interests of existing suppliers, and the weak political system of the post-war 
years. Shortages of oil during the war prompted a series of largely indecisive 
investigations in France. A Comite generale du petrole was created in July 1917 to 
investigate the problem of oil supplies but failed to address the problem of foreign 
dependency. The comite was headed by Senator Henri Berenger, who was also 
France's principal negotiator with Britain over the partition of oil interests in the 
Middle East and elsewhere after the war. Following the war the comite's profile, was 
heightened by concern in France over aggressive competition from foreign, largely 
American companies, Standard Oil suspending supplies in 1920/21 due to 
disagreements over quotas and market share in France. Such disputes, coupled with 
an increasingly powerful lobby in France in favour of importing Russian oil and the 
election of the radical Cartel des gauches government in early 1924, was to lead to 
the creation in January 1925 of a more powerful regulatory body. This was the 
Office national des combustibles liquides (ONCL), which became the principal state 
agency for guiding oil policy. It was to be the ONCL which oversaw the major 
review of National Petroleum Policy following mounting concern at the activities of 
domestic and foreign owned trusts in the economy in 1928. However, as is 
explained later in the text, it had limited power over the CFP, which was a private 
company, or France's role in Iraqi oil. 
4 Nowell, G. Mercantile States and the world oil cartel 1900-1939, pp. 107-110, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca, 1994. 
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3 The post-war struggle over the Turkish Petroleum Company 
The Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC) was formed in 1912 by an alliance of 
banking and oil interests, in the hope of obtaining a concession to develop oil in the 
Ottoman provinces of Mesopotamia. There had long been small scale working of oil 
in the region, notably around Mosul and it was widely assumed that there were 
commercially viable deposits, such as those which were exploited in and around the 
Caspian Sea and Persia prior to 1914. At this time the TPC was just one of a series 
of rival prospective concessionaires, each backed by a variety of external powers. 
The original TPC partners were primarily Anglo-German, with Deutsche Bank (who 
already held the related concession to construct a railway to Baghdad) and the British 
controlled Turkish National Bank, as the principal shareholders. The existing oil 
companies, Anglo-Persian (which obtained a concession for oil exploration in Persia 
in 1901) and Royal Dutch Shell, whose main activities stemmed from East Indies oil, 
also held shares in the company. 
In March 1914 the British government restructured and simplified the shareholding 
in the company. The deal known as the `foreign office agreement" gave the oil 
companies a far higher profile and ensured that the company would be under 
predominantly British control. This was achieved by allocating the Anglo-Persian 
Oil Company (APOC) 50% of the shares. With the British government already 
having purchased a controlling share in APOC, this gave the British government a 
direct stake in the TPC. The remaining shares were divided between Royal Dutch 
Shell and Deutsche Bank, who each held a 23.5% stake. Calouste Gulbenkian, the 
Armenian entrepreneur who was a major shareholder in the Turkish National Bank, 
and had been instrumental in negotiations over the concession with the Ottoman 
administration, held the remaining 5% of shares. After protracted negotiations, the 
TPC signed an agreement with the Ottoman Grand Vizier in June 1914 granting it 
mineral rights in the vilayets of Baghdad and Mosul 5. This agreement was signed 
on the eve of the war which, four years later would lead to defeat and 
5 Kent, M. Oil and Empire; British policy and Mesopotamian oil, 1900-1920, Chapter 6, 
Macmillan, London, 1976. 
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dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. The legitimacy of the TPC's pre-war oil 
concession was to become central to the bargaining between the rival great powers, 
and international oil companies over the future political shape of the region after the 
war. 
The outcome of the various series of negotiations which were to determine the post- 
war form of France's economic involvement in the region rested upon three separate, 
yet inextricably inter-linked issues facing the victorious powers. 
" Firstly, was the 1914 TPC concession seen to be legitimate in the 
post-Ottoman settlement; and therefore would it provide the framework for post-war 
oil development? 
" Secondly, who should control the sequestered, German shares in the 
company? Ownership of these shares would determine the balance of forces 
between existing oil companies, particularly the rivals APOC and Shell within the 
TPC. It would also be crucial in determining the degree of access Britain and France 
envisaged allowing American interests to Middle Eastern oil. 
" Thirdly, who was to have political control over the territories of 
Mosul and Basra? Discussions between Britain and France during the war assumed 
it would be one of the powers or some form of quasi-autonomous Arab entity. 
Immediately after the war the picture was complicated by the Turkish state's claim to 
Mosul. 
The answer to the first issue soon became clear, governments and companies all had 
an interest in upholding the legitimacy of the pre-war TPC concession. Anglo- 
Persian and Shell both preferred to uphold their existing claims to Mesopotamian oil 
via the TPC than lobby for a new concession, in which they would undoubtedly have 
had to contend with American companies. With Anglo-Persian holding the majority 
stake in the TPC, the British authorities clearly had an interest in upholding the 
validity of the TPC concession when it came to post-war oil concessions. 
In the oil negotiations, France's weakness on the ground was compensated for by its 
effective alliance with Royal Dutch Shell. The British government and Anglo- 
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Persian's prime concern came to be to keep the American companies of Standard Oil 
out. The only way of doing this was to incorporate Shell into a settlement. This was 
clearly facilitated by the fact that Shell were part of the original TPC concession, and 
thus if Britain upheld the legitimacy of the concession, it also necessarily affirmed 
the rights of Shell to participate in the company. The desire of Shell and the French 
government to see the TPC developed was consolidated by the idea that the German 
shares in the company should be transferred to France. It was evident that the 
structure of the original TPC would need to be altered as the defeat of Germany and 
dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire meant that German assets were sequestered. 
These assets included the Deutsche Bank's 23.5% of shares in the Turkish Petroleum 
Company. Although these shares were eventually ceded to the French state only in 
1920, as mentioned earlier the idea that they be transferred to France was circulating 
well before end of the war. There were obvious attractions for both French 
politicians and Shell directors of France being brought into the TPC via the German 
shares. For the French, a stake in the TPC would alleviate the problems of oil 
supplies, for Shell it appeared initially to offer a way of competing with Anglo- 
Persian. For these reasons, the British and French administrations supported the 
transfer of shares to France, a manoeuvre which had the added attraction of keeping 
the American oil interests out of the Middle East. 
The idea that the sequestered German shares in the TPC be transferred into French 
ownership seems to have originated with Gulbenkian, whose personal interests were 
allied most closely to those of Royal Dutch Shell. Gulbenkian himself claims the 
credit for floating the idea that the sequestered German shares in the TPC might 
be 
transferred to France 6. He had suggested the move to Senator Henri Berenger. 
Berenger benefited from prime minister Clemenceau's patronage to become head of 
the Comite generale des petroles at its creation in July 1917. As already mentioned, 
the CGP's role was to oversee France's oil strategy following concerns of oil 
shortages the previous winter. Like Clemenceau Berenger 
favoured the Rothschilds' 
banking interests in the Royal Dutch Shell group as being the closet thing to a 
6 Gulbenkian, C. "Memoirs... ", manuscript in US State Dept. Library, Washington, 1945, 
pp20 & 32. Quoted in Nowell, 1994. 
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"French" oil interest at the time. Shell's strategy was to acquire the shares via its 
French subsidiary, Societe Francaise pour 1 'exploitation des petroles, created in part 
for this purpose. They would thus gain an equal footing within the TPC with Angio- 
Persian, then their arch rival. This in turn would put an end to the long-standing 
discussions about a possible APOC-Shell merger which began in late 1917 and 
continued intermittently until May 1919. The move was resisted by major Shell 
shareholders as a thinly disguised hostile take-over. 
French banking groups in competition with the Rothschilds were understandably less 
keen on the idea of Shell becoming the predominant oil interest in France. Notably 
the Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas, which already had extensive interests in 
Rumanian oil and American oil subsidiaries in France, opposed the move. In a 
comprehensive analysis of the French inter-war oil market, G. P. Nowell argues 
persuasively that it was rivalry between private capitalist interests which was the 
determining force shaping post-war French oil policy '. It was primarily competition 
between rival financial interests in the French domestic oil market which would 
undermine the idea that the TPC shares should simply be handed to Shell. Instead a 
domestic oil company would be created with the support of a wide range of French 
banking and oil interests. This was to be a protracted process, which occurred at a 
time of domestic political upheaval. Only in 1924 was it to finally lead to the 
establishment of the CFP. 
4 Anglo-French negotiations over political spheres of influence; Sykes- 
Picot and beyond 
Following the outbreak of the war which was to result in the dismemberment of the 
Ottoman Empire, the great powers began to consider political re-division of the 
Middle East. France had long-standing, and substantial financial interests the 
Ottoman Empire, having a long tradition of political and trade relations with the 
Nowell, 1994. 
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Ottomans 8 Half of all Ottoman debt was held by French interests and from 1898 
France was increasingly preoccupied with growing German influence in the region 
The Ottoman alliance with Germany in the first year of the war served to consolidate 
the Triple Entente, between France, Britain and Tsarist Russia, in the Constantinople 
Agreement of March 1915. 
Against a background of alliance in war, but deep, mutual suspicions over post-war 
intentions in the Middle East, discussions continued between the French and British 
governments over defining their respective spheres of influence in the region. These 
were eventually traced in an initial blueprint to become known as the Skyes-Picot 
agreement, which was signed on May 16 1916. Although the agreement was to go 
through numerous modifications, particularly concerning the Ottoman provinces of 
Mosul and Palestine, it nevertheless delineated the broad spheres of influence around 
which subsequent debate and actions would revolve. The original agreement divided 
the former Ottoman provinces into broad zones of influence, France taking the 
northern swathe of Greater Syria. Part of Palestine was originally envisaged as an 
international zone with Britain having predominance over the remainder of Palestine 
and all of Mesopotamia. In the original Sykes-Picot agreement the Ottoman province 
of Mosul was included in the French sphere of influence as part of Syria. Two 
"intermediate" zones, designated as A and B were left between the French and British 
zones, notionally for the establishment of independent Arab states each under the 
influence of one of the two powers. 
Oil interests do not appear to have figured highly in either sides' negotiating strategy 
in drafting the Sykes Picot agreement. Whilst some British interests, notably those in 
the India Office and Navy, did argue that Mosul should be included in Britain's 
sphere of influence, because of its potential to produce oil, at least until 1917 the War 
Office's overriding concern was to get France to provide a buffer against the threat of 
8 The 1536 Franco-Ottoman treaty has, somewhat fancifully but indelibly been enrolled into 
the modern mythology of France's Middle Eastern relations. See Balta, P. La politique Arabe de la 
France, Sinbad, Paris, 1973. On the 1536 capitulations and international relations, see Naff, T. "the 
Ottoman empire and Europe" in Bull, H Watson A. The expansion of international society, 
Clarendon, Oxford, 1984. 
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possible Russian encroachment. This long-standing, geo-strategic argument 
prevailed and Mosul was duly left to the French 10. Nevertheless, mindful of APOC's 
stake in TPC, and the fact that the most likely oil deposits were in the Mosul area, the 
British were quick to seek assurances from the French over access to oil. They asked 
that, despite the fact that Mosul was in an area of French influence under the terms of 
the Sykes Picot agreement, the prospective oil interests of Britain, by which was 
meant the TPC concession in which the APOC was dominant, would not be affected. 
On 15 May 1916, the day before the Sykes-Picot agreement was signed, Britain's 
foreign secretary Edward Grey wrote to France's ambassador in London, Paul 
Cambon requesting that British economic concessions in the area designated as a 
French sphere of influence would be respected. Cambon affirmed this in writing the 
same day, on condition that French interests under Britain's control would be 
respected reciprocally. Clearly the primary concern behind this move was concern 
over the status of the TPC's pre-war concessions obtained from the Ottoman Vizier. 
For France it had no obvious importance, France at that time had no stake in TPC and 
anyhow Mosul lay within the French sphere of influence. Oil concerns were not 
uppermost in French negotiators' minds ". The significance of both the TPC 
concession and control of Mosul steadily grew in 1918-19 as the powers' reliance 
upon oil was felt. 
Before discussing the parallel series of Anglo-French negotiations over oil in 
Mesopotamia, it is worth noting that clear differences in style, although barely greater 
coherence in actual policy outcomes, were evident in France and Britain's approach 
to the Middle Eastern negotiations which culminated in the Sykes Picot agreement. 
In Britain the policy was extensively debated by a wide range of government 
departments. The War Office, Foreign Office, India Office and Admiralty, were all 
represented on the Bunsen Committee which initially produced a report on "British 
Desiderata in Turkey in Asia" in the spring of 1915. This was submitted to the 
9 Fulton, L. B. "France and the end of the Ottoman empire", in Kent, M. (ed) The great Powers 
and the end of the Ottoman empire, Allen and Unwin, London, 1984. 
10 Jones, G. The state and the emergence of the British oil industry, Macmillan, London, 1980, 
p. 194. 
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cabinet and became the basis for subsequent negotiations with the French which 
culminated the following year in the Sykes Picot agreement. In the run-up to the 
peace accords in Paris in 1919 the Bunsen committee had become the Eastern 
committee, chaired by the foreign secretary Lord Curzon 
In stark contrast to this collegiate British way of working, for the French Picot was 
charged solely to negotiate, reporting only to his immediate superior in the Quai 
d'Orsay, Berthelot. Both were active in colonial lobbies and Picot was also a leading 
member in colonial comites, lobbying for a more forceful policy over Syria. Even at 
this early stage, there was a marked difference in France's formulation and 
implementation of policy, French policies being more personalised and somewhat 
chaotic 12. It is tempting to see in this a precursor of the heavily factionalised and 
personalised decision making which would characterise French policy making 
towards the region in the Fourth Republic (notably in the lead up to Suez in 1956, see 
chapter 2) as well as the Fifth Republic. Notwithstanding these striking differences 
in foreign policy formulation, it is ironic that the positions of both administrations 
were overridden by Prime Ministers acting alone, notably over the issue of Mosul. 
5 Oil negotiations 
Just thirty months after the Sykes-Picot agreement had been signed, the relative 
positions of France and Britain in the Middle East at the end of the war in the autumn 
of 1918 had shifted considerably. This was due to three factors: 
" Firstly, not only had Britain won military control of the bulk of the Ottoman 
territories, but victory had been achieved with minimal French military support. At 
the end of the war the only French troops in the region were a force of 800 officers 
commanding 6000 Senegalese and Armenians in Palestine, which had played a 
negligible role in defeating the Turkish armies 13. 
11 Fitzgerald, E. P. "France's middle eastern ambitions, the Sykes-Picot negotiations and the oil 
fields of Mosul 1915-1918", in Journal of Modern History 66, Dec. 1994. Harvard University, 
Cambridge, M. A. 
12 Andrew, C. M. "France, Britain and the Peace settlement; a reconsideration", in Dann, U. 
1988. 
13 Andrew, 1988. 
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" The second factor was the 1917 Russian revolution. Post-revolutionary civil 
war in Russia had removed the perceived Russian threat, on which Britain's desire to 
see a French "buffer" presence in Syria had rested during the 1915/16 negotiations. 
" The third, dominant factor was the increased importance, to Britain and 
France, (as well, as we shall see later, to the United States), of oil supplies. Both 
Britain and France had suffered oil shortages in the closing year of war and both were 
planning for post-war oil regulation. Representatives had thus begun to conduct bi- 
lateral discussions on oil policy in 1918. In 1920 these culminated in a 
comprehensive agreement over post-war oil interests in Mesopotamia and elsewhere. 
It was this agreement which officially confirmed France's participation in the post- 
war development of Iraqi oil. 
In large part due to rivalry and confusion within the British government, the 
negotiation of the Anglo-French oil accords were exceedingly convoluted. This was 
partly because of disagreements over the status and priority to be given to the oil 
talks relative to the broader negotiations over the scope and nature of France and 
Britian's territorial claims in the Middle East. These were being discussed 
simultaneously within the framework of the Paris peace conference. The British 
government's chief petroleum official, Walter Long, and his delegate John Cadman 
met on numerous occasions with Henri Berenger in late 1918 and early 1919 with a 
view to drawing up an agreement concerning post-war petroleum developments. In 
March and April 1919 a comprehensive agreement was initialled. The primary 
motivation behind Britain's desire to accommodate French aspirations to gain a share 
in Middle Eastern oil was that associating France with the development of the oil- 
fields of the former Ottoman Empire was perceived as the the only way to avoid 
France allying with the United States against British oil interests. Despite resistance 
from both Lloyd George and the Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon in 1919, the bulk of 
British ministers, and the inter-ministerial Petroleum Executive, favoured a rapid 
agreement with France over oil interests. The feeling was that if France was not 
brought into an agreement concerning post-war oil development, she was likely to 
side with the Americans in rejecting the legitimacy of the TPC concession and force 
wider access to middle Eastern oil. Writing after the event, Lloyd George said that 
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the majority view within the British government was that it "should co-operate before 
the French secured American assistance, and before this country was forced by 
decisions at the (Paris) peace conference to adopt in self-defence, and practically 
under compulsion, the policy of co-operation to which it was now invited" 14. 
Despite the oil accord initialled by Long and Berenger in April 1919 Lloyd George, 
apparently in a pique of anger, unilaterally revoked the agreements two months later. 
This was ostensibly due to disagreements with Clemenceau over French claims in 
Syria. However, reservations that Royal Dutch Shell's participation was not in 
Britain's interest also appear to have influenced his decision 15. However, despite this 
setback, the agreement was revived in more or less its original form later in 1919, 
Lloyd George dropping his opposition. In April 1920 the British and French prime 
ministers (Lloyd George and the recently elected Millerand) signed a draft peace 
treaty with Turkey at San Remo. This had one general and two specific results 
relevant to this text: 
" The treaty allocated the Ottomans' former provinces in the Levant and 
Mesopotamia to France and Britain as mandatory powers. 
" Participation in oil developments: a separate paragraph of the San Remo agreement 
covered oil interests in the former Ottoman provinces. This defined respective 
spheres of interest and co-operation in oil matters in Russia, Rumania (where there 
were also sequestered German oil interests) and Mesopotamia. Britain agreed to 
reserve 25% of Mesopotamian production for French interests. It was left up to the 
French government to decide whether their participation would take the form of a 
private or state-owned company. 
" Transportation of oil: although oil had still to be found in commercial quantities in 
Mosul, it was clear that the most efficient export route would be via Mediterranean 
ports. Under the San Remo agreement France thus agreed to facilitate the 
construction of a pipeline to allow oil to be piped across Syria 16. 
14 Shwardran B. The Middle East, oil and the great powers, J. Wiley, New York, 1973, p. 200. 
15 Kent, 1976, provides what remains the definitive version of the extraordinary degree of 
British confusion over the issue (ppl37-157). This was due both inter-ministerial rivalry and the 
ongoing British attempts to take control of Shell. Kent's analysis complements that of Nowell, 1994, 
who traces French oil and bank links with Shell. 
16 Nowell, 1994, p 131. 
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These two latter provisions provided the foundation of France's involvement in Iraqi 
oil; securing a stake in the TPC and triggering construction of pipeline across French 
controlled Syria. Ironically, the agreement also provided the right for a 20% Iraqi 
government participation in the TPC. This idea was later quietly dropped. However, 
the fact that the San Remo provision for national participation was never honoured 
was to be raised repeatedly in the arduous and often acrimonious negotiations 
between post-1958 Iraqi governments and the foreign companies controlling Iraq's 
oil (see chapter 3). In August 1920, four months after the San Remo agreement was 
signed, the legal validity of the TPC's concession in Mesopotamia was reaffirmed in 
the Treaty of Sevres, which confirmed the rights of foreigners in the territories 
"detached from Turkey". 
6 The disputed sovereignty of Mosul 
The Turkish government accepted the treaty of Sevres only under duress, notably 
because of the concessions given to the Greeks who were then occupying Smyrna, 
and the fact that France continued to press its claims to parts of Cilicia. These facts 
made the settlement unsustainable. The subsequent war between Turkey and Greece 
has three consequences of importance to this narrative. Firstly, Turkish victory 
prompted the repudiation of the terms of the treaty of Sevres and a strengthening of 
Turkey's territorial position under the treaty of Lausanne in July 1923. Secondly, 
during the negotiation of the treaty of Lausanne, the dispute over the sovereignty and 
boundaries of Mosul - over which the TPC held their concession - assumed a major 
importance. Thirdly, it was during the negotiations over Mosul that Britain and 
France were compelled to take account of the aspirations of American oil interests in 
the region. 
It will be recalled that under the Sykes-Picot agreement Mosul fell within the French 
sphere of influence. Mosul had been discussed between prime ministers Lloyd 
George and George Clemenceau in London in December 1918. Despite the concern 
of those in the Quai d'Orsay, notably via the numerous colonial comites mentioned 
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earlier, to promote France's interests in Syria, Clemenceau appeared little interested 
in colonial matters. To Lloyd George's apparent surprise, Clemenceau was so 
preoccupied by France's Rhineland border and the potential for French investments 
in Cilicia, he appeared happy to cede French rights to Mosul, seemingly relatively 
unconcerned by Britain's ambitions in the Middle East. The British prime minister 
later wrote that on Clemenceau asking him what he wanted from the French. "I 
instantly replied that I wanted Mosul attached to Iraq and Palestine from Dan to 
Beersheba under British control. Without any hesitation he agreed" ". France's 
ambassador in London at the time, Paul Cambon suggested that Clemenceau 
abandoned the claim to Mosul in part for agreement by Britain to support French 
claims over Cilicia and Syria; "[the French government gave up] all pretensions over 
Mosul provided that the British government promises (... ) its support in helping us to 
realise our just demands concerning Syria and Cilicia"'g. 
There is a substantial literature on the motivations and implications of this decision, 
the bulk of which need not detain us. Much of the debate centres on the perceived 
conflict between the French colonial lobby's "success" in obtaining Mosul's 
attachment during the Sykes Picot and Clemenceau's willingness to abandon it. 
However, as already noted, given that the spheres of influence agreed by Sykes-Picot 
did not alter existing commercial interests in each other's spheres, a French 
administration would not have had control of the oil of Mosul, which would still have 
been produced by the TPC. Although this seems generally accepted, it neglects the 
potential impact of oil revenues upon a French controlled Syrian state. Confusion 
and subsequent debate over the issue was heightened by the fact that neither premier 
told his foreign ministry of the decision that France had ceded Mosul to Britain, until 
many months afterwards... By this time the bi-lateral oil negotiations were well 
advanced. 
With British troops in de facto control of Iraq from 1917 onward, in terms of day to 
day control Mosul had duly been incorporated into the new Iraqi state. However, in 
" Andrew, 1988, p. 159. 
18 Cambon quoted in Nowell, 1994, p. 129. 
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the Lausanne negotiations Turkey contested Iraq's claim to Mosul, chiefly on the 
basis that the province's population was Turkish (although evidently in fact mostly 
Kurdish) and not Arab, and thus should be included within the Turkish state. This 
led to protracted negotiations which were only fully resolved in 1925. At Lausanne 
Britain and Turkey agreed to undertake bi-lateral negotiations on the issue for a year, 
and if they failed to agree, to refer the matter to the League of Nations. Deadlock 
persisted and in 1924 the League launched an enquiry, with the International Court of 
Justice finally upholding the British and Iraqi claim to the province in December 
1925. This decision was accepted with reluctant resignation by the Turkish 
government. However, they then signed a comprehensive agreement on the frontier 
and other issues in June 1926. As partial compensation, the Turkish government 
agreed to accept 10% of the revenues paid by the TPC to the Iraqi government. 
Parallel to the struggle over Mosul's sovereignty, the British were preoccupied at the 
time with establishing a pliant but economically sound government in Iraq. 
Following the Cairo conference King Faisal was duly installed as monarch in 
Baghdad and a treaty of alliance was signed in October 1922. Notwithstanding 
considerable constitutional confusion, and the ongoing repression of internal revolts 
by the British 19, the Iraqi government signed a 75-year concession with the TPC on 
24 March 1925. This covered the whole of Iraq and the southern province of Basrah, 
as well as a strip of land transferred form Iran in 1913. Following the definitive 
award of Mosul to Iraq by the League in January 1926 Britain signed a revised treaty 
with the Iraq government. With Iraqi sovereignty finally assured over Mosul, and the 
concession awarded to the TPC, the way appeared open for the partners within the 
TPC to proceed with exploration and production. However, two problems remained. 
Firstly France had to clarify what form its participation in the TPC would take. 
Secondly the interests of US oil companies which had been effectively frozen out of 
the Middle East by the 1920 San Remo agreement, now needed to be accommodated. 
19 Bearing in mind the late 20th century history of Iraq, it should be remembered that the British 
RAF pioneered the use of aerial bombardment of civilians over Iraq and East Africa 
in the 1920s and 
1930s. 
36 
7 The creation of the Compagnie Francaise des Petroles 
The Compagnie Frangaise des Petroles was formally constituted at the inaugural 
meeting of its founding shareholders on 28 March 1924 20. This was full four years 
after the San Remo treaty had accepted the principle - negotiated between French 
and British officials in 1918/1919 - that France should take control of Deutsche 
Bank's sequestered shares in the Turkish Petroleum Company. Yet it was to be 
another four years after the CFP's formation in 1924 that the French and their 
partners within the TPC would come to an agreement about how the TPC would 
actually operate in Iraq. The TPC signed an initial oil accord with the Iraqi 
government in 1925, and oil was discovered in commercial quantities two years later 
in 1927. Yet it was not until 1928 that partners in TPC drew up the so-called "Group 
Agreement" which defined the modalities of how the companies who made up the 
group would actually operate in Iraq. As well as defining the modalities of the 
companies operation in Iraq, this agreement also limited competition between the 
TPC partners elsewhere in the Middle East. 
The main reasons for the long delay in both clarifying the form that France's stake in 
Iraqi oil would take and the slowness in negotiating an operating agreement amongst 
the partners within the TPC, both relate to rivalries within the oil industry. In the 
French domestic market, competition was most acute among the large number of 
local distribution companies and subsidiaries of the major foreign companies, 
particularly those of Shell and Standard Oil. All were concerned about the impact 
that the creation of a new "national" oil company would have upon their position in 
the French oil market. Evidently fears were heightened by the fact the company was 
being formed primarily to supply Iraqi oil to the French market at the request of the 
state which was liable to discriminate against non-French companies. These fears 
were allayed by the two founding characteristics of the CFP. Firstly inter-firm 
rivalry was resolved by a compromise which gave all significant existing oil interests 
in France shares in the new CFP. Secondly, although the CFP was created at the 
20 Catta, E. Victor de Metz; de la CFP au group TOTAL, TOTAL editions presse, Paris, 1990, 
p. 3. 
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request of the government, the state itself initially took no share in the company's 
capital. Clearly this is somewhat problematic for those who see in the CFP simply a 
manifestation of the French state. This becomes important as CFP does come to be 
equated with French interests in general in the 1950s and 60s, and yet then finds 
itself in head to head competition with its state-owned rival ERAP/Elf, see chapter 3, 
section 7. 
Internationally, the primary concern of the partners in the TPC during the 1920s was 
to regulate the impact of the arrival of Iraqi oil on the international market in such a 
way that it would not damage their interests elsewhere. In this, from its inception, 
French and the CFP's interest was rather different to its "Anglo-Saxon" partners; 
Anglo-Persian, Shell and the Standard Oil affiliates. The CFP was established 
because the French government saw participation in the TPC as being a way of 
securing supplies of crude oil. The CFP's share of Iraqi oil would provide a 
reservoir of "French" oil production, reducing France's dependency upon foreign- 
owned oil sources. In this regard, the CFP had a different set of priorities to its 
larger partners who were already global actors aiming to maximise profits from their 
international activities. Different priorities and strategies amongst the participants in 
the TPC, and the tensions which resulted from these, would persist into the 1970s. 
As such, as will be seen in later chapters, this specificity of the French stake in the 
TPC/IPC becomes one of the abiding themes of French negotiations with both the 
Iraqi authorities, and France's western partners, during the sixties and seventies. 
The actual formation of the CFP was a hasty, muddled compromise. This was 
due 
both to the rivalry between various oil and banking interests with stakes in the 
future 
of oil in France, and the extremely volatile domestic political climate of the 
1920s. 
Acting on the understanding established in the April 1920 San Remo accords, 
in July 
1922 Britain, as the custodian of the sequestered German shares in the TPC, 
officially requested the government of Raymond Poincare to 
decide in what form 
France would take its shares in the TPC. Evidently the shares had to 
be transferred 
to a legal commercial entity. It was for the government to 
designate or create a 
private, mixed or state owned company for this purpose. 
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It will be recalled that the idea that France take the sequestered German shares in the 
TPC originated with Gulbenkian and Berenger, who favoured simply transferring the 
share to Shell's subsidiary in France. By 1921 Shell's predominance in the French 
market, and favoured status in the eyes of French politicians, had been eroded by 
competition from the US-owned Standard Oil companies. Poincare favoured the 
formation of a new, nationally owned private company. In September 1923 he asked 
Ernest Mericer to supervise the founding of the company. Mercier was a bright 
technocrat with experience in banking, electricity and oil sectors, notably as head of 
France's leading oil interest in Rumania. Poincare explicitly laid out Mercier's terms 
of reference in a letter dated 20 September 1923 21. In this Poincare states the 
government's desire to create "a policy instrument capable of carrying out a national 
oil policy" via a private company in which "the ensemble of the principal French 
companies in the oil industry" be represented. Whilst accepting that this would 
include foreign-owned subsidiaries active in France, Poincare specified that the 
CFP's statues should ensure that "permanent control of the company will be effected 
by French capital", adding the proviso that two government commissioners would 
oversee the companies activities regardless of ownership structure. 
This letter has been widely interpreted as being the foundation of a state-driven oil 
policy, providing a blue-print for similar dirigiste developments in both Fourth and 
Fifth Republic administrations after 1945. As we shall see in subsequent chapters, 
the state and CFPJTOTAL did work in very close tandem in the Middle East. In so 
doing they provided a model of state-commercial co-operation which would later be 
applied in the Middle East and elsewhere in defence, nuclear and armaments 
industries. However, a close reading of the available literature suggests it is a 
mistake to see the CFP at its inception as having been primarily the creation of the 
state designed to advance some abstract "national" interest in the oil industry. This 
was not the case for two reasons. Firstly Poincare and Mercier were clear that if the 
company was to be viable, it would have to accommodate and reconcile the key 
21 Kuisel R. F. Ernest Mercier, French technocrat, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 
1967, p. 31. Nowell, 1994, pp. 171-172. 
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private oil interests in France. These included the subsidiaries of foreign oil 
companies, in particular those of Standard Oil. Secondly both men were exceedingly 
wary of domestic, left-wing political lobbies, who were increasingly advocating 
comprehensive state regulation of key industries. 
It was this latter fear, of a domestic left intent on regulation or outright 
nationalisation of oil interests, which in large part explains not only the ownership 
structure of the CFP -a private joint-stock company - but also the haste with which 
the CFP was formed. Between October 1923 and March 1924 Mercier worked hard 
to bring together a joint-stock company which would, as Poincare had specified, 
bring together all the existing oil interests in France. The Company's founding 
capital of FFr24.1 m (old francs) was thus partitioned between a large number of 
independent French companies and the subsidiaries of foreign oil companies active 
in France, and a series of banks who were allied to various of the oil interests. 
The repartition of the shares is best viewed as a compromise to put together a group 
which would involve all of existing interests, none of which would be dominant, thus 
allowing the directors a degree of autonomy. In this regard it is significant that 
banking and oil groups linked to the US oil giant Standard Oil in fact took the largest 
block of shares in the company. This was a recognition of the limits of French 
power, and the feeling that if French interests were sufficiently allied with those of 
the US oil companies, they were more likely to get their way within the TPC. As 
Mercier's biographer succinctly states, the CFP "stumbled into this policy because of 
its own timidity, haste and financial weakness and because of determined resistance 
of private industry to any government control" 22. 
The belated yet hasty creation of the CFP was due to Poincare's precarious political 
position. In the spring of 1924 his government was swept from power and replaced 
with the unsteady radical coalition know as the Cartel des Gauches. This 
administration was in principle intent on greater regulation of the oil industry, which 
it feared was dominated by foreign capital. However, the coalition was itself weak 
22 Kuisel, 1967, p. 34. 
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and proved short-lived. The new regulatory body it created, the Office national des 
liquides combustibles (ONCL) had no direct stake in the CFP and could do little but 
oversee the existing regulated markets between the French companies and importers. 
By creating the CFP as a purely private entity, oil policy was effectively in the hands 
of Mercier and the leaders of the larger independent companies represented on the 
board of the newly founded CFP. The state had little direct impact upon oil policy, 
either at home or in the CFP's negotiations with its partners in the TPC. 
Only in 1928 was there a strenuous effort by the state to question the role of the CFP 
and the government's relationship with it, in the form of a new law to re-distribute 
domestic oil market shares. This exacerbated the tensions between the various 
interests represented on the CFP board. At this point Mercier felt he was unable to 
continue and offered his resignation to Poincare, by now back in power at the head of 
a "National Union" government. His resignation was refused and the crisis defused 
by allowing the company to increase its capital via the state taking a 25% share. 
This was agreed in a new agreement between the CFP and the government, which 
was ratified in March 1929, effectively increasing its total capital by a quarter. In 
exchange the private shareholders were allowed significant tax breaks on profits 
arising from the operation of the TPC. In March 1931 the state's holdings were 
further increased, to 35% via a similar move. The state thus held a third share and 
had two representatives on the board. 
The crises of 1928-31 were resolved in such a way that the company was able to 
consolidate its capital and its relationship with partners in the TPC. It also promptly 
moved towards becoming a more integrated oil company by creating 
its own refining 
subsidiary, the Compagnie francaise de raffinage (CFR), and a tanker 
fleet . The 
CFP had a controlling (55% ) stake in the CFR, with the other oil companies 
(themselves shareholders in the CFP) owning the remaining shares in the refining 
operation.. 
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8 The 1928 group agreement and pipelines 
During these formative years, Ernest Mericer and the other directors of the CFP 
faced two separate challenges. The first, outlined above, was to establish the 
company as a viable commercial entity within the French market. The primary 
obstacle to achieving this was the contradictory pressures of the company's 
heterogeneous shareholders and the contradictory stances of successive French 
governments. The second challenge was to formulate and advance the CFP's specific 
interests vis-a-vis the other partners within the TPC, in the ongoing negotiations on 
how the company would operate. This evolved within two separate spheres; on the 
one hand the debate between the partners who made up the TPC, and on the other 
negotiations with the government of Iraq as to what form, and on what terms, the 
TPC would explore for and lift oil from Iraq. These debates over the internal 
composition and operational modalities of the TPC were only to be finally resolved 
in 1928. 
As indicated above, an initial agreement between the TPC and the Iraqi government 
was signed in March 1925. At this point evidently oil exploration had not begun in 
Iraq. The structure of the TPC was that which had been agreed after the war; APOC 
held half the shares, the remainder were split between Shell and the CFP, with 
Gulbenkian holding 5%. The 1925 agreement provided the TPC with 24 defined 
plots in which to look for oil. Notionally other plots could be auctioned off to other 
firms, although this was little more than a paper device whilst the modalities of 
American participation in the development of Iraqi oil were resolved. Meanwhile 
exploration work began around Kirkuk in the Mosul concession awarded under the 
1925 agreement. 
Whilst the principle admitting the participation of American capital in the TPC had 
been conceded by Britain and France by the time of the Lausanne conference of 
1923, the precise form that this participation would take remained unresolved. The 
background to the entry of US companies into the TPC will now be briefly reviewed. 
In 1920, largely at the bidding of companies related to US oil group Standard Oil, the 
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US state department had made various representations to the British authorities about 
the provisions of the San Remo accords 23. In particular Americans complained that 
bi-lateral agreements on the exploitation of Mesopotamian oil was on contravention 
of the much vaunted "open door" economic policy endorsed by the allied powers 
during the Paris peace conference 24. In 1920, Britain felt able to dismiss US 
concerns on the basis that the US already controlled the worlds largest oil reserves. 
In supporting the TPC concession in Mesopotamia the British maintained that they 
were merely upholding an existing, binding pre-war contract. Nevertheless, Standard 
Oil regarded the San Remo agreement as a blatant attempt to exclude them from 
Middle Eastern oil, and thus weaken their global position. To allow the TPC to 
develop oil in Mesopotamia was seen in direct contradiction of the "open door" 
commercial policy proposed by Wilson at the Paris Peace conference and endorsed 
by Britain and France. From 1920 onwards, US interests lobbied strenuously to 
either be included within the TPC, or failing that, to at least be allowed to explore for 
oil in Iraq on an equal footing to the European investors. 
Although US claims were rebuffed in 1920, by the end of the Turko-Greek war in 
1922, it had become clear to both France and Britain that without US diplomatic 
backing, their ability to consolidate their respective spheres of interests and mandates 
in the Middle East would be jeopardised. The support of the US for the Lausanne 
Treaty was thus a necessary step towards endorsing the validity of the TPC 
concession and ensuring that Mosul was incorporated into Iraq. The best way of 
ensuring US support being to bring American interests into the TPC. 
Therefore, between 1920 and 1925 as the British government struggled to get Iraqi 
sovereignty over Mosul agreed, the TPC was largely preoccupied with how to 
incorporate American interests into the company. The position of the US 
government was complicated by the fact that there were rival concessionary 
23 In 1911 the original Standard Oil Company was broken-up under US anti-trust law. Two of 
the six companies subsequently formed Standard Oil of New Jersey (subsequently Exxon), and SO of 
New York (subsequently Mobil) who together came to dominate the US stake in Iraqi oil. In the 
following text they continue to be referred to collectively as "Standard Oil" as within the T/IPC they 
acted as one. 
24 Shwadran 1973, p. 202. 
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companies eager to claim a stake in the petroleum of the region were the TPC 
concession to be revoked. The existing partners in the TPC therefore had two reasons 
for wanting the Americans inside the TPC. Firstly this would secure American 
backing for the legitimacy of the concession and the Anglo-French partition of the 
region. Secondly it would ensure that the TPC would not face American competition 
in the development of oil in Iraq. In fact, the original partners in the TPC had signed 
an agreement (know as a "mutual denial" clause) that they would not compete with 
each other for oil not just in Iraq, but throughout the Ottoman Empire. Thus 
Europeans were mindful that bringing the Americans into the TPC might be a way of 
heading-off potential US competition throughout the Middle East. 
It was for this reason that the Americans were associated with the peace negotiations 
at Lausanne. As the US had not declared war against Turkey, they had only observer 
status at the negotiations, but nevertheless their presence was seen as essential by the 
British delegation, headed by Lord Curzon. For their part, the Americans were wary 
of being implicated politically in the region. They were conscious of the European 
powers' manoeuvring, and promptly rebuffed the notion, clearly fanciful even at the 
time, never mind in retrospect, that they might be woven into the settlement via a 
mandate over Armenia. However, they were adamant that they should be allowed to 
participate economically in the territories of the former Ottoman Empire, basing their 
case on the principle of the "open door" 25. By the time of the Lausanne conference, 
the US administration had come around to the position of supporting the claims 
by a 
grouping of seven US oil companies, known collectively as the 
Near East 
Development Company to participate in the TPC. In 1923 the TPC's decision to 
offer a 12% stake to the Americans was rejected. This was subsequently upped 
to 
25%, which was accepted in principle by the end of 1925. 
Therefore when the 
agreement was finally signed between the TPC and the 
Iraqi government in 1925, the 
principle of American participation in the group was accepted. 
However, 
negotiations over the precise form this participation was to take continued off and on 
for a further three years before agreement was reached. 
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The catalyst for concluding the protracted and intermittent discussions between the 
existing partners in the TPC (Anglo-Persian, Shell and the CFP) and the American 
group was the discovery of a huge oil deposit at Baba Gurgur just north of Kirkuk on 
27 June 1927. This find provided a clear impetus to formalising the revisions to the 
company's structure. These were finalised in an agreement in July 1928, apparently 
at a meeting in Ostend 26. What subsequently became known as the "Group 
Agreement" defined two things: the internal structure of the IPC and the rules 
governing group-members activities elsewhere in the Middle East. Under the 
agreement, the ownership structure of the company was revised by Anglo-Persian 
ceding half of its 50% share to the Americans, grouped together as the Near East 
Development Corporation (NEDC), although dominated by just two of the Standard 
Oil "sisters", SO of New Jersey and SO of New York. In exchange for ceding a 
stake to the Americans, APOC received a 10% share of operating profits. This left 
major four shareholders: Anglo-Persian, NEDC (Standard Oil), Shell and the CFP all 
holding quarter of the shares. However, Gulbenkian managed to retain his original 
5% share, reducing the four majors' stakes to 23.75% a piece. This foreign 
ownership structure of Iraqi oil would persist until nationalisation in 1972. 
As already noted, the original 1914 agreement between the partners who had formed 
the TPC on the eve of the First World War had contained a "mutual denial" clause. 
Under this partners agreed not to compete with each other over oil exploration and 
production elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire. The 1928 agreement contained a 
revised version of this mechanism designed to avoid competition between the 
partners of the TPC. Under what became know as the "Red Line Agreement" the 
partners within the TPC agreed not to compete with each other for oil concessions in 
much of the former Ottoman Empire, although selected territories, notably Kuwait, 
were excluded. After some disagreement over the precise extent of the Ottoman 
25 Stivers, W. Supremacy and oil; Iraq, Turkey and the Anglo-American world order 1918-30, 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London. 1982, p. 150. This is a concise, lucid and engaging 
account of these events. 
26 Sampson, A. The Seven Sisters, Coronet, London. 1976, p. 84 
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Empire, the exclusion zone was designated on a map in red, hence the title, 
apparently by Gulbenkian 27. 
Shortly after the 1928 Group Agreement between the oil majors governing the 
production of oil in Iraq, a far broader, but informal global market-sharing 
arrangement was drawn-up by the directors of Anglo-Persian, Shell and Standard 
New Jersey. This arrangement, subsequently became known as the Achnacarry 
accord, taking the name of the Scottish castle where it was agreed in September 
1928. It established tacit rules governing the international oil marketing, This drew 
on some of the non-competitive, cartel-like aspects of the Iraq agreement, and was 
designed primarily to avoid "unnecessary" competition in the global distribution of 
oil between the world's three largest companies. 
Mercier and the CFP evidently were signatories of the July 1928 agreement, 
although they did not participate in the Achnacarry talks. Yet whilst the French were 
not part of the global agreement, they had played a significant role in the 
negotiations which led up to the agreement governing the TPC's operation. The other 
three major partners all had important oil holdings elsewhere in the world. They had 
favoured the TPC being simply a holding company which would sell on oil produced 
in Iraq to existing distribution and refining operations and distribute profits 
according to shareholding. Such an arrangement was anathema to the French. As 
outlined earlier, the CFP's entire raison d 'etre was to gain a secure source of crude 
oil for the French market. They thus argued vigorously that the TPC should be a 
company in its own right. The CFP insisted that the TPC's shareholders should not 
simply draw profits from a global marketing operation, but should receive deliveries 
of Iraqi crude in proportion to their share in the company. The majors were reluctant 
to accept this point, which was further complicated by Gulbenkian's stance. Unlike 
the others in the company, the CFP had no source of income other than that promised 
from Iraqi oil, and thus in June 1927 threatened its partners with legal action to 
resolve the deadlock. This threat, coincided with the discovery of the 
first 
significant oil reserves near Kirkuk and together acted as a catalyst for what became 
27 Sampson, 1976, p 84. Stivers, 1982, pp. 128-131. 
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the group agreement. Following the group agreement the TPC officially changed its 
name to the Iraq Petroleum Company, IPC. 
Now the Americans had been brought into the TPC, a second oil agreement was 
signed between the TPC and the Iraqi government in March 1931. This effectively 
closed the possibility of oil exploration in Iraq to other companies; the Americans 
having been brought in, the "open door" now swung firmly shut. Having agreed on 
what terms the TPC would operate, there remained the not inconsiderable problem of 
how to transport the oil from the Mosul fields to ports where it could be shipped to 
refineries. As already mentioned, the construction of pipelines to transport oil from 
northern Iraq to the Mediterranean had originally figured in the Anglo-French 
discussions over partition of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the first world war. 
French diplomats had accepted the principle that pipelines could be constructed via 
French controlled territories of Syria in exchange for a French stake in the TPC. 
However the question of the exact route of the pipelines required was the subject of 
considerable dispute and delay amongst the partners in the TPC. Anxious to see oil 
exported, and thus generate revenue for the cash-strapped Iraqi government, the 
revised 1931 agreement with the IPC made it a definite obligation of the company to 
construct a pipeline. Tripoli in French controlled Syria and Haifa in British 
controlled Palestine were chosen as the two rival points of arrival for such a pipeline. 
Whilst APOC and Shell favoured the Haifa route, supported by both the British and 
Iraqi governments, the French desired a northern pipeline route which would 
terminate at Tripoli. Eventually a compromise agreement was reached whereby a 
line was constructed which divided at the Euphrates, with one branch running to 
Haifa, one to Tripoli. This was achieved only after deadlock was overcome by 
Standard Oil of New Jersey's president Walter Teagle siding with the CFP in favour 
of having at least one line running through French controlled territory Zg. Once 
agreement was reached among the IPC partners in October 1930, construction 
proceeded smoothly and the pipelines were built between 1932-34. 
28 Fitzgerald, E. P. "Business diplomacy, Walter Teagle, Jersey Standard and the Anglo-French 
pipeline... ", Business history Review 67, Summer 1993, Harvard, pp. 207-245. 
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9 Conclusion 
This opening chapter has traced some of the deeper roots of France's involvement in 
the Iraqi oil industry. During and after the 1914-18 war, France was largely reliant 
upon imported oil, largely from Dutch, British and US companies. From 1916 
onwards British and French officials were engaged in debates about how to divide 
and control the territories then under the control of the decaying Ottoman Empire. 
The potential of finding oil within these territories significantly influenced these 
debates. German shares in the Turkish Petroleum Company, formed in 1912 to 
explore for oil in the region under, had been sequestered by the British and the idea 
evolved that France could be brought into the region by granting her the German 
shares in TPC. This was achieved and the French authorities created a largely private 
company, the Compagnie 
, 
francaise des petroles in 1924 which thus gained a quarter 
stake in the Iraqi oil industry. Coupled with France's mandates over Syria and 
Lebanon, through which Iraqi oil was piped following the discovery of commercial 
reserves in Kirkuk in 1927, this stake in the IPC constituted France's primary interest 
in Iraq until the 1939-45 war. The following chapter will examine the legacy of 
France's eviction from the Levant and Syria in the 1940s, and attempts to revive 
French Arab policy in the region in the 1960s. 
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Emerging from Israeli and Algerian shadows: the foundations of Fifth Republic 
foreign policy in the Middle East 1956-1967 
Introduction 
Chapter one identified the roots of France's relationship with Iraq; these were 
established in the form of a French stake in the Iraqi oil industry in the 1920s. Oil 
pumped from Iraq, piped across Syria and Lebanon, continued to be a key source of 
crude oil for France over the next forty years. The subsequent chapter, chapter three, 
will examine the way in which the stake of the Compagnie Francaise des Petroles 
(CFP) in the Iraq Petroleum Company became both one of the pillars around which 
France's post-1945 domestic oil industry was constructed and a cornerstone of 
Franco-Iraqi relations. The CFP's presence in Iraq laid the foundations for a far 
closer commercial relationship with Iraq which was elaborated from the late sixties 
onwards. By the early seventies, Franco-Iraqi ties were part of a flourishing nexus of 
newly established commercial and diplomatic relationships between Gulf states and 
France, successfully challenging Anglo-American predominance in the region. 
These relationships epitomised what had become an unmistakably "Gaullist" foreign 
policy framework. Within this France presented itself as beholden to neither 
superpower and selectively supported non-aligned states, particularly those towards 
which France had good export prospects. In the Middle East this policy had been 
greatly enhanced by a cautiously critical stance towards Israel after 1967. 
While such a pattern was well established by the mid-seventies, what is striking is 
the degree to which France's flourishing relationships with Iraq and other Arab states 
were created from exceedingly inauspicious beginnings, in a very short space of 
time. Therefore before the extent and nature of these policies can be evaluated, they 
need to be placed in a deeper historical context. This chapter examines this context 
by providing a broad, interpretative enquiry into the changes in France's Middle 
Eastern policies between 1956 and 1967. When the Fifth Republic was formed in 
1958, France's formal relations with Arab states were almost non-existent, relations 
with all states except Lebanon having been severed following the Suez invasion of 
1956. 
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The attack on Egypt was the culmination of a tacit alliance with Israel which had 
evolved rapidly from the early 1950s. Both Franco-Israeli relations and the 
ostracisation of France in an increasingly nationalist Arab world were partial by- 
products of the escalating war in Algeria. Both the genesis and early years of the 
Fifth Republic were dominated by this war. It was only after Algerian independence 
in 1962 that France's relations with the Arab world could emerge from the dense and 
overlapping shadows projected by the alliance with Israel and its war in Algeria. 
This chapter is structured around six, broadly chronological, sections. 
" The first examines France's standing in the Middle East in the 
aftermath of the Second World War, focusing on its ejection from Syria and Lebanon 
and the manner in which this exacerbated friction with Britain and the US in the 
region. 
" The second section then looks at the rationale of France's arms sales 
to Israel in the early fifties and the manner in which a de-facto alliance between the 
two had emerged by 1956. The failure of the Suez venture and escalation of war in 
Algeria initially strengthened ties between the alliance, which extended into nuclear 
as well as military cooperation. 
" The third section examines the situation inherited by de Gaulle and 
the Fifth Republic he formed in 1958. De Gaulle sought to reorder foreign policy 
priorities, including the downgrading and regularisation of ties with Israel and the 
official ending of nuclear cooperation. 
" The fourth section looks at the manner in which France gradually re- 
established relations with Arab states following the end of the war in Algeria. 
" Fifthly, this restoration of bilateral ties with Arab countries is then 
located within de Gaulle's revised foreign policy framework. From 1963 this 
explicitly promoted France as a champion of non-aligned, newly independent third 
world states; firstly towards Algeria - which remained central to the notion of a 
French Mediterranean policy - but swiftly to other Arab states such as 
Libya and 
Iraq. 
" Sixthly and finally, the chapter looks at the manner in which this 
policy was fortuitously consolidated by de Gaulle's reactions to the six-day war of 
June 1967. Censure of Israel and suspension of arms sales precipitously bolstered 
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France's prestige in the Arab world. Coupled with prompt overtures to newly 
radicalised Arab governments, notably in Iraq and Libya, this stance provided 
French diplomats with a considerable store of goodwill and commercial leverage 
within the Arab world. By the mid-seventies, the deep Franco-Arab antagonism of 
the fifties had been replaced with empathy and praise for France from Arab states. 
2. France's precarious standing in the Mashreq following the Second 
World War 
This chapter's principal concern is the way in which French relations with the Arab 
states of the Middle East were eclipsed by the Franco-Israeli alliance from the mid- 
fifties to the mid-sixties. However, the broader evolution of post-1945 Franco-Arab 
relations cannot be understood without reference to the defeat and withdrawal of the 
French from Syria and Lebanon. France's ignominious withdrawal from the Levant 
in 1945 bequeathed two longer-term considerations, both of which have had an 
impact upon subsequent French policy to the region. Firstly the events in the Levant 
during the war exacerbated long-standing Anglo-French rivalries in the Middle East. 
This rivalry was translated in the minds of post-war French elites into antagonism 
towards British and American policy in the region. Secondly it meant that following 
de Gaulle's departure from power in 1946, subsequent Fourth Republic governments 
were unfettered by ties to the Levant, and had no interest in constructive engagement 
with Arab nationalism. 
Chapter one outlined how, in the wake of the break-up of the Ottoman empire and 
World War I, France acquired mandates over the newly defined states of Syria and 
Lebanon. French rule faced considerable nationalist opposition; only in 1936 was 
this partially assuaged with the initialling of a treaty, which emulated those signed by 
Britain with Egyptian and Iraqi leaderships. French control of Syria facilitated the 
construction of the IPC's pipelines from the oilfields of northern Iraq in the early 
1930s, permitting the export of Iraqi petroleum and the consolidation of both the 
CFP and France's domestic oil refining industry. As a result of the outbreak of war 
in 1939 and the Franco-German armistice in June 1940 France's Levantine mandates 
fell under the control of the Vichy authorities. Britain's initial attitude to this was 
ambivalent. The allied command in Cairo and Palestine did not immediately attempt 
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to antagonise Vichy-ruled Syria and Lebanon, so long as axis powers were not 
allowed to encroach upon the Levant. 
However, as the allied position in the region deteriorated, initial ambivalence 
evaporated. With substantial allied backing, Free French forces from Palestine 
defeated the Vichy authorities in Damascus and Beirut in June 1941. Jewish 
partisans participated in this campaign, creating personal bonds between Zionists and 
Free French which would later help nurture Franco-Israeli ties. Upon arriving 
triumphal in Beirut, the leader of the Free French corps, General Catroux declared 
France's mandate dissolved and that henceforth Syrians and Lebanese were 
"independent and sovereign peoples" 1. Yet it soon became clear that Free French 
conceptions of independence and sovereignty were extremely restricted. To the ire 
of nationalists who had initially welcomed his arrival, Catroux imposed puppet rulers 
upon both countries and viewed all manifestations of Arab nationalism as being 
largely of British inspiration 2. Conscious of the ground-swell of support for Axis 
powers amongst Arab nationalists, coupled with tension and exasperation over a 
range of issues between Allied leaders and de Gaulle, British and American forces 
pressurised the French to hold elections for more representative government in the 
Levant in 1943. Churchill stated that "there is no question of France maintaining the 
same position which she exercised in Syria before the war" 3. 
However, when in October 1943 these polls produced moderately nationalist 
governments, and the newly elected Lebanese president announced to popular 
acclaim that he was revoking the treaties with France, the French governor reacted 
by arresting him and his ministers. This incensed the British authorities who issue an 
ultimatum and the decision was revoked, marking a sharp escalation of tension 
between British and French authorities. The installation of the Free French authority 
thus highlighted the contradiction which dominated both Franco-Arab, and Franco- 
Allied relations between 1941-45. This was de Gaulle's deeply ambivalent attitude 
towards full independence for Syria and Lebanon. The Free French commander 
Catroux ostensibly modelled his rule on that accorded to Egypt and Iraq by the 
Sachar, H. M. Europe leaves the Middle East 1936-54, Allen Lane, London, 1974, p. 282. 
2 For Catroux' role, and subsequent relations with the Fourth republic, see Lesner, H. Catroux, 
Albin Michel, Paris, 1990. 
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British, i. e. close relations of political patronage and defence ties between the former 
mandatory power and local rulers. In practice, this proved unworkable for three 
reasons: France's far weaker global standing; its desire for direct, centralised rule; 
and the increasingly cohesive nationalist demands in Damascus, then still very much 
the intellectual and political centre of the Arab world. 
The situation was complicated by the fact that de Gaulle himself attached great 
importance to the Levant. This was both for personal reasons and the fact that until 
1945, he drew his own legitimacy in large part from the rule of French colonies by 
Free French forces. De Gaulle had also served in Lebanon in the 1930s. His book on 
the French army, which first brought him to prominence at home, draws on his 
military experience in Lebanon. Thus it was for both personal and political reasons 
that in August 1942 de Gaulle spent a month in the Levant, to the great irritation of 
allied leaders. While there he became convinced that Britain's principal aim was to 
replace French influence in the Middle East, hardening his conviction that all Arab 
nationalist agitation simply reflected British manipulation. At the time this fixation 
soured relations with Britain in general and Churchill in particular. It also 
strengthened the foundations of the belief shared by de Gaulle and many others in 
the Fifth Republic that France's "natural" enemy in the Middle East was perfidious 
Britain and the US, usually referred to nebulously as Anglo-Saxons. 
Faced with increased nationalist dissent in Beirut and Damascus in April 1945 de 
Gaulle dispatched additional troops to the Levant, against the advice of London. By 
May 1945 agreements brokered two years earlier to gradually scale down the French 
presence in Syria completely broke down, prompting widespread urban violence. 
French troops made a clumsy attempt to reassert their presence, triggering an acute 
crisis between de Gaulle's administration and the British. Allied troops 
in Syria 
intervened to separate the forces and restore order while de Gaulle fulminated 
against Churchill, virtually threatening the newly installed British ambassador 
in 
Paris with war. However, faced with a military fait accompli, de Gaulle 
had no 
practical option other than to withdraw his forces and negotiated a total withdrawal 
from Syria by the end of the year. 
3 Sachar, 1974, p. 287. 
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Although generally viewed as the most volatile chapter in Anglo-French relations 
during the war, in fact De Gaulle's spat with Churchill over Syria had little practical, 
immediate lasting impact. By the end of 1946 both men were out of office. The 
quick succession of governments which would characterise post-war Fourth 
Republic government little concerned with Levant, the focus of Mediterranean 
policy shifting to the Maghreb. By 1946 Syria and Lebanon were full members of 
the United Nations; independent Syria, backed by the Soviet Union, hastened the full 
withdrawal of all foreign forces from its soil. For France the ignominious ejection 
from the Levant was a foretaste of the forces of nationalism and decolonisation 
which would first preoccupy and then, twelve years later, destroy France's Fourth 
Republic 
3 Relations with Israel during the Fourth Republic 1948-58 
Franco-Israeli relations are the exception to the general observation made in the 
introduction that little secondary literature exists on France's Middle Eastern policy. 
Indeed few topics associated with French foreign policy have generated such 
extensive or polemical commentary as the Israeli question. The intensity, scale and 
scope of this commentary stems from two, inter-linked sources. Firstly it is one of 
the few foreign policy issues with strong domestic resonance; both because of its 
implications for domestic attitudes to Judaism and the existence of powerful lobbies. 
The latter have been principally, but not exclusively, in favour of Zionism and strong 
Franco-Israeli ties. Secondly, debate has been heightened due to the apparently 
uneven and inconsistent nature of Franco-Israeli ties. As the following text explains, 
a very close relationship, particularly between the two countries' military 
establishments, flourished in the mid-fifties. This culminated in joint military action 
over Suez in 1956. Failure at Suez initially reinforced military ties and spawned 
cooperation on nuclear issues. Close links continued in the early years of France's 
Fifth Republic after 1958. Yet within ten years official bilateral relations were 
strained to breaking point. De Gaulle censured Israel over the June 1967 war, 
applying an arms embargo on the eve of hostilities in 1967. This embargo was 
reinforced in 1969. Indeed it was the sense of rupture in 1967 which triggered the 
Jý 
initial literature on the relationship 4. Although the change in De Gaulle's attitude 
towards Israel in 1967 was undoubtedly abrupt, the resulting polemical, highly- 
polarised literature has often served to exaggerate the nature of rupture. Subsequent 
scholarly writing has stressed that, notwithstanding the polemics, in practice 
France's relations with Israel were characterised by nuances and a basic continuity of 
relations between 1958 and 1967. Even in 1967, links between military elites were 
never totally broken and arms deliveries continued, often quasi-illicitly . 
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Given the principal focus of the text is Franco-Iraqi relations, the reader is well 
entitled to ask whether an examination and understanding of Franco-Israeli 
relations in the fifties and sixties essential for the subsequent analysis of France 's 
relations with Arab countries in general and Iraq in particular? There are three 
reasons why this is the case: 
" Firstly in terms of the analysis of foreign policy making in France, the 
shifting nature of the relationship with Israel under Fourth and Fifth Republic 
administrations is indicative of broader changes in foreign policy making in the pre- 
and post-1958 periods. Prior to 1958 Franco-Israeli relations epitomised the chaotic, 
personalised and unofficial nature of foreign policy formulation under the Fourth 
Republic. Having brought the Algerian war to an end in 1962, de Gaulle 
consolidated the framework of principles and practices which provided the 
foundations of Fifth Republic foreign policy making. Within this framework, 
relations with Israel were "normalised"; ties with Arab states re-established and the 
prerogatives of the Quai d' Orsay over foreign policy restored 
6. However, as will be 
4 This is notably the case amongst intellectuals and politicians conscious of the 
interrelationship between attitudes to Judaism in France and Israel, see Aron, R. De Gaulle, Israel et 
les Juifs, Plon, Paris, 1968. See also the more populist accounts such as Dan, U. L'Embargo, Eds 
Premiere, Paris, 1969. (v. A51b) 
5 Crosbie, S. K., A tacit alliance; France and Israel, Princeton U. P. 1974. Kassir, S& Mardam- 
Bey, F. Itineraires de Paris a Jerusalem (2 Vols), Institut des etudes palestiniennes, Washington, 1992. 
Vaisse, M. La Grandeur; politique etrangere du general de Gaulle 1958-1969, Fayard, Paris, 1998. 
Cohen, S. De Gaulle, les Gaullistes et Israel, A Moreau, Paris, 1974. 
6 Within French literature the concept of "normalisation" of relations was promoted by Samy 
Cohen in his De Gaulle, les Gaul'listes et Israel, A Moreau, Paris, 1974. Cohen suggests that de 
Gaulle's policy in the 60s can be characterised by the "double normalisation", Israel's priviliged, 
personalised ties being brought back into the domain of regular 
diplomacy and diplomatic ties with 
Arab states re-established. This thesis has become influential, and is repeated 
in Vaisse. However, 
while this conception of "normalisation" is technically accurate in terms of 
diplomacy one of the 
aims of this chapter and thesis is to stress that from the mid-1960s, 
far from a simple restoration and 
regularisation of diplomatic ties with Arab states such as Iraq, there was a complete reinvention of 
Franco-Arab relations. 
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seen later, some characteristics of Franco-Israeli relations in the 1950s, notably the 
role of informal lobbies, channels and procedures of arms and aeronautical sales 
would return to characterise France's relationship with Arab states during the 1970s. 
This raises the question as to whether we can discern a pattern and continuity of such 
"parallel diplomacy" within the French state, a question and theme which will 
reoccur in later chapters 
" Secondly, exports to Israel between the mid-fifties and mid-sixties, 
particularly by the aeronautical and nuclear industries, established a precedent of 
subsidising key domestic industrial sectors via exports. Aeronautical and armaments 
industries developed this precedent extensively in their dealings with Arab 
governments in the 1970s, to the benefit of their principal client, the French military. 
Indeed there is an uncanny symmetry between the ties established between French 
companies and Israel in the 1950s and 60s, and those with Iraq and other Arab states 
of Gulf in the l 970s 7. 
" Thirdly, the apparently abrupt change in French official attitudes to 
Israel in 1967 had a decisive and long-standing impact upon Arab perceptions of 
French foreign policy. An undeniable by-product of de Gaulle's criticism of Israel in 
1967 was the perception among many Arab leaders of a "pro-Arab" stance by 
France. This view was cultivated and reinforced in the years 1967-73 as France 
successfully sold a range of armaments to Arab governments, including Iraq, and 
refocused its energy policy towards oil supplies from the Middle East. This 
perception fuelled the notion of what I am terming the "reinvention of French Arab 
policy" from the late sixties onwards. To this day this notion is both implicitly and 
explicitly drawn upon to bolster France's ties in the Arab Middle East 
8. This is 
particularly, but by no means exclusively, true of Gaullist politicians, indeed one of 
the key themes of latter chapters dealing with France's post-1981 relations with the 
Arab world is the high degree of continuity demonstrated under the presidency of 
Francois Mitterrand. 
3.1 Franco-Israeli military co-operation 1949-58 
7 Nan, P. Les deux bombes, Fayard, Paris 1991 (2°d ed. ). See footnote 19, below. 
8 See for example Jacques Chirac's speech in Cairo in April 1996: See "I'Orient complique de 
Jacques Chirac" Le Monde, 18.4.96; "L'impossible politique arabe de la France gaulliste", Liberation, 
16.4.96. 
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Ironically, given the close bilateral ties which were to develop during 1953-56. for 
the first five years following Israel's creation, French relations with Israel were 
unremarkable. Indeed France's formal recognition of the state in May 1949 came a 
year later than other major powers. Full diplomatic relations were established only 
in September 1952; relations being marred largely due to disagreements over the 
treatment of religious orders and sites within areas of Jerusalem under Israeli control. 
These initial problems reflected the vagaries of foreign policy process under 
France's Fourth Republic - something Israeli leaders would swiftly learn to turn to 
their advantage - rather than a general lack of support for Israel within France. 
France's domestic Jewish population of around half a million had been swollen by 
emigres from central Europe and Germany during World War II. Their presence 
reinforced France's status as a centre of Zionism during the first half of the century. 
As Britain restricted Zionist activities in Palestine, several groups, including Ben 
Gurion's Haganah shifted their headquarters to Paris during 1945-46. There they 
drew logistical and political support from the pro-Zionist networks established 
between Jewish partisans active in the French resistance, both in France and in the 
anti-Vichy campaign in Syria, where they based their affinity on a joint mistrust of 
Britain and Arabs (see above) 9. Many of the French politicians instrumental in 
fostering Israeli-French ties, Gaullists and non-Gaullists alike, initially established 
links with Zionists during the resistance. Such links were important in channelling 
arms to Jewish groups in Palestine in 1946-48, notably from Corsica 10 
However, while bilateral trade and cultural ties did evolve during 1949-53, initially 
Franco-Israeli ties were only of very marginal importance to either country. This is 
usually attributed to the fact that Israel's foreign policy apparatus was orientated 
largely towards the English speaking world. The French foreign ministry was also 
wary of the impact of Israel's creation on their fragmentary Arab policy, which was 
still smarting from the loss of Syria and Lebanon and under increasing pressure from 
Arab nationalists in the Maghreb. Yet in the early 1950s three factors were to rapidly 
and dramatically alter the nature of Israeli-French links. Firstly Israel sought to 
significantly increase its arms purchases from abroad. Secondly, Israeli emissaries 
9 Cohen, 1974, p. 28-31. 
10 Crosbie, 1974, p. 30. Kagan, B. Combat Secret pour 1'Israel, Hachette, Paris 1963, pp. 75, 
204. 
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sent to France to buy arms found willing partners as France's newly revived, post- 
war arms and aircraft industries were anxious to secure export orders. Only via 
exports were they likely to obtain economies of scale and thus finance the domestic 
research and development needed to rebuild France's national military capabilities 
11 Thirdly, the existing personal ties between individuals in Israeli and French 
military hierarchies forged during the war, referred to above, were formalised and 
strengthened by the fact that military and political elites in both countries began to 
perceive a common enemy in Arab nationalism and communism. 
From 1953 onwards it was this convergence of foreign policy perspectives, due 
essentially to this encroachment of the cold war upon the Middle East, and more 
assertive Algerian nationalism in the Maghreb, which wove together the otherwise 
disparate threads of French and Israeli policy. Temporarily, this created a unique 
form of close relationship between the two countries; the product of close personal 
relations which, in the confused environment of Fourth Republic politics, allowed 
foreign policy decisions to by-pass formal channels of policy making. This was 
particularly true of the Quai d'Orsay, which was generally perceived by Israelis and 
their French supporters as being hostile to closer Franco-Israeli ties. Formally French 
arms sales to Israel and neighbouring states were subject to approval by Britain and 
the US under the Tripartite Declaration, signed by the three powers on May 20 1950. 
This aimed to limit the flow of arms to the Middle East in a "balanced" manner. It 
was used, particularly by the Quai d'Orsay to constrain initial French attempts to 
supply Israel with arms and aeroplanes. 
From early 1950 Israel had begun to seek new suppliers of military equipment. As 
early as March 1950, Israeli's military attache in Paris, Benjamin Kagan had 
approached the French ministry of Defence and Nord Aviation (a precursor of 
Dassault) with a view to purchasing Ouragan fighter-bomber planes. However this 
was vetoed by the Quai d'Orsay as contravening the Tripartite Declaration. In mid- 
1952 a similar deal concerning Ouragan and Nord-2 transport planes was initialled 
but again blocked by the Quai, although Kagan was able to obtain some 
reconditioned Mosquito planes which France had originally purchased 
from Britain, 
Kolodziej, E. A. Making and marketing arms; the French experience and its implications for 
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and limited supplies of small arms 12 Although the French foreign ministry was 
merely respecting its obligations under the 1950 Declaration, its vetoing of these 
early sales to Israel was decisive in bolstering the subsequent perception of those 
who favoured of closer relations with Israel, that the Quai d'Orsay was an obstacle to 
closer Franco-Israeli ties. 
1953 marked a turning point in relations between France and Israel. In April a new 
French ambassador was appointed to Tel Aviv. Pierre Gilbert proved far more 
dynamic than his predecessor both in exploiting the potential for French military 
exports to Israel and at overcoming, or by-passing, official reluctance in some 
quarters in Paris to authorise such exports. Britain had supplied armaments to Israel 
in the first five years of its existence. However, it had done so largely in line with 
the Tripartite Declaration; supplying Israel primarily the same weapons as those 
supplied to neighbouring countries, notably Jordan, with whom London had a 
defence pact. In the event of conflict with Jordan, Israel thus felt it was unlikely to 
be able count on Britain for supplies. New French ambassador Gilbert therefore 
found a willing commercial partner in Israel's Ministry of Defence, which was eager 
to diversify its suppliers. Shimon Peres, then director-general at the ministry, rapidly 
became the chief architect of the Franco-Israeli military entente. Peres built on the 
initial approaches made by Kagan by undertaking intense, extremely effective 
parallel diplomacy in Paris. In the face of official French reticence - notably in the 
Qual d'Orsay - to supply arms outside of the framework of the Tripartite 
Declaration, Peres and his assistants established an extensive network of contacts 
and sympathisers within the French military establishment. Backed by Israel's 
ambassador in France, Jacob Tsur, Peres' initiative was successful because of the 
sympathies of key French personnel towards Israel and desires of French arms and 
aviation manufacturers, to secure export orders. Despite some resistance from the 
Quai d'Orsay, smaller contracts, for light arms and AMX-13 tanks were agreed in 
1953 and scheduled for delivery the following year. By mid-1954 French positions 
shifted further in favour of supplying weapons to Israel; the delivery of the AMX- 13 
tanks, as well as that of Ouragan planes which had been blocked two year's 
previously, were permitted. In August 1954 General Dayan visited France, 
the international system, Princeton U. P., New Jersey, 1987, especially pp. 32-53. 
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consolidating ties with French generals, including chief of staff general Koenig. In 
the wake of this visit, the sale of MystUre II and IV planes as well as American 
Sherman tanks (sold to France by Britain after 1945) were agreed. 
This relationship continued to flourish during the course of 1955 and was reinforced 
by changes in both Israeli and French domestic politics. Ben Gurion obtained the 
defence portfolio in February and became premier at the end of 1955. Foreign 
Minister's Sharret's replacement with Golda Meir hardened Israel's stance vis-B-vis 
its Arab neighbours and fuelled both Israeli and neighbouring Arab states' drive to 
buy arms. Within Israel, these changes strengthened the hand of Shimon Peres, who 
was close to Ben Gurion. He made numerous trips to France with a series of arms 
orders during 1955. The efforts of Peres and his representative in Paris, Yossef 
Nahmias, were further enhanced by the election in France in early 1955 of the 
government of Edgar Faure. Faure and his advisors were favourable to aiding Israel 
militarily and provided Peres with unprecedented access to key officials; Peres even 
having his own office within the prime minister's office for a time 13. These 
officials included minister of interior Maurice Bourges-Maunory who, with his 
principal aid Abel Thomas, were central to the development of Franco-Israeli 
relations in 1955-58. Such high-level contacts rapidly translated into accelerated 
arms sales and deliveries; by late 1955 France had become the principal supplier to 
Israel's airforce. Conversely, Israel had, in the space of three years, become a key 
client for French aeronautical industry, particularly Dassault. These flourishing 
commercial ties were based on close personal links and empathy between military 
elites, which largely by-passed official diplomatic channels. 
Although Faure's administration fell in November 1955 the composition of the 
subsequent government, headed by the socialist Guy Mollet further entrenched the 
Israeli's favoured position within the administration. Not only was Mollet a firm 
supporter of Israel, but Bourges-Maunory became defence minister and 
Mollet chose 
as foreign minister Christian Pineau. Pineau's pro-Israeli stance was greatly resented 
by officials in the Quai d'Orsay, and led to bitter relations with 
his staff, who were 
12 Kagan, 1963, p. 218. Kassir, 1992, pp. 129-131. 
13 Kassir, 1992,161-162. 
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kept almost totally in the dark about the extent of Franco-Israeli ties leading up to 
Suez 14. 
3.2 The rupture of Suez, 1956 
During 1956 the nature of the Franco-Israeli relationship changed dramatically. The 
roles of France and Israel in the invasion of Suez have been amply documented and 
there is neither need nor space here to enter into the details of the political planning 
or military aspects of the actions of October/November 1956 15. However, it is 
important to briefly examine the motivations which transformed Franco-Israeli ties 
from being primarily about arms supplies to the planning and execution of joint 
military action against Egypt, in collusion with Britain, after Nasser's decision to 
nationalise the Suez canal in July 1956. 
Three sets of factors seem relevant: 
" Firstly within the Middle East, both Israel and France shared a 
suspicion towards the then dominant US and British approaches to Middle Eastern 
"security" based on overarching military pacts. In the Baghdad Pact, which by 
November 1955 regrouped Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan with Britain, France 
perceived an extension of the US and British hegemony established in the Middle 
East when they were ejected from the Levant a decade earlier. Israel made its 
opposition to the Pact known publicly in January 1955. This was noted by Israel's 
ambassador in Paris as being a factor in the alignment of the two country's positions 
in the region 16 
" Secondly, and rather more importantly, was the two countries' mutual 
suspicion of and opposition to Egypt itself. Not only had Egypt under Nasser 
become the vanguard of Arab Nationalism and the Arab world's leading critic of 
Israel, but, more importantly for the French, Nasser was widely perceived by French 
14 Pineau subsequently claimed that foreign ministry officials' pro-Arab, antisemetic (sic) 
views biased their approach to Israel. Pineau, C. 1956 Suez, R Laffont, Paris 1976, pp. 66-68. 
15 In addition to Pineau's piecemeal account, Abel Thomas wrote Comment Israel fut sauve, 
Albin Michel, Paris 1978. See also Vaisse, M "France and the Suez crisis" in Louis, Wm. R, and 
Owen, R. Suez 1956, Clarendon, Oxford 1989, ppl3l, 335. Vaisse, M. (ed) La France et l'Operation 
de Suez, Addim, Paris 1997. Bar-Zohar, M. Suez: Ultra-secret, Paris, 1964 
16 Kassir, 1992, p. 135. Kassir points out that an alternative strategy, of France backing Syrian 
and Egyptian hostility to the Baghdad Pact, was not considered. 
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decision makers and public as the principal power behind the nationalist movement 
fighting in Algeria since 1954. Just as de Gaulle had been blind to the indigenous 
roots of Arab nationalism in the Levant in the raid-40s, blaming opposition entirely 
on the British, so in the mid-50s Fourth Republic politicians and military planners 
appeared convinced that the "resolution" of the Algerian "problem" could be 
obtained if Nasser's power could be curtailed. 
" Thirdly, specific French concerns over Egypt's influence over Nasser 
shade into the broader, global context of French strategic thinking in 1956. Arab 
nationalism was seen as just one manifestation of anti-colonial nationalism which 
was in the process of inflicting a series of humiliating defeats on France's over- 
stretched and beleaguered forces throughout the empire. This was particularly the 
case in Indochina (above all the ignominious ejection of France following the defeat 
of Dien Bien Phu in May 1954) and the Maghreb, where in early 1956 both Morocco 
and Tunisa had regained their independence. Within both the United Nations and 
among the "non-aligned" countries, who first met in Bandung in 1955, France was 
universally condemned for its continuing war in Algeria. 
All three of these factors were important in shaping French actions in 1956. In this 
context Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez canal company - founded by a 
Frenchman and in which many small French investors still had shares - in July was 
seen as a humiliation too far. It led to preparations which culminated in invasion of 
late October. Planning of the Suez operation was very much facilitated by, indeed 
was the culmination of the previous three years ever-closer personal collaboration 
between Israeli and French military and political elites. 
Perhaps ironically, the near-total failure of the operation from a political and 
diplomatic point of view did not dampen official French attitudes to, or the 
relationship with, Israel. Indeed most Fourth Republic politicians felt 
simultaneously embittered and vindicated by what they saw as US duplicity over the 
affair. The enhanced sense of diplomatic isolation, and the relative logistical and 
military success of the operation in fact prompted even closer military Franco-Israeli 
ties during 1956-58, and the acceleration of nuclear cooperation 
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3.3 Nuclear cooperation 
From late 1956 until the fall of the Fourth Republic in May 1958, Franco-Israeli ties 
were the closest they ever came to being a formal alliance. Relations continued as 
they had begun, evolving in an informal, personalised and often clandestine manner 
during the chaotic, closing 18 months of the Fourth Republic. Domestic political 
confusion in France aided those individuals, notably in the defence and interior 
ministries, who were keen to promote closer, post-Suez relations with Israel. This 
factor underpins Crosibe's convincing argument that domestic political changes in 
both Israel and France need to be viewed in conjunction with the changing foreign 
policy objectives of each state in order to explain the rapidly fluctuating fortunes of 
the "tacit alliance" 1 7. As outlined above, at the core of the relationship was the 
supply of French arms and aviation to Israel. These supplies reinforced closer 
military cooperation, which rested primarily on shared ideological and strategic 
objectives in the face of Arab nationalism, buttressed by personal sympathies for 
Israel among some key French military and political figures. Given the prevailing 
secrecy surrounding nuclear issues, it is only in retrospect that the degree to which 
Franco-Israeli relations during this period had a nuclear dimension has been 
appreciated. Bilateral links over nuclear research fostered from 1953 intensified in 
the immediate aftermath of Suez and continued well into the first decade of the Fifth 
Republic. The timing of nuclear scientific co-operation, the cornerstone of which 
was France's construction of a nuclear reactor for Israel at Dimona, was critical for 
both states. For the French, the decision to develop a military nuclear capability, and 
to cooperate with Israel over nuclear matters were taken almost simultaneously in 
1956. Four years later France exploded her first nuclear device, in Algeria in 
February 1960. For Israel, French technical assistance in this period was critical, 
although the precise scale and scope of this cooperation was obscured by the 
deliberate ambiguity surrounding Israel's nuclear weapons developments well into 
g the 1980s 1. 
17 For all the subsequent coverage in France Crosbie, 1974 remains the most succinct and 
diligent study of Franco-Israeli ties. 
18 Hersh, S. M. The Sampson option, Israel's nuclear arsenal and American foreign policy, 
Random House, New York, 1991. Jabber, F. Israel and nuclear weapons, Chatto & Windus, London, 
1971. 
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A brief review of nuclear ties with Israel is important at this juncture for two reasons. 
Firstly, notwithstanding De Gaulle's explicit commitment to continued good 
relations with Israel, suspending cooperation on nuclear weaponry became essential 
for Fifth Republic foreign policy. The extensive inter-penetration of Israeli and 
French scientific and defence communities during the late fifties compromised De 
Gaulle's determination to formulate an independent French foreign policy. In 
addition, by late 1960 such ties and nuclear cooperation also threatened to further 
undermine relations with the United States, who had been kept in the dark about 
Israel's nuclear ambitions and were anxious to prevent proliferation. Yet while De 
Gaulle's desire to curtail nuclear ties with Israel was clear in principle from 1958, in 
practice it was only belatedly and partially implemented. This inconsistency 
reflected serious divisions within his entourage about attitudes to Israel, rather than 
duplicity on the part of the president 
Secondly, the supply to Israel of a French designed and built nuclear reactor is 
important as the first chapter of a broader history of French nuclear cooperation in 
general, and ties with Iraq in particular. Just as the global export successes of 
France's aeronautical industry to the Arab world in 1970 can be traced back to Israeli 
exports in the fifties, so nuclear cooperation with Israel provided the model for 
subsequent French exports of nuclear technology and reactors to several countries. 
Twenty years after having agreed to aid Israel in civilian and military atomic 
research, in 1976 France would consolidate its burgeoning programme of military 
and civilian co-operation with Iraq with the sale of a nuclear reactor. The Franco- 
Iraqi relationship thus again uncannily came to mirror the earlier bi-lateral ties with 
Israel. The parallels between the two were further contorted by Israel's destruction 
of the Iraqi reactor in June 1981. Coming just weeks after Mitterrand's election to 
the presidency, this was a critical juncture for post-May 1981 foreign policy in the 
region. Finally, although separated by two decades, France's history of nuclear 
cooperation with first Israel and then Iraq have become inextricably intertwined by 
the manner in which revelations about the parallel relationship were revealed 19 
19 Nan, P. Les deux bombes, Fayard, Paris, 1991. First published in 1981, this book is 
important but paradoxical. While marred by hasty, and often sensational writing, its importance rests 
on the information revealed, the chief source is almost certainly Pierre Guillaumat, who had 
cooperated with Pean on his 1982 book on the oil industry. Hersh plausibly suggests that the timing 
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The background to Franco-Israeli nuclear cooperation is now well established. Israel 
began limited nuclear research with scientists in the US from 1948 onwards. In 1949 
Ben Gurion suggested co-operation with France and limited scientific contacts began 
that year 20. Yet in keeping with the general evolution of Franco-Israeli ties, nuclear 
cooperation did not begin in earnest until 1953, when France purchased a patent for 
uranium extraction developed in Israel. This purchase, and a subsequent 1955 heavy 
water processing deal helped cement ties between the two countries' scientific 
communities. Formal exchanges between the France's Commissariat Bl 'energie 
atomique (CEA) and its Israeli counterpart occurred from 1954. This cooperation, 
which initially did not have an explicit military component, was publicised by the 
French at the UN in November 1954. 
Suez, whilst a set-back for both Israeli and French foreign policies, triggered even 
closer conventional military cooperation and was decisive in prompting each to 
develop a programme of nuclear weapons development. Whilst each reached this 
decision separately, during 1957 there was considerable overlap between research 
programmes. During 1957, Guy Mollet's (Socialist) government dropped its initial 
hostility to the idea of France becoming a nuclear power. A protocol outlining 
France's atomic defence programme was signed on November 30 1956, in the 
immediate aftermath of the Suez debacle. During the febrile weeks of diplomatic 
and military activity leading up to joint-action at Suez, France's atomic energy 
commission had also signed a protocol with its Israeli counterpart to construct a 
reactor for research purposes. This appears to have been signed on September 17 
1956; although the precise timing and content of initial nuclear agreements between 
Israeli and French authorities have been the subject of considerable subsequent 
controversy 21. Recent research, drawing on archival sources, suggests that an 
agreement was signed on December 12 1956, i. e. just after Suez, with an accord on 
nuclear weapons' research agreed eight months later on August 21 1957 
22. The 
and motivation of Pean's informants reflected their anger over Israel's attack on Osiraq; 
Hersh, 1991, 
p. 64. 
20 Crosbie, 1974, pp. 114-121, Kassir, 1992, p. 265. 
21 Kassir p. 267, drawing heavily on Nan. 
22 Vaisse 1998, pp. 620-625, devotes a section to nuclear issues, his archival research confirms 
much of what Pean's speculative, interview-based approach had suggested 
in 1981. See also Vaisse, 
M. et al (eds. ) L'energie nucleaire en Europe... P. Lang, Bern, 1994. 
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outcome of these accords was France's decision to construct the nuclear facility at 
Dimona, in the Negev, over the subsequent 3-4 years. As Israel's ambassador to 
France subsequently confirmed, this was not, as had been initially presented a simple 
research tool, but a reactor of at least 24 megawatts 23. 
Military nuclear co-operation was not only the logical extension of the close military 
links which evolved in 1953-56, but it was overseen by the same politicians on both 
sides, for the same reasons. Guy Mollet's defence minister was Bourges-Maunoury, 
who, assisted by Abel Thomas had played a key role in promoting strategic co- 
operation between the two countries. Leading French generals such as Ely and 
Koenig, who had championed conventional Franco-Israeli military cooperation, were 
also key proponents of a French nuclear capability. In many cases this stance was 
the product of personal sympathy for Israel and strategic outlook dominated by need 
for independent French power. Such support was not restricted to figures in the 
Fourth Republic. Pierre Guillaumat, who became a leading figure in the Gaullist 
movement, controlled the CEA for much of the 1950s before briefly becoming the 
Fifth Republic's first minister of defence (1958-60) for atomic affairs. Guillaumat 
was a staunch supporter of Israel and his pre-eminent position among French nuclear 
establishment facilitated co-operation. This was also true of Jacques Soustelle, 
minister of scientific research with responsibility for atomic affairs 1959-60. 
Soustelle, along with Debre, de Gaulle's first prime minister, had in 1956 been 
among the most prominent Gaullists to support Israel 24. Soustelle parted ways with 
de Gaulle over Algeria in January 1961. He was replaced as minister by Guillaumat, 
who went on to become the most pre-eminent Gaullist technocrat of the Fifth 
Republic 25. Guillaumat subsequently played a central role in the development of 
France's energy policy and was a key architect in relations with Arab oil suppliers. 
On the Israeli side, Shimon Peres, backed by Ben Gurion and working closely with 
ambassador Jakob Tsur in Paris, remained the principal architect of Franco-Israeli 
26 
ties, in both conventional military and nuclear co-operation spheres 
23 Tsur, J. Prelude A Suez, Presses de la Cite, Paris, 1968. 
24 Cohen, 1974, p. 63. 
25 Soutou, G. -M. et al (eds), Pierre Guillaumat, la passion des grandes projets industrielles, eds. 
rive droit, Paris 1995. 
26 Tsur, 1968. 
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De Gaulle, on coming to power in May 1958 appears to have immediately attempted 
to halt Franco-Israeli cooperation over nuclear weapons research, and scaled-down 
civilian cooperation. On June 17 1958 one of the first decisions of de Gaulle's newly 
convened defence committee was to suspend all bilateral nuclear technical 
cooperation agreements. Despite this decision, work on Dimona actually accelerated 
in 1959, largely under the impulsion of the minister in charge, Soustelle. This 
inconsistency created friction between de Gaulle and his premier Debre on the one 
hand and the ministers involved, particularly Soustelle and Guillaumat, on the other 
27. In 1959 and 1960 de Gaulle remained concerned about the scale and nature of 
nuclear cooperation. In March 1960, realising that non-military cooperation, 
including the delivery of uranium, was continuing, he sought clarification from Ben 
Gurion, visiting Paris in June 1960. Such cooperation appears to have been finally 
suspended in January 1961. De Gaulle was in particular worried that Ben Gurion 
might reveal the extent of Franco-Israeli nuclear cooperation to the US, further 
exacerbating uneasy US-French relations. The US was already suspicious both of 
France's sharing of nuclear know-how, and of Israel's reluctance to open its 
"research" facilities to inspection. It was only after considerable fuss in the USA 
that the Franco-Israeli cooperation over Dimona was publicised in December 1960, 
prompting Ben Gurion to admit to the Knesset that Israel did have a nuclear 
programme. It was these US revelations, coupled with Israeli refusal to countenance 
independent verification of activities at Dimona that seem to have prompted a "final" 
French cabinet decision to halt all deliveries of material for Dimona in mid-January 
1961. By this time Soustelle and his aides had left the government as the clash 
between De Gaulle and the military over Algeria intensified . 
Despite this, work on 
the Dimona plutonium processing plant, notably by the principal contractor St. 
Gobain, continued, indeed There is considerable evidence that French work on 
Dimona continued in a quasi-clandestine manner throughout the early sixties 
28. It 
is clear that, well after the departure of Soustelle, elements within France's 
defence 
and nuclear establishments remained partisan to close ties with Israel. 
De Gaulle's 
27 Vaisse, 1998, p. 621. 
28 Kassir, 1992,285-287. Crosbie, 1974, plausibly suggests that large number of French 
continued to work in Dimona throughout the sixties, p. 169. This 
is supported by Nan, 1991. 
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foreign minister Couve de Murville condemned the clandestine manner that nuclear 
atomic issues continued to be dealt with outside normal diplomatic channels 29. 
4 The continuity of Franco-Israeli relations under De Gaulle 
The issue of nuclear cooperation appears to have been central to de Gaulle's dealing 
with Ben Gurion. Ben Gurion made two official visits to Paris, in June 1960 and 
June 1961. De Gaulle was unstinting in his praise for Ben Gurion and his admiration 
for Israel and made clear his intention to continue close relations with Israel. In May 
1959 the president despatched Guy Mollet to Israel to reassure Israeli leaders of de 
Gaulle's support for the 1956 action and France's continued commitment to Israel's 
defence 30. However, relations in the first decade of the Fifth Republic were to be 
modified in three ways. 
" Firstly, whilst excellent state to state relations would continue, these 
would be on a more regular, official footing, doing away with the clandestine and 
parallel networks of influence which characterised relations during the period 1955- 
1958. 
" Secondly close collaboration in the nuclear domain, particularly on 
plutonium processing and weapons research, was to cease, although as already 
stated, this was to prove easier to declare in principle than to implement in practice. 
" Thirdly de Gaulle attempted to ensure that France's privileged links 
with Israel should not be an obstacle to the re-establishment of relations with Arab 
states, alienated by the Suez invasion and Algerian war. 
For obvious personal and political reasons de Gaulle identified closely with Ben 
Gurion. During the latter's visit to Paris in June 1960 he declared him the "greatest 
statesman of this century". During the second visit the following year, de Gaulle 
pronounced Israel a "friend and ally", a phrase that would be much debated 
during 
the crisis in bilateral relations which erupted in 1967. While there is little doubting 
the warmth of personal feeling between the two men, diplomatic relations were 
nevertheless tempered by series of issues during the 1960 and 1961 visits. 
Fristly the 
decision to halt nuclear assistance was made during the mid-1960 visit. Secondly, 
29 Vaisse, 1998, p. 620. 
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notwithstanding the "friend and ally" quote, de Gaulle firmly rebuffed the suggestion 
that the two countries conclude a formal alliance. Following the "unification" of 
Egypt, Syria and Iraq in April 1963, Ben Gurion pressed for such an alliance with 
France, Peres openly supporting the idea in the Knesset in June 1963. Yet in political 
terms mid-1963 marks a watershed in bilateral relations as the influence of Ben 
Gurion and hawkish key aides such as Shimon Peres was waning as Israeli 
politicians sought to bring defence and foreign policy dossiers more firmly under 
civilian control. Some Israeli politicians also began to have misgivings about the 
proclaimed desire of France to re-establish ties with Arab states from mid-1962. In 
France publicity about the relationship with Israel in 1965/66 created unease in Paris, 
reinforcing the hand of those, particularly in the Quai d'Orsay, who favoured re- 
equilibrating relations in favour of Arab states. 
In 1962 the annual joint Franco-Israeli military discussions were suspended. De 
Gaulle made quite clear to senior ministers that he was opposed to any formal 
defence arrangement with Israel. However, de Gaulle did agree delivery of 72 
Mirage III planes during Ben Gurion's visit in June 1961, some suggesting that this 
was in part as recompense for the downgrading of nuclear cooperation. Indeed 
French arms supplies to Israel increased during the period 1958-65. Notably for 
aviation manufacturer Dassault, Israel became a key customer and partner in 
research and production. Much of the research on the Mirage III and V series of 
planes was done in conjunction with Israel and there were a series of agreements that 
France would purchase Israeli made components, in part to offset the significant 
trade imbalance due to the growing volume of military sales to Israel. In 1966, 
Dassault also began work on Israel's first surface to surface, "Jericho" missile. 
Levi Eshkol, who succeeded Ben Gurion in 1963, visited Paris in June 1964, seeking 
and obtaining reassurances over the supply of French spare parts to the 
Israeli 
airforce in the event of war in the region, the Israeli's now almost entirely 
dependent 
upon the French. Abba Eban also visited France in February 1966. The visit 
led to 
the contract to supply 60 Mirage V signed in the summer of 1966. It was these 
planes that would be at the centre of embargo controversy a year 
later. Some writers 
30 Cohen, 1974, p. 75. 
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have tried to portray Franco-Israeli ties between 1958 and 1967 as progressively 
worsening, as if there was some gradual, ineluctable path to the break of 1967. 
Clearly this was not the case. Although he did redefine the limits of bilateral 
cooperation, in both nuclear and military domains, de Gaulle remained a partisan of 
Israeli interests. However, he incorporated these into the broader Fifth Republic 
foreign policy framework which he was elaborating. Crucially, this framework 
included the re-establishment of relations with Arab states. 
5 The re-invention of an Arab policy: restoring diplomatic links 
The previous section reviewed de Gaulle's shifting attitudes towards Israel between 
1958 and the mid-sixties. As explained above, one of his preconditions for France's 
ongoing close diplomatic and commercial links with Israel after 1958 was that these 
should not prevent the restoration of diplomatic ties between France and Arab states. 
Although restoring diplomatic links was to take over five years, de Gaulle was made 
acutely aware of the need for France to re-establish a broader presence in the Middle 
East during his first weeks back in power. Events in the region in July 1958 
reinforced de Gaulle's conviction that a comprehensive Middle Eastern policy was a 
necessary component of his plan to restore France's global power and prestige and 
attain an equal diplomatic footing with the US and Britain. 
As already noted, the crises in France and Algiers which ended the Fourth Republic 
and triggered de Gaulle's return to power in May 1958 coincided with a series of 
political convulsions in the Middle East. Military officers in Iraq overthrew the 
monarchy in Baghdad on July 14. They promptly suspended Iraq's membership of 
the pro-western "Baghdad Pact" defence grouping on which US and British visions 
of security in the Middle East then rested. The following day US marines landed in 
Lebanon to quash Arab nationalist threats to president Camille Chamoun. British 
troops were simultaneously despatched to Jordan. British and American actions 
reflected their perceptions that both the Iraqi revolution and events in Lebanon were 
evidence of the growing strength of pan-Arab political movements, inspired, 
encouraged and supported by Nasser's Egypt. Three months earlier, on February 1 
Egypt and Syria had formed the United Arab Republic. In mid-1958 it was initially 
assumed that revolutionary Iraq would join the Nasserist fold. 
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De Gaulle was incensed that the US and British authorities had not consulted France 
before launching a military intervention. His anger was fuelled by the fact that 
during initial discussions with Macmillan just a fortnight earlier on June 29 and 30, 
de Gaulle had been reassured by an apparent understanding that Britain and France 
would liase over the crisis then brewing in Lebanon. Lebanon was also the only 
Middle Eastern state which de Gaulle both knew personally, and where France 
retained a modicum of influence. Inevitably, the fact that France was not consulted 
served to confirm de Gaulle's long-standing conviction of the "Anglo-Saxon" 
powers' perfidious intentions in the Middle East, responsible in De Gaulle's mind 
for France's humiliating eviction from the Levant 12 years earlier 31. 
In addition, the Anglo-American intervention also contravened the 1950 Tripartite 
Declaration. Evidently this was rather academic in that, although never abrogated, 
the 1956 Suez intervention had annulled this. Nevertheless it was of relevance to de 
Gaulle in that it provided precisely the kind of model of great power co-operation 
around which he wanted to build his global, post-1958 foreign policy. 
The fact that France was not consulted on, or involved in Anglo-American initiatives 
in the Middle East in 1958 was a salutatory reminder that if de Gaulle was to attain 
for France the great power status and profile to which he aspired, then he would have 
to re-establish a broader policy and presence in the Middle East. As such the 
marginalisation of France in the July 1958 crisis informed de Gaulle's first major 
foreign policy initiative towards France's western allies; the "memorandum" of 
September 17 1958 which the French leader personally addressed to Macmillan and 
Eisenhower 32. This 500-word note effectively sketched the agenda which would 
dominate France's dealings with its NATO allies over the coming decade. The 
memorandum suggested a radical overhaul of security arrangements. De Gaulle 
specifically criticised four aspects of NATO's existing architecture. Firstly he called 
into question the narrow US-European focus of the Atlantic treaty, suggesting in its 
place an expansion of political coordination and cooperation among allies, notably 
31 Evidently this echoed the resentment of Anglo-Saxon interests noted earlier. The French vs 
British and US angle is very present in French writings on the Middle East in the late 1950s, see the 
1959 works of Pierre Rondot and Benoist-Mechin. 
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extending it to the Middle East and Africa. Secondly he proposed a security 
framework in which Britain and France were perceived as equal partners with the 
US, rather than simply being junior, subordinate clients. Thirdly, for de Gaulle it 
was essential that such equality extend to nuclear issues, the notion that only the US 
and Britain should have nuclear capabilities was unacceptable to France. An 
acceptance of the US's monopoly on nuclear force was incompatible with the 
Gaullist vision of France. This was linked to his fourth criticism, of the integrated 
nature of NATO's military command, which left French forces under US control. 
Unsurprisingly, such a radical redesign was rebuffed. Macmillan was silent and 
Eisenhower, who had good relations with de Gaulle, replied timidly, in cautious, 
vague tones on October 20. 
The initial impetus for De Gaulle's Arab policy therefore came not simply from 
potential commercial gains, or the perception of the Middle East as strategic 
importance in terms of oil, but as a region of superpower confrontation and thus a 
necessary part of France's global policy. This poses a question which will be a 
recurrent theme in the remainder of the text; to what extent was there an explicit 
reinvention of France's Arab policy under De Gaulle? In this and subsequent 
sections I will argue that for De Gaulle himself, the Middle East was principally a 
key element within a broader foreign policy vision aimed at restoring French prestige 
and autonomy on a global stage, rather than an end in itself. In an evidently 
unplanned, but nevertheless fortuitous manner, this was boosted by the critical stance 
De Gaulle took towards Israel in June 1967. 
Although the need to restore links with Arab countries was clear from 1958, in large 
part because of the ongoing war in Algeria it would be five years before attempts to 
re-establish normal diplomatic relations succeeded. However, this was not for want 
of trying. In the summer of 1958 informal discussions began with both Egypt and 
the new regime in Iraq with a view to settling outstanding differences. In Iraq 
French concern focused on the new government's attitudes to the CFP and French oil 
supplies. These are discussed in the next chapter. 
32 Vaisse, 1998, pp. 114-123. 
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De Gaulle's desire to refocus France's Middle Eastern policy was reflected in two, 
inter-linked domains. Firstly in his choice of foreign minister. Maurice Couve de 
Murville had been ambassador in Egypt between 1950-54, before being promoted to 
Washington. In July 1956, in the middle of the Suez expedition to which he was 
opposed, he was moved to Bonn. As such he was distinctly not part of the 
entourage of pro-Israeli Gaullists outlined above. Although the constitution of 1958 
granted the president extensive powers over foreign and defence policy, de Gaulle 
largely concerned himself with the broad orientation of policy, leaving the detailed 
formulation and implementation to Couve de Murville. This day to day control of 
foreign policy reinforced the second domain, the fact that the prerogatives of the 
foreign ministry itself and the formal channels of foreign policy making, were 
strengthened. This, at least in theory, marked an end to the cabals, lobbies and 
informal influence wielded by the interior and defence minister under the Fourth 
Republic and restored both the influence and confidence of Quai d'Orsay which had 
been totally marginalised under Christian Pineau during the Suez period. This 
formalisation of policy both reflected and reinforced the "normalisation" of Arab 
policy during Couve de Murville's ten year stint as de Gaulle's foreign minister. 
Couve de Murville initially attempted a rapprochement with Egypt. This was an 
obvious first step for two reasons. Firstly there was a series of unresolved financial 
issues stemming from the seizure of French assets during the Suez operation which 
both sides were eager to resolve 33. Indeed negotiations on these were already under 
way in Geneva in the closing months of the Fourth Republic. Secondly it was hoped 
that resolution of these differences with Egypt would facilitate a broader diplomatic 
opening for France in the Middle East. More pressingly, with Nasser at the height of 
his influence, rapprochement with Egypt appeared to also offer a path towards the 
Algerian nationalist movement. Egypt headed Arab support for the Algerian 
nationalist movement, the FLN, whose government in exile, the GPRA, was based in 
Cairo. 
In fact, the Algerian war and Egypt's support for Algeria's FLN proved a decisive 
barrier to initial attempts at Franco-Egyptian rapprochement. The technical aspects 
33 Kassir, 1992, p. 25. 
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of the financial disputes arising from the nationalisation of the Suez canal were 
resolved with the initialising of four accords in Geneva in August 1958. However, 
despite this apparent breakthrough, and the fact that in May 1959 Couve de Murville 
met with the Egyptian ambassador to Switzerland, Saroite Okacha (a key proponent 
of Franco-Egyptian rapprochement, who later became minister of culture), relations 
remained deadlocked over Egyptian support for the FLN. During 1958/59 Egypt 
apparently sought not only French recognition of the legitimacy of the FLN, but also 
a commitment that France scale down military and diplomatic support for Israel. 
Quasi-official talks were dogged by mistrust on both sides, and collapsed following 
the arrest of French diplomats on spying charges in Cairo in 1961. The failure to 
restore relations with Egypt was proof that rapprochement with Arab countries 
would be impossible without a resolution of the war in Algeria. For the first four 
years of the Fifth Republic, both domestic and foreign policy was overshadowed by 
the Algerian war. At home De Gaulle faced the threat of military revolt in 1960 and 
1961. Internationally, the war meant France was increasingly marginalised, notably 
at the United Nations. 
In the light of this, the signing of the Evian accords in March 1962, leading to 
Algerian independence in July, was a crucial turning point in Franco-Arab relations. 
What is surprising is the relative speed with which formal diplomatic relations were 
resumed with key Arab states. This is particularly so given that de Gaulle himself is 
on record as cautioning diplomats not to be seen to be too anxious to re-establish ties 
34 A month after the signing of the Evian accords, on April 3 1962 an Arab League 
meeting in Riyad passed a resolution urging the government and people of France 
"to establish equitable and beneficial relations with Algeria and the rest of the Arab 
world". Four days later Egypt released the French diplomats it had accused of 
spying the previous year. 
The subsequent five year period (1962-67) were characterised by three factors: 
formal resumption of ties with Arab countries between 1962 and 1963; the 
increasing frequency of official visits by Arab dignitaries to France, accompanied by 
the increasingly prominent place accorded to Arab relations in De Gaulle's rhetoric; 
34 Vaisse, 1998, p. 630. 
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and the incorporation of the Arab world into broader framework of Gaullist foreign 
policy which from 1963 accorded a prominent place to the non-aligned states of the 
third world. 
Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Syria all established full diplomatic relations with Paris in 
September 1962, (Syria having separated from Egypt and the United Arab Republic 
a year earlier). Iraq restored diplomatic relations in January 1963. Three months 
later in April 1963, Egypt, then by far the most important state in the region, became 
the last major Arab state to renew relations, completing France's diplomatic 
"reappearance" throughout the Middle East. Visits to Paris of Arab heads of state 
followed. King Hussein of Jordan made a state visit to Paris in September 1963, 
Lebanon's president Helou followed in May 1965. Meanwhile the number of Arab 
delegations and senior dignitaries arriving in Paris steadily increased; Jordanians, 
Saudi Arabians and Syrian all began discussions on bilateral trade and the possibility 
of acquiring French arms 35. The visit of Egypt's foreign minister to Paris in 
November 1964 consolidated the process of Franco-Egyptian rapprochement, which 
culminated in the visit of Egypt's vice-president Abdel Hakim Amar to Paris in 
September 1965. This visit was accorded a high profile in Paris. It prompted 
numerous official statements in support of Arab states and peoples as well as a good 
deal of media coverage. The Egyptians also apparently used to the visit to caution 
France over its apparently unconditional support for, and delivery of weaponry to, 
Israel 36. However, during the period 1962-66, French trade and investment in the 
Middle East remained very limited. The restoration of diplomatic and cultural ties 
was accompanied by calls for more assertive commercial policies, particularly in 
order to compete more effectively with "Anglo-Saxon" interests in the region 
37 
6 De Gaulle's foreign policy framework; superpower politics and non- 
alignment 
35 Vaisse, 1998, p. 630. Combat, Paris, 23.1.63. 
36 Kassir, 1992, p. 42. 
37 Chastenet, J. "Ce role essentiel que la France ne doit pas perdre au Proche-Orient", 
L'Aurore, 4.3.64. Lyautey, P. "Notre presence au Proche-Orient" Notre Republique, 11.2.64. 
Lyautey wrote extensively on the need to promote French interests in the region. See also "La rentree 
de la France dans l'Orient nouveau, Le Monde 15.9.62, and his vague, romaticised book Les 
nouveaux revolutions du Proche Orient, Julliard, Paris, 
1968. 
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The few existing studies of French policy in the Middle East in the 1960s, focus 
almost uniquely on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Indeed most of the books drawn on here 
are essentially studies of Franco-Israeli relations which deal with broader Franco- 
Arab relations only in so far as they concerned the Arab-Israeli conflicts. Before 
going on to examine how France's relations with oil producing states of the region in 
general, and Iraq in particular, evolved subsequently, the remainder of this chapter 
will consider how the Middle East as a whole fitted into the new architecture of 
Gaullist foreign policy. The reappraisal of relations with Israel and Arab countries 
during the 1960s occurred as a total redefinition of both the instruments and goals of 
French foreign policy was undertaken by de Gaulle himself. A key element of this 
restructuring was the prominence that policy gave to third world and non-aligned 
states. French attitudes to Arab states in the late sixties - and conversely, Arab 
perceptions of France - can only be fully understood in this context. 
Unlike most subjects treated here, there is both an extensive literature and a broad 
consensus among analysts at to the nature, motivations, framework and goals of 
Gaullist foreign policy. This is both because they marked such a decisive break with 
the past and have proved so enduring 38. All analysts concur that de Gaulle's foreign 
policy contained many contradictions, notably between rhetoric and reality, 
grandiose intentions and actual outcomes. Nevertheless key characteristics of 
France's Fifth Republic foreign policy as formulated by de Gaulle can be 
summarised in the following five points: 
" The Fifth Republic constitution of 1958 greatly strengthened the prerogatives 
of the president in the domain of foreign policy. The initial domestic political 
constraints upon de Gaulle's foreign policy making were further reduced after 1962; 
peace in Algeria allowing the appointment of a new government and the removal of 
effective parliamentary and military restraints to the President's power 
38 Kolodziej, E. A. French intenational policy under De Gaulle and Pompidou; the politics of 
grandeur, Cornell U. P. Ithaca, 1974. Vaisse, M. La Grandeur; politique etrangere 
du general de 
Gaulle 1958-1969, Fayard, Paris, 1998. Gordon, P. H. A certain idea of France; French security policy 
and the Gaullist legacy, Princeton UP, Princeton, NJ, 1995. Cerny, P. G. The politics of grandeur; 
ideological aspects of De Gaulle's foreign policy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1980. Se 
also De Gaulle en son siecle : actes des Journees internationales tenues A 
l'Unesco, Paris, 19-24 
novembre 1990. Plon/La Documentation francaise, Paris, 1992. 
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" In an international context increasingly dominated by the cold war, France 
under De Gaulle was allied to the west. Yet de Gaulle's international vision rested 
on a rejection of the notion of a bi-polar world dominated by two superpowers, each 
with subordinate, satellite allies. De Gaulle thus systematically challenged the notion 
of NATO as a US dominated alliance. He resisted the incorporation of French 
troops into NATO's integrated military command. Although French troops were 
only fully withdrawn from NATO command in 1966, as already noted, de Gaulle's 
discordant, alternative vision of the alliance were evident from the 1958 
"memorandum". 
" For de Gaulle an independent nuclear deterrent was a central element in 
restoring France's independence and great power status. 
" In more theoretical terms, de Gaulle's vision rested on the primacy of the 
nation-state. It was for this reason that he resisted the notion of a supra-national, or 
federal Europe, basing his vision of Europe on a strong Franco-German axis, capable 
of counter-balancing US hegemony 
" The centrality of independent states operating according to their own interests 
led de Gaulle to champion the emergence of newly independent states, thus 
projecting a very specific post-colonial global role for France. 
France's Middle Eastern policy was conditioned by the second and last of these 
characteristics, the region being both an arena of rivalry with firstly Britain and then 
the US and Soviet Union, and an opportunity to forge new alliances with nation- 
states. The last section already outlined how in ending the Algerian war, the Evian 
accords were decisive in allowing the diplomatic re-entry of France to the Arab 
Middle East. However, the end of the war in Algeria was a watershed which had far 
broader implications for de Gaulle's vision of Fifth Republic foreign policy, as it 
effectively closed the colonial chapter of French history. In doing so it ended 
France's diplomatic isolationism, notably from the growing number of newly 
independent and non-aligned countries. In a remarkable turn-around, in the five 
years from 1962-67 France's international reputation shifted from a country waging 
a brutal colonial war to the champion of nationalism in the third world. This was 
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particularly so among those countries seeking to preserve their independence in the 
shrinking middle ground between the two superpowers. 
With colonial wars in Indochina and Algeria having paralysed the Fourth Republic, 
on coming to power in 1958 de Gaulle was not only committed to ending the 
violence, generated by war in Algeria but also to closing the colonial chapter. The 
period 1958-63 also brought the independence of all of France's Black African 
colonies, all but one of which forged extensive defence and cooperation accords with 
the metropolis. 
In many respects the years 1962/63 mark a watershed in foreign policy orientation. 
De Gaulle shifted from a concentration on relations with Europe and US to those 
with the third world. This shift was explicit and in part reflected the failure of de 
Gaulle's Atlantic and European visions. In January 1963 the French President 
rejected the offer by the US to join Britain in accepting US nuclear weapons after the 
Nassau meeting of December 1961, and effectively vetoed British membership of the 
EEC. Although he signed a bilateral deal with Germany's Adenauer the same 
month, in fact the French blueprint for Europe failed in April 1962. This "Fouchet 
plan" had aimed at creating a "Union of states" to counter the move towards supra- 
national European Community. Thus is was partly due to a faltering of his Atlantic 
and European visions that de Gaulle turned to the rest of the globe. 
His approach to the third world has several separate strands. The first of these was an 
emphasis on relations with independent Algeria, both as an end itself, and as a 
gateway to relations with other non-aligned states. France also sought to broaden 
cooperation policy away from its pre-1962 focus on Sub-Saharan Africa. De Gaulle 
also undertook trips to Mexico and then ten states of southern America in mid-1964. 
In 1966 he visited South East Asia, honing his increasingly critical stance to US 
bombing of North Vietnam. Finally De Gaulle recognised China in January 1964. 
These strands were skilfully woven together to successfully portray a France 
committed to championing third world states, who, while an awkward member of the 
western alliance, often appeared formally committed to neither block, i part by being 
openly critical of US global ambitions. 
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Of central importance to France's relations with non-aligned third world states in 
general, and the Arab world in particular, was the unique relationship formed with 
independent Algeria after 1962. Under the terms of the Evian accords, France 
secured continued use of key strategic installations in Algeria for five years. These 
included the nuclear testing and hydrocarbon facilities in the Sahara, as well as naval 
bases. However, as will be seen in the next chapter, within three years it was clear 
that Algeria was intent on nationalising French oil and gas investments. However, 
despite bitter bilateral wrangles over such issues, plus deep-seated divisions within 
the Algerian government and increasingly close ties between Algeria and the Soviet 
Union, France nevertheless maintained a close relationship with post-independence 
administrations. France adopted a deliberately ambivalent attitude towards 
successive, increasingly radical Algerian governments, which were beset with 
internal rivalries. A key reason for this was that, given Algeria's status within the 
non-aligned movement, close Franco-Algerian ties reinforced French attempts to 
cultivate support among newly independent states. This was clearly demonstrated at 
the 1964 Cairo non-aligned summit. Indeed French diplomats explicitly defended 
the maintenance of good relations with Algiers as providing a springboard into the 
third world 39 
Boosted by criticism of what he perceived as US imperial involvement in SE Asia, 
De Gaulle's criticism of the US was in part the basis for his appeal to non-aligned 
states. By 1964 de Gaulle was openly critical of the US attitudes towards Cuba. 
Yet it was the rift between China and the Soviet Union in 1963 which provided him 
with the greatest diplomatic scope to distance France from both superpowers, whilst 
apparently championing independent, non-aligned states. Despite considerable US 
pressure not to, France duly recognised (the People's Republic of) China in January 
1964. The significance of the move was strengthened as de Gaulle's criticism of the 
US in Vietnam became more strident from late 1966. 
This post-colonial policy of support for third world and non-aligned states was 
buttressed by a completely reformed French aid and cooperation policy. This was 
39 Kolodziej, 1974, p. 464, quotes Jean de Broglie, French secretary of state for Algerian Affairs 
in 1964 ".. Algeria is also and especially the narrow door through which we are penetrating the third 
world... a falling out with Algeria would... endanger the efforts of our worldwide 
diplomacy". 
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examined by the Jeanneney commission who in early 1963 reformulated French 
assistance to better fit the post-colonial mould 40. The report was partly aimed at 
diverting domestic criticism of aid, and sought to give the appearance of diversifying 
assistance away from African states, whom hitherto had accounted for the majority 
of aid flows. One chapter of the Jeanneney report covered the Arab world; focusing 
largely on Algeria, it was written by a senior diplomat, Jean Chauvel. 
Thus two trends characterised de Gaulle's foreign policy in the mid-sixties, vocally 
distancing French policy from that of the United States, while championing non- 
aligned, independent states in Asia, Latin America and Africa. While one cannot 
discount completely benevolence, or post-colonial obligations, overall, by the mid- 
sixties France's reformulated role in the north-south equation was designed to give it 
leverage over east-west superpower rivalry. It also put France in a stronger trade and 
diplomatic position vis-a-vis other OECD states within the third world. This 
prompts two questions in terms of this thesis. On the one hand, how did the Arab 
states figure within De Gaulle's vision? On the other, how did the Arab states which 
restored diplomatic ties with France in the period 1963-65 view this global policy? 
Here four factors are of relevance. 
" Firstly, rather than viewing "Arab states" as a whole, in fact it was 
initially France's relations with two states, Algeria and Egypt which were 
determinant. This was, as outlined above, both because of independent Algeria's 
political and symbolic importance to the non-aligned movement, and due to Egypt's 
pre-eminent position in the Arab world. 
" Secondly, the post-Evian opening to the Arab world did, irrevocably 
and with astonishing speed, erase the image of France associated with the Suez 
invasion, the Israeli alliance and the Algerian war. 
" Thirdly, repeated criticism of the US, coupled with the broader, 
activist policy towards the third world firmly established France's credentials as 
offering an alternative political and commercial partner to the superpowers. This 
40 Institut Charles De Gaulle (ed), De Gaulle et le Tiers Monde, Pedon, Paris, 1984. Pp 213- 
230. Although conventionally presented as a watershed in French attitudes to former colonies and the 
third world, in fact the report itself had largely administrative implications, and indeed was never 
either fully implemented nor fully published. 
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was true even for radical states with growing links to the Soviet Union as with 
Algeria in the mid-sixties, or Iraq a decade later. Nevertheless, 
0 Fourthly, and finally it should be stressed that these factors alone 
were insufficient to greatly advance France's commercial and diplomatic standing in 
the Middle East in the mid-sixties, a region beset both by the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
and inter-Arab rivalries. It was in this context that de Gaulle's stance during the war 
of June 1967 played a decisive role. By clearly censoring Israel for its actions in the 
six day war, the French President not only abruptly completed the gradual scaling 
down of Franco-Israeli ties evident during the mid-sixties. Far more importantly for 
subsequent relations with Arab states, his criticism of Israel and the US clearly 
demarcated French policy from other that of Western powers, in the Middle East. 
7 De Gaulle and 1967 war; embargoes on Israel and French status in the 
Arab world 
De Gaulle's reactions to the events surrounding Israel's launching of war in June 
1967 mark a critical watershed in French foreign policy in two respects. By 
condemning Israel as the aggressor, de Gaulle dramatically and definitively 
transformed both Israeli and Arab perceptions of France's policy towards the Middle 
East. June 1967 thus decisively altered the course of subsequent French relations 
with the countries of the region. Simultaneously, de Gaulle both alienated 
significant sections of the French public and triggered recriminations and divisions 
among his own supporters. In retrospect, June 1967 is viewed by many French 
historians as beginning the tarnishing of de Gaulle's presidency. Public disquiet and 
media criticism over the Arab-Israeli conflict first fuelled then merged with other 
signs that the seventy-eight year old was out of touch; with mounting dissent 
culminating in the revolts of May 1968 and De Gaulle's departure from power a year 
later. 
Rather more importantly for this thesis, the watershed of June 1967 and the manner 
in which it divided de Gaulle's own followers was to have a lasting impact on what 
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has subsequently become known as "Gaullist" Arab policy 41. The events that 
shaped this watershed, and both their domestic and international implications are 
now briefly examined, completing this survey of France's fluctuating relations with 
Israel and the Arab east to the late sixties. 
During April and May 1967 there was a precipitous escalation of inter-state tension 
in the Middle East. Following attacks in the Galilee in early April, Israel destroyed 
20 Syrian Migs. In mid-May the Egyptians ordered the UN out of Gaza and Charm 
El-Sheikh and on May 22 imposed a blockade on the Gulf of Aqaba. In this 
atmosphere of heightened tension Israel's foreign minister Abba Eban, en-route for 
the US, stopped in Paris on May 24 for discussions with de Gaulle, the leader until 
then considered among Israel's closest western allies. De Gaulle explicitly and 
bluntly cautioned Eban against going to war with Egypt 42. Above all fearful that 
war in the Middle East would engage the superpowers and trigger a third world war, 
de Gaulle maintained that France would not support any state which opened 
hostilities. With Jordan aligning with Egypt on May 30, and a new Israeli 
government appointing Moshe Dayan as defence minister on June 1, the following 
day De Gaulle issued a statement. While reaffirming France's view that "that all 
states in the region have a right to exist... " he warned that "... the state that is first to 
resort to arms would not have [France's] approval, still less her support. " 
With full-scale war appearing increasingly likely, de Gaulle reinforced this position 
by declaring an embargo on the sale and delivery of arms and spare parts to all front 
line states on June 3. On paper the embargo applied to Israeli and Arab states 
equally. In reality, given the preceding decade and a half of arms and aeronautical 
sales to Israel detailed above, the practical impact of the embargo was largely upon 
Israel. Virtually all of Israel's 250 combat aircraft were of French origin. More 
41 It should be noted that contemporary polemics over the nature of De Gaulle's heritage 
necessarily revolve around interpretations of his stance in 1967. These resurfaced during the debate 
over France and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. See interview with Roland Dumas 
in Le 
Monde 12.3.91 and Cohen, S. "De Gaulle et les Arabes", Le Monde 21.3.91. 
42 The exact wording of the de Gaulle/Eban exchange has been the subject of considerable 
debate. Lacouture, J., De Gaulle; the ruler 1945-70, Harvill, London, 1993. p. 439, provides a good 
comparison of the versions both men subsequently published. This point is of crucial 
importance for 
those who allege that, in bluntly threatening Israel rather than seeking a negotiated diplomatic 
solution, De Gaulle reinforced Israel's sense of diplomatic and military isolation, pushing 
it to strike 
first. 
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importantly, given the Soviet Union's recent despatch of Migs to both Syria and 
Egypt, delivery of the 60 Mirages V-J Israel had ordered from Dassault in 1966 was 
blocked by the embargo. 
Despite the scale of domestic controversy generated by the embargo, over the 
coming months, de Gaulle and French diplomats stuck to the principles underlying 
the decision, de Gaulle predictably calling for a great power conference as the only 
vehicle capable of resolving the crisis. France unambiguously backed UN resolution 
242 as the basis of a post-war settlement. The French text was more explicit and 
forceful than the English version, calling for withdrawal from the occupied 
territories, rather than the vaguer "from Occupied Territories" of the English 
language version 43. Domestic and international controversy surrounding the French 
embargo was greatly inflamed by the press conference given by de Gaulle on 27 
November 1967. In his inimitable manner, rather than limiting his comment to the 
immediate crisis, the French President delivered to the world's press a lecture on the 
historical destiny of nations. Characteristically, he justified his decision in June to 
warn Israel against war, and censor it when it did not heed his warning, via a broad 
analysis of the Jewish people, parts of which were widely - if erroneously - 
interpreted as being anti-semitic 4. However, de Gaulle himself saw no 
contradiction between criticism of Israel's behaviour in June 1967, and his long- 
standing admiration and support for the state of Israel in general, and its leaders in 
particular. He was clearly taken aback both by the public outrage his comments 
generated and by Ben Gurion's lengthy, wounded rebuttal of the press conference 
45 
De Gaulle was deeply stung by the scale and scope of domestic criticism. This, 
coupled with his irritation that during May and June senior French officers clearly 
connived to circumvent the embargo (see below), probably reinforced de Gaulle's 
intransigence over the issue. Certainly formal attempts to have the embargo lifted, 
notably by the Israeli ambassador to Paris in March 1968, came to nought. Speaking 
43 des territoires occupes. 
44 The phrase that the Israelis were "an elite people self-assured and domineering" caused the 
greatest fuss. The speech, and intensity of that year's debate over Franco-Israeli relations re-kindled 
the debate over anti-Semitism in France. Aron, 1968. The issue had already been given a renewed 
twist by the arrival in France of large number of Algerian and other Maghrebian jews in the mid- 
sixties. 
45 Ben Gurion, by then out of office, penned a 15-page letter to de Gaulle after the press 
conference. In his reply, he reiterated the phrase that he perceived Israel as a "friend and ally". 
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to French parliamentarians in July 1967 de Gaulle justified his position in the 
following terms: "We told the Israelis not to start a conflict. Now, France does not 
recognise her conquests. We have been pushed into a position similar to that of the 
Soviets, but for different reasons. Our policy is to maintain good relations with the 
Arab countries, so that they will not have them only with the Soviets" 46 
Formal relations between France and Israel deteriorated further during what was for 
France the turbulent year of 1968. In both March and May 1968 France endorsed 
votes censuring Israeli actions in the United Nations. Events at the end of 1968 
provoked a near total break-down in relations, although again there is little evidence 
to support the notion that this was a premeditated move by the French 47. Following 
attacks on Israeli targets by Palestinians in Athens, on 28 December 1968 Israeli 
commandos took control of Beirut airport and destroyed eight Middle East Airlines' 
planes on the tarmac. De Gaulle took the assault as a personal affront. He saw it as 
an unjustified attack on the territorial integrity of Lebanon, the one country in the 
region with which he had long personal ties. The fact that Israel's used French 
(Alouette) helicopters to mount a raid which destroyed French (Caravelle and 
Comete) airliners, among others, added insult to injury. As a result, on 3 January 
1969 France tightened its 1967 arms embargo, specifically banning the export of 
spare certain parts which had still been permitted after June 1967. The embargo was 
announced to ministers and the French public only 3 days after its imposition. De 
Gaulle also promptly despatched his information minister to Lebanon and redoubled 
efforts to convene a four-power conference to implement resolution 242. 
Given both the domestic unpopularity surrounding de Gaulle's censorship of Israel, 
and its legacy for Franco-Arab relations, it is worth summarising why he adopted the 
stance. What is clear is that the break with Israel was not pre-meditated. His 
criticism and subsequent embargo arose from the principles underpinning de 
Gaulle's broader view of international relations, rather than any change in his 
longstanding admiration for Israel, or far less from any new-found respect for Arab 
states. The rupture arose primarily because of the diametrically different analyses 
46 Quoted in Lacouture, 1993, p. 442. 
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made by de Gaulle and the Israeli leadership of the likely significance of Egypt's 
closure of the Gulf of Aquaba and the international ramifications of renewed war in 
the region 48 
In the light of the debates that the decision triggered, and the amount written and 
spoken by De Gaulle himself on the matter, three factors appear to have influenced 
the decision. 
" Firstly by May 1967 De Gaulle was deeply preoccupied by likelihood 
of a third world war. He viewed the USSR's encroachment on the Middle East 
largely as a by-product of US actions in Vietnam. As such both Vietnam and the 
Israeli-Arab conflict provided De Gaulle with examples of local conflicts, which the 
bi-polar international environment exacerbated. In his view, any war in Middle East 
was thus likely to trigger a global confrontation. 
" Secondly, for de Gaulle, the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba did not 
fundamentally threaten Israel's existence. For de Gaulle the blockade did not 
constitute an act of war, and in any case he had felt since the late fifties that Israelis 
had greatly exaggerated the military threat that the Arab states posed to its survival. 
Within this perspective, both the warning addressed to Abba Eban in May, and the 
embargo of June 3 1967, were designed to try and deter the Israeli's from starting 
hostilities. Indeed in his controversial press conference that November, de Gaulle 
insisted that the facts largely vindicated his analysis; the speed and scale of Israel's 
victory indicated that had been right. 
" Thirdly, again linked to his global view, De Gaulle also saw in the 
crisis as an opportunity for a four power conference, reaffirming his long-standing 
desire and conviction that only Great Power negotiations could contain the 
likelihood of regional wars drawing in superpowers. 
Numerous opinion polls as well as press coverage at the time testified to the 
unpopularity of the embargo among the French public. There was also an upsurge of 
popular support - both moral and financial - for pro-Israeli lobby groups such as the 
47 This was usually the line of the popular, pro-Zionist literature published in France in the 
wake of the 1967 war. See Dan, U. De Gaulle contre Israel, editions premieres, Paris 1968 (reissued 
in 1969 under the title of "Embargo"). See also Uri Dan's Mirage contre Mig, Laffont, Paris, 1968. 
48 See the succinct article by Cohen, S. "De Gaulle and Israel" in Barnavi, E. Friedlander, S. 
(eds), La politique etrangere du General De Gaulle, PUF, Paris, 1985. 
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Alliance France -Israivi, as well as lobbying efforts by both Jewish and non-Jewish 
French groups 
49. Some accounts see the domestic furore over official French 
censorship of Israel's actions as having decisively contributed to the growing 
dissatisfaction with de Gaulle which culminated in the April 1969 referendum defeat 
and departure from office. Evidently such suggestions are impossible to quantify, 
particularly in the wake of the domestic convulsions of May 1968. 
In addition to these significant shifts in general public opinion, criticism of Israel 
also prompted divisions within the ranks of de Gaulle's own supporters, polarising 
opinion between those who supported his criticism of Israel and those who were 
outraged at the apparent severing of long-standing ties between Gaullist republicans 
and Israel 50. Those in the former group are significant for the ensuing story as they 
formed the nucleus around which explicit promotion of a "Gaullist" Arab policy was 
subsequently conducted. Prominent amongst these was Louis Terrenoire, a close 
colleague of the General who switched from being an ardent lobbyist for Israel to a 
founder of pro-Arab pressure group, Association de solidarite franco-arabe (ASFA), 
whose publication France Pays Arabes would in the seventies popularise Franco- 
Arab ties in general, and France's relationship with Baathist Iraq in particular 51 
The splits both within de Gaulle's entourage and the French administration more 
generally over the president's attitude towards Israel in June 1967 undermined the 
effectiveness of the embargo itself. There were large scale deliveries of arms and 
military hardware from France to Israel in the weeks leading up to June 5 1967. 
These included the "loan" of 20 MystIIre III planes to Israel. Despite the furore the 
embargo created, it subsequently emerged that all outstanding military orders except 
the completed Mirage V-J planes were in fact delivered to Israel, either incognito, or 
via "flexible" interpretations of the terms of the embargo. These deliveries suggest 
that de Gaulle's apparent attempts to bring an end to the informal, parallel relations 
between French military and aeronautical establishment and their Israeli counterparts 
which had flourished under the Fourth Republic were far from complete. This is 
49 Crosbie, 1974, p. 195, fn 12. 
50 Cohen, 1974, chs. 9 and 10. 
5' See chapter four for details of ASFA, Terrenoire et. al. Of broader intellectual and political 
significance was the way in which left-wing support for Algerians' struggle 
for independnece meant 
that sectors of the French left were later more readily sympathetic to Arab and Palestinian causes. 
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unsurprising considering the extent of bilateral cooperation, particularly in aircraft 
research and construction, during the 1960s. Dassault in particular had a series of 
cooperation and production accords with Israeli partners. These included Mirage III 
and V series aircraft, for which Israeli companies had become significant sub- 
contractors. Dassault also designed, produced and tested Israel's first surface to 
surface missiles, the MD660. Joseph Szydlowski, owner of France's Turbomecea 
which manufactured aircraft engines had close ties with Israel. A month after the 
embargo was announced, he established Turbomecea-Israel to produce engines 
within Israel 52. Further evidence of the porous nature of the embargo, and the 
continued links between French and Israeli military authorities, surfaced early in 
1970 with the controversy surrounding the delivery of a dozen speedboats to Israel 
by shipyards in Cherbourg. Five of these were delivered, legally, during 1968, two 
others had mysteriously departed on the eve of the renewed embargo of January 3 
1969. The five remaining boats slipped out of Cherbourg late in December 1969. 
This was in clear contravention of the embargo, and prompted a significant scandal. 
The practical implications of the embargo - in terms of its impact upon Israel's 
military capability both during and after the June 1967 war - therefore in retrospect 
appears to have been limited. However, the move had international implications 
beyond simply the rift in Franco-Israeli relations. In declaring the embargo and 
criticising Israel as the aggressor, France once again decisively distanced its own 
policies from those of the US. This reinforced its ongoing criticisms of the US over 
Vietnam, further boosting its support and profile among newly independent states 
which de Gaulle has so assiduously cultivated within his pro-active policy towards 
the third world over the previous four years. Conversely, criticism of the US stance 
in the Middle East, coming in the wake of the decision to withdraw from NATO's 
military command, evidently reinforced the US's exasperated perception of De 
53 Gaulle's France as a maverick global actor 
It was noted earlier, that although frequently grounded in principle, in practice, de 
Gaulle's foreign policy decisions often had paradoxical, or contradictory, effects. 
52 Crosbie, 1974, p. 206. 
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This was clearly the case over Israel in 1967. One of de Gaulle's prime motivations 
appears to have been to resist the encroachment of the cold war polarisation in the 
Middle East. Yet France's unilateral embargo clearly helped push Israel into a far 
closer military relationship with the US. Unable to depend upon France for supplies, 
Israel swiftly consolidated its military relationship with the US. This had begun, 
somewhat tentatively, only three years earlier when Israel ordered Skyhawk rockets. 
Problems with French supplies in 1967 prompted Israel to order US tanks and its the 
fleet of Mirage III were shortly supplemented with Phantom F-4s. Therefore de 
Gaulle's stance on the war not only further twisted already strained US-French 
relations, but actually hastened superpower involvement in the Middle East. 
Returning to the second of the two guiding questions asked earlier in the chapter the 
most important international outcome of the embargo for French foreign policy was 
the way it changed relations with Arab countries. In theory it should be possible to 
separate the rhetorical and symbolic aspects of Arab sympathy for France's stance 
from the subsequent material benefits that rapprochement with Arab states had for 
France. In practice, the two became closely linked. Literally overnight, De Gaulle's 
decision to criticise Israel and place an embargo on arms deliveries to the region in 
June 1967 radically altered Arab perceptions of French diplomacy. In the wake of 
the war, viewed through the eyes of beleaguered Arab leaders and peoples, France 
alone among western powers had distanced itself from Israel. This earned the 
French President unsolicited, but nevertheless rapturous, praise. Nasser acclaimed 
France's "highly moral" stance over the war, stating that de Gaulle was the "only 
western head of state on whom the Arabs can rely", a sentiment that was echoed 
throughout the Arab world 54. Thus the decision of June 1967 consummated at a 
single stroke, the "rapprochement" with the Arab world that French diplomats had 
been cautiously working on since 1962. This had two, lasting effects. Firstly during 
the final two years of his life, De Gaulle was revered by Arab statesmen and 
editorialists alike. Secondly, the fact that France was suddenly held in high esteem 
facilitated diplomatic and trade contacts between France and Arab states. These 
intensified significantly from mid-1967. As subsequent chapters will explain, by the 
53 In mid-1967, when Israeli foreign minister Abba Eban raised the French call for a four power 
summit, US president Johnson replied, with exasperated irony, "the four great powers!? But who the 
hell are the other two? " Quoted in Vaisse, 1998, p. 647. 
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early 1970s these contacts had been elaborated into a comprehensive "Arab policy" 
towards the Mashreq and Gulf Arab states. 
Clearly other consequences of the 1967 war consolidated this trend. With both the 
Soviet Union and the US being drawn in to the region more fully by the war, only 
France appeared to offer an alternative to closer diplomatic alignment with either the 
Soviet Union or the US. Within the Middle East, such an option was to be 
particularly significant for those states wary of Soviet influence, be they radical 
military leaderships such as Iraq or Libya, or conservative monarchies of the Gulf. 
As such both the war and France's stance consolidated De Gaulle's "non-aligned" 
policy framework towards the newly independent states of the third world post 1963. 
The stance provided an apparent coherence to regional policy in Middle East 
comparable to that already elaborated by De Gaulle in Asia, Latin America and 
Africa during 1962-66. 
Secondly, the war simultaneously demonstrated both the limitations of Soviet 
military assistance, and the need for Arab states to rearm. French aeronautical and 
armaments industries were not only well placed to supply arms, but also France was 
able to offer credit, without the political strings attached to US or Soviet military 
assistance. Equally, notwithstanding the fact that some key figures in the French 
aeronautical industry remained staunchly pro-Israeli, France was in the process of 
diversifying its military and aeronautical exports. Israel had been both the first, and 
by far the most important initial, export market for French aircraft exports in the late 
fifties. Partly because of the success of these exports, by the mid-sixties numerous 
OECD countries were also purchasing Mirage planes and Alouette and Super Frelon 
helicopters. Evidence suggests that it is wrong to think that the arms sales to Arab 
states in the late sixties occurred because of the loss of Israeli markets. However, it 
is clear that while the June '67 Mirage-Mig comparisons has become stuff of myth 
ss 
subsequently, it clearly did have an effect upon Arab attitudes to French arms sales. 
From mid-1967 to 1969, the practical outcome of these factors can be seen most 
clearly in France's relationship with three Arab states; Saudi Arabia, Libya and Iraq. 
54 Vaisse, 1998, p. 644. 
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The steady arrival of Arab diplomatic and trade missions in Paris from 1963 onwards 
accelerated markedly from mid-1967. In July 1967 Prince Fahd, then Saudi Arabia's 
Defence Minister, visited de Gaulle, opening discussions which in March 1968 led to 
the signing of a contract worth around $300m for AML-90 tanks and light armoured 
cars. Prince Abdel Aziz al-Saoud led the March 1968 Saudi delegation to Paris, 
which also signed a series of military and civilian cooperation agreements. This 
proved to be just the first of a series of increasingly elaborate and expensive Saudi 
armour contracts with France over the next 15 years 56. The following month, in 
April 1968 a Libyan delegation had extensive discussions on arms sales in Paris. 
After the change of regime in September, these discussions culminated in Libyans 
ordering 110 Mirage V planes from Dassault. This, then the largest single French 
foreign arms sale, prompted considerable controversy when made public in 1970. 
Nasser's fulsome praise for de Gaulle enhanced Franco-Egyptian relations which 
also led to military orders, notwithstanding the embargo; Cairo reportedly ordering 
525 half-track armoured cars in early 1969. 
However, it was the relationship with Iraq which best exemplified the new warmth in 
Franco-Arab relations. Iraq's minister of planning visited France in late 1967, 
preparing the way for an official visit by the head of state, General Aref in February 
1968. As with the first Egyptian senior delegation in 1965, Aref s visit was accorded 
considerable prominence. De Gaulle declared to Aref that France was "ready to 
assist you according to our means" and discussions led to the signing of a series of 
bilateral agreements. France agreed to provide military training, coupled with sales 
of 70 AMX-30 armoured cars and opened discussions on 54 Mirage V planes, 
scheduled for delivery in 1970. 
As will be explained in chapter three, these discussions over arms purchases were 
inextricably intertwined with the ongoing negotiations over oil both before and after 
the change in government from General Aref to Bakr and Saddam Hussein in 1969. 
As such Franco-Iraqi relations were to reflect the far greater role that oil, both in 
terms of France's supply requirements, and Arab states' surplus revenues, were to 
play in French foreign policy in the early 1970s. 
55 Uri Dan's Mirage contre Mig, Laffont, Paris, 1968. 
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8 Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to provide a broad, interpretative account of France's 
fluctuating interests and alliances in the Middle East up until the late sixties. It has 
identified factors shaping De Gaulle's perceptions of Middle Eastern policy and 
examined how these informed his perspective of global politics, through which he, 
virtually single-handedly, crafted France's Fifth Republic foreign policy framework. 
Both this general framework and the specific post-1967 legacy of France's symbolic 
and economic presence in the Arab world were to shape the policies followed by 
subsequent French presidents, diplomats and private companies with Arab states in 
general, and Iraq in particular. 
The chapter has attempted to highlight three factors: 
" Loss of French control over Syria and Lebanon was widely resented by 
French policy makers as a humiliation inflicted by the British and Americans. Its 
legacy for Fourth Republic politicians was as the first blow in the escalating crisis of 
decolonisation in Indochine and the Maghreb. For de Gaulle it fuelled his conviction 
that Paris' presence in the Middle East was an essential component of French foreign 
policy. If France was to match the rank and global reach of "Anglo Saxon" rivals, 
she needed a pro-active policy in the region. For De Gaulle a presence in the Middle 
East was therefore principally a symbol of global power politics. However, this 
inchoate sentiment of humiliation by, rivalry with, and resentment of British and 
American interests was also widespread among post-war French elites. It was 
clearly exacerbated by the Suez crisis and, as the next chapter will show, informed 
French energy and oil policy in the region in the 1960s and 70s. 
" From the French perspective the Fourth Republic's relationship with Israel 
was a temporary, conjunctural product of a shared perception of communist and 
Arab Nationalist opposition to France as seen through the prism of Algeria. The 
personalised, at times clandestine form that Franco-Israeli ties assumed was due 
56 Kolodziej, 1987, p. 344-346. 
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largely to the internal weaknesses and incoherence of policy formulation and 
implementation by successive Fourth Republic administrations. With the Algerian 
war over, after 1962 de Gaulle sought to regularise relations with Israel, who 
nevertheless remained a significant client of the French arms industry, whilst 
renewing ties with Arab states. From 1963, this shift in the Middle East was located 
within a pro-active policy towards non-aligned states as de Gaulle attempted to 
promote France as an alternative diplomatic and commercial partner to either the US 
or Soviet Union. 
" The abrupt downgrading of relations with Israel in 1967 was not a pre- 
meditated element of a new, more "pro-Arab" French policy in the Middle East. 
Rather the shift reflected De Gaulle's fear of the impact that a Middle Eastern war 
would have on global US-Soviet rivalry. Nevertheless, however unplanned this 
change was, criticism of Israel and the US clearly reinforced the activist policy 
towards the third world which de Gaulle had pursued from 1963 onwards. However 
unintended, the net result of this was that increasingly radicalised Arab nationalist 
leaders in the Middle East saw in the final years of De Gaulle's presidency a France 
eager to establish a substantial political and economic partnership with Arab states. 
France was manifestly not beholden to either superpower. Untainted by the 
"imperialist, pro-Israeli" connotations of British and American policy in the region, 
she was also able and willing to supply arms to increasingly radical Arab leaders. 
Thus, after being the bete noire of Arab nationalists in the wake of the 1956 Suez 
invasion, little over a decade later France's image in the Arab world had been 
completely reversed. Received by de Gaulle in Paris in February 1968, the Iraqi 
president Aref succinctly summarised the post-June 1967 Arab view of superpower 
policies towards the Middle East, stating that in the region France "is in the process 
of winning hearts, just as the English sun is setting and the tyranny of the Americans 
is coming to a close" 57. 
In conclusion, it should be restated that the initial impetus for de Gaulle's Arab 
policy therefore came not primarily from potential commercial gains, or a perception 
57 De Gaulle-Aref discussions, 7-8 February 1968. Quoted in Vaisse, 1998, p. 646. 
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of the Middle East as strategically important in terms of oil, but as a region of 
superpower confrontation and thus a necessary part of France's global policy. As 
already stated, this begs the question to what extent was there an explicit reinvention 
of France's Arab policy under de Gaulle? For the founder of France's Fifth 
Republic himself, the Middle East was primarily a core element within a broader 
foreign policy vision aimed at restoring French prestige and autonomy on a global 
stage, rather than an end in itself. In an evidently unplanned, but nevertheless 
politically and commercially fortuitous manner, this vision was buttressed by the 
critical stance the President took towards Israel in June 1967. Only after this, in the 
last two, twilight years of de Gaulle's presidency did the potential commercial 
benefits of France's new Arab policy and criticism of Israel become clear. It was 
subsequently, under the presidency of Pompidou that the economic benefits of the 
policy were realised as the policy was refocused within the less global, yet more 
aggressively mercantilist, policy framework of Fifth Republic foreign policy in the 
1970s. 
How these shifts in foreign policy dovetailed with oil policy towards Iraq, helping 
France weather the oil shock of 1973 and laying the foundations successful export 
drive in the Middle East in seventies is subject of next chapter. 
vc 
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Chapter 3. French oil policy and relations with Iraq to 1972 
1 Introduction 
Chapter one identified the roots of France's oil industry in Iraq while chapter two 
examined the framework of France's relations with Middle Eastern states during the fifties 
and sixties. Chapter three will now focus on France's relationship with successive Iraqi 
administrations between 1958 and 1972. 
France's fifth, and Iraqi's first, republics came into existence within days of each other in 
July 1958. Chapter two demonstrated the degree to which de Gaulle's first three years in 
power were dominated by war in Algeria, and thereafter how official attitudes to the 
Middle East shifted significantly in the mid-sixties. As we shall see, both Algerian 
independence in 1962, and the widespread perceptions of de Gaulle having taken a 
"pro-Arab" stance over the June 1967 war, did influence the evolution of Franco-Iraqi ties. 
Yet, despite the fact that Iraqi politics were acutely unstable for the decade following the 
1958 revolution, and that both Algeria and Israel were key concerns, at least rhetorically, 
of Arab politics in the 1960s, these were not the dominant factors in Franco-Iraqi relations. 
Rather it was disagreement over access to oil reserves which dominated Iraq's relationship, 
not just with France, but also the US and Britain, in a fairly consistent manner from 
1958-72. 
As such the primary tussle over access to Iraqi oil, and the secondary issue of whether 
France's access to Iraqi oil should be sought in conjunction, or in competition, with other 
Western oil companies and their governments, played a central part in the formulation of 
Fifth Republic energy policy in the Middle East. While the Compagnie francaise des 
petroles (CFP) remained a core component of the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) during 
the mid-sixties, the French began to distance themselves from their "Anglo-Saxon" 
partners in the IPC. 
Within this perspective, this chapter attempts to present and chronicle the evolution of 
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Franco-Iraqi bi-lateral relations to 1972. In doing so it attempts to answer two, broader 
questions which are central to re-thinking French Fifth Republic foreign policy. Firstly did 
French officials develop a "national" oil policy during the 1960s? Secondly, if so, how 
did this shape the overall policy framework towards the Middle East followed by de 
Gaulle and his successors as presented in chapter two? 
Examining France's oil and energy policies requires an analysis of the commercial and 
political aspects of three overlapping issues, which thus form the key themes of this 
chapter. 
" Firstly the Compagnie francaise des petroles relationship with its 
"Anglo-Saxon" partners within the Iraq Petroleum Company as successive Iraqi republican 
regimes (Qassem, the Aref brothers, Baathists) struggled to wrest control of their oil 
reserves away from the IPC. At least until 1968, CFP appears to personify French 
government interest in Iraq, even once formal diplomatic relations were re-established 
early in 1963. 
" Secondly the CFP's relationship with the state-owned petroleum company, 
Enterprise de recherches et d'activites petrolieres (ERAP), which adopted the trade name 
"Elf' in 1966 1. The often antagonistic relationship between the two French oil giants 
means one cannot discuss "French" oil interests in Iraq in a unitary sense. In reality the 
equation of oil supplies to France is linked to ERAP's pivotal role in post-independence 
Algeria, and the need for France to secure alternative supplies from the Middle East, 
primarily Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Examining the tension between Elf and CFP thus 
permits an insight into the personalities involved in decision making in the Fifth Republic 
by rival group of technocrats with immense power and influence. 
" Thirdly, intra-French rivalry in the oil industry has to be seen in the context 
of the more elaborate and ambitious Middle Eastern policy which emerges after de 
Gaulle's stance in the 1967 Arab Israeli war. This opens new possibilities for French 
commerce in the Middle East, but increased dependence on oil brings with it a vastly 
increased commercial deficit with the countries of the region. The increased demand for 
I Erap was created by merging several French state-owned oil interests in 1966. Its products took 
the name "Elf' from the late sixties, when CFP also began marketing under the name TOTAL. See Nan 
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arms in the region provides new export potential for French industry and a means of 
partially paying for the oil deficit. From 1967/68 onwards this linkage was to be exploited 
to the full. This meant that many of the key figures involved in policy making became 
involved in both the arms and oil dossiers. This linkage became even more explicit as a 
more mercantile policy emerged under Pompidou, particularly after June 1972; the month 
of Iraq's nationalisation of IPC and Saddam Hussein's visit to Paris. In the early seventies, 
what began primarily as an "oil for arms" relationship thus widens to broader commercial 
relationship. The flourishing of the relationship in the mid-seventies is the focus of 
chapter four. 
2 The Qassem administration; 1958-63 
In July 1958 France was totally absorbed with the domestic events which saw the demise 
of the Fourth and rise of the Fifth Republic. Other than the CFP, it did not have immediate 
interests in Iraq. Concern, as reflected in both French press coverage and de Gaulles initial 
statements, was with Lebanon and the manner in which the Anglo-American military 
intervention there reinforced French marginalisation in the region (see chapter 2). In Iraq, 
much has been made, not only of the near simultaneous timing of change of regime, but 
also the explicit references to revolutionary French iconography by the Free Officers who 
took power in Baghdad. The Marseillaise was played on Radio Baghdad by the army, and 
observers both at the time and subsequently noted the references and parallels with French 
revolutionary upheavals. Qassem himself drew explicit parallels between the French the 
Iraqi revolutions in speeches at the time 2. France and French thinking had an intellectual 
impact on certain Francophone elites in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East at the time, 
and was part and parcel of the cultural and political effervescence of the mid-fifties. In 
Iraq such currents were evident in the Arab-French revue Culture Nouvelle, which 
included contributors, from both left and right, who had studied in French universities in 
P, Sereni, J-P, Les Emirs de la republique, Seuil, Paris, 1982. Catta, E. Victor de Metz, Total, Paris, 1990. 
2 Daniel, N. "Contemporary perceptions of the revolution... " ch. I in Fernea, R. A. & Roger Louis, 
Wm. The Iraqi revolution of 1958, I. B. Tauris, London, 1991. Daniel ponders the mirroring of the French 
revolution in Baghdad pp. 21-28. See also La revolution francaise et 1'Orient 1789-1989, Cariscript, Paris 
1989, a collected work produced by French and Lebanese for the bicentenaire of the revolution. 
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the 1950s 3. Despite the lack of formal diplomatic relations, France maintained a French 
Cultural Centre in Baghdad, which facilitated educational and cultural exchanges. Pierre 
Rossi, who wrote one of the two French works on the revolution in French, headed the 
Centre. Rossi continued to exercise a certain influence upon the narrow oil and policy 
circles, and his writings reflect his knowledge of Iraqi student milieu and republican 
leadership 4. Evidently the French revolution influenced subsequent Iraqi historiography, 
most notably the approach of Hanna Batatu. 
Yet these French influences did not prompt an opening of official diplomatic ties with 
France. France remained a pariah in the Arab world due to the ongoing war in Algeria. 
While other western nations quickly established relations with Iraq, Paris made no such 
formal overture. As noted in chapter two, Fifth Republic Arab policy rested on first 
establishing ties with Egypt; the evident rift and rivalry between Baghdad and Cairo did 
not alter this. There were however some in France and Iraq who considered that the 
Francophone leanings of Qassem's new republican administration, not least the Sorbonne 
educated foreign minister Abdul Jabar Jomard, could have been more constructively 
engaged, suggesting that failure to do so had unnecessarily jeopardised oil supplies and 
commercial ties 5. 
With the Algerian war a significant issue within the Arab world, republican Iraqi support 
for the Algerian nationalists became important. Support for Algeria's FLN, and the at least 
rhetorical hostility to France, became an issue of rivalry within the Arab world, 
particularly between Iraq's new leaders, Nasser's Egypt and the United Arab 
Republic 
3 Abdul-Salaam Yousif, "The struggle for cultural hegemony", ch 10 in Fernea & Louis, 1991. 
Vernier, B. L'Irak d'aujourd'hui, Armand Colin, Paris, 1963, p. 236. See also the into. To Beau. N, Paris 
Capitale Arabe, Seuil, Paris, 1995. 
4 Rossi, P. L'Irak des revoltes, Paris, 1961. See also Rossi, P. "La culture... " Orient, 
8,1958, Paris. 
(fn 13 in Abdul Salaam, above). Rossi was a friend of Philippe Saint-Robert, whose writings are 
discussed 
in ch. 4. A quixotic reportage-type book was also written on Qassem's 
Iraq in 1959, L'Irak rouge; Khassem 
entre Moscou et le Caire, ]'ordre du jour, Paris, 1960. See also the memorial to 
the correspondent of AFP in 
Baghdad in 1950s, Dauphin, J. Incertain Irak; tableau de'un royaume avant la tempete, Libriaire 
Orientaliste 
P. Geuthnier, Paris, 1991. 
5 In "Les francais sont bienvenus en Irak", Combat, Paris, 29.7.58 Jomard is quoted as saying policy 
to France could change. "Les relations franco-irakiennes; histoire dun rendez-vous manque", 
Le Monde, 
20.11.58. This article also suggests that an abortive attempt via a young academic 
linked to the Quai 
d'Orsay, was made to re-establish formal ties at the time. 
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(UAR). The Algerian government in exile (GPRA, based in Cairo) had full diplomatic 
representation in Baghdad. Iraq provided arms, other material support and training, and its 
media coverage of Algerian support was explicit in its rivalry with the UAR during 
1959-61. Paradoxically although British and US governments were pilloried for being 
imperialist and Zionist, in fact it was the French who seemed to bear the brunt of the 
criticism in Iraq. In July 1959 Iraq proposed to extend the boycott against Israel to include 
French products. Relations with France were further tarnished by the fact that the 
Baghdad branch of a French bank, the Banque Nationale pour le Commerce et l'Industrie, 
based in Beirut was the conduit for UAR-funds in the failed Rachid Ali coup against 
Qassem in December 1958 6. However, the proposed 1959 boycott was not adopted and 
an easing of restrictions on dealings with French private companies was apparent from 
early 1960, although at the time France had only limited commercial interests in the 
country. Aside from the CFP's links, the most significant French ties were via the 
religious orders 7. Calls for a boycott were linked to both the Algerian war and Israel; 
Qassem's minister of economy made this clear. He stated that calls to limit French imports 
were due to "French participation in invasion of Egypt in 1956 is only one of our reasons, 
there is also French repression in Algeria and arms supplies to Israel... " adding that the 
resumption of Franco-Egyptian trade would not influence Iraq's attitude '. The list of 
banned products continued into 1962 9. 
3 Oil and Law 80 of 1961 
It was oil which lay at the root of Iraq's links with the West, the relationship being 
channeled largely via the Iraq Petroleum Company. Aside from the notions of revolutions 
and republicanism noted above, French influence was of only marginal importance in the 
birth of republican Iraq. France's primary concern was its quarter share in the IPC. 
6 Dann, U. Irak under Qassem, Israel U. P., Jerusalem, 1969, p. 131. The plot also reportedly involved 
Iraqi Jews. 
Vernier, B. Iraq d'aujourd'hui, Paris, Armand Colin, 1963, p. 238. Vernier's relatively insightful 
book was published to coincide with the reopening of diplomatic ties. Pierre Rondot's preface explicitly cites 
it as part of the "renouveau du rayonnement francais" 
8 "Nous reglons nos affaires economiques sur la base de nos interets politiques", Le Monde, 27.11.58. 
9 "L'Irak renforce le boycottage des produits franrais", Le Monde, 23.8.62. 
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During the first five years of republican Iraq under Qassem, France's interests were largely 
indistinguishable from those of the US, Britain and Dutch administrations, acting via 
CFP's commercial partners in the IPC, Esso, Shell and Mobil. France, at least until 
1964/65, was therefore in an identical position to other western powers. However, the 
stand-off between the IPC partners and the Iraqi authorities, notably over the confiscation 
of oil exploration rights in 1961, was to create confrontation and thus an opportunity for 
France. Friction allowed the CFP and the French government to differentiate themselves 
from British and American approaches to Middle Eastern oil development and middle 
eastern politics more generally by the late sixties. This process of differentiation from 
"Anglo-Saxon" oil companies' policies in Iraq, which began within the IPC, was to 
become a central element of the elaboration of a more proactive French energy policy and 
diplomatic stance in Middle East in the period 1967-72. 
The exceedingly protracted and frequently fractious negotiations which followed the San 
Remo agreement in 1920 (see chapter one), set the pattern for subsequent dealings 
between the IPC and successive Iraqi governments. Chapter one outlined how the initial 
agreement was re-negotiated in 1934. Both the volume of oil lifted, and terms on which 
Iraqi government derived revenue from oil remained a perennial source of conflict. 
Exports of oil from Iraq increased as new pipelines were installed in 1946-47. Revenue 
for government shifted from payment gold sterling to profit sharing, eventually based on a 
50% share. This arrangement was first operated in Venezuela; in 1950 it was established 
between Aramco and Saudi Arabia and became the norm throughout the Middle East. In 
the light of this, in early 1952 a new pricing arrangement, combining a half share of 
"posted prices" and royalties was agreed by the IPC 10. Negotiations were complicated by 
the fact that individual members of the IPC favoured differing pricing strategies. The 
CFP, for whom Iraqi crude was at the core of its activities, favoured a lower posted price. 
It was opposed to incorporating amortisation of exploration and other costs favoured by 
majors, for whom Iraqi supplies just one element in complex financial dossiers within 
10 Penrose, E. & E. F. Iraq; international relations and national development, E. Benn, London, 
1978. pp. 157-160. In France, details were published by the La Documentation Francaise, Documents sur 
le 
petrole de l'Iraq, 5.11.52. 
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which higher Iraqi costs could be offset against activities elsewhere ". The 1952 deal was 
thus exceedingly complex, offering ample scope for criticism by diverse and competing 
political currents in Iraq. 
By the mid-50s oil was central to criticisms of the monarchy and its advisors as support for 
Nasserism and pan-Arabism increased throughout the Middle East. In Iraq this prompted 
calls for nationalisation, targeting in particular the French share of the IPC, due to France's 
involvement not just in the Suez invasion, but also the Algerian war. Nationalisation of 
French shares in the IPC had already been raised in the early 50s after Mossadeq's move in 
neighbouring Iran, and became a persistent theme in the nationalisation debate. In 
February 1958,34 Iraqi MPs submitted a motion to parliament, which proposed 
nationalising the French share in IPC, an effect of both Suez and war in Algeria ' 2. 
Despite the evident effervescence of Iraqi domestic politics, the head of CFP, Victor de 
Metz, thought nationalisation of the company's shares in IPC unlikely. When addressing 
the IPC board in February 1958 he nevertheless stressed the linkages between wider 
French policy in Algeria and economic interests in the Mashreq 13. The change of regime 
in Baghdad in July 1958 had little immediate impact on the IPC. No doubt mindful that 
the bulk of its revenues depended on the IPC, the new government assured the company 
that it would be allowed to continue operating. Nevertheless Qassem's administration did 
gradually elaborate a more radical stance vis-a-vis the IPC; demands included access to 
unexploited oil fields under national control, a revision of the posted price arrangement 
and direct participation in IPC, citing again the original 20% of shares notionally reserved 
for Iraq in the original San Remo agreement. These were made clear to Herridge, then the 
head of the IPC visiting Baghdad a month after the revolution. CFP's De Metz argued 
within the group for the restitution of unexploited fields as a concession to Iraq's demands. 
Indeed in November the IPC agreed it could relinquish claims over 50% of these fields, 
" Penrose, 1978, fn. 6, p. 161. 
12 On the possibility of the nationlisation of IPC following events in Iran in 1951; Agence France 
Press, Les petroles d'Irak seront'ils nationlises? 31.3.51. "La nationalisation de la part francaises..? ", Le 
Monde, 12.2.58. 
13 Catta, 1990, p. 204. 
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but rejected Iraqi claims to participate in the capital of the IPC, under article 8 of the 
original, 1920 San Remo treaty. These points became the subject of protracted negotiations 
between IPC and Iraqi government over next three years. Although calls for the 
nationalisation of the French stake in IPC did not entirely disappear, CFP was reassured by 
Qassem's statement in April 1959 that "the nationalisation of French interests is not on the 
revolutionary government's agenda". This did not stop regular reports that France was to 
be singled out due to its policy in Algeria 14. Although Metz appeared confident that 
nationalisation of only the French share was both legally impossible and politically 
unlikely, he nevertheless stressed to French authorities that broader considerations of 
French Middle Eastern policy, which inevitably prompted anti-French sentiment which 
Arab governments could not ignore 15. Neither de Metz nor the CFP's permanent 
representative to the IPC, Jean Duroc-Danner, minimised the overall threat to the IPC by 
Qassem, who, under pressure from an array of domestic critics was viewed as a volatile 
negotiating partner. Talks continued to be episodic, Iraq upping the stakes in October 
1959 by a 12-fold increase in port charges at Basra. Aggravated government : IPC 
negotiations in August 1960, notably over which areas would be returned to Iraq, were 
now to become enmeshed, and would thus remain for 12 years, with international issues. 
Faced with falling global oil prices posted by companies, from which their national 
revenues were derived, the oil exporting states of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Iran and 
Venezuela met in Baghdad in mid-September 1960 to form the Organisation of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries, OPEC. The impact of the international politics of oil supply and 
price upon the Iraqi negotiations was reinforced by Qassem's appointment in August 1960 
of Dr Salman, who then also became head of OPEC's petroleum office, as Iraqi oil 
minister, although Qassem himself dominated negotiations with the IPC. When Herridge 
returned to Baghdad to reopen negotiations in March 1961, Qassem's increasingly 
beleaguered domestic political position had prompted a more strident set of demands. He 
now insisted on the deduction of "dead rents"; money paid up front during exploration and 
at the time deducted from the price of oil, and urged the suspension of all exploration until 
differences were resolved. In June 1961 he further upped the stakes; making the 
14 "Seule la part franraise de 1'Iraq Petroleum serait nationalisee" Combat, Paris, 10.4.59, and "les 
remous autour du petrole d'Irak", Combat, Paris, 11.4.59. 
103 
resumption of negotiation conditional upon the IPCs acceptance of 20% Iraqi participation, 
increased taxes and control over posted prices. In July 1961 the IPC told the Iraqis they 
were willing to concede 75% of concessions and stop deducting dead rents from revenues 
paid to the government. By this time negotiations were further complicated by Iraq's 
claims over Kuwait, generating strains within OPEC. 
After the failure of the eleventh hour, abortive negotiations between Fisher of Standard Oil 
and Qassem, on December 11 1961 the Iraqi government issued its "law 80". This brought 
the unproductive negotiations to an abrupt close, and established the framework for 
antagonistic IPC-Iraqi relations for the coming decade. Law 80 removed 99.5% of the 
concessions originally attributed to the IPC, leaving the companies just 1900km2. In 
doing so, Qassem removed around 1000km2 of concessions already explored by IPC 
partners notably areas of North Rumailia, which had already yielded promising 
discoveries. For France and the CFP, the move had potentially far more serious 
implications than for the other IPC partners. Although CFP had diversified its activities 
elsewhere in the fifties, Iraq remained its primary market. For France, imports from Iraq 
represented around 20% of total oil imports and Qassem's confiscation of oil exploration 
concessions in October 1961 prompted consternation in France '6 
Yet for the CFP and its president the crisis of 1961 also offered new possibilities. 
Evidently CFP supported its IPC partners in demanding arbitration over the seized 
concessions. Negotiations over this were to drag on for the next eight years. However, 
during 1962 CFP head Victor de Metz saw possibilities of supporting and working with 
Iraqis in pushing for higher IPC production. Law 80 also opened up the possibility of the 
CFP negotiating with Iraq over exploration of domains withdrawn from the IPC, but which 
nevertheless required exploring. This was something that the Iraqi government, which still 
lacked its own national oil company or infrastructure, was unlikely to be able to achieve 
without external assistance. 
15 Catta, 1990, p. 209. 
16 "Kasem peut-il priver la France de petrole? " La Croix, Paris, 15.10.61. 
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Yet during 1962 the CFP worked hard to convince its IPC partners; Mobil, Esso and Shell, 
that the conflict over concessions and law 80 should not be allowed to derail existing plans 
for the expansion of oil output; which stood at 46m tonnes in 1961 with an expansion to 
67m tonnes planned in 1962. Although the issue of Basra port fees was still a problem in 
the south, de Metz feared that any cutback in IPC output would both personally enrage and 
politically compromise Qassem. CFP chairman de Metz appears to have been behind an 
attempt to get a senior non-IPC figure, from either the World Bank or the US State 
Department, to go to Iraq to try and reason with Qassem and restore relations. This 
attempt failed, as Qassem's administration weakened in late 1962 and ties with the outside 
world, including with Arab League states and the United States deteriorated due to Iraq's 
claim over Kuwait in June 1961. Qassem was overthrown and executed by fellow officers 
on 8 February 1963 - 14 Ramadan, as opposed to the 14 July of 1958 when he came to 
power. 
4 1963; diplomatic relations restored 
The removal of Qassem by fellow officers, led by Abd al-Salam Aref and Baathists on 
February 9 1963 came at a crucial moment for France and the CFP. Since late 1962 
French diplomats had been negotiating the restoration of diplomatic ties, in line with de 
Gaulle's policy of re-opening formal relations with Arab states after the end of the war in 
Algeria, as discussed in chapter two. 
In December 1962 a delegation of French academics were received with great pomp in 
Baghdad, ostensibly to participate in a celebration of the work of the Arab philosopher 
Al-Nandi. The group included leading archaeologists and the noted orientatlist Jacques 
Berque. Berque's allocution on Arab philosophy, delivered in Arabic and broadcast on 
radio and television appears to have greatly impressed both Qassem and 
Iraqis generally. 
For Berque it was the start of a life-long involvement in Franco-Iraqi relations which 
continued to his death in 1995 17 . The same week 
foreign minister Hashim Jawad 
17 "le general ... universitaires 
francais", Le Monde, 14.12.62. See also Jacques Berque's posthumous 
collection, Une cause jamais perdue, Albin Michel, 1998, pp. 
258-263. On Berque and Chevenement, and 
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presented a paper to the cabinet proposing Iraq re-open relations with France. In addition 
to the ending of war in Algeria and France's own wish to restore relations, his proposal 
cited "a profound change in France's attitudes to the Arab cause", francophone African 
states criticism of Israel and France's non-recognition of Kuwait. Jawad's proposal also 
stated that " the French shareholders of oil companies operating in Iraq do not share the 
same attitude as other shareholders; a fact which could be advantageous for Iraq" 18. The 
full significance of this observation would develop only gradually over the next five years. 
The Iraqi cabinet formally restored relations on December 12 1962. As the two states 
prepared to exchange diplomats, in January 1963 delegations of businessmen and French 
journalists also visited Baghdad 19. Qassem received the latter at length on the evening of 
February 4. Qassem was overthrown just five days later. The account by Le Monde's 
correspondent Edouard Saab provides a remarkable, prescient insight into the state of mind 
of the president in his final days 20. Qassem was unstinting in his praise of France, "entre 
nous et les peuple frangais il existe des liens que rien n'aurait dü alterer, meme pas la 
guerre d'Algerie". Saab was probably the first to highlight a series of factors which, over 
the coming decades, would become the guiding principles of Franco-Iraqi relations. Thus 
suspicion of Anglo-American designs in the Middle East, French and de Gaulle's support 
for nationalism, and the apparent correspondence between French and Iraqi philosophies, 
echoing Berque's lectures two months earlier, were all cited 21 
The abrupt change of government did not derail the rapprochement. Although the 
temporary suspension of physical and communication links between Baghdad, Damascus 
and Beirut initially delayed negotiations. Fearing Nasserists may have seized power, the 
Syrian government closed its borders. Only when it was clear that Baathists were 
associated with Aref did Michel Aflak arrive, discretely, in Baghdad 
22. The swift 
the Association des Amis de Jacques Berque see footnote 5 in the epilogue, and 
http: //www. multimania. com/aajb/accueil. htm 
'8 W. Jawad parle en faveur de 1a reprise des relations avec la France", Le Monde 18.12.62. 
19 Une mission economique est attendue ä Baghdad, Le Monde, 25.1.62. 
20 "Le general Qassem... ", interview, Le Monde 5.2.63. 
21 Entre la France et 1'Irak c'est le coup de foudre, Le Monde, 6.2.63. 
22 Iraqi-Syrian relations are beyond the scope of this work, although the Cairo-Damascus-Baghdad 
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resumption of Iraqi-Syrian relations allowed France's ambassador in Damascus to 
complete negotiations with his Iraqi counterpart, smoothing the way for the new French 
charge d'affairs, M. Pol Le Gourrierec, to arrive in Baghdad in late February. In 
September 1963 France reopened its embassy, appointing M. Jacques Dumarray as its 
first, post-Suez ambassador 23. 
5 The emergence of a distinctly French approach to Iraqi oil 
The overthrow of Qassem did not prompt the reversal of Law 80. It did however lead to a 
series of more flexible administrations in which civilians played a more prominent role 
and with whom French oil representatives were able to negotiate. CFP representatives 
established good relations with the ministers of finance and petrol, Ibrahim Kubba and 
Abdul Aziz al-Wattari. The statement of Qassem's foreign minister that France's attitude to 
Iraqi oil differed from other shareholders in the IPC was to be realized during this period. 
Qassem's demise did not end the internecine struggles within civilian and military elites. 
Nine months after the Baathists seized power, they were replaced by Abdul Salam Aref in 
November 1963. Aref made extensive use of civilian and technocratic administrations. 
The ensuing years of exceedingly convoluted negotiations revolved around four issues. 
Firstly arbitration over Law 80 itself, secondly the overall level of production, and thus 
revenues, from the IPC fields already in production and thirdly the formula for revenue 
sharing. The fourth, more complex, long-term issue was potential negotiations with Iraq 
over how the concessions confiscated under Law 80 might eventually be developed if and 
when the IPC accepted it could not reclaim them. The CFP and France were able to 
differentiate themselves from the other IPC partners on all four of these issues. In 
particular the fourth allowed France the greatest potential leeway to expand its domestic 
oil industry via its involvement in Iraq. 
It was clear that if the Iraqi government did retain control of those concessions, given that 
it still lacked its own national oil company or infrastructure, it would require external 
triangle provided the framework in which French policy had to operate. See also Amin, S. Irak et Syrie, 
1960-1980, Editions de Minuit, Paris, c1982? 
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assistance. Thus in the event of negotiation and arbitration not leading to the IPC 
recovering the concessions there would be new opportunities for foreign companies to 
invest in Iraqi oil under different terms. Thus tension between western solidarity within the 
IPC against the Iraqi government and cooperation with the same Iraqi authorities in 
developing their oil industry, was the key source of contradiction during the period 
1963-73. 
In these negotiations, the 1962 [? ] observations of Qassem's oil minister quoted above - 
that French interests were different from other IPC shareholders - were to become 
increasingly important. This was particularly true on two of the four issues outlined 
above; the need to maximise current output, and its willingness to cooperate with Iraq in 
developing the oil fields nationalised under Qassem's law 80. 
The US and Anglo-Dutch members of IPC, Mobil, Shell and BP had ample reserves 
elsewhere. They thus favoured reducing production as a tactic in order to try and force the 
Iraqis to arbitration over law 80 as part of a confrontational strategy. They also feared that 
concessions to the Iraqis would weaken their position vis-a-vis other producing 
governments. The CFP, for whom Iraqi crude remained its prime source of supply, 
favoured compromise and accommodation with the Iraqi government. In this is was 
partially supported by Shell 24. The CFP therefore had a common interest with Iraq in 
wanting to maximize output while negotiations continued over Law 80 and other 
outstanding issues. The Iraqis were acutely aware of this. From 1963 they viewed the 
CFP as favoured partners within the IPC. This had two effects. Firstly CFP shook-off its 
"sleeping partner" role and played a pro-active role in negotiations. Indeed from 1963 the 
CFP's delegate to the IPC, Jean Duroc-Danner, became the lead negotiator in IPC: Iragi 
negotiations, something that the other IPC majors reluctantly accepted simply because the 
Frenchman obtained results. Secondly closer cooperation with the CFP - coupled with the 
restoration of diplomatic ties - allowed for a gradual broadening of the French presence in 
Iraq. 
23 Reprise des relations diplomatiques... J-F Chauvel, Le Figaro, 20.2.63. 
24 Penrose, 1978, p. 387. 
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Following Qassem's overthrow in February 1963, the new minister of petrol Wattart, and a 
senior official, Okeili (later to become the first director of the national oil company) 
requested a meeting with Victor de Metz and Jean Duroc-Danner. They specifically 
requested that CFP assist in reaching a compromise with the whole of the IPC. Shortly 
afterwards Duroc-Danner's successful resolving of the problem of port fees at Basra 
boosted CFP's standing within the IPC 25. This in turn meant that Duroc-Danner, who had 
forged excellent personal and professional ties with Wattari in particular, played the lead 
role over the subsequent two years in hammering out a compromise agreement over law 
80. 
Meanwhile both the national, and international politics of oil were evolving. After 
estrangement from OPEC (and the Arab League) following Qassem's attempt to annex 
Kuwait at its independence in June 1961, in December 1964 Iraq under Aref resumed a 
role within OPEC at its fifth meeting. In February 1964 Iraq had created the Iraq National 
Oil Company (INOC), denying this was in preparation for nationalisation, but making 
clear that INOC could develop North Rumaila and other law 80 concessions. 
In July 1965, under Wattari and Duroc-Danners' stewardship, an outline agreement was 
reached between the IPC and the Iraqi authorities. This gave Iraq, via the newly created 
INOC, a 30% stake in a new company, the Baghdad Oil Company in which the IPC 
members also held stakes, which would develop the areas nationalised in 1961. However, 
in July 1965 a change of government derailed the agreement resulting in a further two 
years of stalemate. The 1965 agreement in part fell victim to shifts within Iraqi politics, in 
which government oil revenues, and control over national resources were key issues 
26. 
The Yahya government fell, and oil minister Wattari was replaced; the deal initialed just a 
few weeks later, thus becoming moribund under the new al-Bazzaz administrations. 
Political uncertainty was compounded as the presidency itself changed following the death 
of Abdul Salem Aref and his replacement by his brother Abdul Rahman Aref in August 
25 Pean, Serini 1982, p. 104. 
26 Penrose, 1978, p. 389. 
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1966. 
This stalling of the Duroc Danner: Wattari IPC agreement, from which CFP hoped to 
emerge with considerable credit from both the Iraqis and its partners in the IPC, coupled 
with the suspension of oil deliveries due to dispute with Syria from September 1966 put 
considerable pressure on the CFP 27. By early 1967 such problems were compounded by 
the fact that the Italian oil group, ENI, were reportedly negotiating with INOC to develop 
the North Rumailia field, the most lucrative part of the disputed concessions confiscated 
under Law 80 of 1961. 
During this period the CFP established a broader Middle Eastern presence, entering into 
agreements elsewhere in the Gulf, including Iran and the Emirates. As was the case in Iraq, 
it was initially the sole French presence in such territories. As such it acted as catalyst for 
those few people, be they academics or politicians, with a stake in increasing the French 
presence in Arab East. This link was formalised by the fact that Vincent Labouret, an 
official from the Quai d'Orsay, was seconded to CFP specifically to assist Victor de Metz 
on international issues. From 1965 onwards the CFP also funded scholarships for Middle 
Eastern students in Paris; creating the Centre d'accuil des etudiants du proche orient 
which at the time became a focal point for Middle Eastern students and Arabs in Paris 28. 
6, The impact of the June `67 war on oil policy 
Chapter two demonstrated the degree to which the stance of the French government, in this 
case clearly de Gaulle in a personal capacity, over the war of June 1967 abruptly altered 
perceptions of French diplomacy both at home and in the corridors of Arab and Western 
governments. June 1967 equally marked a watershed in French energy and oil policy. It 
added a more explicit and compelling linkage between France's general diplomatic 
"re-invention" of Arab policy underway since 1962, and the needs of domestic energy 
27 Catta, 1992, p. 458-60. Penrose, 1978, p. 392. 
28 Catta, 1992, p. 457. Interview with Vincent Labouret, Paris, 1996. On links between CFP, 
Rondot, the journal L'Orient, and middle east studies, see Fremaux, J. Le monde arabe et la securite de la 
France, PUF, Paris, 1995, pp. 268-71. 
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policy, most particularly France's dependence upon imported oil. 
Within the Middle East, the war of 1967 had two additional effects, both of which France 
was able to turn to her advantage. For the Arab oil producing states it further marked the 
radicalisation of policies, with intertwined debates over Palestine, relations with the West 
and control of oil resources all exacerbating the tensions between and within Arab states. 
Finally it brought the cold war more firmly into the Middle East, stimulating and 
accelerating a regional arms race. The period 1967-74 (from the June 1967 war to the 
death of Pompidou) sees the interweaving of these three concerns; Arab politics, oil 
exports and arms imports, into a moderately coherent, albeit oft-criticised, framework of 
French Arab Policy. Although gestating since 1962, the contours of this policy became 
clearly discernible in the intense months between June 1967 and the visit of General Aref 
to Paris in February 1968. 
From the Iraqi perspective, the June 1967 war acted as a catalyst in French energy policy 
towards Iraq and the Middle East in two ways. Firstly it spurred Iraqi plans to control their 
own oil reserves via their national oil company, hardening attitudes to the stalled IPC 
negotiations and making a compromise agreement over Law 80 unacceptable. Secondly, it 
therefore meant that Iraq had to seek non-IPC partners in oil development. In practice this 
opened opportunities for companies from both France and the Soviet Union. 
Any hopes that the Wattari-IPC agreement might be implemented were irrevocably dashed 
by the war, which prompted the Iraqi government to take a series of measures. The most 
important of these was Law 97 of 16 August 1967 which awarded the state oil company 
INOC exclusive rights over the concessions expropriated in 1961 under Law 80. This 
meant that in practice the IPC would and could not re-gain control of North Rumailia, 
(although it would be another six years before the legal wrangling over this came to an 
end). Shortly afterwards, Law 123 decisively restructured the INOC with a view to 
enabling it to independently take control of exploration and production. Simultaneously, 
Adib al-Jadir was appointed as INOC head in a restructuring which meant that oil officials 
who had painstaking negotiated the Wattari compromise deal with Duroc-Danner and the 
IPC were demoted. This occurred against a background of acute hostility to the US and 
UK due to their support for Israel in the war, tarring the "Anglo-Saxon" majority within 
IPC ever more firmly with anti-Zionist rhetoric. 
It was in this respect that De Gaulle's critical stance towards Israel became so crucial. By 
decisively sanctioning Israel, in such marked contrast to all other western powers, France, 
and thus her oil companies and other commercial interests in Iraq and in the Middle East, 
emerged with an extraordinarily enhanced credibility. Although CFP was de jure and de 
facto an integral part of the IPC, the likelihood of it acting independently from the other 
IPC partners was considerably boosted after June 1967. Thus the singularity of the CFP 
within the IPC stable, a notion which had been fostered during the arduous 
Duroc-Danner: Wattari negotiations, was heightened in 1967, as war exacerbated the 
national fault lines in the IPC edifice. Thus over the subsequent eight months, it was 
assumed that companies from either France or the Soviet Union were the best placed to 
develop oil and other commercial relations in conjunction with the INOC. 
Thus the war had a contradictory impact upon the CFP. Law 97, effectively ending the 
debate over Rumailia, shook the IPC, further widening the cracks between its 
multi-national components, providing more space for the CFP to go it alone and 
consolidate the special bilateral relationship between Iraq and France nurtured by Wattari 
and Duroc-Danner. Yet in the short-term the suspension of oil deliveries and disruption to 
transport facilities due to the closure of the Suez Canal caused the company grave concern. 
However, a month after hostilities Victor de Metz was already looking forward; just as the 
fall of Qassem in 1963 had been seized by the CFP as an opportunity, so de Metz tried to 
steer a path through the watershed of June 1967, hoping it would act either as a catalyst for 
the resolution of the IPC: Iraq dispute in its entirety , or open the way 
for a new strategy for 
the CFP acting alone 29. 
7 Intra-French competition, CFP versus ERAP/E1f 
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The opportunity and possibility of the latter strategy emerged clearly in late August 1967, 
two weeks after the passing of Law 97. The Iraqi authorities approached Paris, via its 
ambassador in Baghdad, Pierre Gorse, asking the government to nominate a French 
company with which Iraq could discuss the future development of Iraqi oil. It would be 
natural at this point to assume (as, presumably, did the Iraqi authorities) that in initiating 
such an approach, that the French government would nominate the CFP to assume such a 
role, not least because the CFP was already present in Baghdad and its personnel 
well-known to Iraqi officials. 
In fact the CFP office in Baghdad was not told directly of the approach. Instead the 
ambassador passed the request directly to the Quai d'Orsay. While the Quai and foreign 
minister Couve de Murville were generally well disposed to the CFP, the message then 
went to the President. De Gaulle himself, whether due to capriciousness or clairvoyance 
remains unclear, decided to throw his weight, and that of the French state, behind, not the 
CFP, but that of its principal rival, the recently amalgamated, state-owned oil company 
ERAP/Elf. 
De Gaulle was open to the views of the leading figures in ERAP, Pierre Guillaumat and 
Jean Blanchard, who argued in particular that if France failed to act decisively, the Italian 
state oil interest ENI, would enter Iraq. Franco-ENI rivalry was acute due to the Italian's 
apparent support for the FLN in Algeria - where the main French oil interests were run by 
ERAP. Despite the enthusiasm and influence of Guillaumat, there were nevertheless 
voices of caution, in ERAP, largely due to reserves about nature of Aref regime in 
Baghdad. Couve de Murville, de Gaulle's foreign minister was also opposed to favouring 
ERAP. Yet de Gaulle perceived that CFP "was British", and as such too closely aligned to 
IPC and oil majors. He therefore decided that while CFP would continue to attempt to 
protect French oil interests within IPC, ERAP would operate in competition 30. Once this 
decision was made, the Quai d'Orsay nevertheless immediately sent two officials to 
Baghdad in order to clarify that that CFP could also submit a bid. Thus in October 1967 
29 Catta, 1990, p. 463. 
30 Pean, Serini, 1982, p. 108. 
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Iraqi oil officials were faced with two rival French bids to work with INOC in the areas 
taken from IPC in 1961; one from ERAP, one from the CFP acting independently of the 
IPC. 
Before examining the outcome of this convoluted initiative, we should ask why de Gaulle 
chose this strategy. Three factors weighed; two French one Iraqi. Firstly if ERAP's bid 
was successful, it would greatly strengthen the company, which was under pressure in 
Algeria. Secondly it would irritate the "Anglo-Saxon" IPC. Thirdly, de Gaulle and his 
officials also calculated, correctly as it turned out, that it would be easier for Iraq to strike a 
deal with a company which was independent of IPC, thus avoiding the necessity of linking 
the new, post June 67 developments with a settlement of the IPC disupte over Law 80. 
To fully understand this logic requires a brief explanation of the origins and nature of 
ERAP and the rivalry between what became the two French oil giants, as well as the 
personalised nature of this rivalry. As explained in chapter one, CFP was from its 
inception a private company in which the state had a controlling stake. However, ERAP 
(which, confusingly, became known as Elf during this period) was a very different 
creature, being entirely state-owned as a result of the consolidation in the mid-sixties of the 
state's disparate initiatives at oil exploration throughout the Empire during the Fourth 
Republic. The Bureau de recherches de petrole (BRP), had been created in October 1945, 
to liaise with and coordinate existing companies, notably SNPA, and Rap (SN Repal.. ), 
and the Union generales des petroles (UGP). This move was aimed to put an end to the 
struggles both between French groups, which were mostly small and lacked both research 
and production economies of scale, and with the foreign majors within France. Research 
for petrol in French territories, notably Africa (Gabon) and the Maghreb. By the early 
sixties these companies were cooperating with CFP, notably in Algeria, (CFP Repal) and 
then from January 1963 in the North Sea. ERAP was born formally in 1 January 1966, as 
the Enterprise de recherches et d'activites petrolieres (ERAP), as a fusion of BRP and 
RAP 31. This was put under the control of key Gaullist Pierre Guillaumat. Andre Giraud 
was then at the head of Dica. Guillaumat had himself appointed Giraud when both were in 
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the Institut Francais des petroles (IFP) in the 1950s. The professional background of 
these two men, as those of the several key technocrats around them, overlapped 
considerably. They shared an education in the elite schools of mines as well as Gaullist 
political persuasions. Guillaumat had headed the state's nuclear energy and arms body, the 
Commissariat Bl 'energie atomique CEA in the 1960s, before becoming briefly de 
Gaulle's minister of defense. Giraud was appointed to head the CEA in the 1970s and then 
the ministry of industry. Thus both men would have extensive dealings with Franco-Iraqi 
ties in the seventies. Giraud would again be involved in Iraqi issues in 1986-88 as Jacques 
Chirac's cohabitationiste defense minister. Competition between French oil companies 
over access to Iraqi oil therefore had both personal and broader French oil policy 
dimensions. The personal aspect was the acute rivalry between Guillaumat and de Metz, 
itself reflecting the myriad of competing interests at the summit of French oil policy in the 
late sixties. The broader context was that of diversifying France's oil supplies. If Elf could 
get their hands on Iraq oil, perhaps as a foothold to Rurnailia, it would reverse its growing 
weakness in Algeria, where it was clear that from 1965 the authorities wanted to establish 
national control over oil and gas. 
While the state backed the ERAP bid in Iraq, it was assumed that CFP would also apply. 
This was correct, CFP to the grand damn of the other IPC partners, quickly mounted its 
own, individual bid, thus rupturing inter-IPC solidarity. CFP now openly broke from the 
IPC consensus, tabling its own bid for North Rumailia in October 1967. A CFP 
delegation left for Baghdad in early October 1967. This was headed by Vincent Labouret, 
seconded to the company by the Quai d'Orsay, and CFP's financial director, Francois 
Berbigier. The mission was accompanied by Andre Giraud, the directeur de carbons 
(DICA) in the ministry of industry. This CFP team left Paris on October 16. Yet the 
ERAP team arrived just four days later, 
Fifteen years later, Duroc-Danner, remained convinced that if ERAP hadn't charged in, a 
resolution of the IPC dossier would have been possible. In retrospect it seems that the 
issue was mismanaged by Olivier Guichard, de Gaulle's minister of industry. In particular 
31 Pean, 1982, p. 108. 
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he misjudged the acute personal and professional rivalry between Guillaumat and de Metz. 
Guillaurnat was clear that it was the backing of de Gaulle which was decisive, having 
convinced the General that the CFP was compromised, both in Iraqi eyes and in terms of 
Gaullist foreign policy, by its association with the "Anglo-Saxon" IPC. Guillaumat was 
one of the few to go on record about the incident: "we would have never been able to enter 
... 
Iraq. The CFP was English and we raised the French flag in Baghdad for the first time" 
32 
"In Iraq it was ERAP which was chosen by the French government, in fact by the 
presidency, while foreign affairs wanted to leave the CFP to act alone in order to 
avoid conflict with Great Britain. The general was happy to use ERAP to irritate 
the British and have two French groups competing in the Middle East. Victor de 
Metz took this as heresy" 33 
In the end, de Metz's attempt to promote a CFP bid separately from the IPC failed. ERAP 
initialed an agreement with INOC on November 23 1967, covering a joint exploration and 
production agreement for a concession of 11,000km2. However, this did not include 
North Rumailia. Significantly, the agreement was a "service contract", in principle a 
partnership between Iraq and a foreign partner, rather than a "concession". It was modeled 
on a similar service contract that ERAP/Elf had earlier signed with the Iranian government 
34 The deal was widely hailed, in Iraq and elsewhere in the Arab world as a significant 
breakthrough in the struggle between the producer nations and foreign companies. Iraq's 
prime minister Tahir Yahya declared it "an important step towards breaking the monopoly 
of foreign oil companies operating in Iraq" 35, its significance was that it marked a break 
with the agreements at that time operating between Arab oil producers and the oil majors, 
being regarded as both far more beneficial for national governments that the old 
concession system, and as a step towards state sovereignty over the oil industry. 
32 Nan, 1982, pp. 72-75. 
33 Catta, 1990, p. 464. 
34 De Gaulle's attitude towards Iran, which he did visit, requires some investigation. See Faith S. 
L'Iran et de Gaulle, Univercites, Paris, 1999. 
35 L'Aurore, 5.2.68. 
116 
The INOC: ERAP agreements was thus part of Iraq's rapidly evolving national policy. The 
following month, in December 1967, an agreement was outlined with the Soviet Union 
which greatly boosted INOC's activities. In April 1968 INOC announced that it would 
alone develop North Rumailia. It now appears that the Iraqi authorities never had any 
serious intention of negotiating over Rumailia. Rather the Iraqi authorites wanted a 
preferential tie with a western country prior to confronting the IPC. Jader also suggested 
to Duroc-Danner that in fact Iraq only sought to keep open the negotiations over Rumailia 
until after the visit of General Aref to Paris in February 1968 36. However, this sits 
uneasily with the impression Duroc-Danner gave Pean that an IPC: Iraq deal was possible 
had not de Gaulle backed ERAP. 
At the end of 1967 it appeared that both French and Iraqi governments had benefited from 
the deal. The French state, in the shape of Elf, had established a foot-hold in Iraq, 
outwitting its main commercial rivals in the shape of the Anglo-Saxon oil giants. From 
Elf s point of view they also appeared to have secured supply of oil (despite the rivalry 
between ERAP and CFP, ERAP had obtained CFP/IPC surveys of the areas, and thus 
knew that the availability of ample supplies of cheap, good quality crude oil appeared a 
near certainty. Many in Iraq's oil establishment were also aware of this, and the sharing of 
insider information between the (ostensibly rival) French companies would be a source of 
polemic in years to come. 
8 Increased bilateral contacts prior to General Arefs trip to France 
The INCO-Elf contract initialed in November 1967 was formally ratified by the Iraqi 
cabinet on February 4, just three days prior to Aref s trip to France. The agreement was 
signed in Baghdad by Jean Blanchard, vice president of ERAPElf, Pierre Guillaumat's 
number two 37. The context of state visit of the Iraqi president, General Abdul Rahman 
Aref to Paris in early February 1968, thus contained four key components; 
36 Catta, 1990, fn 7 p. 470. 
37 While Guillaumat continued at Elf, two months later Blanchard became head of the delegation 
generale pour 1'armement (DGA), Nan, 1982, p. 131. 
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" de Gaulle's criticism of Israel in June 1967, 
" the euphoric reception of this stance among Arab states, 
" the Iraqi authorities' convoluted oil negotiations with both Elf, CFP and 
Soviet interests between August 1967 and spring 1968, and 
" Iraq's desire to acquire arms after the Arab defeat of June 1967. 
From the French perspective, Aref s visit was clearly intended to crown France's post June 
67 prestige in the Arab world. Receiving the Iraqi president would hopefully consolidate 
the series of bilateral ties and visits by Arab dignitaries over the previous five years (see 
chapter 2). The trip thus was both a practical manifestation of France's revived Arab 
policy, and an opportunity for more detailed negotiations over oil and other commercial 
deals France hoped to sign with Iraq. It was to be the first of three such visits of Iraqi 
leaders, Saddam Hussein, (although still not technically head of state), making similar trips 
in 1972 and 1975 (see chapter 4, section 4 and chapter 5, section 6). 
However, despite the symbolism invested in the 1968 Aref trip by both Iraqi and French 
governments, the visit triggered significant protests in France, and produced few of the 
immediate, tangible benefits anticipated by the French authorities. 
Bilateral ties intensified markedly during late 1967. In addition to the ERAP/Elf 
negotiations and the commercial credits, an Iraqi military delegation visited Paris in 
December 1967. This was headed by the deputy chief of staff, Hassan Sabri. It was this 
visit which triggered the initial speculation that Baghdad was negotiating to purchase 
Dassault's Mirage III. Such speculation intensified during Aref s trip two months later. As 
such it became inextricably intertwined with the hostility of the French press and public to 
the Middle East arms embargo De Gaulle had declared against all front line states, but 
targeting Israel in particular, in June 1967. On November 7 foreign minister Couve de 
Murville reiterated that the embargo would be maintained. However, by the time Hassan 
Sabri's Iraqi delegation arrived a month later, the position had clearly shifted. The 
embargo was modified to exclude only arms with "clear offensive characteristics", 
118 
generally interpreted as attack aircraft 38. The government let it be known, albeit indirectly 
via agence france presse, that it was intent on diversifying its arms sales policy in the 
Middle East. It declared that it no longer wanted to be in what it termed an "exclusive 
alliance" with Israel, implying that it was preferable that Iraq be equipped with Mirages 
rather than Migs. This "better French than red" justification would be used repeatedly in 
the early seventies to justify new arms sales to Arab clients. It is from this period that 
members of the powerful Delegation generale pour l'armement (DGA) began to visit 
Baghdad. A French military delegation also visited Baghdad in mid-January 1968, with 
negotiations continuing on artillery and armed vehicle sales, with a deal on artillery being 
initialed by the head of the DGA's international section, General Bonte, in April 39. 
Such visits received scant attention in the press and the government was clearly concerned 
over adverse publicity. A subsequent deal to sell Mirage planes to Libya concluded early 
in the Pompidou presidency (see chapter 4) would be concluded in almost complete 
secrecy. 
Even the minimal publicity accorded the contacts with Iraq inevitably exacerbated the 
general hostility towards the embargo and potential arms deals with Arab countries in the 
French press. Not surprisingly, several reports alleged that the same Mirages embargoed 
for Israel would be sold to Iraq. Sabri's visit and the possibility of arms sales to Iraq also 
prompted protests from Iraqi Kurds, and Iran 40 
Again, it should be noted that Franco-Iraqi ties were just one element of the drive towards 
sales in the Middle East. Also in December 1967 De Gaulle received Youssef Zouayen, 
the head of the Syrian government, and possible deals with Libya, Saudi Arabia, and 
Lebanon were evoked in the press. At this date, alongside Israel, only Lebanon had 
actually purchased French weaponry in the Middle East. However, Dassault had agreed to 
sell Pakistan 24 Mirage III in early 1966. 
38 France Soir, 8.12.67, Le Monde, 9.12.67, International Herald Tribune, 8.12.67. 
39 Le Monde, 18.1.68. 
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The Elf deal of November 1967, and ongoing discussions on arms sales were not the only 
facets of the new relationship. Paris had already agreed to provide trade credits of 
FFr225m to Baghdad as part of a wider commercial accord signed on June 25 1967 in 
Paris during the visit of the minister for planning, Yacub Al Saidi. Just prior to Aref s 
visit, Iraq announced that it would open a cultural centre in Paris, headed by the Iraqi 
representative to UNESCO. This consolidated the cultural accord signed by France in 
Baghdad early in 1966. It was only during preparations for Aref s visit to Paris in 1968 that 
it emerged that the Iraqi foreign minister Pachachi had visited Paris privately during early 
1966, during which he had held private meeting with de Gaulle and his foreign minister 
Couve de Murville 4' 
. 
9 Aref in Paris; February 1968 
In the new year of 1968, General Aref s impending trip to Paris was presented by both 
governments as representing an important milestone in bilateral relations. However, before 
narrating Aref s trip, it is important to note that the Iraqi authorities already viewed their 
evolving policies towards both France and the Soviet Union as being closely inter-linked. 
This was true both in terms of Iraq's specific oil policy requirements and general foreign 
policy aims. Indeed the extent to which Iraqi leaders explicitly linked, and 
counter-balanced their ties with France and the Soviet Union, dates from this period. The 
counter-balancing of Iraq's ties with France on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the 
other, was further complicated by deep divisions within Iraqi oil and government circles 
over the stance to take with each power. However, the extent of Soviet-Iraqi oil 
cooperation only become evident after Aref s visit to France, indeed, as suggested above, it 
may have been that the announcement of what later emerged as the Soviet-Iraqi oil 
agreement of April 1968 was deliberately delayed until after Arefs Paris trip. This 
Franco-Soviet linkage was to be an equally pertinent policy issue in the months prior to the 
simultaneous nationalisation of Iraqi oil and Saddam Hussein's visit to Paris in June 1972 
(examined in more detail in chapter 4). 
40 Combat, 12.12.67. 
41 La Nation, 7.2.68 
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Undoubtedly Aref also saw closer ties with France, hailed throughout the Arab world as its 
lone western ally, since June 1967, as boosting his own status within the wider Arab 
world. Thus speaking to French journalists in Baghdad in December, Aref set the broad 
themes and tone of the speeches he would present in Paris; "contrary to the US and Britain, 
who continue to interfere in the affairs of Arab countries, France has no ambitions of 
colonialism or economic domination ... this is why Iraq in particular is increasingly 
interested in extensive cooperation with her. " He also denied that the oil and arms deals 
were in any way linked 42. Addressing a French military delegation who were in Baghdad 
the week before he left for Paris, Aref stated; "the attitude of general de Gaulle towards 
Arab problems, his respect for sovereignty and rejection of all foreign domination have 
provided the solid foundations for the establishment of good relations between our two 
countries. The position taken concerning the Zionist aggression has prompted the 
profound respect of the government and people of Iraq, both for De Gaulle personally, and 
his government " 43. These themes were to be repeated, by both Iraqi and French 
presidents, during Aref s four day trip. The symbolic resonance of the trip was evidently 
echoed in the Arab press coverage, and was deliberately played up by Aref and his 
entourage during his stopovers in Cairo both en-route to, and from, Paris 44 
Aref his wife and an entourage of 30 arrived in Nice on February 6. The next day he was 
met at Orly in the driving rain by De Gaulle himself, his prime minister George Pompidou, 
and the armed forces minister Pierre Messmer. The rank of this reception reflected the 
pomp, expense and symbolism that the French invested in the visit. The programme 
included three tete-a-tete discussions with De Gaulle himself, gala diners at the L'Elysee, 
the Quai d'Orsay and the Hotel de Ville, as well as a visit to the Institut francais du petrole 
(IFP), where 15 Iraqis had been undergoing training since 1965. For much of the visit 
42 Paris-Presse, 12.12.67 
43 Le Monde, 25.1.68. 
as Al-Ahram (Cairo), quoted in Le Monde, 13.2.68. David Hirst encapsulated English-language press 
coverage noting that the trip marked "the consumation of a Franco-Arab entente", Guardian, Manchester, 
7.2.68. Nick Herbert for the Times in Beirut echoes the view of "De Gaulle's recent performance in the 
Middle East [as] a sort of super confidence trick whereby the Arabs are supposed to have been lulled into 
forgetting French aid to Israel so that both sides can cynically engage in sharp practice at the expense of 
121 
Aref was accompanied by the minister of industry, Olivier Guichard, the man responsible 
six months earlier for implementing De Gaulle's decision to promote ERAP/Elf rather than 
the CFP in Iraq. In addition there were the inevitable stopovers at the Opera, tomb of the 
unknown soldier and Versailles. 
From the evidence available, discussions appear to have focussed equally on the post-June 
1967 geo-strategic problems of the Middle East and bilateral Franco-Iraqi relations. The 
brief communique, drafted on February 10 only after considerable disagreement, was 
predictably long on pledges of fraternal cooperation and short on details 45. The two 
presidents' keynote speeches focussed primarily on the Israeli-Arab conflict, although both 
men noted the potential for increased bilateral ties, only De Gaulle mentioned the 
ERAP/Elf deal, adding that "a lot more could yet be achieved" in the oil sector by direct 
discussion 46. Yet despite a prolonged discussion in the L'Elysee on February 9, no 
contracts were signed and the final communique made no mention of progress on either oil 
or arms dossiers. 
The visit triggered substantial press interest in France. Press reports focussed primarily on 
the possibility of arms sales and more substantial oil sector cooperation in the wake of the 
Elf deal. In the run-up to the visit, the possibility of ERAP/Elf also gaining a major 
contract for sulfur production at al-Mishraq, south of Mosul, was widely envisaged 47. 
Given the overwhelming hostility to the possibility of arms sales to Arab states manifested 
in the French press at the time, several people with existing connections to Iraq attempted 
to present the positive side of such contacts. Pierre Rondot (an influential colonial 
administrator who headed CHEAM)attempted to simultaneously justify Iraqi trade and 
reassure Israeli and Kurdish critics of such ties. Pierre Rossi, who like Rondot had 
longstanding Iraq and CFP ties, also wrote of the commercial potential, noting that such 
ties could only be developed over the long-term 4&. However, such articles were largely 
Anglo-Saxons" Times, London 7.2.68. 
as Le Monde 11-12.2.99, Texte officiels in, Articles et documents, Paris, 1.3.68. 
46 Le Monde, 9.2.68. 
47 Nothing came of this, Iraq developed el-Mishraq itself, with Soviet assistance. 
48 Le probleme de la liverasion d'armes a ('Irak, La Croix, 11-12.2.68. 
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overshadowed by those expressing indignation at the ferocity of Aref s attack on Israel, 
notably the denunciation of what he termed "cowardly Zionist aggression" during his 
speech at the Hotel de Ville. In many respects such reporting represented a continuation of 
the hostile press coverage of De Gaulle's attitude towards Israel which he had stirred up the 
previous November (see chapter 2, section 7). 
Despite the lack of contracts signed, one press article of the time suggested, not without 
ambiguity, that Aref s trip to Paris had nevertheless had the effect of opening up the Arab 
world's commercial "door of dreams" to France 49. While the trip appears significant, what 
did it in fact achieve? Indeed one could ask what purpose do any such trips serve? On the 
oil front little appears to have been achieved. Despite the fanfare surrounding ERAP/Elf s 
deal, ceremoniously ratified on the eve of Arefs departure for France, and the jingoistic 
speculation in the French press about commercial benefits, there is no evidence that the 
Iraqis seriously considered that Elf or CFP might participate in the development of the 
North Rumailia field. During Aref s trip, the one journalist to interview Aref directly did 
push him on the likelihood of preferential treatment for French oil interests. Aref replied 
"of course Franco-Iraqi friendship is a factor taken into consideration in the (tractations) 
negotiations under way" and that "France will be given priority" if the CFP offer (on 
Rumailia) was of interest 50. Yet in April it was announced that INOC itself would 
develop the field, with assistance from the Soviet Union. Indeed not only did neither 
French company get a look-in on Rumailia, but, as explained below, Elf s deal of 
November 1967 soon turned sour. 
On arms, the picture was more complex. As explained above, numerous contacts had 
already taken place between French and Iraqi military delegations. During Aref s trip to 
Paris, agreement was reached over the delivery of 72 artillery pieces 51. It also seems clear 
49 The smiles of Baghdad and Paris..., Temoignage Chretien, 15.2.68. 
so Eric Rouleau, Le Monde, 10.2.68. 
51 Le Monde 13.4.68; this order would comprise 32 Mirage V and 22 Mirage III; 16 version E 
(ground attack), 4 version B (trainers) and 2 reconnaissance planes. Bonte was at this time head of the 
international affairs division of the DGA. He was replaced by Huges de 1'Estoile in following the January 
1969 scandal of Israeli speedboats spirited out of Cherbourg in contravention of the embargo. 
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that between December 1967 and April 1968 detailed discussions occurred over the sale of 
up to 54 Mirage aircraft, with a protocol agreement worth a reported FFr620m being 
signed in Baghdad by General Louis Bonte in mid-April 52. The question remains as to 
what, if any, linkage either party to the agreement had envisaged between the oil and arms 
dossiers? Did the French pursue the arms negotiations partly because they felt it would 
enhance the likelihood of a French company getting the Rumailia concession? Or was it 
the other way around? Is it just coincidence that INOC's decision to develop Rumailia 
alone was announced almost simultaneously with the French arms deal? 
As Aref was about to leave for his final meeting with De Gaulle, Le Monde's young 
correspondent asked him about political liberalisation, Aref answered summarily that this 
would occur "soon". Five months later Aref was overthrown, casting a further shadow and 
set of question marks over the achievements of the February 1968 visit. 
10 Controversy surrounding the Elf deal and the hiatus of 1969-71 
As seen above, the ERAP/Elf "service contract" signed in November 1967 was hailed as a 
practical and symbolic milestone by both France (denting the Anglo-American cartel in the 
region) and Iraq (the first foreign agreement with INOC, thus a step towards national 
control and ownership). Yet paradoxically the agreement very quickly turned sour and 
within the year was proving to be a hindrance rather than a help to Franco-Iraqi relations. 
Even before it was signed the deal was controversially enmeshed in Iraq's bitter internal 
power struggles. Iraq's oil technocrats ousted in August 1967 - those who had negotiated 
so painstakingly with the IPC to 1965 - contested the terms on which Adib el-Jaber and the 
new INOC management came to agreement with ERAP/Elf. In particular critics argued 
Elf already had the geological data on the areas to be explored, (passed to them by the 
CFP), so knew they were taking very little risk. The deposed head of INOC (Ghanen 
el-Okeili) vehemently denounced the Elf deal as being detrimental to Iraq's interests in the 
Lebanese press on 7 January 1968. The suggestion, by Okeili and others at the time, was 
that the decision had been taken essentially for political reasons by those commonly 
52 Guillaumat quoted in Nan, 1982, p. 112. 
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termed the "leftist" or Nasserist cliques around al-Jadir. They favored dealing with 
ERAP/Elf rather than coming to a comprehensive settlement with the IPC, something 
which may have provided better returns for Iraq and INOC, but required compromise with 
US interests. The importance of these criticisms was greatly amplified by the overthrow 
of the Aref government in July 1968. Adib el-Jader and others who had supported the Elf 
deal were swiftly removed from power amid allegations of corruption, part of which may 
have been linked to the deal. Meanwhile in April 1968 ERAP/Elf actually began 
exploration in the 11,000km2 area allocated to them under the November 1967 deal. Here, 
practical problems also arose, notably over the use of Iraqi staff. Then when oil was 
discovered in the area, known as the Buzurgan field, it proved to be of poor quality. 
Although Elf continued to work in Iraq throughout the period, these disagreements and 
distrust between INOC and France continued as negotiation between the post-July 1968 
Baathist authorities and the IPC made little progress during 1969-71. 
Initial disputes over staffing were exacerbated by various arguments between those in the 
new government and Elf, notably wrangling over the financial arrangements of the 
contract. This issue was further complicated by the February 1972 "Tehran agreement" on 
international oil pricing, which prompted Iraq to try to revise the terms of the Buzurgan 
contract. By 1971, Pierre Guillaumat, the head of Elf was close to breaking point, 
suspecting connections between the Iraqi's intransigence over Buzurgan, Elf s mounting 
problems in Algeria, where they faced nationalisation, and, as ever, deep suspicion of 
British "machinations" in the Middle East. During 1971 Elf and Guillaumat's Iraqi 
headaches were reportedly compounded by their lobbying of, and reliance upon, 
vice-president Ammache, who was subsequently removed from power 53. As Iraq 
campaigned openly against Elf in early 1972, yet again, the specific political conjuncture 
of late 1967 in which the deal was negotiated was cited as being at the root of the problem. 
Publicising Iraq's differences with Elf in L'Orient du Jour, published in Beirut, 
Abdullah-al Sayyab, INOC technical director, stated that "the non-oil considerations of an 
emotional and psychological nature which influenced the conclusion of our agreement 
with ERAP, in that General de Gaulle had just come out in support of the Arab cause 
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against Israeli aggression of June 1967". Iraq also denounced the Elf service agreement in 
adverts placed in the Beirut press, blaming the problems on "French imperialist and 
Zionists". 
Despite both contractual and practical problems with Elf, it should be stressed that on 
coming to power, the new government did not have a specifically different set of foreign 
or oil policies, from its predecessor. On July 27 1968 the new foreign minister, Nasser 
El-Hani stated that "Iraq wishes to further develop its excellent relations with France", 
praising de Gaulle's policy in words identical to those used by Aref five months earlier sa 
The same was true in Franco-Iraqi relations more generally. The foundations, in terms of 
both dossiers and personalities, laid before and during Aref s visit to France, were 
inevitably shaken by the change of power in Baghdad. More importantly, they were also 
hit by the crises of mid-1968 in France, and the eventual replacement of De Gaulle by 
Pompidou in mid-1969. Relations with Iraq went though a hiatus due to deadlock over 
both CFP/IPC negotiations and Elf s problems. For Pompidou it was the related issues of 
a huge arms deal with Libya, and the ongoing Arab-Israeli arms embargo which caused 
problems. While the Franco-Iraqi ties which had developed since 1967 attracted a good 
deal of publicity, much of it negative, in Paris, relations with Libya were conducted almost 
entirely in silence. Following the change of government in Libya in 1969, France and 
Dassault negotiated what was then by far France's largest single arms export deal, to 
supply Libya with 110 Mirage (III and V) planes. News of this deal, worth around $400m 
reportedly tied to oil supplies, emerged only in very partial form during 1970. Pompidou's 
foreign minister Maurice Schuman justified the deal on the grounds that it was better than 
allowing the Soviet Union to arm a key Mediterranean power 55 
53 Guilaumat, quoted in Pean, 1982, p. 112. 
54 Le Monde, 27.7.67. 
55 Kolodziej, 1987, p. 345. France's ambassador to Libya at the time, Guy Gegory makes little 
reference to the arms deal in his memoires of the period. Le Berger des Syrtes, Flammarion, Paris, 1996. 
During the crisis of summer 1981, Gregory was ambassador to Iran, see chapter 6. Although largely beyond 
the scope of this text, insights into the background of French personalities behind Franco-Libyan links and 
the role Libya played in France's embryonic Mediterranean policy are provided in chapter 5, section 5. 
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The Pompidou administration soon became ensnared in the contradictory heritage of De 
Gaulle's policy towards Israel. Twelve speedboats had been ordered by Israel prior to the 
June 1967 war; now completed, they were moored in the northern port of Cherbourg. 
These armored boats clearly fell within the enlarged terms of the embargo as decreed by 
De Gaulle in January 1969. Yet at Christmas 1969 five of these boats slipped out of 
Cherbourg and headed for Israel. In the subsequent maelstrom of allegation and 
contradictory reports, it soon emerged that senior figures in the French administration had 
actively connived with Israel to enable the boats to escape. The Cherbourg scandal clearly 
shook Pompidou's administration and is an important episode in the broader evolution of 
Franco-Israeli ties narrated in chapter 2. It also had lasting impact on France's policies of 
arms exports and controls. Armed Forces minister Michel Debre sacked Louis Bonte from 
the international section of the DGA, reinforcing its role in promoting foreign sales. 
An irony of the Cherbourg scandal was that as the impounded Israeli boats escaped, 
alongside them on the quayside was the second shipload of artillery and ammunition 
ordered by Iraq in late 1967. Two hundred tons of weaponry on the ship 14-Ramadan left 
Cherbourg on January 4, press reports noting that it was the second such shipment to Iraq 
in three months, and that similar arms cargoes had recently left for Turkey, Saudi Arabia 
and Libya. Libyan naval vessels had also collected armaments from Cherbourg in May 
1969 56. The numerous visits of Arab delegations to Paris from the mid-sixties onwards 
chronicled in chapter 2 were clearly being translated into arms orders. 
Military ties thus continued to be developed with Iraq as with other Arab States during 
1969-71. In June 1969 Hamad Shibab, a member of Iraq's ruling Revolutionary Command 
Council (RCC) led a military delegation to the French aeronautical and arms fairs at 
Bourget and Satory. Delegation to these crucial fairs would be a fixture of the calendar of 
Franco-Iraq relations for the next 20 years. In 1969 Shibab reportedly made little progress 
on the stalled negotiations over the 54 Mirages, but brought a gift for De Gaulle "in 
56 International Herald Tribune, 5.1.70, Le Monde, 8.1.70. 
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recognition of his honorable attitude towards Arab problems" 5'. In terms of bilateral 
Franco-Iraqi relations new, more senior ambassadors were appointed by both countries. 
Mohamed Sadiq al-Machat was appointed ambassador to Paris in early 1969. He 
immediately had to deal with widespread protests in Paris at the hanging of Jews in 
Bahgdad in January 1969. Protests in Paris over this became inextricably linked to 
pro-Israeli anger over De Gaulle's decision to reinforce the arms embargo against Israel. 
This followed Israel's destruction of Lebanese (Middle East Airlines) civilian aircraft on 
the tarmac in Beirut. Following news of the hanging of Iraqi Jews 1500 people protested 
outside the Iraqi embassy, then based in Neuilly 58. Thus from the start al-Machat began to 
invest energy in broader public relations and attempt to counter what he and his successors 
regarded as undue Israeli influence on the French press. By late 1969, he was apparently 
much concerned that Pompidou might water down De Gaulle's support for the Arab cause 
in general, and Iraq in particular 59. Nevertheless, cultural cooperation outlined in 1967/68 
was implemented, notably via Arabic and French scholarships, and plans for a 
Franco-Iraqi archeology institute 60. In early 1970 France appointed a new, more senior 
ambassador to Iraq, Pierre Cerles replacing Pierre Gorse. Cerles and his network of 
colleagues in both the French state and private sector would play a crucial role in fostering 
closer relations with Baghdad in the 1970s. 
11 Conclusion, the consolidation of ties 1968-72. 
Viewed in retrospect, Aref s trip appeared to achieve little, no contracts were signed, it did 
not head off the controversy surrounding the Elf contact, and Aref and his government 
were removed from power five months later. However, it should be noted in retrospect 
that it was the highpoint of Arab policy for de Gaulle himself. The events of May 68 
meant not only that de Gaulle never made the trip to Baghdad, but the notion of grandeur 
and vision with which the revived Arab policy had been framed was irrevocably tarnished. 
57 Le Monde, 5.6.69. 
58 Le Monde 30.1.69. Embassy was at 3 r. Pierret, Neuilly. Under al-Machat it moved to 24 r. de 
Berri, 8e, thereafter 47 Avn George IV?. 
59 L'Express, 10.11.69, Le Monde ?. 11.69. 
60 Le Monde 28.4.69. 
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It would, for the reasons given in the previous section, be easy to suppose that bilateral 
relations faltered somewhat after 1968. However, even if the bilan of the Aref s trip was 
far from unambiguous, and subsequent progress was only piecemeal, it did bring into the 
open the basic foundations of French-Arab policy elaborated over the subsequent decade. 
As already indicated in chapter 2, this was not simply opportunistic use of de Gaulle's June 
67 criticisms of Israel. Rather it rested on the application of wider policy objectives 
established from the mid-sixties onwards. These were primarily to expand the sources of 
France's oil supplies and, via a heightened political and diplomatic presence in the Middle 
East to increase French commercial penetration of Arab markets for both civilian and 
military goods. Increased arms sales in the Middle East would both offset the cost of oil 
imports, and help subsidize the rising research and development costs of France's own 
aeronautical industry. Gaullist ministers and advisors demonstrated a fairly far-sighted 
determination to achieve this. This policy was pursued regardless of obstacles and 
short-term policy set-backs, notably volatility of domestic politics in states such as Iraq, 
and opposition at home, particularly from pro-Israeli lobbies. Equally, broader geo- 
strategic concerns such as the acute irritation of US and British governments and oil 
companies, or commercial rivalry with the Soviet Union, notably in the oil sector, were not 
allowed to derail the policy. 
During Aref s visit in February 1968, Le Monde attempted to evaluate the balance sheet of 
French policy in the Middle East. Its editorial correctly highlighted that in terms of arms 
sales France appeared ready to step in to counter the Soviet Union, and that obstacles to 
the policy would be shrugged off by Paris; 
"The irritation evident in Washington or Moscow, the protests of Israelis and 
Kurdish nationalists ... 
henceforth would appear to been seen in Paris as secondary effects 
of une grandepolitique 
61» 
Viewed in a longer-term perspective, Aref s trip was thus a catalyst and a visible 
manifestation of the beginning of a denser web of bilateral ties. 
In the Franco-Iraq context, 
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such visits would continue virtually uninterrupted over the next 25 years. They took the 
form both of formal trips (of ministers, technical advisors, businessmen) to Paris and 
Baghdad, and involved a myriad of individuals whose influence in later years would be 
considerable. Thus Andre Giraud, then head of the direction des hydrocarbures (Dica) in 
the ministry of industry. accompanied the ill-fated CFP delegation to Baghdad in October 
1967; de Gaulle apparently clearly defining his mission within the French: Anglo-Saxon 
struggle over oil 62. Giraud would himself have far more to do with Iraq as minister of 
industry in the 1970s and then ministry of defense in 1986-88. Nicholas Lang, a 
businessman was in September 1968 working for Georges Albertini, a political advisor to 
. 
the merchant bank Worms, also central to the dossier. Albertini was close to key French 
politicians in both fourth and fifth republics and Lang would become a crucial link 
between Baghdad and French politicians, including Georges Popmidou and then later 
Jacques Chirac. As explained, Pierre Guillaumat's involvement with Iraq was established 
in 1967 via Elf s bid for Buzurgan. His deputy, Jean Blanchard, moved in early 1968 to 
head French arms sales within the DGA. The CFP, via its head, Victor De Metz, and its 
foreign office advisor Vincent Labouret both became ever closer involved in Iraqi affairs 
at this time. Meanwhile in 1968 in Beirut, Paul Depis, who had a hitherto undistinguished 
foreign office career, was given a free hand to learn Arabic and immerse himself in Arab 
politics. The ties he made with Iraqi Baathists in exile in Lebanon would prove invaluable 
when he became number two in the French embassy in Baghdad under Pierre Cerles The 
role of Lang and those with an interest in communist world reinforced with the nomination 
of a new ambassador to Iraq by Pompidou in 1970, Pierre Cerles. Cerles already had 
extensive experience of China and Russia. He spoke Russian and would be crucial in 
ensuring France a special place in an Iraq eager to simultaneously maintain both close 
relations with, and critical distance from the Soviet Union. This fitted with Pompidou's 
foreign policy vision and practice. From 1969 de Gaulle's successor was to adapt France's 
foreign policy framework, adopting a more mercantile stance, particularly 
in relation to 
France's role in the economic and energy crisis of early 70s. 
61 Le Monde, 8.2.68. 
62 Pean, 1982, p. 33. 
130 
This chapter has sought to trace the Iraqi roots of this wider Arab policy. The following 
chapter examines the manner in which these roots were nurtured so that Iraq became a 
central element in French energy policy from 1972. Both the links and adaptation of 
policy towards Iraq during 1967-72 were to bear fruit during the nationalisation of Iraqi oil 
in June 1972. With France's privileged position thus established, this then became a 
central element of France's overall Middle Eastern policy which was to be more decisively 
honed by Michel Jobert, Pompidou's last foreign minister during 1973/74 as France 
promoted arms sales and oil contracts throughout the Gulf, providing a commercial 
springboard for the rest of the seventies. Chapter four will examine Iraq's own foreign 
policy stance and then oil policy to 1972. Chapter five will then examine post-1972 French 
policy towards the region. VC 
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Chapter 4. France, Iraqi foreign policy and the nationalisation of Iraqi oil, June 
1972 
1 The context of Iraq's foreign policy in the 1970s 
Viewed from Baghdad, the contours of the Franco-Iraqi relationship as they evolved in 
the 1970s can only be understood within the overall goals and constraints of Iraqi 
foreign policy. At the end of chapter three, it was noted that the Baathists who came to 
power in July 1968 did not differ significantly from their predecessors in their attitude 
towards France and oil negotiations. In 1968 in the closely linked domains of oil and 
foreign policy, the Baathists' goals were not fully formed. The oil issue dominated both 
foreign and domestic politics, as the state's revenues, and thus its capacity both to 
provide services and resist opposition, still depended largely on revenues from oil. 
With Iraqi oil production by the INOC still in its infancy, the struggle with the IPC was 
to dominate policy until 1972. As such, it continued to shape relations with the western 
powers, including France as it had done under Qassim and both Aref administrations. 
It is both artificial and analytically impossible to convincingly disentangle the pressures 
and impulses upon domestic policy from those upon foreign policy. Nor, in the foreign 
policy domain can the influence of factors related to oil be divorced from broader 
foreign policy consideration. In their political-economy based survey of Iraq's 
international relations E. and E. F. Penrose cogently point out that a domestic: foreign 
policy dichotomy in the Iraqi case is patently false. More importantly, they stress that 
key dates in domestic oil policy were closely linked to regional and international oil 
diplomacy, in which successive Iraqi governments played a key role. 
"[But] the coincidence between the significant dates in the progressive 
assumption by Iraq of control over her own oil industry and the significant dates in the 
general evolution of events affecting oil in the Middle East is no chance coincidence: 
- Law 80 of 1961 followed close in the formation of OPEC in 1960; 
- Laws 97 and 123 of 1967 were passed in an atmosphere conditioned 
by the 
Israeli war and OPEC militancy, which culminated in the OPEC "declaratory 
statement" in 1968; 
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- the nationalisation of the IPC in June 1972 followed the successful OPEC 
discussion on participation in March, and the conclusion of the OPEC participation 
agreement at the end of 1972 paved the way of the IPC settlement in February 1973; 
- finally the timing of the large increase in prices for Iraqi oil and the 
consequent increase in revenues in 1973 and 1974 was determined by the October war 
of 1973. 
In other words, for the most part the practical success of actions by Iraq had a 
hand, but in which this hand was not decisive. "' 
Elaborating on this catagorisation slightly, in order to try and evaluate how the 
Franco-Iraqi relationship fitted within the broader context of Iraqi policy, we can 
identify five distinct spheres of Iraqi foreign policy in the 1970s. 
"1 The relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy. 
For Iraq in the seventies this was particularly relevant both in the context of regional 
affairs, due to the Kurdish issue, and that of the cold war, due to the strength of the Iraqi 
Communist Party. 
"2 Iraq's standing in the Arab world. Iraq consistently took a 
rej ectionist stance over Palestine, staking its claim to leadership of the Arab world on 
this stance once president Sadat of Egypt broke with the Soviet Union and embarked on 
a separate peace with Israel, culminating in the Camp David process. 
"3 Control over domestic oil resources and international oil 
developments; producer vs. consumers via OPEC and OAPEC. 
"4 Relations with the West, which at least until the early 1970s 
were largely conditioned by the oil issue. Nevertheless, two other factors counted; US 
support for Israel in the Arab-Israeli conflict, most particularly during and after the 
crisis of October 1973, and broader cold-war considerations of superpower 
involvement in the Middle East. 
"5 Clearly sphere four was thus closely linked to Iraq's relations 
with the Soviet Union. 
I Penrose, E&E. F. Iraq: international relations and national development, London, E. Benn, 
1978, p. 422. 
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In terms of the first sphere, (domestic: foreign relations), Kurdish uprisings sapped 
central government and provided scope for destabilisation by neighbouring states. This 
was most obviously the case with Iran. Iran's involvement was predicated not only on 
its own large Kurdish population, but also on the spiritual affinity between Iranian and 
Iraqi Shia. Although beyond the scope of this study, the period 1970-73 in Iraqi 
politics was marked by a fraught liberalisation of domestic politics as the Baath party 
sought to simultaneously coerce and co-opt other domestic Iraqi political currents. An 
initial rapprochement with Kurds in 1970 was followed in late 1971 by the notion of a 
national pact. After closer relations were established with the Soviet Union following 
Saddam Hussein's trip to Moscow and in February 1972, and Kosygin's visit to 
Baghdad in April, two communist party members were brought into the government. 
This relatively (certainly to the post-1978 period) pluralist phase of domestic politics 
culminated in the 1973 "National Front". The linkage between Kurdish and Communist 
participation in the government, and Iraqi-Soviet relations, was further complicated by 
the fact that much of the ICP leadership was also Kurdish. 
The issue of the relationship between Iraq's domestic and foreign policies at this time 
raises a secondary issue as to what degree the actual foreign policy choices made within 
the RCC, particularly in the key year of 1972, were the product of an internal policy 
dialogue and decision making process. It cannot be assumed either that there was 
natural policy unanimity over key decisions (notably the treaty with the Soviet Union in 
April 1972, or nationalisation of the IPC in June 1972), or that the ascendant Saddam 
Hussein simply dictated policies within the RCC. In retrospect the decisions taken 
during 1972 appear to be cogent, far-sighted and ultimately successful, and are 
customarily credited almost entirely to Saddam Hussein. However, such a view is 
largely the product of a retrospective reading of Iraqi history. At the time the decisions, 
and their potential for success, were contested within the RCC, and the precise form 
2 they took were the product of internal political compromise 
In terms of the Franco-Iraqi relationship, the first sphere (the relationship between Iraqi 
domestic and foreign policies) had very little impact on the relationship. With the 
relationship driven by Gaullists and the Baathist hierarchy, the opposition French 
2 For a partial insight into the arguments surrounding oil nationalisation, see Financial Times, 
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Communist Party maintained only limited links with Bagdad, while Kurdish and other 
Iraqi diaspora opponents of the Baath on the whole kept a low profile in Paris 3. In 
terms of sphere two (Iraq in the Middle East and in relation to the Palestine question), 
de Gaulle's differentiation of France's stance over the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1967 was 
continued under Pompidou. Despite significant differences in interpretations (notably 
Iraq's rejection of UN resolution 242) both French and Iraqi leaders made repeated 
reference to each other's stance on the issue. Both under Pompidou and Giscard, 
France consistently took a more "progressive" line over Palestine than other western 
European states, thus reinforcing the image of a pro-Arab policy forged by De Gaulle in 
1967 established in chapter 2. As explained below, France under Giscard also was 
generally critical of the Camp David process. 
However, it is in the linkage between spheres three, four and five in which Iraq's 
cultivation of a special relationship with France was crucial. From mid-1972 onwards, 
the Franco-Iraqi relationship plays two central roles in Iraqi foreign policy. 
" Firstly closer bilateral ties with Paris splits the western block, both in 
terms of the oil issue (IPC, and Iraq's need to sell, oil after the 1972 nationalisation), 
and over intra-European and cold-war diplomacy, French reticence effectively 
preventing the emergence of a coalition of OECD, oil consuming states. The stance 
taken in 1972 was reinforced during the 1973/74 energy crises, France refusing to join 
the US-sponsored IEA. In this Franco-Algerian relations were also extremely 
important. 
" Secondly for Iraq, the sharp deepening of trade, financial and diplomatic 
ties between Paris and Baghdad in the seventies provides a practical counterweight to 
the influence of the Soviet Union on Iraqi affairs. Political links with France were 
entirely free from the domestic (Kurdish and Iraqi Communist Party) implications for 
Baathist rule; supplies of French arms came free of domestic political or regional geo- 
strategic strings. 
9.6.72. 
3 The impact that the increasingly assertive (and well financed) Iraqi presence in Paris had 
upon Arab politics in Paris in the seventies is sadly beyond the scope of this text. For a very partial 
insight into this issue, see Beau, N. Paris Capitale Arabe, Seuil Paris, 1995. Kassir, 1992, also 
chronicles the impact that Iraq's attitude to the Palestinian issue and the Arab press in Paris had in the 
1970s. 
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2 Relations with the Soviet Union 
Unsurprisingly, given the both the importance and the ambiguities surrounding the 
links between Baghdad and Moscow, there is a body of literature dealing with 
Iraqi-Soviet relations. However, existing works are somewhat fragmentary and 
inconclusive about the importance of the relationship, and tend to ignore or downplay 
the degree to which Iraq consciously counter-balanced relations with the Soviet Union 
against ties with France 4. 
The Soviet Union had been interested and involved in Iraq since 1959, when Qassem 
withdrew from the Baghdad Pact. This interest stemmed from geo-strategic issues, due 
to Iraq's location and its potential to provide the Soviet Union with a port as well as its 
oil reserves. The Soviet Union supported Iraq's 1961 claim over Kuwait, but in 1963 
was initially wary of the post-Qassem administrations due to their repression of Iraqi 
communists. Assistance was restored in 1964 as the Soviets endorsed Iraq's anti- 
western stance. However ties continued to be stymied by both Egyptian-Iraqi rivalry 
and the internal Communist Party and Kurdish issues. Only after the Arab defeat of 
June 1967 did relations begin to expand significantly. As noted in chapter two, Soviet 
technical assistance in the oil sector was initially agreed in late 1967. In an increasingly 
polarised post-June '67 Middle East, first Aref then, after July 1968, the Baathists 
sought enhanced military and political support from Moscow. By 1969 the Soviet 
presence in Iraq was the largest to any third world nation not formally allied to the 
Soviet Union 5. Ties were boosted by similar stances on a range of regional issues, 
including Sudan, Eritrea and Oman. 
From 1967 onwards, the USSR supported Iraqi attempts to take control of their own oil 
resources. In December 1967, a month after the path-breaking oil service agreement 
was signed with France's BRAP/Elf, a senior Soviet economic delegation signed a letter 
of intent in Baghdad committing the USSR to provide substantial technical assistance 
to INOC in return for bartered oil supplies (see chapter 3, section 9). This became the 
model for a series of such oil barter deals. Assistance was delayed by the July 1968 
4 Golan, G. Soviet Policies in the Middle East, CUP, Cambridge, 1990. Chubin, S. Security in 
the Persian Gulf; 4 the role of outside powers, IISS-Gower, Aldershot, 1982. 
5 Golan, 1990, p. 165. 
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change of government, but in June 1969 a new series of loans were agreed, with a 
joint-commission formalising economic cooperation from early 1970 6. Soviet 
technical assistance and purchases of oil was therefore crucial to the expansion of 
national production by INOC. Such assistance underpinned the April 1972 Treaty of 
Friendship and Cooperation, which provided a far more comprehensive framework for 
Soviet-Iraqi relations and ushered in what, in retrospective, can be seen as the 1972-75 
highpoint in Iraqi: Soviet relations. For the Soviet Union, the agreement meant the 
scaling-up of oil barter assistance deals in return for a more formal economic and 
commercial presence in the Gulf. Such cooperation was bolstered by the creation of a 
Soviet-Iraqi planning committee in June 1973 and further substantial loans five months 
later. 
Yet despite further large Soviet arms supplies to Iraq in 1975, relations were 
nevertheless tarnished by a series of tensions. Firstly, as already noted, were the 
inconsistencies and uncertainties over Soviet involvement in Iraq's domestic affairs, via 
both the ICP and Kurdish factions. Secondly, despite some commonalties, the two 
state's regional stances were far from identical, with Iraq consistently more rejectionist 
than Moscow over Palestine, although post-Camp David this inconsistency lessened. 
Thirdly, and most importantly in so far as Franco-Iraqi ties are concerned, Iraq's 
leadership was unwilling to be dependent upon the Soviet Union either economically or 
technologically. Although Iraq welcomed technical assistance in the oil sector, sent the 
largest number of students to the USSR from any state in the Arab world, and was one 
of only five third world states to receive nuclear research facilities from Moscow, it 
nevertheless maintained its right to cooperate equally with non-Comecon states. It was 
in this latter context that the relationship with France became far more significant in 
1972. 
3 The nationalisation of Iraqi oil and the Soviet Union 
Echoing the first of the five spheres identified at the beginning of this chapter, the 
catalyst for the changes of 1972, culminating in the nationalisation of most Iraqi oil 
interests in June, was, as it had been for much of the past decade, stalemate in 
6 Penrose, 1978, p. 426. 
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negotiations with the IPC. Again emphasizing the links between internal politics and 
external oil and foreign policy, the break with the IPC was propelled initially by a 
reconfiguration of domestic politics. In September 1971 power was redistributed within 
the Baathist RCC. Vice President Ammash and Foreign Minister al-Shaikly were 
removed, although Ammash became ambassador to Moscow 7. Saddam Hussein 
replaced Ammash not only as vice-president, but also as the head of the all-important 
committee controlling INOC and Iraq's oil policy. This political change triggered a 
more urgent, confrontational policy towards the IPC; the Iraqis - in this instance 
presumably Saddam Hussein as the head of the oil committee - imposing shorter, rigid 
deadlines on negotiations. A new round of talks began mid-January 1972. Their 
suspension five days later prompted Saddam Hussein, oil minister Saadoun Hammadi 
and new foreign minister Abdul Baki, who had led the negotiations with the IPC, to fly 
to the Soviet Union on February 10. On April 7a senior Soviet delegation headed by 
Alexei Kosygin (head of the USSR's council of ministers) arrived in Iraq. A 15 year 
treaty of friendship was signed on April 9. In a moment of high symbolism, Kosygin 
simultaneously inaugurated oil production and exports (evidently to the USSR... ) from 
the North Rumailia oil field which had been developed by INOC, with Soviet technical 
assistance, since early 1968. Later in April the IPC cut production, enraging the Iraqis. 
On May 17 a further package of points was put to the IPC, with a two week deadline. 
At the time only the CFP appeared to take seriously the threat of outright nationlisation. 
However, in retrospect, by May the gulf between the respective Iraqi and IPC positions 
was so great that both parties seemed to tacitly recognize they were ineluctably engaged 
on a collision course. In retrospect each seemed to be positioning for 
8 post-nationalisation, implicitly accepting that nationalisation was inevitable 
The Iraqi: IPC stand-off was in part conditioned by international factors, notably 
negotiations over national participation between producers and oil exporters, led by 
OPEC. As such this can be linked to what was earlier identified as the third sphere of 
Iraqi policy making; the relationship between control over domestic oil resources and 
international oil politics. Iraq's leadership had close relations with both Libya and 
Algeria, both of whom had embarked upon confrontational strategies with western oil 
interests during 1971. Conversely, French attitudes to Iraq in 1972 were undoubtedly 
He was, briefly in early 1975, ambassador to Paris. 
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influenced by the fact that both major French oil companies, CFP and ERAP/Elf had 
been nationalised during 1971 in Algeria. OPEC backed Algerian and Libyan stances, 
and thus OPEC support for Iraq was also forthcoming in June 1972; OPEC officially 
supporting Iraq during a meeting of oil ministers in Beirut on June 9. This position of 
support for Iraq had already been endorsed by Arab oil states meeting previously in 
Algiers. 
It would be easy to assume that the USSR had backed nationalisation. Kosygin's 
much-publicized cry "Arab petrol for the Arabs", at the inauguration of North Rumailia 
in April being read as an encouragement to nationalisation, thus emboldening Saddam 
Hussein for the stand-off in May. However, such a view appears presumptuous in the 
face of the facts. In both February and April, Moscow reportedly cautioned against full 
nationalisation. This was also the position of the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP). The fact 
that ICP members were brought into the cabinet during May, and that foreign minister 
Baki was again hastily dispatched to Moscow immediately after the nationalisation was 
announced, both appear to reflect Baghdad's unease and uncertainty as to the USSR's 
reactions. 
The nationalisation Law 69 of June 1 1972 was greeted with euphoria in Baghdad. 
Despite the cry of victory, the move was not as comprehensive as it first appeared. 
While IPC assets and production in the north were nationalised and transferred to a 
newly created company, the Iraqi Company for Oil Operations (ICOO), stakes in the 
IPC's southern body, the Basra Petroleum Company (BPC), were not touched by the 
decision. The Syrian authorities also immediately nationalised IPC assets on their 
territory; the pipelines and terminal at Banias. The decision to leave the BPC untouched 
and an immediate, unilateral offer to France that their oil supplies from Iraq would 
be 
unaltered were integral elements of Iraq's subsequent negotiating strategy. This aimed 
to ensure both the future of Iraqi national oil sales and revenues, and a speedy 
resolution of outstanding litigation and compensation claims from Law 69. 
8 This is the conclusion of Penrose, 1978, p. 416. 
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"A frantic fortnight in Paris" 
The foregoing bland narrative cannot do justice to the chronological congestion of the 
events of early June for Iraqi, or as we shall see, French actors.. In the space of less 
than two weeks, Iraq's leadership had nationalised the IPC, while leaving the door open 
to compensation and negotiation (by not fully nationalising the Basrah and Mosul 
companies). They had reinforced their cooperation with, and obtained backing from 
the Soviet Union (Abdul Baki's precipitate visit to Moscow), obtained OPEC and 
OAPEC backing for the move. The nationalisation strategy was then crowned by 
tactics which successfully drew France out of any potential western moves to sanction 
nationalisation. This was achieved by offering Paris special post-nationalisation terms 
for oil deliveries, thus denting any hopes of united action, either by the IPC members, 
or western governments. It was the in context of these events, crammed into the space 
of just three weeks, that Saddam Hussein then arrived in Paris on June 14 1972 for his 
first formal visit to a West European state. 
The degree of physical congestion and chronological confusion among the disparate 
actors in Paris in the drama of June was considerable. On June 13 behind the Quai 
d'Orsay's venerable facade the delegates of the four countries whose interests had been 
nationalised met. Meanwhile across town the CFP officials were beginning discussions 
with an advance party of INOC personnel which had arrived ahead of Saddam Hussein. 
Elsewhere in the Quai itself and in other ministries throughout the capital, members of 
ministerial cabinets were finalising their plans to receive the full Iraqi delegations. 
Two days before Saddam Hussein arrived in Paris, the representatives of the interests 
he had seized met in two separate fora in the French capital. Immediately following the 
nationalisation decree of June 1st, Britain had called for a special four-power meeting 
between the governments concerned (USA, UK, Netherlands and France). The French 
government, then considering the offer of preferential terms for post-nationalisation oil 
supplies made to them by Baghdad, rejected this. Instead they agreed to the convening 
of the special "petroleum committee" of the OECD in the margins of a long-scheduled 
meeting of the 23-member OECD held in Paris on June 12-14 9. Simultaneously in 
9 This could be seen as an ironic, hollow echo of de Gaulle's continual urging of a four power 
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Paris, representatives of the four governments with interests in the IPC would then meet 
separately to discuss Iraq. However, by the time the meeting took place, Iraq and the 
IPC had accepted the irreversibility of nationalisation and the principle of a mediation 
role for OPEC. 
The full IPC board would eventually meet only on June 19-20 in Paris, fully aware of 
the special deal which had been struck between France (CFP) and Iraq on Saturday 
17th at the end of Saddam's trip. The key decision facing the IPC was how to go about 
negotiating compensation, it was agreed that the CFP's veteran negotiator Duroc 
Danner would represent the IPC in such negotiations. 
Nadim al-Pachachi (an Iraqi minister prior to 1958, who had become secretary-general 
of OPEC), had been proposed by OPEC to mediate between Iraq and the IPC at the 
meeting of OPEC in Beirut. IPC head Geoffrey Stockwell and al-Pachachi had agreed 
a timetable for negotiations by the end of June. This was to later be extended, but it 
eventually led to a full settlement of all outstanding claims in late February 1973. It is 
important to note that the IPC's negotiations were led by the CFP's Duroc Danner, 
drawing on the good relations established both during the arduous negotiations which 
culminated in the 1965 Wattari agreement and with the Baathists. Therefore in both the 
special deal concluded between France and Iraq, and in during negotiating the terms of 
compensation, French officials played a particular role. 
4 French policy and the watershed of June 1972; Saddam Hussein in Paris 
The importance accorded to relations with France by the Iraqi leadership increased in 
late 1971. Closer ties with Paris became an integral part of both the more 
confrontational strategy with the IPC and the desire to foster closer relations with 
Moscow embarked on after September 1971. It is an important question, to which at 
present we can have no definitive answer, to what degree this decision to privilege 
relations with Paris reflected the personal preference of Saddam Hussein. Clearly the 
elements for such a strategy were in place, the "differentiation" of French interests in 
the oil sector having been apparent from 1962 onwards (chapter 3). Yet following the 
concert on Middle East questions, something the US Britain had always rejected. Ironically, the 
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ousting of Ammash, Saddam Hussein had a decisive impact upon policy. The 
interviews he gave before and during his trips to France in both 1972 and 1975 suggest 
both a specific personal interest and political investment in the decision to foster a 
closer relationship with French leaders. Exactly when and why Saddam Hussein 
formulated this "French strategy" is clearly a crucial question to which I have no 
answer. It is unlikely to have been simply a product of France's post-67 stance. To my 
knowledge Saddam Hussein had no direct contact with the CFP or other French 
officials prior to 1968. Interest in France may well have reflected strategies elaborated 
by others in the Baathist party and Saddam's entourage. Clearly it is of interest and 
importance to clarify what contact Pierre Cerles (France's ambassador to France from 
1970) or Roland Bareille's (CFP's rep in Bagdad) had with who during 1970-71. 
In January 1972 French journalists were invited to Baghdad to interview Saddam 
Hussein as part of the preparations for a trip to Paris by the Iraqi leader, which was 
initially scheduled for mid-April. In an interview Paul Balta quizzed Saddam Hussein 
on the significance of the visit 10 ; 
"Given that, as you're no doubt aware, I rarely travel abroad. my visit is 
particularly important. We really would like not only a close, but an 
exceptional relationship with France. This is because France's policy is not 
imperialist; its attitude towards the Arab world and the Palestinian question is 
different to countries such as the US, Britain or West Germany, with whom we 
have broken our relations due to their hostility towards us". 
Balta then pressed Saddam on the stand-off with Elf, the Iraqi vice-president replying 
that he felt that the problem could be; "resolved within the framework of our policy of 
friendship with France, and shouldn't influence overall relations, which we would like 
to expand and deepen" 11 
The ratcheting up of tension with the IPC which occurred two weeks after this 
interview was published, and Saddam's subsequent rapprochement with the Soviet 
Union (the February trip to Moscow, Kosygin's arrival and the signing of the 
petroleum committee of the OECD had originally been created in the wake of the 1956 Suez crisis. 
10 Balta, alongside Eric Rouleau, wrote on the Middle East for Le Monde. In 1973 he wrote the 
first book attempting to provide an overview of French Arab policy, Balta, P. Roulleau, C. 1973. 
Interview in Baghdad, 1996. 
11 Le Monde, 9-10.1.72. 
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Friendship Treaty in April) both delayed and heightened the importance of Saddam's 
state visit to Paris, which was now hastily rescheduled for mid-June. 
As the showdown with the IPC evolved in late May, the CFP's representative in 
Baghdad (Roland Bareilles) and the French ambassador, Pierre Cerles, were 
approached by colleagues from INOC with reassurances that in the, increasingly 
probable, event of nationalisation of the IPC, French oil supplies would be unharmed. 
This offer was formalised immediately following the announcement of Law 69 on June 
1. In exchange for French acceptance of and cooperation with the fait accompli of oil 
nationalisation, Iraq offered to guarantee the CFP and France oil deliveries equivalent 
to the CFP's stake in the IPC. This offer immediately became common knowledge in 
Paris and among CFP's partners in IPC. Yet despite intense diplomatic activity, for a 
full week following the nationalisation, the French government made no official 
statement on their reply. This silence augmented the atmosphere of speculation 
surrounding Paris' stance. In a move which had been scheduled to coincide with 
Saddam's state-visit to France, a delegation of French businessmen had flown to 
Baghdad on June 2 to inaugurate the first direct Air France Paris-Baghdad flights. 
Among them were the heads of two of the new Franco-Arab financial institutions 
1'Union des banques arabes et francaises, (UBAF) and Banque franco-arabe (BFA)12. 
Their presence prompted speculation that the French had offered Iraq credit facilities in 
the event of the IPC nationalisation triggering an western embargo. 
It is impossible to confirm or deny such reports. However, in the weeks prior to 
nationalisation Iraq removed substantial sums of money from US and UK banks as a 
precaution against assets being frozen in retaliation for nationalisation of IPC 13. It is 
thus probable both that Iraqi assets were transferred to Paris and, at the very least, 
assurances over the availability of corresponding credits would have come from Paris 
in late May, early June. Evidently this did not require the presence of such banks' 
directors in Baghdad, their trip probably being a coincidental by-product of 
preparations for Saddam Hussein's impending visit to Paris. Over the weekend of June 
3-4, there were also rumours, which proved unfounded, that Iraq had requested that the 
12 Le Monde 6.6.72. 
13 Penrose, 1978, p. 409. 
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visit to Paris be brought forward in order to expedite a bilateral Franco-Iraqi oil 
agreement. 
On June 7, the Wednesday following the nationalisation, the French cabinet formally 
considered Iraq's offer, conscious that their decision would in large part determine the 
tenor and outcome of the visit of the Iraqi vice-president to Paris the following week. 
The same day Iraq's foreign minister Abdul Baki, who had begun an unscheduled trip 
to the USSR on June 2 (the day after the nationalisation) declared in Moscow that the 
Soviet Union "supported the initiatives of the Iraqi government to re-establish 
sovereignty over its natural resources". Baki also announced the formal ratification of 
the friendship treaty initialed by Kosygin in April. As outlined above, this was a crucial 
shift in, and statement of, Soviet policy. 
France's president Pompidou effectively now faced a choice of doubling or quitting his 
stake in Iraq. On the one hand Pompidou could accept the hand proffered to him by 
Iraq, gaining accepting preferential access to Iraqi oil and thus bolstering a specific 
French policy in Iraq and the Middle East. The alternative was to end French 
exceptionalism in the region and, as a leading French weekly put it; "simply align 
himself with western policies" and accept that cold war interests in the Middle East had 
14 imposed a sort of "new Yalta of petrol" 
Following the French cabinet meeting of June 7, the government spokesman simply 
stated that the meeting had considered the dossier from the perspectives of French oil 
supplies and compensation of French assets. The cabinet had paid "particular attention" 
to Iraq's specific offer to France, and noted that CFP had already had "useful" 
discussions in Baghdad on the matter and that an exploratory note had been sent to the 
Iraqis on June 6. Meanwhile the government stressed that it had declined the British 
request for a meeting in June 8 in London of all four governments with stakes in the 
IPC 11 
This remained the formal state of play on June 14 when Saddam Hussein arrived at 
Orly, accompanied by large delegation of senior officials comprising five ministers and 
14 Le nouvelle observateur, 5.6.72. 
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other RCC members. These included oil and foreign affairs ministers, and Fakhouri 
Khadouri who led the group which would discuss the aftermath of oil nationalisation 
with the CFP and other oil interests in Paris. Two days prior to the arrival of the main 
delegation, Adrian Qassab, head of INOC, had already opened discussions with French 
companies; stressing that Iraq was not going to "compensate" for the nationalisation but 
that she "wished to safeguard and maintain French interests [and] treat French interests 
in a manner different to those of other countries". 
On arrival the Iraqi delegation stated that their aim was to discuss not only the widening 
of Franco-Iraqi relations but also "the future of French interests in the Arab world". 
During his address to the banquet offered by the French prime minister on June 15 
Saddam Hussein explicitly compared the relationship Iraq now desired with France to 
that just established with the USSR; "We open our doors to France for the same reasons 
which prompted us to open them to the Soviet Union [and] all states.. who wish to 
cooperate with us on an equal footing". Rouleau noted that although formal discourse, 
actually debate, and that it emerged from the discourse of Saddam that he had the 
ambition to forge a relationship as "an ally, more than a friend" 16 
Discussions with the prime minister Jacques Chaban Delmas, foreign minister Maurice 
Schumann and President Pompidou followed. After Maurice Schumann's discussions 
with Saddam on June 15, he stated that "within the policy framework of France's 
friendship with the Arab world in general, there is now a specific Franco-Arab policy 
17. Three principal issues were discussed during the visit; the Israel-Arab conflict, oil 
supplies and bilateral trade, and Iraq's differences with Iran. Further financial 
assistance for Iraq was discussed between Pompidou's finance minister Valery Giscard 
D'Estaing, and the Iraqi vice-president. At the core of the discussions, notably on 
Thursday with President Pompidou, were the precise terms of France's agreement to 
accept Iraq's offer of preferential access to oil. Wrangling over this, and its linkage to 
other dossiers, notably enhanced trade relations necessitated extra, unscheduled 
sessions between Saddam Hussein and both premier Chaban-Delmas and Pompidou. 
15 Le Monde 9.6.72. 
16 Le Monde 16.6.72. 
17 Figaro, 16.2.72. 
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As ever the Iraqis proved arduous negotiators even, or perhaps particularly, with their 
new-found "privileged" European partner. 
Saddam Hussein left Paris on June 18. Successive rounds of negotiations over four 
days resulted in a communique summarising the series of agreements in three key 
domains oil, financial and industrial cooperation. Firstly in terms of oil supplies during 
Saddam's trip Paris fully accepted the offer made to France as the IPC had been 
nationalised a fortnight earlier. France, via the CFP would continue to received a share 
worth 23.75% (i. e. equivalent to its former stake in the IPC) of all oil produced from 
Kirkuk for a period of ten years. Only France among the four former national 
shareholders (USA, UK, Holland) struck such a preferential, post-nationalisation 
agreement. The Iraqi delegation in Paris strongly denied that these supplies were being 
offered to France at below market prices. However, the door was left open for France 
to negotiate to purchase more than its original share of Iraqi crude, Iraq being anxious 
to be able to place as much nationalised oil on the market as possible (Khadouri and the 
INCO delegation left Paris for Italy, where a supply agreement was agreed with ENI). 
As the agreement was initialed in Paris, the Iraqi news agency publicized the fact that 
the first cargo of post-nationalisation oil from Kirkuk was loaded onto a French tanker 
at Banias. 
Secondly the accord provided for a significant expansion. of French commercial credits 
to facilitate industrial development in Iraq by French companies. Cultural cooperation 
was also reinforced, with reciprocal provisions to expand Arabic and French language 
training as well as broader scientific and technical cooperation. An educational 
protocol was subsequently signed in Baghdad in early August 1972. The Iraqi 
vice-president issued invitations to both President Pompidou and Premier Chaban 
Delmas to visit Iraq. These were accepted. The communique concluded by saying, "the 
conditions now exist for France and Iraq to embark on a profitable [fructueuse] 
cooperation". 
Saddam's June 1972 trip to Paris can be portrayed as a success for both Iraq and France. 
Paradoxically it can also be seen having been beneficial to the IPC, in that acceptance 
that nationalisation was inevitable and the closer Franco-Iraqi ties aided settlement of 
outstanding issues. For all the partners except France, the ongoing discussion with 
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OPEC about participation in other Gulf countries, most particularly Saudi Arabia, was 
actually of greater importance than Iraq's nationalisation. In this sense, for the other IPC 
partners the impetus given to bilateral Franco-Iraqi relations by Saddam Hussein's Paris 
trip was in fact a useful step. They had no objection to CFP obtaining preferential 
access to Iraqi oil, internal IPC solidarity no longer being of concern post- 
nationalisation. Indeed France's privileged position actually assisted the negotiations 
over compensation for nationalisations and the settlement of outstanding claims. Thus 
by the end of June the modalities of the negotiations had been settled, with OPEC 
playing a mediator role between the CFP's Duroc-Danner and the Iraqi authorities. 
These negotiations were concluded relatively harmoniously eight months later. The 
agreement of February 1973 formally bringing to an end both the 12 years struggle 
between Iraq and the IPC initiated by Qassem's Law 80 in 1961, and ending the IPC's 
50-year existence. 
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Chapter 5. France and Iraq in the 1970s 
1 Pompidou's policy framework in the Middle East 
General literature on French foreign policy frequently views Pompidou's tenure as 
President as a hyphen between de Gaulle and Giscard. This view is both reflected by, 
and in part due to, the lack of literature on Pompidou's foreign policy. Pompidou, 
uniquely among Fifth Republic presidents has no collected work on his foreign policy 
and there is only one generally available monograph in French 1. Aside from the 
meager literature, the view of Pompidou's foreign policy as not terribly significant 
persists for two reasons. The first of these was that Pompidou's presidential term was 
truncated. Its early years were dominated by the troubled aftermath of May '68 and de 
Gaulle's enforced retirement after the referendum of April 1969. Its final years were 
overshadowed by the President's illness. From 1973 onwards the French public were 
aware that Pompidou was ill, although not of the severity of the illness from which he 
died on April 2 1974. 
Secondly that as de Gaulle's faithful servant, first as his Prime Minister and then 
presidential successor, Pompidou is regarded as having implemented pre-existing 
Gaullist policy, rather than modifying or innovating. A typical view is that "he made 
no attempt as Prime Minister to influence that (foreign and defense) policy and ... 
did 
little to change it when he became president" 2. Pompidou is thus often regarded as a 
nightwatchman between De Gaulle and Giscard, overseeing what Hayward terms "the 
transition from heroic to humdrum Gaullism" 3. 
' Diallo, T. La politique etrangere de George Pompidou, libraire generale de droit, Paris, 1992. 
Originally a thesis in Paris V., Diallo in large part managed to avoid the pitfalls of science-po / droit 
thesards and produce a readable work. Michel Jobert was on the jury, hence the convoluted preface. 
Kolodziej, 1974, remains the standard work in English. Roussel, E. Pompidou 1911-74,2nd edition, 
J. C. Lattes, Paris, 1994. 
2 Howorth J. "The president's special role in foreign and defense policy" in, Hayward, J. et al, De 
Gaulle to Mitterrand, Hurst, London, 1993. However, Howorth notes, fn 31 on p. 164, that Pierre Messmer, 
Pompidou's Prime Minister, vigorously disagrees with this analysis. All of Michel Jobert's writings 
confirm Messmer's view; Pompidou strengthened his convictions and personal prerogatives on foreign 
policy over the last year of his life he last year of his life. 
3 Hayward, J. "From republican sovereign to partisan statesman" in, Hayward, J. et al, De Gaulle 
to 93, Mitterrand, Hurst, 1993, p. 26. 
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Certainly as concerns Franco-Arab relations, this notion of Pompidou as a largely 
passive interim hiatus is misguided. Pompidou himself developed strong opinions on 
Middle Eastern policy, and both the overall direction, and individual decisions taken 
within France's policy towards the Middle East were far more substantive between 
1969-74 than under de Gaulle himself. While the initial foundations for subsequent 
relations with states such as Iraq were laid in the sixties, it was under Pompidou's 
administrations of the early seventies that policy was elaborated. By the time Valery 
Giscard D'Estaing was elected President on May 19 1974, France had a substantial, and 
rapidly expanding commercial and diplomatic presence in the Middle East. As shall be 
shown later in the chapter, the Middle East was one of the few areas of foreign policy in 
which Giscard was to allow his young Prime Minister, Jacques Chirac, a certain degree 
of autonomy. The actual basis of France's commercial and diplomatic presence in the 
Iraq and the Gulf was thus largely established under Pompidou's presidency. This was 
most conspicuously so during Michel Jobert's tenure as Foreign Minister between 
March 1973 and Pompidou's death in April 1974. Yet between Iraq's oil nationalisation 
in June 1972, and the death of Pompidou 22 months later in April 1974, France's role in 
the Middle East dramatically changed. France became a commercially aggressive and 
successful partner of both radical Arab states, such as Libya or Iraq, as well as of Saudi 
Arabia and the conservative monarchies of the Gulf. How this was achieved in the 
period will now be examined first through an overview of the issue of Pompidou's 
attitude to de Gaulle's Arab-Israeli arms embargo and relations with Libya. The text 
will then examine in more detail how Franco-Arab relations evolved through the efforts 
of Pompidou's foreign minister for the last 13 months of his presidency, Michel Jobert. 
Viewed from a global perspective France's stance in the Middle East between the 
Arab-Israeli wars of June 1967 and October 1973 appears to be fairly constant. As 
such, following Kolodziej's analysis, we can identify three factors shaping French 
policy in the region during Pompidou's presidency 4. 
" Firstly France's shift in its attitude to the Israel-Arab conflict evident 
from June '67 onwards which has already been narrated in chapter 2. The embargo of 
June 1967 marked an end to unlimited arms sales to Israel. By the time the embargo 
4 Kolodziej, E. A. French international policy under De Gaulle and Pompidou; the politics of 
grandeur, Ithaca/London, Cornell U. P. 1974, ch. 10. 
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was reinforced in January 1969, arms sales to Arab states were steadily increasing, 
reflecting this shift in policy. 
" Secondly, given the internal rivalries in the Arab world, France had to 
choose between Arab states. From the early seventies onwards, what had hitherto been 
disparate policies towards individual states in the Maghreb, Levant and Gulf states, had 
to be increasingly integrated. This was particularly so given that, despite its 
nationalisation of French oil interests in 1971, Algeria became more firmly at the centre 
of France's Mediterranean and Middle Eastern policies, marking a tilt towards more 
radical states such as post-1969 Libya and Baathist Iraq. Whereas de Gaulle had 
incorporated his policy towards the Arab world within his approach to the non-aligned 
world as a whole, under Pompidou this approach was narrowed and repackaged as a 
specifically "Mediterranean policy", within which Arab states of the Gulf were 
included. Under Giscard this stance was again reconfigured into a "Euro-Arab 
dialogue", a notion which originated under Jobert, and then again the broader 
"North: South" dialogue within the move towards a "new international economic order". 
" Thirdly, as noted in chapter 3, the twin incursions of the cold war and 
regional arms race into the Middle East created both problems and opportunities for 
French policy in the region. As the US-Israeli axis strengthened, so Egyptian, Syrian 
and Iraqi dependence upon the Soviet Union increased, This had a paradoxical impact 
upon French policy in the region. Objectively, it narrowed French scope for action. 
Kolodziej's analytical framework remains useful in terms of understanding the 
divergent forces underlying French policy in the region. He suggests that French 
leaders were forced to "strike a balance" which involved the juggling of four 
awkwardly contradictory policy objectives: (1) optimizing bilateral ties with as many 
Arab states as possible, (2) reconciling French and Soviet positions in both the Middle 
East (notably over the core Israeli/Arab issue) and Europe, while (3) attempting to slow 
Superpower penetration in the region, and (4) criticising US support for Israel, while 
depending upon it in Europe. In addition to bilateral initiatives with Arab states, and a 
hardening of position towards Israel noted below, France did this by flexible attachment 
to the formula of a Great Power concert over the Middle East; "until the (1973) war, 
nothing was more constant, nor more subject to change, than the French formula for 
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peace in the Mediterranean; four power accord among the US, Soviet Union, France 
and Great Britain" 5. 
Yet while policy undoubtedly did involve the balancing of these factors, the 
international condition of the Middle East between 1967-73 also offered France an 
opportunity, both in terms of scope for its own policy initiatives, and in how such 
initiatives could be justified to its European and American allies; as a way of preventing 
Soviet encroachment into the region. From the 1968 arms sales to Iraq onwards, but 
most explicitly in the deal struck with Libya in 1969, arms sales to Arab states were 
justified in terms of counterbalancing the encroachment of the Soviet Union. 
2 Squaring a circle: the Arab-Israeli arms embargo; arms sales to Libya, 
hostility in and from the US, 1969-73 
We have already seen how de Gaulle decreed an embargo on the delivery of offensive 
weapons to the frontline states (the French formula was champs de Bataille) during the 
Arab-Israeli war of June 1967. These states were defined as Syria, Jordan, Egypt and 
Israel. The real impact of the embargo was overwhelmingly on Israel, although in 
practice weapons delivery continued throughout late 1967 and 1968, mostly in the form 
of "spare parts". Following the Israeli raid on Beirut airport in December 1968, de 
Gaulle tightened the terms of the embargo to include all armaments, including spares 
and moved to try and close some of the loopholes through which Israel continued to 
received French military supplies. 
The barbed legacy of this embargo was to dog Pompidou and his ministers throughout 
the period 1969-74 in two different, but closely linked, ways. Firstly the domestic 
hostility to the embargo "against Israel" continued to be a major issue in France. 
Pro-Israeli lobbies in the US meant that it also became a significant factor in French-US 
relations during the period. Secondly, as France deepened its relations with Arab states, 
most explicitly Libya, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, in an increasingly polarised and volatile 
Middle East it became increasingly difficult to justify arms deals with these states, on 
5 Kolodziej, 1974, p. 508. 
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the basis that such states were not "frontline", rather French arms supplies could be 
justified in the basis that they prevented increased Soviet penetration into the region. 
When he came to power all the indications were that Pompidou would most likely 
loosen the embargo of January 1969. Maurice Schumann and Jacques Chaban-Delmas, 
respectively foreign and prime ministers, both were favorable to Israel and critical of de 
Gaulle's "pro-Arab" policies. However, although a blind eye continued to be turned to 
some deliveries of arms to Israel, two factors mitigated against an actual change in 
policy. The first of these was the acute official embarrassment at Israel's coup in 
illicitly spiriting away its patrol boats from the port of Cherbourg in December 1969. 
Seven of the 12 patrol boats Israel had ordered in 1965 had been delivered prior to the 
tightening of the embargo in January 1969. On New Year's eve 1969, the five 
remaining boats slipped out of Cherbourg, in blatant contravention of the embargo. 
Subsequent press coverage and an enquiry revealed official connivance, making 
Pompidou's administration look foolish. 
Pompidou's irritation at this incident was greatly enhanced two months later when his 
official visit to the US was seriously marred by large scale protests by pro-Israeli 
lobbies against French arms sales to Libya. Despite hostility within his cabinet and 
entourage, Pompidou had backed swift moves by French emissaries and officials to 
establish links with the new Libyan administration which seized power on September 1 
1969. The President's backing in large part seems to have stemmed both from the sheer 
scale of the Libyan contract and the fact that Franco-Libyan ties were a key element in 
his vision of a new "French Mediterranean " policy. The scant available evidence 
indicates that unofficial French envoys had already cultivated close ties with Gadaffi 
prior to the overthrow of King Idris in September 1969 6. A young, oil-rich 
revolutionary regime in the Maghreb which was intent on expelling the "reactionary 
and imperialist" Anglo-Saxons, while wary of the Soviet Union, was a clear 
opportunity for post-June 1967 French policy in the region. French archives now show 
that as quickly as late September 1969 the US was aware that a major arms deal was in 
the offing between France and Libya; Kissinger, apparently drawing on Israeli 
intelligence, pressurising foreign minister Schumann to desist from such a policy 
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because of its ramifications for broader military balance in the Middle East 7. 
Nevertheless, Franco-Libya negotiations over what was an order for 110 Mirages 
continued in secret during the final quarter of 1969. US failure to block the deal by 
diplomatic suasion was undoubtedly behind the leaking of the news to the US press on 
December 19 1968. The news that France, with its enhanced embargo on Israel, was to 
sell 110 advanced fighter jets to Libya, triggered a storm of protest in France, Israel and 
the US. Gadaffi had immediately adopted a militantly anti-Israeli, pan-Arab policy. 
With no pilots of his own, it was widely assumed that the Mirages would be transferred 
to Egypt. The project of union, ephemeral though it proved, between Egypt, Libya and 
Syria in April 1971 reinforced such assumptions. France insisted there was a non 
re-exportation clause in the contract. Given that the pilots trained to fly the Libyan 
mirages appear to have been largely Egyptian and Pakistani, it is little surprise that this 
clause was in particular breached in the October 1973 war 8 
The publicity surrounding the Libyan deal posed a problem for Pompidou. Schumann 
had visited Algeria, Tunisia and Libya the previous week. Although Schumann 
appears to have opposed the deal, the rest of the cabinet eventually backed it 9. 
However, the protests that the deal prompted in the US had significant ramifications for 
US-French relations. Pompidou was scheduled to tour the US in February 1970. 
Mindful of the strength of US pro-Israeli lobbies and wary of adverse publicity in the 
wake of the Libyan contract, key aides, notably Michel Jobert who then headed the 
presidential office, advised the president to truncate his US tour. Schumann disagreed 
and Pompidou maintained the original schedule. During the tour, the French president 
defended the Libyan deal, stressing that France's regional policy was designed to 
counter the Soviet Union. "For us, situated as we are in Western Europe, at the west of 
the Mediterranean, our interest, indeed our duty, is to maintain our presence, rather than 
6 See the paras on Saint-Robert and Benoist-Mechin below- See also Georgy- G. Le Berger des 
Syrtes, Flammarion, Paris, 1996. 
7 Roussel, E. Georges Pompidou 1911-74,2nd edition, JC Lattes, 1994, p. 344. This second 
edition of Roussel's classic 1984 biography of Pompidou was considerably updated and revised 
following access to presidential archives. As such, in historiography terms it can be seen as a 
companion to the new archival work of Maurice Vaisse on de Gaulle's foreign policy. However, 
presumably an indication of persistent sensitivities, Roussel was not granted access to archives on the 
Middle East... 
8 Kassir, 1992, p. 96. 
9 Roussel, 1994, p. 342. 
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let others install themselves, in these regions. " 1 °. On February 28 at the Palmer Hotel 
in Chicago Pompidou and his wife were mobbed and spat at by a hostile crowd several 
thousand strong. While his distraught wife immediately returned to Paris, a livid 
Pompidou was placated only by the intervention of Nixon himself. Several key 
commentators see this incident as hardening both Pompidou's stance on the Israeli-Arab 
issue, and his conviction that broad Gaullist policy had to resist the derive atlantiste. 
3 Michel Jobert, energy and Arab policies, 1973/74. 
Michel Jobert was little known outside of French political circles prior to March 1973. 
His stint as Pompidou's last foreign minister lasted barely a year. Yet during that time 
Jobert gained a reputation and public profile, both at home and abroad, unsurpassed by 
any other French Fifth Republic foreign minister. A man who had been a self-effacing 
and discreet political advisor to Pompidou for many years, became an outspoken and 
combative minister who played a key role in the evolution of France's relations towards 
Iraq and other the Arab Gulf States 11 
Jobert's role is significant for this text in two respects. Firstly Jobert was both 
committed to and energetically promoted a policy which integrated newly established 
ties to both radical and conservative Arab states within a broader policy framework 
encompassing arms exports and oil imports. This in turn was linked to foreign policy 
goals both within Europe and with the United States. Jobert's arrival at the head of the 
Quai d'Orsay coincided with the arrival of Saudi Arabia's King Feisal in Paris in March 
1973. From then until his extensive tour of the Gulf states and Iraq during February 
1974, Jobert was more or less continually absorbed by Middle Eastern affairs as the war 
of October 1973 and subsequent energy crisis became a central issue both in France's 
dealings with its European allies and the USA. As such Jobert was able to bring to the 
fore themes he and his close collaborators had been working on since the mid-60s. 
Secondly, Jobert's time as foreign minister is significant in terms of both his power and 
influence vis-a-vis the President and decision making, as well as the reform of French 
10 New York Times 10.2.70, quoted in Fremaux, J, Le Monde Arabe et la securite de la France 
depuis 58, PUF, Paris, 1995, p. 98. 
11 Jobert's role and friendships from the early 60s onwards with virtually all the key actors 
in 
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foreign policy machinery. He asserted the prerogatives of the minister and Quai 
d'Orsay in a way in which none of his predecessors did 12. This was due to a variety of 
factors: the close relationship and trust built up over many years between Jobert and 
Pompidou; the fact of Pompidou's illness; Jobert's commitment to, and specific 
interpretations and promotion thereof of a particular strand of Gaullist ideas on foreign 
policy, as well as what emerged as his outspoken and at time irascible character. 
Although he appeared to strengthen the institution of the Quai d'Orsay as a force in 
foreign policy making, Jobert's impact stemmed equally from his skill in understanding, 
using and where necessary subverting, established channels of decision making. As 
such he made ample use of personal networks of advisors. 
Michel Jobert was a key member of Pompidou's ministerial cabinet when the latter was 
de Gaulle's Prime Minister. When Pompidou became president in May 1969, he 
appointed Jobert to the key post of secretary-general of the 1'Elysee. Jobert, who 
himself had been born in Morocco, thus became the President's principal advisor on oil 
and energy issues during 1969-72, negotiating in particular with the Algerian 
government over the nationalisation of French interests there in 1971 13. He thus 
already had a substantial involvement in the dossiers of Arab oil and French energy 
supply which would come to dominate his time as foreign minister from March 1973. 
Jobert was himself born in Morocco and thus, more than most of the Gaullists who 
came through the Algerian war, had a long-standing interest in Maghrebi and Arab 
affairs. Like Pompidou, Jobert also had an interest in literary affairs and, although a 
poor orator, was a talented writer. In his memoires of 1974, and a series of subsequent 
writings he documented his attitude to and engagement with the Arab world. Much of 
this is in the tone of self-justification due to the criticism that Jobert came under, 
following his pronouncements in the wake of the October 1973 war, and his extensive 
tour of Arab countries in early 1974. The problems with the arms embargo had 
already been addressed by the administration in mid-1973 during the trip to Paris of the 
King of Saudi Arabia. Faisal's trip to Paris brought home to French officials the need to 
this story requires further examination. 
12 Cohen, S. La monarchie nucleaire, les coulisses de la politique etrangere sous la Ve republique, 
Paris, Hachette, 1986, ch. 5. 
13 Ironically, as Jobert subsequently became French foreign minister 1973/74, and served again as 
a minister in 1981/83 before retiring, his Algerian counterpart in the 1971 nationlisation negotiations, 
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develop a new Arab policy due to mounting tension in the region 14. By the time of the 
visit Pompidou agreed that the embargo should be lifted, 'though this time because of 
the French state's desire to sell arms to Arab states, rather because of obligations to 
Israel. 
While most western states, and the bulk of the French political class immediately 
condemned Arab aggression in the war of October 1973, France, in the shape of Michel 
Jobert, once again took a different tack. Addressing the National Assembly on October 
17, Jobert, in a "little phrase" which would dog him for the rest of life, asked 
rhetorically, est-ce que tenter de remettre les pieds chez-soi constitue necessairement, 
forcement une agression imprevue? 15. The statement, widely interpreted as a 
justification of the Egyptian attack, predictably provoked a storm of protest in France 
and the US and, equally predictably, it was well received in the Arab world, where it 
was equally noted that Jobert was the sole Western statesman to refer to the war as that 
of Ramadan, rather than Yom Kippur. Thus what was generally seen as a major gaffe, 
( or at best an impetuous, unfortunate turn of phrase) at home, in fact further boosted 
French prestige in the Arab world. 
Jobert's visits to and courting of Arab governments in early 1974 can only be 
understood in the context of both the energy crisis and French attempts to unite their 
European Community colleagues around a collective European partnership with Arab 
oil producers. By their nature, both projects went against the thrust of US policy, which 
favoured close US: EC cooperation within the framework of an energy consumer's 
organisation. It was this essential incompatibility of visions which was at the core of 
the much publicised US: Franco, Kissinger: Jobert rivalry between October 1979 and 
April 1974 which both at the time and in subsequent writings in part defined the 
framework in which European: US relations and the 1973/74 oil crisis was perceived. 
Thus from late 1973, as Jobert attempted to forge a common European stance to the 
energy crisis, he was simultaneously trying to draw in Arab governments to a broader 
form of Euro-Arab partnership. 
Bouteflika, became Algerian president as this text was drafted in 1999. 
14 Weed, M. K. Michel Jobert et la diplomatie francaise... Paris, eds. F. Lanore, Paris, 1988, p. 131. 
15 Weed, 1988, p. 134. In his book Un Autre regard, B. Grasset, Paris 1974, Jobert claims this 
statement was made, on Pompidou's orders, to counter the pro-Israeli gloss put on government policy 
by Pierre Messmer. 
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Jobert visited Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Syria in mid-January 1974. This was followed 
by a trip to Baghad on February 7, while subsequent trips to Libya, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Egypt and Abu Dhabi were scheduled for March and April. The trip to Baghdad was 
less concerned with individual French projects than dominated by broader strategic 
issues. These revolved around two essentially contradictory initiatives; that of the US 
to convene a conference of energy consumers the following week in Washington DC, 
and the French proposal for a far broader "Euro-Arab dialogue". These two, essentially 
contradictory, initiatives happened simultaneously, As European Community foreign 
and energy ministers had finalised their position on the energy question the previous 
week in Brussels, a delegation of four Arab League representatives arrived to begin 
preliminary discussions on a broader framework of Euro: Arab cooperation. This had 
been largely a French initiative and Jobert used his trip to Iraq to further publicise the 
form that the nascent Euro-Arab dialogue might take; suggesting a meeting of the 
foreign ministers of nine EC and 19 Arab League states at some point during 1974. 
Replying to a French journalist's question as to whether this didn't amount to 
straightforward US: French rivalry in the Middle East, Jobert replied, "We consider that 
Europe and France have a practical policy to offer the Middle East" 1 6. 
Jobert considerably elaborated France's attitude to the Arab world during his trips of 
early 1974; 
"Nous avons, nous aussi, une strategie dans nos rapports avec le monde arabe et nous 
pensons que notre cooperation doit s'inserer dans une large perspective. Le 
Proche-Orient et les pays arabes presentent, pour les raisons politiques et 
economiques, un interet majeur pour la France. Ceci nest pas tres nouveau. Le 
General de Gaulle avait dejä formule cette analyse de facon precise et c'est cette 
politique lä que nous suivons. Nous allons plus loin que ce qu'il avait imagine. 
Nous 
venons maintenant jusqu'ä vous" 
D'autres amenent avec eux des hommes d'affaires... Pour ma part, je ne suis pas venu 
pour arracher un contrat petrolier contre des armes, mais pour proposer une politique 
16 Le Monde, 12.2.74. 
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deliberee, volontaire et de longe haleine 
... 
Mieux place, notre pays lest 
indiscutablement en Orient arabe. Mais je vous le disais hier, la France a fonde sa 
politique bien avant la crise de l'energie, une ligne de conduite s'inspirant a lafois des 
interets generaux du pays et de ses amities seculaires" 17 
Reflecting on his attitude to the Arab states, Jobert insists that he saw Franco-Arab 
partnership as crucial to France, and Europe's cohesion in the face of the US. He 
consistently rejected the notion that oil was the prime motivation behind his trips to the 
Gulf trip 18. Rather he insisted that Arab states were eager to embrace a French 
representative, and refuted the notions that France had a specifically "pro-Arab" stance 
at the time. 
4 Jobert and the reform of French foreign policy machinery 
One of the sub-themes of this thesis is the mechanisms of French policy making 
process. It is therefore important to note that Michel Jobert's impact upon French 
foreign policy went well beyond either the abrasive manner in which he honed the 
Franco-US antagonism, or his promotion of French Arab policy. Rather in his brief 
tenure as foreign minister, he managed to make significant changes to the mechanisms 
of foreign policy decision making, as well as the research capabilities of the Quai 
d'Orsay. 
At first glance, this role appears paradoxical. His detractors often accused him of 
excessive personalisation of decision making, short circuiting established bureaucracies 
and procedures. In retrospect, Jobert acknowledged that this was true, but defended his 
actions as having resulted in clearer and more efficient information flows and decision 
making. It is also clear that his determination to reform a bureaucracy which had been 
hitherto very much under the shadow of the L'Elysee, restored a degree of autonomy 
and pride to the foreign office which it had lacked under Schumann. 
Institutionally, Jobert's most striking new departure, and lasting achievement, was the 
creation of the Centre d'analyse et de prevision (CAP) as a think-tank and policy 
17 Weed, 1988, pp. 156-157. 
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formulation unit within, but not entirely of, the Quai d'Orsay. Often portrayed uniquely 
as Jobert's brainchild, in reality the need for a unit to provide longer-term reflections on 
foreign policy was recognized a decade earlier. In fact these reforms were part of 
gradual changes and modernisation occurring under Pompidou, 19 
The idea of creating a "cellule de reflection" on East: West issues was first suggested by 
Jean-Bernard Raimond in the early 1960s 20. Raimond was a life-long colleague of 
Jobert's who eventually became foreign minister in 1986 The "cellule" was blocked by 
Couve de Murville, briefly revived in mid-68, under Michel Debre's premiership, 
mothballed by Schumann and finally established as the CAP by Jobert 21. The CAP was 
put under the charge of Thierry de Montbrial, an expert on energy policy 22. Jobert 
himself had been Pompidou's chief advisor on energy policy. At the time this was seen 
as empire building by Jobert, and an attempt to by-pass normal channels; leading to the 
pejorative phrase "Jo-boys", to refer to the team of bright young things headed by 
Montbrial. However, with time the CAP rapidly became analogous to the research and 
analysis dept of FCO. It drew on a range of outside specialists from academia and 
business, some on retainers, some individually commissioned. Although the CAP was 
Jobert's creation, its primary purpose was to create new ideas. Although initially staffed 
by Jobert's confidants, papers produced did not necessarily support Jobert/Pompidou 
ideas in the Middle East. CAP staff were critical of the Arab policy, and generally 
more Atlanticist than Jobert himself 23. The CAP expanded and had greater influence 
18 Jobert, M& Remilleux, J. -L. Ni dieu, ni diable, Albin Michel, Paris, 1993, p. 241-245. 19 Destremau, B. Le Quai d'Orsay, Plon, Paris, 1994, pp318-329. 
20 In 1964 Hughes de L'Estoile (a central figure in arms sales to the Arab world in the 190s and 
80s 
, 
first as international director of the DGA, then as head of international sales of Dassault) created 
a research centre in the ministry of defense the centre de prospective et devaluation. De L'Estoile 
was consulted by de Montbrial in 1973. Schwartzbrod, A. Le president qui n'aimait pas la guerre, 
Plon, Paris, 1995, p. 54. 
21 Cohen, S. La Monarchie nucleaire; les coulisses de la politique etrangere sous la Verne 
Republique, Hachette, Paris, 1986, p. 92-95. Cohen, S. "Prospective et politique etrangere; le CAP", 
Revue Francais de Science Politique, No. 6 Dec 82. 
22 He was followed at the CAP by Jean-Louis Souviron, Destremau, 1994, p. 379. 
23 Schwartzbrod, A. 1995. While this book's main theme is Mitterrand's defense policies, it 
also contains an exceedingly insightful section on the evolution of policy and academic strategic 
studies and international relations in France, tracing the way in which individuals from the CAP went 
on to become the core analysts for French academia, and its aeronautical industry, in the 1980s. 
Thierry de Montbrial, and Jean-Luc Georgin and their CAP colleagues and successors were the source 
of a new generation of strategic and IR think tanks in France. De Montbrial left in 1979 to form IFRI. 
Georgin went to Matra, followed by Francois Heisbourg. In an aside which speaks volumes about the 
nature of personal links between the core actors in the French oil/arms milieu, Schwartzbrod relates 
how, in 1974 de Montbrial was called by Pierre Guillaument (by then head of Elf) and the Chief of 
Staff of the armed forces about the possibility of defense: CAP liaison. The link man between the two 
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under Giscard, notably in furthering medium term reflections on North: South and 
nuclear proliferation issues. Despite fluctuating fortunes and influence on policy in the 
1980s under Roland Dumas, the Centre continues to exist and is generally viewed as a 
counterpart to the UK's Research and Analysis wing of the FCO 24. 
As he had demonstrated during his tours of the Middle East in 1973/74 Jobert was 
particularly keen to integrate external economic promotion and foreign policy. The 
energy and success of his reforms to foreign commercial policy during his year as 
foreign minister was in part what inspired Francois Mitterrand to appoint him as 
minister for external economic affairs in 1981. Michel Jobert thus became the only 
French politician to be appointed as a key minister in both Right and Left wing 
cabinets. Here again, in what was a brief tenure as minister he made a series of changes 
to policy formulation, notably by creating the Centre d'Observation et de Prospective 
(COP), a commercial equivalent of the Quai's CAP. This body was an attempt to 
simplify and coordinate the plethora of bodies charged with promoting French overseas 
trade 25. 
5 Legitimising and promoting a French Arab policy; Gaullist writers and 
lobbies. 
The narrative of foreign policy above has made only passing reference to public 
pressure and debate of the issues of Arab policy. For much of the sixties, apart from 
the isolated academics and journalists writing on the Middle East, in practice there were 
no public voices backing a "pro-Arab" stance. What subsequently emerged as such a 
lobby can only be understood in relation to (indeed as an explicit reaction to) the 
strength of pro-Israeli opinion and lobbies in France. As already noted, these virtually 
monopolised press coverage and public interpretation of de Gaulle's stance in June 
1967, much to the latter's chagrin. The fact that de Gaulle's intemperate press 
conference of November 1967 was widely condemned as being anti-Semitic simply 
reinforced his mistrust. When announcing the total arms embargo in January 1969, de 
institutions was an officer called Lanxande, who in the 1980s became chief of staff to Mitterrand, 
p. 58 
24 Cohen, S. Les conseillers du president... PUF, Paris, 1980. p. 197. 
25 Weed, 1988, p. 218. When Jobert resigned in 1983 there was barely disguised friction 
between him and the - openly pro-Israeli - Jacques Attali. 
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Gaulle stated "it is remarkable, and has been noted, that the Israeli influences have 
made themselves felt close to the information milieux" 26. Primarily for this reason, 
some senior Gaullists close to the General himself began to organize pro-Arab 
groupings. Although conceived largely in the context of the Israeli-Arab conflict, in 
fact these drew in part on pre-existing Franco-Maghrebian ties and sympathies. 
Although not formally part of policy making, in the 1970s such groupings came to play 
a significant role, both in publicising and promoting broader Franco-Arab ties in the 
Middle East, as well as facilitating informal contacts between French and Arab decision 
makers. 
The Association de solidarite franco-arabe ASFA 
Primary among these was the Association de solidarite franco-grabe (ASFA), formed 
in May 1967 at the initiative of Louis Terrenoire. Terrenoire was a colleague and 
former minister of de Gaulle's. Terrenoire chose Lucien Bitterlin to head ASFA. 
Bitterlin, who was still heading ASFA in the mid-1990s, had distinguished himself as 
head-strong, courageous anti-OAS militant in Algiers 27 In 1967 he had been 
administering the association Algerie-France, itself founded under the patronage of 
George Gorce, de Gaulle's minister of information. The only French child in his 
Algiers school, Bitterlin spoke Arabic; he was one of an eclectic band of French 
individuals whose support for Algerian nationalism lead to a broader engagement with 
Arab causes, firstly over Palestine, and then as Franco-Arab relations broadened in the 
70s, other issues. 28. 
In origin, ASFA was clearly a Gaullist body, bringing together several noted scholars 
and activists during late 1967. In its early years its seems to have received discrete 
26 Kassir vol 2, p84. 
27 Bitterlin, then in his late twenties, had shown near-wreckless courage in the fight against the pro- 
Algerie francaise, anti-Gaullist Organisation de 1'armee secrete (OAS) in Algiers in 1961. His Nous 
Etions tous les terroristes; I'histoire des "°barbouzes" contre I'OAS en Algerie, eds Temoignage chretien, 
1983, is a starkly intense account of the internecine French violence in the final months of 
Algerie 
francaise. Aficionados of the shadier realms of French foreign policy should note that, as his book's 
subtitle suggests, it was the officially condoned but clandestine actions of Bitterlin and 
his anti-OAS 
colleagues in 1961 which introduced the term "barbouze" into the French language. 
"Barbouze" has since 
become the standard slang term for secret agents or mercenaries. By 1967 Bitterlin, had 
become the 
secretary of a solidarity group, France-Algerie. 
28 Kassir, 1992, p. 165. For a fuller account of ASFA and Bitterlin's life, see his La flamme et 
le soufre, Vega presse, Paris, 1988. Interview with Bitterlin, Paris June 1996. 
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financial assistance from the Quai d'Orsay 29 From October 1968 onwards, the 
association began to produce a regular bulletin, France Pays Arabes. Edmond 
Michelet and Louis Terrenoire typified those Gaullists who had been highly 
sympathetic to Israel, who then championed de Gaulle's "Arab policy", clearly marked 
by the resentment of first de Gaulle and then Pompidou that France's stance in the 
Middle East was so poorly received in France 30. By the 1970s France Pays Arabes 
became an important vehicle for the dissemination of information about France's 
growing ties with the Arab world, although its reliance on external funding and the 
influence of ac-hoc donations to ASFA and FPA is evident. As Iraq strove to influence 
France's Arab policy from 1974/75 onwards, and as Iraqi representatives played a 
greater role in intra-Arab politics in Paris, Iraqi courting of ASFA and Bitterlin 
increased. The creation of ASFA and a "pro-Arabe" presence in Paris dovetailed with 
the rise of interest in the Arab world by French financiers. Thus in 1970 the Chambre 
de commerce franco-arabe was formed by Michel Habib-Deloncle. Habib-Deloncle 
was a Gaullist depute and, like Bitterlin and others associated with ASFA, became a 
permanent fixture of this emerging "milieu" 31. The personal networks woven around 
solidarity and information groups such as ASFA played a role in fostering informal 
relations with Arab administrations. Nevertheless, until 1972 this milieu was still 
primarily concerned with Palestine, an issue which in post-May 68 France was largely 
polarized between extreme left-wing sympathy with Palestinians, and the Gaullist 
tendency of ASFA 32. By the time Jean-Pierre Chevenement, who was evidently not 
from the same Gaullist stable as Michelet, Terrenoire et al, came to chair the 
association des amities franco-iraqiennes (AAFI), the format and function of such 
"friendship" associations was long established. AAFI included several figures who had 
been prominent in ASFA, notably Jacques Berque, Pierre Rossi and Philippe Saint- 
Robert (see chapter 7, section five). 
Philippe Saint-Robert 
29 Fremaux, 1995, p. 280. 
30 Terrenoire, L. De Gaulle, Israel et les Palestiniens, Paris, eds du Temoignage chretien, Paris, 
1989. 
31 Fremaux, 1995, p. 281. 
32 Kassir, 1992, pp 166-172. 
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By the late sixties, Philippe de Saint-Robert had become one of the rare prominent 
Gaullists with a knowledge of the Arab world beyond the Maghreb. Through his 
numerous writings on Arab issues Saint-Robert clearly had an impact on this milieu, 
not least because of his stature as a leading Gaullist writer and thinker. Saint-Robert 
was in touch with Jobert and himself claims to have been the originator of Pompidou's 
"Mediterranean Policy", and had visited Libya several times in the late sixties 33 
Pompidou's biographer credits Saint-Robert and Jacques Benoist-Mechin as both 
having been influential in guiding Pompidou's ideas on the Middle East 34. Saint- 
Robert and Benoist-Mechin make an improbable couple. Yet the extensive writings of 
Benoist-Mechin, a political and literary figure from a previous generation, appear to 
have had a significant impact upon the evolution of French thinking about the Middle 
East. Benoist-Mechin, who died in 1983, was a complex and enigmatic figures. His 
influence is due to his stature as a pre-war literary intellectual and thence senior Vichy 
politician, rising to become Petain's foreign minister. Sentenced to death for his part in 
Vichy in 1947, he was pardoned and released in the mid-1950s. He then became an 
acclaimed military historian, writing notably on the inter-war German army. His works 
seen both at the time and subsequently, as being key texts in understanding the collapse 
and collaboration of war-time France. 
In 1959 he published a vast travelogue of a journey through Egypt, Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Iraq, Syria and Turkey he undertook in the winter of 1957-58. This book, "The 
Arab spring" is an extraordinary, 600-page political portrait of the Middle East. His 
prescient account largely prophesised many of the changes that were to come due to oil 
and revolution. The book sold excellently in France and had a profound impact on 
subsequent French perceptions of the region35. Benoist-Mechin went on to write 
numerous books on Middle Eastern and literary topics, most notably on successive 
36 Saudi monarchs 
33 Saint-Robert, Ph. Les septennats interrompus, R. Lafont, Paris, 1977, p. 35-39. 
34 Roussel, E. Georges Pompidou 1911-74, J. C. Lattes, Paris, 2nd ed, 1994, p. 343. 
35 Benoist-Mechin, J. Un printemps Arabe, Albin Michel, Paris, 1959. A remarkable snapshot of 
the Middle East, this comprises portraits of and interviews with Nasser, Nuri Said, Michel Aflak as well 
as the monarchs, courtiers and common people of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. 
36 Faycal, roi d'Arabie, Albin Michel, Paris, 1975. Following his trip to Saudi in 1958, he had also 
published Ibn-Seoud, la naissance d'un royaumme, Albin Michel, Paris, 
1959. 
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Due to his literary talents and political contacts, Benoist-Mechin undoubtedly had 
influence in the Fifth Republic, notably via Pompidou and Michel Jobert. He had 
extensive contacts in the Arab world, and, like Michel Jobert, was a confidant of 
Hassan Il of Morocco. The meager literature available suggests that he undoubtedly 
had an impact on both the mid-60s reinvention of French Arab and commercial policy 
in the region. Benoist-Mechin was a frequent visitor to the Arab world in 1966/67. An 
astonishing photo of him and Gadaffi, meeting illicitly in a Libyan oasis on January 12 
1967, a full 20 months before he took power, suggests that he was no stranger to the 
speed and efficiency with which Pompidou's new administration signed deal with Libya 
37. Similarly the former Petainist toured a series of capitals in the weeks prior to the 
June 1967 war. 
Eric Roussel, Pompidou's biographer and the editor of Benoist-Mechin's writings, is 
guarded as to the impact that he had on Arab policy; 
Presenter l'historien comme l'inspirateur secret de la politique arabe de la Ve 
Republique releve du roman feuilleton; sous estimer totalement la portee de ses 
conceptions est une autre erreur 38. Yet elsewhere the same author states that he was a 
crucial point of contact with the Arab world for Michel Jobert and Georges Pompidou 
39 Jobert, also a fine writer, who also maintained close links with Moroccan and 
Algerian leaderships, appears to have numerous points in common with Benoist- 
Mechin 40 
6 Jacques Chirac, Giscard D'Estaing and France's relationship with Iraq in 
the seventies 
37 Benoist-Mechin, J. "A 1'epreuve du temps", vol. 3,1947-71, Bourin/Julliard, Paris, 1993, plates 
between pp. 128-129. 
38 Benoist-Mechin, J. 1993, p 12. 
39 Roussel, E. Georges Pompidou, (2nd ed. ) J. C. Lattes, Paris, 1994, p. 343. 
40 Benoist-Mechin's role evidently raises the far broader issue, sadly beyond the scope of this text, 
of what role, if any, either explicit or implicit anti-semitic sentiment played in motivating those 
advocating renewed Franco-Arab ties in the period. This goes both for those of Benoist-Mechin's 
generation and those attracted to the diverse pro-Iraqi movements in the 1970s and 80s. This was 
discussed in several 1996 interviews, notably concerning Charles St. -Prot (Saddam Hussein's French 
biographer) and, to a lesser degree, Gilles Munier, as well as others. 
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When Saddam Hussein made his first visit to Paris in June 1972, Jacques Chirac was 
agriculture minister. Chirac had headed George Pompidou's private office in the mid- 
sixties; like Michel Jobert he was both a graduate of ENA and a member of the elite 
cour des comptes. His promotion to minister of the interior in the final months of 
Pompidou government reflected his growing status within the divided Gaullist 
movement. If the election of Valery Giscard D'Estaing in May 1974, marked the 
ascendancy of a more liberal, atlanticist and technocratic Gaullism, this image was 
initially enhanced by Giscard's appointment of the relatively young and dynamic Chirac 
to the post of Prime Minister. 
Giscard's foreign policy has been analysed, written and argued about in France far more 
than policy under Pompidou 41. There are three obvious reasons for this; Giscard 
served his full seven-year term, he launched a series of major policy initiatives and, 
lacking the unalloyed Gaullist mantle of his predecessor, he strengthened the 
presidential prerogative in foreign policy, centralising power in the presidency, while 
drawing extensively on parallel networks of advisors. Valery Giscard D'Estaing, came 
to the presidency with virtually no direct experience of foreign policy. There was little 
love lost between the president, Pompidou, and Giscard, his aloof and self-assured 
minister of finance. When head of the presidential office, one of Michel Jobert's key 
tasks was to ensure that presidential initiatives were not blocked by Giscard's finance 
ministry, which, whenever possible was kept at arms length from foreign policy 
initiatives. After the apparent autonomy and dynamism exercised by the Quai d'Orsay 
under Michel Jobert during 1973-74, Giscard was anxious to ensure his foreign 
minister faithfully executed his policy. His three foreign ministers were all largely 
passive, in-house career diplomats. Jean de Sauvagnargues, Louis de Guiringaud, Jean 
Francois-Ponret were all former senior Quai d'Orsay figures, none had their own power 
bases within the divided Gaullist movement. Giscard pointedly declared that "I am the 
real foreign minister" to his first secretary general of the foreign ministry 
42. 
41 Cohen, S. Smouts, M. -C., La politique exterieure de Valery Giscard D'Estaing, FNSP, Paris, 
1985. This contains one, largely descriptive chapter on the Middle East, ch. 14, Errera-Hoechstetter, 
Kassir & Mardam-Bey, 1993, pp. 211-266 provide by far the most detailed account of policy towards 
Israel between 1974-1981. 
42 Cohen, S. La Monarchie nucleaire; lees coulisses de la politique etrangere sous la Ve republique, 
Hachette, Paris, 1986, p. 118. 
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There were distinct nuances and underlying shifts in foreign policy under Giscard. He 
adopted a less confrontational policy vis-a-vis the United States, while emphasising 
increased North: South cooperation, elaborating a far a more ambitious framework for 
cooperation between rich and poor countries, emphasising interdependence. He 
promoted Franco-Algerian relations as the cornerstone of far more ambitious edifice of 
"North: South" cooperation thus broadening (and diluting) the stress on Mediterranean 
policy pioneered by Pompidou. To this end Giscard reinforced Euro-Arab dialogue, 
within the context of north: south relations, a preparatory meeting in April 1975 paving 
the way for 19 months (December 1975 - June '77) of deliberations between 27 
countries which was supposed to give meaning to the notion of a New International 
Economic Order. While the talks produced nothing tangible, such initiatives 
contributed to French presentation and self-image of cooperation. 
In summary, it is clear that overall Giscard consolidated the monarchical tendencies of 
the Fifth Republic presidency in the domain of foreign policy. However, the one 
crucial exception to this was in the Middle East. Giscard himself was wary of Middle 
Eastern issues, and policy towards the region was the only one where he allowed his 
young Prime Minister a certain degree of autonomy. Thus throughout Chirac's first 
premiership (May 1974-August 1976 43), policy towards the Gulf states and Iraq was 
one area where Chirac could exercise his own ideas and judgement. This he did by 
forging what by all accounts appears to have been a close commercial and relationship 
through personal ties with Saddam Hussein and others in his entourage. This trend of a 
prime ministerial, rather than presidential, role in the region continued under Chirac's 
more a-political, technocratic successor Raymond Barre, who thus also found himself 
deeply immersed in Middle Eastern and Iraqi affairs. 
The following paragraphs will chronicle the rapid deepening and broadening of Franco- 
Iraqi relations during the mid to late seventies. This period was marked by a swift 
expansion of commercial links and closer personal and political ties between Iraqi and 
French politicians. These ties were consolidated during four principal tours; 
43 Chirac resigned in august 1976, replaced by the more technocratic Raymond Barre. Chirac 
then formed the Rassemblement pour la republique (RPR). He again became premier in cohabitation 
with Mitterrand 1986-88, see ch. 7. 
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Jacques Chirac's trip to Baghdad in November 1974, the second official visit of 
Saddam Hussein to Paris in June 1975, the brief visit of both Chirac and Raymond 
Barre, then minister of external commerce, to Baghdad in January 1976, and then 
Barre's major trip to Iraq as Prime Minister in July 1977. 
Although the personality of Chirac is important, it is clear that both Chirac and Barre 
promoted a more dynamic commercial policy. As such French policy towards the 
Middle East offers the most clear example of the mercantile thrust of French foreign 
policy developed throughout the 1970s. This was honed under Giscard 44. The broad 
lines of France's commercial presence in the Middle East and Iraq thus followed and 
consolidated the template established under Pompidou, most explicitly during Michel 
Jobert's time as foreign minister, particularly during his tour of the region in early 1974. 
Bilateral ties between Paris and Baghdad were boosted by the visit of Michel Jobert to 
Iraq on February 6-9 1974. Yet by this time both commercial and political exchanges 
had become increasingly frequent. Pompidou's minister of industry, Jean Charbonnel, 
had visited Baghdad in mid-December 1973. The number of French industrial projects 
visited during the tour indicated the degree to which French companies were expanding 
their presence in the country. By late 1973 Renault were building lorries in Iskanderia, 
Alsthom assuring electricity generation and other French interests opening new cement 
and textile factories. In mid-October 1973 the Creusot-Loire steel group had signed a 
FFr600m contract to supply an integrated iron and steel complex to be built close to 
Basra at Khor al-Zubair. A week after Jobert quit Baghdad in early February 1974, a 
45-strong commercial delegation, led by the head of the Franco-Arab chamber of 
commerce, Michel Habib-Deloncle arrived. On 12 March 1974, the culmination of the 
previous three months of exchanges, an accord on economic cooperation was signed. 
In fact, following Jobert's visit to Baghdad, a tentative schedule of subsequent visits by 
French officials was arranged. The then agriculture minister Jacques Chirac appears to 
have been slated to visit Iraq in April or May to discuss a proposed agro-industrial 
project near Kirkuk, with a visit by Prime Minister Pierre Messmer pencilled in for the 
4s end of 1974 
as Lacorne, D. "La politique de promotion des exportations; le Colbertisme dans les moyens, le 
liberalisme comme fin", ch. 6 in Cohen & Smouts, 1985. 
45 Combat, 11.2.74. 
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Although the French government changed in May 1974, there was no re-orientation on 
policy towards Iraq. Overall France still had to ensure supplies of oil from the Middle 
East and Iraq, while trying to counterbalance the resulting commercial deficit with an 
aggressive policy of commercial exports and investments in Iraq. This thus provided 
the context for the visit of the new premier, Jacques Chirac, to Baghdad in November 
1974. Chirac was preceded in Baghdad by Raymond Offroy, former diplomat, turned 
depute who was then heading both the parliamentary group of France Pays Arabes, and 
the newly formed Association parliamentaire europeenne pour la cooperation euro- 
arabe. Just prior to Chirac's trip, Giscard's minister of agriculture, Christian Bonnet, 
also visited Iraq, signing a series Of agricultural cooperation agreements, in early 
November. Prior to Chirac's departure, Philippe Saint-Robert wrote an eloquent plea 
for closer economic cooperation with Baghdad, stressing the "legitimate 
complementarily" of French and Iraqi requirements (oil and industrial plant) and the 
plethora of industrial projects that Iraq was considering offering France. He also 
stressed that Chirac's administration was intent on pursuing the Gaullist "Mediterranean 
policy", with France's interior minister Michel Poniatowski leaving for Algeria, and 
Algeria's minister of energy also visiting Paris in the same month 46, all of which was 
presented as being the French specificity of the embryonic "Euro-Arab dialogue". 
Chirac arrived in Baghdad on November 30 1974, for a three day trip; the first French 
head of government to visit Baghdad. The bilateral agreement on oil supplies for 
France was already in place. However, the key commercial objective of the visit was to 
advance negotiations on as many major French industrial projects in Iraq as possible. 
These included the construction of a petro-chemical complex at Basra (awarded to 
Creusot-Loire), two cement factories, Baghdad's military hospital, the renovation of 
Baghdad airport and the possibility that France supply its colour TV system, SECAM, 
to Iraq. With such projects under way or in the offing, it is easy to see how France had 
become, in the course of 1974, the largest single supplier of goods to Iraq. 
Commercially Chirac, declared that the trip was a success "beyond all expectations", 
judged on the volume of contracts signed. Later it was noted that the impetuous 
46 Le Chemin de Baghdad, Quotidien de Paris, 1.11.74 
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premier had greatly overestimated the sum of FFr1 5bn contracts signed, perhaps carried 
away by the fact that he personally persuaded Saddam Hussein that Iraq should adopt 
the SECAM TV system. Pechiny were awarded a contract to construct an aluminum 
factory. Several other large contracts were left to be finalised during the February 1975 
trip to Baghdad of Giscard's minister of planning, Segard. It is also important to note, 
in the light of the subsequent polemics on the subject, that during the visit, French 
officials openly announced that France would also supply Iraq with two nuclear 
reactors 47 
Although it remains a factor which is difficult to evaluate, it is clear that on a personal 
level, Chirac and Saddam Hussein appeared to get on excellently. The two men had 
tete-a-tete lasting over six hours during the trip, apparently establishing a personal 
friendship. Several journalists accompanying the premier noted this "... le courant 
passait entre ces deux hommes d'apparence dissemblable" 48. Chirac "found Saddam 
had a good deal of charm, even if he seemed a bit brutal... he felt he was dealing with a 
great statesman. Given that the Soviets appeared reticent to develop their nuclear 
49 cooperation with Iraq, Saddam Hussein had a real need for French technology" 
These personal ties between the two men were to be both further deepened, and much 
commented on, during Saddam's return trip to France ten months later; Chirac greeting 
Saddam in Orly on September 5 1975 with the accolade "You are my personal friend... 
you're assured of my esteem, consideration and affections" a phrase he would, a decade 
and a half later, come to regret. 
The broader political framework of Franco-Arab relations was also elaborated during 
this November 1974 trip with the keynotes being (the very Gaullist... ) mutual respect 
for national independence, bilateral partnership between energy producers and 
consumers, and Euro-Arab cooperation 50 
47 albeit "ä des fins pacifiques.. ", Figaro, 3.12.74. 
48 Dumoulin, J. L'Express, 9-15.12.74. Press coverage of these trips merits further consideration, 
particularly in the light of the subsequent scandal and revelations over French nuclear policy. In 
retrospect, it is easy to forget the degree to which general press coverage of French Middle Eastern and 
African policy remained quiescent and uncritical until the late seventies. 
49 "a former French ambassador in Baghdad", probably Depis, quoted by Angeli, p. 52. 
50 The content and vocabulary of this text, and that given by Chirac 22 years later as President 
in Cairo, can usefully be compared, see conclusion fn 11. 
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La cooperation entre la France et l'Irak est confirme aux interets des deux pays dons 
l'aspiration politique fondamentale est la sauvegarde de l'independence nationale ... Le monde du 21e siecle devrait connaitre un monde arabe uni et une Europe unie ayant 
des liens etroits... Chirac also expressed openly what was to become the standard 
French view of Iraqi Baathism - shared by both right-wing Gaullists and Socialists 
alike - Ce nationalisme (irakien) au meilleur sens du terme, ce socialisme comme 
moyen de mobiliser les energies avec pour but d'assurer l'avenir sont tres proches des 
sentiments du people francais" sl 
It is not possible in the current version of this text to undertake a satisfactory analysis of 
the role that what is perhaps best termed the "ideological impulsion and justification" 
played in the Franco-Iraqi relationship. We have already seen that the roots of this 
"shared secular and republican" tradition and myth were already evident in the 
discourses of General Aref and de Gaulle in 1968. Indeed they were already presented 
in an embryonic form by Jacques Berque and Le Monde's correspondent when 
diplomatic ties were restored in 1963 (see chapter 4). 
Yet from 1974 Jacques Chirac - no doubt in part as a conscious and explicit bid to 
simultaneously re-define and lay unique claim (i. e. against Giscard) to the heritage of 
de Gaulle's foreign policy, stressed these allegedly shared political traits between 
France and Iraq. Clearly such themes, secularism, national sovereignty and autonomy 
in a bi-polar world, were central to the beliefs and writings of many Gaullists (Saint- 
Robert being typical in this respect). Coupled with an essentially technocratic, 
modernising view of socio-economic development such themes came to be at the centre 
of not only Franco-Iraqi relations, but also ties between France and Algeria. Following 
his departure from office in 1974, Michel Jobert greatly elaborated such themes in his 
journalistic and other writings. Yet what is simultaneously enigmatic, confusing and 
crucial to stress is that such beliefs, and thus the attraction and appeal in the burgeoning 
ties between Baathist Iraq and France in the 1970s, were not - indeed still to this day are 
not - restricted to uniquely Gaullist or even right-wing thinkers and politicians. Two 
examples. Firstly that a variety of far-right French republicans and monarchists have 
51 Figaro, 3.12.74, The Baathisminationalism/socialism as a progressive, and above all secular 
ideology would become an important argument used by those in France favouring Iraq in its struggle 
against revolutionary Iran. 
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systematically been attracted to Iraq. This is best personified in the various writings of 
Charles Saint-Prot. This is most explicitly the case in his 1987 biography of Saddam 
Hussein 52. But far more importantly numerous left-wing republicans embraced this 
notion of Iraq, most obviously and influentially in the person of Jean-Pierre 
Chevenement. Chevenement, who was close to Berque, espoused these beliefs from 
the seventies onwards. Yet it is clear that support for Iraq post 1979 was premised on 
and legitimised by opposition to theocratic Iran, presented by left and right wing French 
alike as the very antithesis of secular, progressive Iraq. The most clear exposition of 
this is in his 1995 book 53 
Both Jacques Chirac's personal friendship with Saddam Hussein, and his development 
of the theme of shared ideological premise between French and Iraqi political systems 
and leaders were further developed during Saddam Hussein's second trip to Paris in 
June 1975. The details of this trip, which cemented the Chirac: Hussein special 
relationship, are extensively chronicled by Angeli and Mesnier, and are reproduced in 
Timmerman. 
On November 18 1975 the French minister of industry and research, Michel D'Ornano 
signed three preliminary protocols defining an "enhanced cooperation framework" 
between the two countries covering the domains of nuclear, computing and 
telecommunication issues. 
Jacques Chirac again visited Baghdad on January 26 1976, for a brief stopover as he 
returned from Delhi. He was accompanied by Raymond Barre then still minister of 
external commerce. The press noted that the trip appeared in part to try and "relaunch" 
Franco-Iraqi commercial ties. Chirac had been far too over-optimistic when he had 
announced that FFr15bn of contracts had been signed. A year later, contracts worth 
only FFr3bn had actually been agreed. In retrospect the Iraqis appear to have been 
somewhat bemused by the "triumphalism" of Chirac's pronouncements after the 1974 
trip. While Saddam Hussein made no secret of the political reasons for choosing a 
partnership with France, the Iraqis proved tenacious negotiators when it came to the 
52 Saint-Prot, Ch. Saddam Hussein; un gaullisme arabe, Albin Michel 1987. 
53 Chevenement, J. -P., Le vert et le noir; integrisme, petrole, dollar, Grasset 1995. See especially 
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detail of contracts, and numerous of the projects outlined in 1974 were rejected or 
modified because the Iraqis found them far too expensive in relation to tenders offered 
by other OECD countries, French companies frequently finding themselves in stiff 
competition with firms from Japan and W Germany, as minister of industry Michel 
d'Ornano found when visiting Baghdad in November 1975. There was criticism from 
some French industrialists that insufficient commercial preparatory work had been done 
by France in Iraq. In late May Raymond Barre, still as minister of external commerce, 
returned to Baghdad, heading the French team at the Franco-Iraqi joint-commission and 
attempting to resolve some of the outstanding problems. 
During the bilateral exchanges and visits of 1974-76, much attention in France focussed 
on the civilian commercial potential of the Iraqi market. However, in reality, military 
and nuclear affairs increasingly came to preoccupy the leaders of both countries in the 
later seventies. 
During Chirac's December 1974 trip to Baghdad, the possibility of Iraq purchasing 
Mirage fighter planes was again raised. It should be recalled that this was first 
discussed in early 1968 and that at the time, despite extensive negotiations, agreement 
was never reached. During the late 1974 trip, Chirac had been accompanied by Hughes 
de L'Estoile, since the early seventies international director of the delegation 
ministerielle de l'armement of the DGA. During both Saddam Hussein's September 
1975 trip to France, and again during his stopover in Baghdad in January, Chirac had 
pursued the idea of a major sale of aircraft to Iraq. Saddam had observed the Mirage F- 
1 in flight in France and in early 1976 Iraqi pilots had flown tests on both Dassault's 
Mirage F-1 and the smaller Alpha-Jet at the Istres flight centre. In early September 
1976 an Iraqi delegation led by the minister of defense appears to have confirmed the 
order for 72 Mirage F-l. No firm details were published, and doubts remained as to the 
delivery schedule . 
Until this point all of Iraq's modern aviation was of Soviet origin. 54 
In August 1976 Jacques Chirac resigned as Prime Minister, (forming a new Gaullist 
party, the Rassemblement pour la republique, RPR, and the following year becoming 
the mayor of Paris). He was replaced by Raymond Barre. By the time that Raymond 
chapters 9 (pour un projet nationale arabe moderne) and 10 (une diplomatie laique). 
174 
Barre visited Baghdad as Prime Minister on June 25-26 1977 the sale of the 72 Mirages 
was at the top of the Franco-Iraqi agenda. Sales of Alouette helicopters, AMX 
armoured vehicles and artillery were also under discussion. It had been agreed to 
deliver the Mirage-Fl in two batches of 36, although negotiations over the precise 
specifications of the planes and their equipment continued, notably the Thompson-CSF 
radar system and Matra's Magic missile system. At this time Mirage's manufacturer, 
Dassault-Breguet was developing the Mirage-Fl's successor, the Mirage 2000. 
Although not due for completion for the French air force until mid-1978 Iraq had 
reportedly expressed interest in the plane to Barre 55. On a trip to Paris in May 1979 the 
Iraqi defense minister Khairallah met with his French counterpart Yvon Bourges to 
discuss possible purchase of the Mirage-200056. 
Conclusion 
By way of a truncated conclusion to this chapter two trends are worth highlighting. 
" Firstly the roots and evolution of Jacques Chirac's relationship with Iraq. 
Although Chirac left the premier's office in August 1976, in effect to create an 
alternative, rival Gaullist movement to Giscard, the impulsion he gave to the links 
between Bagdad and France had gain sufficient momentum and scope that his 
successor Raymond Barre continued to develop the trade. Chirac's entourage and 
followers maintained close links with Baghdad, people who were subsequently key 
foreign policy advisors - such as Eric Desmarest and Serge Boidevaix - remained 
involved in the various Iraq dossiers. Gaullists who joined or were sympathetic to 
Chirac's aims also maintained ties; Philippe Saint Robert for example acting as Chirac's 
envoy to Saddam in 1979 57. Dassault's expanding links with Baghdad in the later 
seventies are also important to Chirac and his movement, Marcel and then Serge 
Dassault being both long-time family friends and influential - not to mention rich - 
political allies of Chirac. 
" Secondly, although this has not been sufficiently detailed in the 
preceding text, it is important to highlight the degree to which the composition of 
sa Dumoulin, J. Figaro, 11.9.76. 
ss Le Monde, 8.7.77. 
56 Le Monde 8.5.79. 
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French trade with and investment in Iraq changed from the mid-1970s. As explained in 
previous chapters, up to and beyond 1972 it was oil which was the bedrock of trade, 
France running a significant commercial deficit with Iraq, despite the beginnings of 
arms sales from the late sixties on. As witnessed during Chirac's November 1974 trip 
to Baghdad, in the mid-1970s it was civilian - particularly public works - contracts 
which became crucial to France. Yet by the late 1970s two other domains would come 
to dominate the trade relations between the two countries. Firstly sales of nuclear 
technology, secondly increased military sales. By 1979 large French defense 
companies such as Dassault, Thomson, Matra and Aerospatiale all had established 
presence in the expanding Iraqi market for arms. Following the Iranian revolution in 
1979, and Iraq's declaration of war against Iran in September 1980, their presence, 
along with that of other western arms companies, was set to greatly expand. 
VC 
57 Saint Robert, 1995, page 388, see also Angeli 1992, page 238. 
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Chapter 6. Plus ca change... continuity under Mitterrand; Israel's 
destruction of Iraq's nuclear reactor, the impact of the Iran-Iraq war. 
1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 showed that between 1972 and 1980, France greatly increased its volume of 
exports of both civilian and military goods to Iraq. Both states consciously and 
deliberately entered into this close commercial and political relationship. This was 
largely driven by bilateral considerations under the control of both governments. Yet 
during the period 1979-1981 shifts in the Middle Eastern politics meant that the 
relationship increasingly came to be shaped by factors beyond either state's direct 
control. 
Three factors had a direct impact Paris-Baghdad ties. Firstly the Iranian revolution, and 
the granting of asylum to Iranians in France first to Khomeini himself, and thence his 
opponents. Secondly Israeli hostility to Iraq's nuclear programme, culminating in the 
destruction of the French-supplied Iraqi nuclear reactor at Tammuz in June 1981. 
Thirdly, and most importantly, the aftermath of Iraq's September 1980 attack on Iran. 
The Iran-Iraq war had two key implications. Firstly Iraq needed far more weapons, 
which France could and did supply. Secondly these supplies to Tehran's enemy earned 
France the deep hostility of Iran. These three factors would condition bilateral Franco- 
Iraqi relations over the coming decade. This chapter will examine the pressures upon 
the relationship in five different spheres: 
"1 Nuclear issues: France's supplying to Iraq of a nuclear reactor. 
This was agreed in the mid-seventies under the premierships of Jacques Chirac and 
Raymond Barre. Despite intense US and Israeli opposition to the supply of nuclear 
materials to Iraq, France under Giscard constructed a reactor for Iraq, Osiraq at 
Tammuz. This was part of a broader policy of developing exporting French nuclear 
technology in the 1970s, in part to reduce France's own dependence upon imported oil 
examined in earlier chapters. In 1975 France the Commissariat Bl 'energie atomique 
(CEA) had sought and obtained a $1 bn Iranian participation in the pan-European 
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Eurodif project to enrich uranium. This loan would greatly complicate relations with 
revolutionary Iran in the 1980s. Israeli attempts to prevent the construction and delivery 
of a nuclear reactor to Iraq in 1979-80 failed but immediately after Francois 
Mitterrand's election as the fifth Republic's first Socialist President, Israel bombed the 
reactor, triggering the first foreign policy crisis of Mitterrand's septennat. One constant 
theme in post-1981 relations with both Iraq and other Gulf Arab states was Iraq's 
request that Tammuz be reconstructed. 
"2 The new President's shifting attitude to Iran and Iraq: Francois 
Mitterrand had been highly critical both of the Gulf policy of Valery Giscard 
D'Estaing, and France's export of arms in the run-up to the 1981 presidential election. 
Yet within three months of coming to power, Mitterrand had found himself largely 
constrained to continue existing commitments to Iraq, via pressure both domestically 
and from other Arab allies, and to adopt a critical stance towards Iran. Support for Iraq 
in its war with Iran put France and Iran on an inevitable collision course which from 
late 1983 onwards became in effect an undeclared war, fought partly via proxies, 
largely in the Lebanon. 
"3 Petrodollars and personal emissaries: The need to counter the 
preconceived perception of Mitterrand being "pro-Israeli" weighed heavily on the 
action of the president and his advisors during 1981. Two factors, one foreign, one 
domestic, conditioned policy towards Arab states. With Iraq at war with Iran, the 
conservative states of the Gulf were increasingly concerned that Iran might triumph. 
With France having emerged as a key supplier of military material to Iraq, particularly 
in the strategically vital areas of strike aircraft and artillery, Paris came under pressure 
from other Arab states - as well as western allies - to step up military supplies to Iraq 
1. 
This dovetailed with a key domestic consideration in the early months of the Socialist 
administration, the need to stabilize the franc by preventing capital flight. As already 
explained (chapter 3) France's burgeoning relationship with Gulf countries in the 1970s 
had led to the growth of Franco-Arab banks in Paris, and by 1981 oil-rich countries had 
significant deposits in the French financial sector. During June and July 1981 Francois 
Mitterrand dispatched a series of envoys to the Arab world to try and persuade Arab 
rulers that there would be no fundamental shift in policy. This initiative was bolstered 
' Although the Franco-Iraqi relationship evidently has a logic of its own (and from the Iraqi 
viewpoint, as examined in ch. 4, was seen alongside its ties with and supplies from the Soviet Union) 
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by the visit to Paris in June 1981 of King Khaled of Saudi Arabia. The way Mitterrand 
actually implemented this strategy, by extensive use of personal friends and parallel 
networks with good contacts in the Arab world, rather than relying uniquely on the 
formal channels of foreign policy, was indicative of the personalised manner in which 
policy towards the Middle East would continue to be run during the 1980s. 
"4 Arms and Debt: France, in supplying Iraq with increasing 
volumes of weaponry, notably advanced artillery and aircraft (Mirage F1 and 2000s) 
found that Baghdad's debts became unsustainable. Thus from 1983 onwards, Iraqi 
debts to France became a major issue of concern in bilateral relations. French officials 
found themselves locked into a vicious circle of trade and debt, in that Iraq - usually in 
the person of vice-president Tariq Aziz - was able to leverage more supplies of more 
advanced weaponry out of the French state, arguing that if more weapons were not 
forthcoming, Iraq might be defeated and thus be unable to repay its debts. Thus to the 
triumvirate of oil, arms and nuclear dossiers that had dominated relations since the 
sixties, was added the factor of sovereign debt. 
"5 Relations with Iran: France's sale to Iraq of increasingly 
sophisticated weaponry, notably the convoluted "loan" of five Super-Etendard planes 
and advanced missile systems to Iraq in 1983 greatly escalated Iranian hostility to 
France. Isolated incidents of attacks on French targets in Lebanon since 1981 then 
escalated sharply, and it became clear that French policy in the Middle East could not 
indefinitely neglect relations with Iran. From 1984 onwards a tentative and delicate "re- 
balancing" of France's relationship with Baghdad and Tehran began. This 
reconfiguration of policy would be greatly complicated by the seizure of French 
hostages in Lebanon in 1985, and the violence triggered by Paris's failure to manage its 
relations with Iran and Iraq would dominate foreign policy during the constitutionally 
unprecedented period of cohabitation between President Mitterrand and his right-wing 
premier Jacques Chirac during 1986-88. 
2 The situation in 1979; prior to the Iranian revolution and Iran: Iraq war 
By 1979 the picture was somewhat mixed. The sale of the nuclear reactor to Iraq 
continued, as did the sales of Mirage-Fl and other armaments. However, the 
"fabulous 
broader geo-strategic shifts of the early 1980s, notably the warming of US-Iraqi ties, need 
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contracts" in the civil domain promised in 1974 by Jacques Chirac had only partially 
materialised as French companies found themselves out-bid by other OECD producers. 
Thus by the time that the minister of external commerce, Jean-Francois Deniau 
presided over the third joint-economic commission on February 17-20 1979, relations 
were far less certain than they had been at their nadir of 1974-76 (see ch. 5). Ties had 
been tarnished and complicated by a shooting incident outside the Iraqi embassy in 
Paris in July 1978. A French policeman and two others were killed as embassy staff 
opened fire after a Palestinian seized hostages in the embassy. Iraq at this point was 
backing hard-line Palestinian factions, notably the renegade PLO rep in Baghdad, Abu 
Nidal, who had begun a campaign of terror against PLO officials, assassinating the 
PLO representatives in Kuwait and London. Two days after the shoot-out outside 
Iraq's Paris embassy, the PLO representative in Paris was murdered, with suspicion 
falling on Nidal and his Iraqi patron. This incident highlighted an aspect of Franco-Iraqi 
relations hitherto neglected in the text. With the establishment of close ties between 
Iraqi and French elites, Iraq came to be a major factor in intra-Arab politics in Paris 2 
Raymond Barre re-visited Baghdad on July 7 1979. As Europe in general and France in 
particular faced further oil price rises and potential shortages, Barre's trip had three 
objectives. Firstly to reassure the Iraqis over the delivery of the nuclear reactor. 
Despite the destruction of the original model at La Seyne three months previously, and 
the mounting pressure on France not to supply enriched uranium to Iraq, France would 
honour the contract. Secondly ensure continued favourable supplies of oil to France. 
Thirdly to continue to promote France's military and civilian exports to Iraq. The 
former comprised above all Dassault's Mirage-F 1 already on order, and the possibility 
of sales of Mirage-2000. The latter involved in particular a contract for the extension of 
Baghdad airport, as well as a series of irrigation and railway projects. Thus industry 
consideration; aspects of French support for Iraq suited US policy in the region. 
2 Le Monde, 2.8.78, [d12p15]. The matter was quickly hushed up. Three Iraqi diplomats were 
"expelled", and the Iraqi press mentioned the affair only as an intra-Palestinian struggle, Le Figaro, 
3.8.78. The Iraqi ambassador Al-Wandawi made no comment. The family of the murdered police 
inspector, Jacques Capela, were discreetly paid-off by Baghdad, as was the French Police Federation. 
The deal was negotiated by a confidant of Giscard's, Victor Capot. See Pean, La Menace, Fayard, 
Paris, 1988, p. 111, Angeli, C. Mesnier, S. Notre Allid Saddam, O. Orban, Paris, 1992, p. 76. On Iraq's 
role in Arab and Palestinian politics in Paris, see Kassir, S, Mardam-Bey, F. Itineraires de Paris A 
Jerusalem la France et le conflit israelo-arabe, Institut des etudes palestiniennes , 
Washington, D. C. 
1992. Beau, N. Paris, Capitale Arabe, Seuil, 1995, esp. ch 7. 
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minister Jean-Francois Deniau returned to Baghdad in October 1979 to attend to the 
Baghdad International Trade Fair, where over 40 French companies were exhibiting. 
By mid-1979 French officials appear to have redoubled attempts to consolidate links 
with Iraq, in part because of the sense that Iraq was in the process of modifying its 
stance to the Soviet Union and moderating its radical stance vis-a-vis other, 
conservative oil producers, notably Saudi Arabia. Again, domestic Iraqi consideration 
appear to have influenced foreign policy. Opposition at home from both Iraqi 
Communists and Kurds led to a further cooling of Baghdad's relations with the Soviet 
Union. This, coupled with the fact that the Soviet Union now required cash rather than 
oil-barter terms for arms supplies, strengthened Iraq's desire to purchase western 
weaponry. 
3 Franco-Iraqi Nuclear cooperation 
The reporting and writing about Franco-Iraqi nuclear ties has had a checkered history. 
The, largely secret, development of nuclear cooperation with Israel and France's 
building of the Dimona facility were narrated in chapter two. In the 1970s, as France 
sought to develop its own nuclear industry, and export nuclear technology to gain 
economies of scale and help offset R&D costs, it was fairly open about its success in 
selling to foreign clients. By 1979, with increased criticism from western allies, and 
growing concern in the entourage of Giscard about proliferation, there was evident 
tension between the commercial benefits of exports, and the political dangers of such a 
policy. Officials nevertheless defended existing contracts, such as that signed with Iraq 
in 1975. As explained later in this chapter, Israel's destruction of Tammuz in June 
1981 greatly complicated the issue, generating far more publicity and awareness of 
France's nuclear exports 3. In the mid-eighties, both Jacques Chirac, who became 
prime minister in 1986, and Giscard attempted to deny their role in providing Iraq with 
nuclear technology . 
4 
3 Pean, P. Les Deux bombes, comment la France a donne la bombe ä Israel et ä 1'Irak, Fayard, 
Paris, 1982 
4 Angeli, 1992, p. 56-58. A polemic surfaced in August 1986 following Chirac's denial of any 
responsibility in interview with an Israeli daily; Yediot Aharonot, 15.8.86; for French echos of this, see Le 
Matin, 20.8.86, Liberation, 20.8.86. 
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Iraq's desire to acquire nuclear technology from France dated from mid-1974. When 
Iraqi officials arrived in Paris shortly after Giscard became President, they were 
received by Andre Giraud, head of the Commissariat al 'energie atomique (CEA). 
When Jacques Chirac visited Baghdad for the first time in December 1974, Giraud, his 
number two at the CEA, Michel Pecqueur, and one of Chirac's principal diplomatic 
aides, Serge Boidevaux, accompanied Chirac 5. Boidevaux, a senior diplomat close to 
Chirac and later trusted by Mitterrand, would come to play a key role in Franco-Iraq 
relations over the next decade. The nuclear dossier was thus discussed between French 
CEA officials and Iraqis in Baghdad. The French industry minister, Michel D'Ornano, 
then studied the matter, which was complicated by Iraq's request for a type of graphite- 
gas reactor no longer produced in France, where the nuclear industry had opted for 
pressurised water reactors. D' Ornano suggested Iraq first receive a research reactor. 
The issue of which type of reactor to supply to Iraq became entangled in internal- 
French debates about the future of the French nuclear industry and its cooperation with 
the American Westinghouse company 6. When Chirac received Saddam Hussein in 
Paris in September 1975, the nuclear issue was discussed in more detail. Chirac took 
the Iraqi leader to see French nuclear installation in Cadarache in Provence, 
accompanied by Giraud and Pecqueur of the CEA. At a formal dinner for Saddam in 
Versailles during the September trip, Chirac declared that; "Iraq is in the process of 
putting together a coherent nuclear strategy. France would like to be involved in this 
strategy, at present in the domain of water-based reactors". While French official 
statements and press reports were careful to stress that nuclear cooperation was strictly 
for civil use, the following day Saddam Hussein gave an interview in Paris to the 
Lebanese weekly, al-Usbu al Arabi, in which he declared that "the (nuclear) accord 
with France is the first concrete step towards the production of an Arab atomic 
7 weapon" . 
The deal agreed in September 1975 between France and Iraq was for France to supply a 
research reactor similar to Osiris, a reactor operated by the CEA at Saclay south west of 
Paris. An initial protocol was signed between D'Ornano and the Iraqis in November 
1975. The agreement to enter into nuclear cooperation with Iraq was published in the 
5 Angeli, 1992, p. 51. The following draws heavily on ch. 2 of this Angeli/Mesnier book, and that 
of Pean, 1982. 
6 Le nouvel observateur, 20.10.75. 
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Journal Officiel, signed by Chirac and Giscard, on 18.6.76, although the final, full 
agreement was not signed until October 1976, after Chirac had left office two months 
earlier 8. In November 1976 the Quai d'Orsay confirmed the sale to Iraq of a research 
reactor, comprising 12 kilos of 93%-enriched uranium 9. The Iraqi reactor was thus to 
be known as Osirak, or Tammuz I. It operated with 93% enriched Uranium 235, a 
fissile material suitable for weapons. France agreed to supply six batches of U-235, 
each of around 12kg. The supplying of fissile material to Iraq was to be the most 
controversial aspect of the deal. The Quai d'Orsay were hostile to the idea of nuclear 
cooperation with Baghdad. The nuclear cooperation was at the centre of Raymond 
Barre's trip to Baghdad in July 1979, when he was accompanied by Pecqueuer, now at 
the head of the CEA. During the trip he announced that a second, full-scale reactor 
would be supplied to Iraq, to be known as Tammuz II, despite the reservations and 
criticisms of the US. 
Opposition to French nuclear sales to Iraq did not just take diplomatic forms. On the 
evening of 4-5 April 1979, seven explosive devices exploded in a hangar belonging 
to the Constructions navales et industrielles de la Mediterranee (CNIM), a 
contractor of the CEA at La Seyne, close to Marseilles. Crucial components of the 
reactors constructed and about to be delivered to Iraq were destroyed. No trace was 
found of those who had placed the sophisticated devices, with all the reports 
concurring that the attack was certainly the work of a professional espionage team 10 
The CEA was evidently obliged to re-manufacture the destroyed components, 
delaying the programme by several months. The French used the attack to insert a 
clause into the agreement that French personnel must supervise Tammuz on-site for 
a period of 10 years. 
A year later, on June 14 1980, an Egyptian scientist working on the Iraqi nuclear 
programme, Yahia al-Meshad, was found dead in the Meridien hotel in Paris. Again, 
no suspects were found, and the one possible witness also mysteriously "died". 
Israeli statements immediately after the death, claiming that the Iraqi nuclear 
programme had been retarded, left little doubt that this time Israeli agents were 
Angeli, 1992, p. 54. 
8 Angeli, 1992, p. 57. 
9 La Croix, 16.11.76. 
184 
behind the attack 11. By July 1980 an international campaign criticising France's 
nuclear cooperation began, indicating that both the La Seyne and Meridien attacks 
were the work of Mossad, with revelations purporting to be from an Israeli who 
participated in the attack at La Seyne being published in the German press 12. On 24 
September 1980 at the United Nations, two days after Iraq attacked Iran, Giscard's 
foreign minister Jean Francois-Poncet defended France's policy of nuclear 
cooperation, confirming that France had delivered the first consignment of 12kg of 
U-235 to Iraq 13. France insisted that it would deliver Uranium to Iraq, stressing that 
Iraq was a signatory to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The 
polemic over the delivery of enriched Uranium to Baghdad erupted at a crucial 
moment. The week after Iraq opened the war with Iran, Tariq Aziz flew to Paris, 
principally to insist that France reconfirm its assurances that there would be no 
embargo on supplies of weaponry to Iraq in the context of its war with Iran. These 
assurances had been repeatedly given by French officials. Indeed many of those 
involved in the supply of arms to Iraq during 1975-79, appear to have been aware by 
1980 that a conflict was possible. 14. On three separate occasions, in meetings with 
the French President in late September, November and December, Tariq Aziz was 
reassured that deliveries would continue, a critical factor as Iraq's principal 
armourer, the Soviet suspended supplies as the war erupted. Meanwhile France 
discreetly placed an embargo on an order of missile launching patrol boats for Iran. 
These had been ordered by the Shah and had already been largely paid for 
15 
4 Francois Mitterrand, arms sales and the Iran-Iraq war 
After Tariq Aziz's first, post-war trip to Paris in September 1979, the Iraqi 
ambassador redoubled his efforts to ensure that all of France's political class were 
behind Iraq's war effort. Mindful of the impending Presidential election, the 
10 Le Matin, 15.4.79. 
" Nan, P, 1988, p. 100. 
12 Le nouvel observateur, 19.7.80. 
13 Le Monde, 26.9.80, dl p60. 
14 Angeli, 1992, p. 83. 
15 Evidently France was not the only arms supplier to be faced with a dilemma over supplies to 
the two sides in 1980. Britain's uneven application of controls on arms supplies at this period 
formed 
the first chapter in what would become the saga of the "Arms to Iraq" enquiry in the early 1990s. 
See 
Styan, D. French and British trade and arms sales to Iraq, 1980-90, unpublished conference paper, 
July ' 1996. 
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ambassador also visited the headquarters of the Parti socialiste (PS). However, the 
party rejected his arguments and condemned Iraq's aggression against Iran. This 
stance became that of the PS's founder and candidate at the 1981 Presidential 
Elections, Francois Mitterrand. Mitterrand had consistently criticised the foreign 
policy of the right, in particular condemning Giscard's mercantile policy of arms 
sales. In April 1980, in the national assembly, Mitterrand had vigorously criticised 
France's export of arms to the Middle East; "pretending to favour progress and peace 
in the region, while simultaneously supplying explosives does not appear to us (the 
PS) very logical". After the launching of war on September 22, the PS and 
Mitterrand condemned Baghdad, while noting the convergence of interests of the 
Soviet Union and US in the region, and prophesising that; "in terms of territory, the 
war can not progress far". In early December, the PS strongly criticised the supply 
of weaponry to Iraq, the Franco-Iraqi nuclear programme as well as arms supplies to 
Saudi Arabia. As the first of the Mirage F1 arrived in Baghdad in January 1981, the 
PS again condemned French policy, and had by this time come out in favour of a full 
embargo on arms supplies to either side 16. Given the past relations with the 
politicians and parties of the right, and in the light of the critical stance taken by 
Mitterrand vis-a-vis Iraq, it is unsurprising that in general Arab governments and 
their representatives in Paris favoured Chirac and Giscard in the presidential 
campaign of early 1981 17. In addition, Mitterrand was known for his friendship of 
Israel, notably via his personal links with Shimon Peres and the Israeli Labour party. 
Given that Mitterrand ran a campaign in conjunction with the Communist Party, on a 
platform favouring major nationalisation, it is unsurprising that conservative Arab 
opinion was concerned. 
Concern over capital flight 
On May 10 1981, in the second round of the presidential elections, Francois 
Mitterrand was elected President of France. Between his election and the 
inauguration, following by his triumphal visit to the Pantheon on May 21, both the 
16 Angeli, 1992, p. 89-90. 
17 Literature on the clandestine funding of political parties and presidential campaigns in the 
1970s is meagre. However, it is virtually certain that Arab states contributed heavily to the 1981 
campaign costs, many of those interviewed in 1996 took it as a matter of course that contracts signed 
in the 1970s by Chirac and Barre contained commissions for party funds. See conclusion, fn 9. 
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value of the franc and shares on the Paris Stock Exchange fell sharply. Given the 
immediate threat and reality of capital flight, and the general disquiet in the Arab 
world over Mitterrand's election, the new French foreign policy team was faced with 
two immediate, inter-linked, goals: firstly to reassure Arab states that French foreign 
and economic policy was stable, and that there was no reason to withdraw funds 
from French banks and further weaken the Franc. Secondly, that there would be no 
drastic shift in French policy in the Middle East, either towards Israel, or the 
Iran: Iraq conflict. 
Such reassurances were achieved by a series of initiatives taken by Mitterrand and 
his officials, and then were curiously aided by an Israeli action. 
" Mitterrand chose two key ministers with a considerable experience of 
the Arab world, excellent contacts and long pedigree's of "pro-Arab" positions, 
notably over Palestine. Claude Cheysson was appointed minister of foreign affairs 18. 
More surprisingly, Michel Jobert, Pompidou's foreign minister in 1973/74 (see 
chapters 4 and 5) was appointed minister of external commerce. Both ministers 
immediately put their existing contacts to use. Also in the cabinet, albeit at the 
junior post of minister of research, was Jean-Pierre Chevenement, a figure who was 
to become a key part of pro-Iraqi groupings in France during the next ten years 
19. 
" Mitterrand skilfully combined use of personal envoys drawn both 
from existing networks with links to Arab countries, and from his personal 
entourage. Several figures who were close personal friends of Mitterrand would 
play key roles in forming his ideas and policies towards the Arab world in the 1980s. 
One of these, Claude de Kemoularia, a well established banker, was crucial in 
coordinating a series of meeting with Arab diplomats immediately upon Mitterrand 
taking power. Along with Pierre Beregovoy, and a junior advisor Hubert Vedrine, 
Kemoularia held meetings with all Arab ambassadors in Paris during the week prior 
to Mitterrand's inauguration 20. Roland Dumas, also a close and longstanding 
18 The ministry, formally know as Affaires etrangeres, was simultaneously re-named Relations 
exterieures. When Chirac became PM in March 1986, it reverted to Affaires etrangeres. 
19 Promoted to minister of education in 1984, Chevenement became a founding member of the 
Association des amities franco-iraquiennes in 1985. In 1991 he would resign as Mitterrand's defense 
minister over his disagreement with French policy towards Iraq. 
20 Vedrine would become a key foreign policy aide to Mitterrand. In 1996 he published an 
account the Mitterrand years Vedrine, H, Les mondes de Francois Mitterrand :ä l'Elysee, 1981-1995, 
Paris, Fayard, 1996. In June 1997 he was chosen as France's third "cohabitationiste" foreign 
minister. 
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colleague of Mitterrand's, addressed a gathering of the same Arab ambassadors 
whom the head of the Moroccan embassy in Paris had brought together 21. A key 
advisor of Jacques Chirac on the diplomatic and Middle Easter affairs, Serge 
Boidevaux, was chosen to immediately visit Baghdad in order to reassure Saddam 
Hussein that Mitterrand's election did not signal a change in French strategy in the 
region 22 He then went to Jordan with a similar message. Meanwhile, while 
Mitterrand despatched France's ambassador in Cairo to Saudi and the gulf states, 
Claude de Kemoularia also left for a tour of the Gulf states. He too then visited 
Baghdad. Meanwhile Mitterrand's brother, Jacques Mitterrand, who headed the 
French aeronautical giant Aerospatiale which had extensive contracts in Saudia 
Arabia, communicated a similar message to : the King of Saudi Arabia. French links 
with the Saudi government and royal family were by this time extensive. 
Mitterrand's new defence minister, Charles Hernu, was also enrolled into the drive to 
reassure Arab allies of France that policy would not radically change. As all these 
initiatives were under way, the idea of inviting the King of Saudi Arabia, then 
summering in Switzerland, emerged. Being the first foreign head of state to make an 
official visit to Paris would reaffirm the message that France would remain loyal to 
its Arab allies. Two personal Arab envoys contacted by Mitterrand's team took the 
invitation to the Saudi monarch 23. King Khaled's was duly invited to visit Paris on 
June 13 1981. However, a week before Khaled's visit, Israel's destruction of Iraq's 
French-supplied Tammuz nuclear reactor thrust Middle Eastern policy to the top of 
the new President's agenda. 
Israel's destruction of Tammuz 
On Sunday June 7 1981,14 years to the day of Israel's victory in 1967, eight F16 
Phantom bombers left their base at Etzion in the Sinai, crossed Saudi Arabia 
undetected, entered Iraqi airspace and destroyed the main Tammuz reactor. The 
attack did not touch the facilities where the uranium was stored. A young French 
technician, Damien Chaussepied, working for Air Liquide and the CEA, was killed 
21 Angeli, 1992, p. 91. 
22 Boidevaux, who would become head of the ME and North Africa section of the QO in 1980, 
had consistently been close to Franco-Arab affairs. He was an aide in the ministry of defence 
between 1969-73, then director of Michel Jobert's office in the foreign ministry 1973/74 before 
working for Jacques Chirac when premier 1974-76. 
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in the attack 24. The raid was hailed as a triumph by the Israeli government of 
Menachim Begin who justified the attack on the basis that 
"Iraq was preparing to produce atomic bombs. The target of those bombs 
was Israel. Consequently Israel decided to act without waiting in order to ensure the 
security of our people... incontestable sources suggested to us two possible dates for 
the completion of the reactor, the first early June, the latter early September. In a 
short time, the reactor would have been operational. Under such conditions, no 
Israeli government would have been able to destroy it as such an initiative would 
have provoked a vast radioactivity around Baghdad and hit an innocent population... 
In exchange for petrol, two European governments have aided the Iraqi dictator to 
build nuclear weapons. Yet again, we call on them to renounce this assistance. " 25 . 
It appears that, operating on the former date, and giving the raid a far clearer anti- 
French symbolism, - Israel had originally intended to stage the raid on Tammuz on 
May 10, the day of the second round of French Presidential elections. Shimon Peres, 
fearing that the act would damage Mitterrand, apparently intervening in order to 
delay the attack until after the election. Although little noticed at the time, Israel 
had, unsuccessfully, attempted to bomb the Tammuz site the previous year. 
The visit of King Khaled to Paris was announced in the immediate aftermath of the 
Israeli raid on Tammuz. France, supported by Britain, officially called on the UN 
Security Council to condemn the raid on June 16 26. In France, it was the new Prime 
Minister, Pierre Mauroy, who formally condemned the raid for the government as 
"an unacceptable and serious action which the French government condemns. Such 
a raid can only serve to increase tension in this region", . 
Mitterrand himself said 
little on the subject; talking to the Washington Post on June 18, he simply 
commented that "it is a pity that the first gesture of Mr Begin has dented our 
goodwill", clearly uncomfortable having come to power with the idea of improving 
Franco-Israeli relations, that one of his first acts as head of the government was to 
censure Israel. Foreign Minister Cheysson was more forthright; "All attacks on the 
territory of a foreign state constitute a violation of law and thus are to be condemned. 
23 Akram Ojjeh and Samir Traboulsi, Angeli, p. 94. 
24 Le Monde, 10.6.81. 
25 Quoated in Pean, 1988, p. 103. 
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The Israeli government's initiative is a serious act which the French government 
judges unacceptable. In addition, the bombing increases the tension in the entire 
region. " 27. All official French statements in the days following the raid stressed the 
fact that the reactors were for peaceful use, and that they were under the supervision 
of the International Atomic Energy Agency. 
Several key questions faced the government in the wake of the Israeli destruction of 
Tammuz. Firstly Mitterrand had planned to make his first foreign trip to Israel; 
should the trip be postponed? Secondly Iraq, supported by key Arab states, was 
adamant that France should reconstruct the reactor; should France engage itself to 
reconstruct Tammuz? Thirdly how would this new element alter Iraq's immediate 
demands for increased supplies for weapons from France? 
In the event Mitterrand's trip to Israel was postponed. What attitude to take towards 
Iraqi demands, both that Tammuz be reconstructed, and that Paris continue to supply 
arms, would be discussed in mid-August when Tariq Aziz made his first visit to 
Paris under Mitterrand's presidency. 
The destruction of Tammuz in fact had a paradoxical result for Mitterrand. Although 
his government condemned the attack, it effectively removed the nuclear element 
from Franco-Iraqi relations. Iraq lobbied for the French to rebuild the reactor, 
something which the Saudis and other Arab states also pushed France to do. In July 
1981 Claude Cheysson declared to a Lebanese publication that "If Iraq wants to 
conclude a new accord to obtain a nuclear reactor, France will be ready to supply her 
under the same conditions as those applied to other customers" . In mid-July, 
Saudi 
Arabia even offered to finance the work. Mitterrand agreed to let studies begin, but 
eventually cancelled the project in early 1983, by which time Iraq's difficulties in the 
war with Iran, requiring more conventional weapons and a rescheduling of debts, 
overshadowed long-term plans for nuclear development. 
Yet, somewhat paradoxically, the destruction of Tammuz in fact aided those in 
France who were pushing for a closer relationship with Iraq in that from August 
26 Le Monde 19.6.81. 
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1981 onwards, growing requests for conventional weapons were agreed to, in part as 
compensation for the fact that the French president was clearly reticent to re-engage 
France in a programme of nuclear cooperation with Iraq. 
5 Complications with Iran, July-August 1981. 
Shoring up the Franc by courting conservative Arab states, and Israel's raid on 
Tammuz and its aftermath was not the only Middle Eastern issue to preoccupy 
Mitterrand and his advisors in the first, chaotic three months of office. By early 
August relations with revolutionary Iran, were at breaking point. Ties had already 
been strained in late 1980, early 1981 by France's continued supply of weaponry to 
Iraq after the latter's attack on Iran in September 1980. In late November 1980 a 
delegation of Iranians visited both London and Paris. The delegation, which 
included Mohamed Hashemi and Rafsanjani met Giscard's foreign minister 
Francois-Poncet, criticising French arms sales to Iraq 28. The delegation told a press 
conference that "the delivery of arms to Iraq worries Iran and could lead to a 
deterioration of relations between Tehran and Paris 29. When the first four Mirage 
Fis were delivered to Baghdad in January 1981, there were protests both in Iran and 
France 30. It should be noted also that Iran was also discreetly attempting to 
purchase arms in Paris in December 1980, and also trying to secure the delivery of 
patrol boats ordered and paid for by the Shah 31 
When Mitterrand came to power he did not share the anti-Iranian positions of many 
of the senior figures involved in French foreign policy. Although he had not, as had 
at one point been suggested to him, met with Khomeini during his weeks of exile in 
France in 1978, nor was he initially instinctively hostile to Iran's revolutionary 
regime. However, the US hostages crisis had made him wary of the situation in 
Tehran. 
27 Le Monde 10.6.81. 
28 The delegation also included a little known depute Mohamed Khatemi. 
29 Le Monde, 30.11.80. 
30 Le Monde 16.2.81. 
31 Le Canard, 4.3.81. Interview, Paul Depis, July 1986, Lyon. 
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On July 29 1981 two Iranians arrived in an Iranian Boeing 707 at the military airport 
of Evreux, seeking asylum. The presence in France of the former president of the 
Islamic Republic, Bani Sadr, and the leader of the Mujahidin, Masud Rajavi, was to 
greatly complicate Franco-Iranian relations. France accepted their presence in the 
country, but forbade them from making any public statements. Paul Depis, former 
secretary in the French embassy in Baghdad who was in 1981 now deputy director in 
the North Africa and Middle East department of the Quai d'Orsay, was despatched to 
ensure that the two did not talk to the press 32. France's reception of the two 
opponents of the regime in Tehran is immediately denounced in Iran. The next day, 
July 30 Ayatollah Khalkhali condemned France's action, declaring threateningly that 
"The French embassy serves no purpose, if the government hesitates, the people will 
decide" students immediately surrounding the French embassy in Tehran. The issue 
immediately escalated into a major crisis. France's ambassador in Tehran, Guy 
Georgy, was recalled and requested that all French nationals in Iran leave the 
country. Yet the same day. August 5 the departure of Georgy and 62 French citizens 
was blocked by the Iranians, who demanded the extradition of Bani Sadr and Rajavi 
and announced that Georgy was being expelled. Paul Depis was despatched by 
Mitterrand to negotiate the release of the French. Depis and Georgy returned with 
around 50 French citizens on August 12 33. In Iranian eyes, France had now become 
firmly the "Small Satan" alongside the US. Things were made worse when Iranian 
opposition figures seized hold of the Iranian patrol boats which had left Cherbourg 
for Iran, off the coast of Spain, and then sailed to Marseille under a monarchist flag 
34 
The crisis in Franco-Iranian relations of early August 1981 could not have been 
engineered. It was provoked above all by the decision of Bani Sadr and Rajavi to 
seek exile in France, thus enraging the Ayatollahs who were already ill-disposed to 
Paris due to French arms supplies to Iraq. Did the two Iranian opponents go to 
32 Pean, 1988, p. 108. 
33 L'Express, 14.8.81. Much was made of the initiative and skill of Depis and Georgy. Six 
years earlier, at the end fo his six-year term as ambassador to Libya (see ch. 3) Georgy had been at the 
centre of one of France's most famous "hostage-taking" episodes, when he negotiated the release of 
Francoise Claustre from Chad, Le Figaro, 13.8.81. Although Depis was one of the key "pro-Iraqi" 
figures in the French establishment, he had also established ties with Iranian clerics, notably when 
Khomeini was based in Iraq. 
34 Le Point 24.8.81. 
192 
France because they thought that France, because of its ties with Iraq, would support 
them? This seems unlikely given the uncertainty surround French policy in the 
aftermath of the Mitterrand's election. However, their reception in France, and the 
reaction this provoked in Iran, rupturing relations with Paris, proved exceedingly 
fortuitous both for the Iraqis, and for those in France who sought to boost French 
support for Iraq in its struggle against Iran. Troubled by what narrowly avoided 
being a "hostage crisis" akin to that experienced by the Americans in Iran, from 
August 1981 Mitterrand would more easily endorse the pro-Iraqi line increasingly 
argued for by many around him. Between this time and early 1984, France would in 
effect be an unconditional ally and key arms supplier of Iraq in its struggle against 
Iran. 
6 French "pro-Iraqi" interests and continuity of policy. 
The position of Francois Mitterrand, his party and ministers on arms sales was not 
clear when they came into office. As already indicated, Mitterrand had already made 
several statements against France's policy of arms exports during the presidential 
campaign. One of his first official functions was to open France's annual 
aeronautical trade fair at the Bourget aerodrome, where a stir was caused by the fact 
that overzealous officials decided that the planes he see be first disarmed. Yet in a 
meeting held in the foreign ministry in late May, a group of senior political and 
military experts reviewed the state of France's arms exports, orders and deliveries. 
At this meeting, both Charles Hernu and Claude Cheysson reportedly declared 
themselves to support the continue delivery of arms to Iraq. Notably discussions on 
an order for the advanced artillery pieces 155GCT (Canon a grande cadence de tir) 
was discussed, with agreement that the order should be pursued. The finance 
ministry noted both that Iraq had hitherto been a prompt payer for military orders, 
and that if the regime were to falter or fall due to reversals in its war with Iran, then 
French companies and the state's export credit guarantee department COFACE, 
would be in trouble. 
With Franco-Iranian tension still running high, on August 18 the indefatigable Tariq 
Aziz arrived in Paris for his first visit since Mitterrand's election. Aziz met with 
Mitterrand and all of his senior ministers; Cheysson, Jobert (who, two months later 
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in October 1981 would become the first of Mitterrand's ministers to go to Baghdad) 
and Hernu at defence. Tariq Aziz's primary concern was that the existing orders 
placed, notably for Mirage Fl and the almost finalised contract for the 155-GCT 
guns be fulfilled as quickly as possible. Although Paris decided not to supply the 
advanced missile systems requested by Baghdad 35 the other orders were fulfilled, 
with the contract for the 155-CGT signed in October. France's apparently 
unconditional support for Iraq greatly aided policy towards other Arab countries. In 
September Mitterrand paid a return visit to the King Khaled of Saudi Arabia, and in 
December defence minister Charles Hernu visited Saudi and the Emirates, signing a 
series of major arms contracts. 
The pro-Iraqi stance of the foreign minister was reinforced by the appointment in 
1981 of Paul Depis as ambassador to Iraq. Depis was close to Cheysson and had his 
own, extensive network of existing contacts in Baghdad. In the Quai d'Orsay, the 
pro-Iraq tendency was also reinforced by the presence of Eric Desmarest who 
assisted the new team and was appointed to Depis's old post. Desmarest had been a 
diplomatic aid to Hughes de l'Estoile in the DGA in the mid-1970s and had 
extensive experience of the politics of arms sales 36. Thus from Michel Jobert's trip 
to Baghdad in October 1981, throughout 1982 Franco-Iraqi relations continued to be 
dominated by arms supplies and the continuation of the large civil construction 
projects begun under Giscard. The Franco-Iraqi joint commission on economic 
cooperation met in October 1982 in Paris. It was chaired by Michel Jobert and the 
Iraqi minister of petrol, Qasirn Ahmed Taki 37. However, by the beginning of 1983, 
the balance of power in the relationship had shifted. Baghdad, increasingly 
embattled and beleaguered in its war with Iran, found. itself both increasingly in need 
of more, more sophisticated weaponry, while it was less able to pay either for the 
debts accumulated on existing arms deliveries, or for the new orders it wanted to 
place. 
Tariq Aziz visited Paris in the first week of 1983. Again he was receive by 
Mitterrand and all the key ministers. Iran having reversed the military situation in 
35 The missile air-sol de moyenne portee ASMP, Angeli, 1992, p. 108. 
36 Desmarest had close link to Chirac's entourage. In March 1986 he would go to Baghdad to 
assist the new ambassador, Maurice Courage. Angeli, 1992, p. 118. 
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the middle of 1982, during the last quarter of the year, Iraq had stopped paying its 
debts. Aziz's primary aim was thus to reschedule debts to France. This would be 
achieved, after four months of arduous negotiation, by a complex arrangement 
whereby France agreed to offset Iraq debts against increased "purchases" of oil from 
Iraq, which in fact would be supplied by Saudi Arabia to France via Elf and Total. 
This triangular arrangement meant that in fact Saudi was paying Iraq's debts as an 
indirect financial support for Iraq in its war against Iran. Much of the complexity of 
the negotiations over the rescheduling of debts arose from disputes as to what price 
the oil should be valued at. Before the Iraqi vice-prime minister left Paris, he 
declared that "Nous avons trouve avec le gouvernement francais des dispositions 
serieuses et pratiques pour resoudre a bref delai les difficultes provisoires que 
traverse l'Irak" 38. To the ire of the Iranians, while in Paris, Tariq Aziz also met 
with Massud Rajavi 39. While the Franco-Iraqi ties were constant, broader 
diplomatic shifts were also afoot. While in Paris, Tariq Aziz also met with the 
Egyptian foreign minister, Boutros Ghali, the first such meeting between Egyptian 
and Iraqi ministers since the Camp David accords. The US also began to treat Iraq 
more favourably from this point, according commercial credit to Iraq for the first 
time since 1967. When in Paris for further negotiation over Iraqi debts in May 1983, 
Tariq Aziz met with the American secretary of state, George Schultz 40. 
By this time, Iraq's debts to France stood at around FFrl5bn. However, COFACE's 
total exposure to Iraq stood at FFr35bn. It seems that at this point, the Iraqi dossier 
triggered a series of conflicts within the French state. The arms companies were 
adamant that Iraq should be accorded new credits to allow it to purchase further 
weaponry. Indeed the degree to which companies such as Dassault and Thompson 
were implicated in the actual fighting has probably been underestimated, a French 
weekly noting, no doubt with some exaggeration, that by early 1983 "Iraq's war had 
4 become partially a war of the strategies of French arms salesmen" 
1. 
37 Le Monde, 20.10.82. 
38 Liberation, 8-9.1.83. 
39 Pean, 1988, p. 114. 
40 Le Monde 14.5.83. 
41 L'Express, 21.1.83. 
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The fact that this deal was not simply a bilateral one involving as it did complex 
barter and credit arrangements with Saudi Arabia, underlines the degree to which 
France's support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war cannot be understood simply in 
bilateral terms. Gulf Arab states were willing to conclude favourable deals with 
France on the strength of France's support, in terms of military equipment, for 
Baghdad. Tariq Aziz returned to Paris in early May to further discuss the 
rescheduling of Iraqi debts, having failed to come to an agreement, he returned to 
Paris ten days later, a deal being finally agreed on May 24 1983. Iraq agreed to pay 
FFr2.5bn outstanding debts in cash, with the remaining FFr6.5bn being settled in 
petrol, partly supplied by Saudi Arabia. France agreed to triple its purchase of Iraqi 
oil 42. A degree of secrecy was maintained over how exactly this petrol was to be 
purchased, but it appears that the two French oil giants, TOTAL and Elf were 
obliged by the French state to purchase the oil 43. In August Paris agreed to accord 
Iraq additional commercial credits in order that French companies owed monies by 
the Iraq state could be paid 44. Michel Jobert having quit the government earlier in 
the year, Edith Cresson replaced him as minister of external commerce and thus 
presided over the Franco-Iraqi joint commission on economic cooperation in 
Baghdad in November 1983. She reaffirmed France's commitment to Iraq, while 
trying to resolve the continued cash flow problems of French companies operating in 
the country 45 
7 France's "loan" of five Super Etendard's to Iraq 
In fact, Tariq Aziz's negotiation with France over the rescheduling of outstanding 
debts and the delivery of new arms occurred against a backdrop of a more significant 
and pressing issue for Baghdad, securing more advanced planes and missiles with 
which they could hit Iranian oil facilities in the Gulf. By 1982 General Rene 
Audran had become a leading figure in the international section of the Delegation 
generale pour l `armement DGA, by then headed by Henri Martre. As such he had 
made numerous visits to the Iraqi capital. There again in October 1982, Audran was 
asked by the Iraqis to try and find a solution to problems posed for the Iraqi army by the 
42 Liberation, 25.5.83. 
43 Les Echos, 30.5.83 and 23.6.83. 
44 Le Monde, 18 and 19.8.83. 
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fact that the advanced Mirage F1 fighters ordered by France would not be available for 
delivery for another three years. Iraq wanted to get hold of French Super Etendard 
planes equipped with Exocet missiles. These aircraft, supplied to the French Navy 
since 1977, had proved themselves in combat during the 1982 Falklands war, 
Argentinian pilots using Etendard's exocet's to devastating effect on the British Navy 
46 Audran passed the request to the DGA and the cabinet. While Auroy and Hernu 
agreed to the idea, the problem was that Dassault no longer produced Super Etendards. 
The only way Iraq could obtain the planes would be if five planes could be "borrowed" 
from the French Navy's stock of 72 Etendards... In December 1982 Hemu told 
Hughes de L'Estoile, the former boss of the DGA who has since become director of 
international affairs for Dassault, that the Navy would temporarily "lend" Dassault back 
five of the Etendards that had been sold to them, in order that Dassault could then 
"temporarily" sell them to Iraq, until the Mirage F1s could be completed and delivered, 
when the Etendards would be returned to France... 
This convoluted arrangement was discussed when Tariq Aziz came to Paris in January 
1983, although at this point it remained secret. On February 1 1983 the leading French 
satirical weekly, Le Canard Enchaine revealed the arrangement, code-named "Milan", 
although at that point the Canard's journalists did not realize the extent of the scam, 
believing that the Etendards were being sold to Iraq 47. Paradoxically the revelation of 
the deal to supply Etendards to Baghdad further boosted France's standing in the Gulf 
among Iraq's allies. As the deal was revealed in February 1983, Hernu and Cheysson 
were embarking on a tour of Egypt, Saudi, Jordan and Kuwait. They received praise 
for their support of Iraq. France's flexibility vis-a-vis Iraq helped win new arms 
contracts in the Gulf; Abu Dhabi negotiating to purchase the next generation of 
Dassault fighters; the Mirage-2000, which Iraq was also now expressing interest in, 
and Kuwait buying Mirage F1 and Exocet missiles 48 
45 Le Monde 15.11.83. 
46 http: //www. dassault-aviation. fr/group/history/esetenda. htm 
47 Both Claude Angeli and Pierre Nan worked on the Canard. Angeli's 1992 book with 
Stephanie Mesnier, colleague and confidant of Angeli's on the paper, stemmed in large part from 
having covered the successive affaires connected to Franco-Iraqi ties. Interview with Angeli, June 
1996. 
48 Angeli, 1992, p. 128. 
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The exact process whereby France decided to deliver the Etendards to Iraq is both 
convoluted and controversial. From the available evidence, it is clear that there were 
grave doubts both in some sections of the administration, and with the President and 
his immediate entourage about the wisdom of the move. Once the negotiations had 
been revealed in February, other Arab states pushed France hard to deliver the 
planes, believing, with some justification, that this would shift the strategic balance 
in Iraq's favour. When Mitterrand made a state visit to Morocco in late January 
1983, Hassan II lobbied him to deliver the planes. There was resistance from the 
French Navy, who were reluctant to let their planes go. However, Dassault clearly 
favoured the deal, arguing persuasively and forcefully that if France did not agree to 
the Etendard loan, then Iraq might renege on its Mirage F1 order, for which the 
Etendards were simply a temporary substitute 49. The actual contract between Iraq 
and Dassault for the supply of the planes was signed in Paris in June 2 1983, with 
payment being made three weeks later. However, the deal then ran into diplomatic 
resistance from the US, who feared that this would greatly escalate the war, the US 
circulating all of its Arab Gulf allies with warnings about the issue. Mitterrand then 
hesitated for several months, with many, including people who were hitherto strong 
supporters of Iraq, now being far more cautious, acknowledging the magnitude of the 
act. However, Claude Cheysson remains strongly in favour of the deal, and the 
Iraqis were increasingly uneasy about the delay. In late September 1983 Cheysson 
accompanied Mitterrand to the UN General Assembly. There the US secretary of 
state Shultz nuanced the US's reservations, apparently easing Mitterrand's doubts 
over the delivery. As the two Frenchmen left the UN, Mitterrand apparently gave 
Cheysson the green light. The planes left France a week later, October 5 1983 so 
Ironically, both French and Iraqi officials then threw up a smokescreen of dis- 
information, presumably in an attempt to deflect possible criticism and confuse the 
Iranians. In Paris Cheysson suddenly became uncharacteristically vague and evasive 
about the planes. While in Baghdad, on October 10, with the Etendards presumably 
already having arrive in Iraq, Saddam Hussein called together 32 French journalists 
to bitterly complain about France's hesitations and reluctance to assist Iraq. The 
49 Angeli, 1992, p. 129. 
50 Angeli's account of this is so precise (p. 134), it can presumably only have come from either 
Cheysson himself, or one of his closest advisors. 
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ruse did not dupe the Iranians. The French charge d'affaires in Tehran was told in 
no uncertain terms that the Iranians saw the delivery of the planes as a hostile act. 
The Super Etendard episode is important for three reasons: two linked to French 
policy in the region itself, one to the longer term analysis and understanding of that 
policy. 
" Firstly it became symbol (an image d'Epinal par excellence - if you 
like) in popular imagination of Franco-Iraqi relations, French state bent over 
backwards to bend and break the rules to help the Iraqis, with the line between 
government (President and ministers), the state's aeronautical apparatus (the DGA) 
and private sector (Dassault) became a fiction. It was most tangible example of 
France as effectively Iraq's ally, and as such became a cause celebre. 
" Secondly, as shall be seen below, the supply of the five planes had, as 
the Iraqis hoped, both a practical and psychological impact on the war. Their 
presence helped alter the strategic balance in the war. The planes and missiles 
allowed Iraq to strike at the Kharg petrol terminal, thus cutting Iran's source of 
foreign earnings, and thus its ability to purchase arms. As such, from mid-1983 Iran 
saw ever more clearly that their enemy was France as well as Iraq, and then, via 
allies and proxies, began attacking French targets, first in Lebanon, then in France 
itself. For France, the counterpart of what became known euphemistically as co- 
belligerence with Iraq against Iran was a relationship with Iran conducted via 
terrorism and hostage taking as Iran attempted, eventually with some success, to 
exert indirect leverage on France. 
" Thirdly, the supply of Super Etendards and Exocets to Iraq in 1983 
has been used in subsequent literature on French foreign policy as a key example of 
the lack of control that politicians exercise over its "military industrial lobby". Given 
the polemics and controversy over the unorthodox Etendard arrangement, sufficient 
evidence about the issue has been made public to allow analysis. Some have seized 
on the episode to argue the power of such a lobby 51. Others, most notably Samy 
Cohen whose works on French foreign policy analysis have been referred to earlier 
in this study, have argued that the opposite is true, and that the Etendard affair was 
51 Marion, P. Le Pouvoir sans visage : le complexe militaro-industriel, Calmann-Levy, Paris, 
1990. Guisnel, J. Les Generaux : enquete sur le pouvoir militaire en France, la Decouverte, Paris, 
1990. 
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very clearly conceived and driven by the politicians 52 . This debate will 
be returned 
to in the conclusion. 
vc 
52 Cohen, S. La defaite des generaux : le pouvoir politique et 1`armee sous 1a Ve Republique, 
Fayard, Paris, 1994. 
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Introduction 
This text has already stressed several times that Franco-Iraqi relations cannot be 
understood uniquely from a bilateral perspective. Examples provided in earlier chapters 
included the way in which the fluctuations in both Franco-Algerian and Franco-Israeli 
relations in the sixties paved the way for the flourishing of France's ties with Arab states in 
the seventies, and how subsequently the Franco-Iraqi relationship came to be viewed in 
Paris as being the keystone of a broader Arab and Mediterranean policy. Chapter six also 
stressed the degree to which the French ties with Baghdad after the start of the Iran: Iraq 
war in 1980 locked France ever closer to Iraq, as Paris' support for Iraq was warmly 
encouraged, initially by conservative Arab Gulf states, and then the US and other OECD 
states. 
The manner in which policy towards Iraq increasing intermeshed and overlapped with 
France's convoluted ties with other Middle Eastern states dramatically increased in the 
mid-eighties. Iranian hostility to France, sparked by its support for Iraq in the war, created 
a host of new problems, most pointedly bomb attacks against civilian targets in France and 
hostage-taking in Lebanon. This "intermeshing and overlapping" of diverse strands of 
French foreign policy, most of which can ultimately be traced back to the ties with Iraq 
outlined in earlier chapters, creates a daunting set of analytical and chronological 
problems in terms of how to narrate and evaluate the course of the Franco-Iraqi 
relationship in the mid-1980s. This is especially so as during this period the overlapping 
Middle East policy dossiers increasingly became the subject of intense domestic political 
rivalry in France. Clearly a dissection of such rivalry and how it underpinned, motivated 
and shaped leading French politicians' beliefs, analyses and decisions ought to be central to 
an evaluation of policy during this period. However, this is easier said than done. Faced 
with the complexity of the interlinked dossiers and the multiplicity of actors, this final 
chapter simply tries to provide a general sketch of the issues, while identifying the 
multiplicity of actors. 
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For the purposes of analysis, the domestic political rivalry referred to above can be 
separated into three strands: firstly electoral struggles between right and left wing 
politicians, firstly in the run-up to the March 1986 legislative elections, and then again in 
the mid-1988 presidential campaign. Secondly the tussle over foreign policy between the 
right-wing government and president Mitterrand during the initial period of cohabitation. 
Between the elections of March 1986 and June 1988, for the first time in the Fifth 
Republic, a president of the left, Mitterrand, ruled alongside a government of the right, 
headed by Chirac. Particularly in the domain of foreign and defense policy, this pitched 
the ship of state into uncharted and frequently choppy constitutional waters. Nowhere was 
this more problematically so than in the conflicting undercurrents of policy towards the 
Middle East and its interface with domestic policy via terrorism in France and outcry at 
home over the detention of French hostages in Lebanon. The third strand of domestic 
rivalry was the struggle within and between ministers and associated factions of Jacques 
Chirac's administration. This was most acutely so as Middle Eastern related terrorism in 
France, and much of the negotiations over French hostages held in Lebanon, came to be 
controlled by Chirac's powerful interior minister, Charles Pasqua. 
Evidently this final chapter cannot satisfactorily illuminate all of these issues. Rather it 
attempts to narrate key events and issues of the period in terms of how they relate to the 
Franco-Iraqi dossier. In doing so it tries to highlight the evolution of and inflections in 
some of the themes presented in earlier chapters. Clearly the period of cohabitation is of 
crucial importance for the broader analysis of Fifth Republic foreign policy decision 
making, both because of its unprecedented constitutional character and the fact that policy 
divisions became more visible due to rivalry within the administration. Two subsequent 
periods of cohabitation in the nineties have largely served to obscure the uncharted, 
unprecedented nature of the 1986-88 period. In retrospect it is easy to forget or downplay 
the degree to which in early 1986 the onset of cohabitation was viewed as a crisis and a 
threat to Fifth Republic foreign policy. 
This final chapter is divided into seven main sections. The first examines the Iranian 
backlash to France's unbridled support for Iraq; elaborating on the increased military 
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supplies and easing of credit terms offered to Iraq which were outlined in chapter six. The 
second section presents the result of Iran's hostility to France, Mitterrand's attempts from 
1984, particularly via his new foreign minister Roland Dumas, to "normalise" relations 
with Iran. Section three then looks at the continuation of French arms supplies to Iraq. 
Section four provides a schematic overview of the reconfiguration of French foreign policy 
which occurred due to cohabitation. Several politicians who had been deeply involved in 
oil and defense policy towards the region in the seventies returned to office. These 
included Chirac himself as premier, Andre Giraud at defense and Jean-Bernard Raimond 
as foreign minister. The unprecedented political configuration of cohabitation was 
accompanied by an escalation of the convoluted and brutal fall-out from the contradictions 
of earlier policy towards Iran and Iraq. These side-effects of Middle Eastern policy, were 
on the one hand attacks on French targets and the seizing of French hostages in Lebanon, 
and on the other violence which terrorised mainland France during 1986. By the time of 
the presidential election of June 1988 these attacks had created an extraordinarily complex 
and chaotic policy environment as Jacques Chirac and his interior minister Charles Pasqua, 
undertook frenetic, but ultimately successful efforts to obtain the release of French 
hostages from Lebanon. 
Section five then examines the principal issues which shaped Franco-Iraqi relations during 
1986-88. These revolved around the issue of debt and arms supplies. A brief examination 
of the debates and divisions within the Chirac administration provides some insights both 
into the weight and continuity of Chirac's own adhesion to the Iraq link, and the actual 
mechanisms of policy making on this central foreign policy dossier, which had significant 
implications for several key ministries. Section six then returns to the issue of lobbies and 
those pushing for closer Iraqi ties in the mid-1980s. Section seven highlights how, 
notwithstanding opposition from the bulk of the Socialist government and the ministry of 
finance, Jean-Pierre Chevenement, the new minister of defense, and Dassault attempted, 
with little success to reactivate and upgrade relations and sell ever more sophisticated 
weaponry to Baghdad. Although this text evidently focuses on France, both this final 
chapter and the conclusion which follows it, stress how, following the end of the Iran-Iraq 
war in August 1988, similar balancing acts of simultaneously trying to retrieve debts and 
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gain a share of what promised to be an exceedingly lucrative post-war Iraqi market, were 
mirrored in the UK, Germany and other OECD states. It was the (unannounced) switch in 
policy in 1988 in the UK which ultimately led in 1992 to the Scott enquiry and report. The 
information produced in the course of what remains to date by far the most meticulous 
analysis of UK foreign policy decision making, has a surprising number of points in 
common with the French saga narrated here. This is most particularly so in the conflicting 
aims of the commercial and wider diplomatic and regional aspects of policy objectives. '. 
1 The Iranian backlash 
The background to Iran's rupture in relations with France in August 1981 was narrated 
in chapter six. As France continued to deliver weapons to Iraq, so Iran was consistently 
critical of Paris's stance in the war during 1981-83. Attacks on diverse French interests 
in the Middle East had occurred during this period, but these had not been linked 
systematically to France's stance in the Gulf war. During the crisis of August 1981, an 
initial attack on a French target in Beirut occurred. A month later, on September 4, the 
French ambassador to Lebanon, Louis Delamare, was killed, apparently in a botched 
kidnap attempt, with a view to exchanging him for Bani Sadr and Rajavi 2. On April 15 
1982 the head of the Direction generale de la securite et de la defense (DGSE, France's 
external intelligence agency) in Lebanon and his wife were killed in Beirut. During the 
summer of 1983, against the backdrop of the possible delivery of Etendard planes and 
Exocet missiles to Iraq, France's relations with Iran became far more tense. Matters 
were aggravated by the fact that on July 6 six opponents of Khomeini hijacked an 
Iranian Boeing 707 and flew it to Paris's Orly airport, where the opposition leader 
Massoud Rajavi - with the blessing of France's interior minister - negotiated the release 
of the passengers. Shortly afterwards, a bomb exploded at the Air France desk in 
Baghdad airport. French intelligence (DGSE) reports began to suggest that Iran would 
plan a broader campaign of attacks against French targets. In Tehran in late August, an 
II attempted an overview of these comparisons when beginning this thesis. Styan, D. "French and 
British trade and arms sales to Iraq, 1980-91; contrasting attitudes and raising questions", paper to the 
EURASMES conference, Aix, July 1996, pp. 21. 
2 Pean, La Menace, Fayard, Paris, 1988, p. 109-110. 
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Air France plane was hijacked within Iran, the assailants demanding French withdrawal 
from Lebanon and a halt to French arms supplies to Iraq. A then little known Shia 
group. "Aural" - led by Hussein Mussawi - claimed responsibility for the hijacking, 
which ended peacefully. In late September anti-French sentiment in Iran was further 
heightened as numerous leaders warned of the dangers of introducing new weaponry 
into the region which could threaten Iran's oil exports - i. e. the Etendards. France 
seems to have been well aware of these threats, not least because they were relayed to 
Paris by Nicolas Lang, the advisor to the Worms Bank who had been instrumental in 
assisting France's first contacts with Iraq in the late sixties (see chapter 3 section 11). 
By now Lang had excellent contacts also with key figures in the Iranian state, notably 
Mohamed Sadek, an aide to Rafiqdust, the head of the Pasdaran 3. 
Once the Etendards were delivered in early October, the Iranian riposte was not slow 
coming. On October 23, a truck driven by a suicide bomber smashed into the Drakkar 
building housing the French contingent in Beirut. The bomb killed 58 French troops. A 
simultaneous attack on the US marine building left 241 dead a. The following night 
Mitterrand and a small group of staff, including Hubert Vedrine and Francois de 
Grossouvre, flew to Beirut. The visit was historic, and deeply paradoxical. De Gaulle, 
who had put Lebanon at the centre of much of his analysis and action in the Levant, had 
never visited as head of state. De Gaulle's adversary Mitterrand thus became the first 
French head of state to visit Lebanon, arriving in catastrophe, the physical and human 
wreckage of his Middle Eastern policy around him 5. 
After intense consultation between diverse French and American intelligence agencies, 
within a fortnight it became evident that Mussawi's Shia grouping Amal had carried out 
the attack, and that Amal's links were above all with Tehran. Determined to meet force 
with force, France staged two responses to the attack. The first was a bodged attempt, 
3 Pean, 1988, p. 117. 
4 Fisk, R. Pity the Nation, Andre Deutsch, London 1990, pp. 511-20. Intriguingly Fisk notes (p. 
516) that the CIA had received a report on a possible attack, from an operative in a Paris cafe... 
5 The image of Mitterrand in the ruins of Drakkar became one of the most poignant of his 
presidency. The coup de theatre of the Beirut visit bears comparison with Mitterrand's arrival in Sarajevo 
in 1992. Favier, P. Martin-Roland, M. 1991, vol. 2 pp. 30-45. 
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by French intelligence operatives in Lebanon to destroy the Iranian embassy at Jnah in 
the southern suburb of Beirut. The French jeep packed with explosive failed to explode. 
Secondly, on November 17 nine planes took off from the aircraft carrier Clemenceau 
(the same which had refuelled the 5 "Iraqi" Etendards on their journey from France six 
weeks earlier) in the Eastern Mediterranean and bombed the barracks of the Hezbollah 
movement in the Baalbek valley - though the bombs largely missed their target. The 
attack was initially planned as a joint riposte with the US, but the Americans backed out 
6. The previous day an Israeli raid had bombed an Amal base, leaving 30 dead. Over 
the following months, sporadic attacks against French members of UNIFIL escalated. 
At the end of December both France and Iran expelled diplomats. Although Charles 
Hernu, defence minister was despatched to Lebanon by Mitterrand for Christmas, this 
was little comfort as in. the first two weeks of January a further series of attacks were 
staged against French personnel in Lebanon. 
2 Roland Dumas and the reopening relations with Iran 
While French troops withdrew from the UN force in Lebanon at the end of March 1984, 
relations between France and Iran remained fraught. In July 1984 the government of 
Pierre Mauroy was replaced by that of Laurent Fabius. Fabius was immediately 
confronted by the problem posed by France's support for Iraq, and by the end of July 
had set the wheels in motion to try and start, if not to reverse, then at least to "re- 
equilibrate" France's stance towards the two belligerents in the Gulf. Roland Dumas, 
Fabius' minister for European affairs, and a close personal friend of Mitterrand's would 
be instrumental in this effort. 
In late July 1984 a French Airbus flying from Frankfurt was hijacked by Revolutionary 
Guards, who held 60 hostages on the tarmac in Tehran. The hijackers demanded the 
release of the Iranians held in French jails for their part in the bungled attempt to kill 
Shapour Bakhtiar in 1980. In fact Iranians officials had already attempted to negotiate 
6 Favier, P. Martin-Roland, M. La deciennie Mitterrand. Seuil 1991, vol 2 les epreuves (1984-88), 
p. 40. 
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the release of Bakhtiar's assailants, headed by Anis Nakkash, in 1981. Their release was 
to henceforth be a central issue in Franco-Iranian relations, not least because Nakkash 
was a close friend of Rafiqdust, the head of the Revolutionary Guards. Fabius charged 
Dumas to attempt a negotiation with the Iranians in Paris, Dumas discussing with Iran's 
charge d'affaires in Paris; Ali Velyati, the possible ways in which the Nakkash affair 
might be resolved'. A verbal "understanding" seems to have been reached on Nakkash 
in Paris between Dumas and Velyati, and the French hostages in Tehran were released. 
Formally, the Franco-Iranian dossier now contained three major issues, Nakkash's 
release, the return of the $1 bn Eurodif loan made by the Shah in 1975, and the halting of 
arms supplies to Iraq. However, a fourth element of the equation was to play a role; 
although not known at the time, France also began to secretly supply weapons to Iran in 
what would become known as the Luchaire affair '. Aides from the DGA and Hernu's 
ministry of Defence began to make discreet journeys to Iran in mid-1984 9. By the time 
Mitterrand made a visit to President Assad of Syria in late November 1984, France was 
hoping that relations with Iran could be smoothed. Cheysson, who had long been 
perceived as the most partisan of those within the administration favouring privileged 
relations with Baghdad, was replaced by Roland Dumas in December 1984. Yet those 
Iranians with whom Dumas had discussed in July had become disenchanted by the time 
of his appointment in December. A member of the Revolutionary Guards who had 
arrived in France on a mission to purchase arms in September had been arrested at Orly, 
before being returned to Tehran; both Rafiqdust and Rafsanjani felt betrayed by France, 
and were little reassured by the replacement of Cheysson by Dumas. 
On January 25 1985 Rene Audran, head of the DGA's industrial unit who had 
responsibility for exports to Iraq was killed outside his house in the Paris suburb of St 
Cloud. Although the attack was widely imputed to Action directe, members of French 
security services subsequently suggested that Iranian agents may have been behind the 
7 Pean, 1988, p. 128. 
8 In March 1987 the French press revealed that since 1985 arms bound for Iran had been leaving 
Cherbourg. Further enquiries revealed substantial deliveries of arms to Tehran via a Paris-based company 
named Luchaire, using false end-user certificates. Quotidien de Paris, 3.3.86. 
9 Villeneuve, C. Peret, J. -P. Histoire secrete du terrorisme: les juges 
de 1'impossible, Plon, Paris, 
1987. 
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attack and presented it as the first indication of an escalation of Iranian hostility towards 
French interests 10. Two months later, on March 22 1985 a new chapter opened in the 
saga of France's involvement in the Iran-Iraq conflict. That day in Beirut two 
Frenchmen, the vice-consul Marcel Fontaine and an attache at the embassy Marcel 
Carton were kidnapped; Carton's daughter Dominique Perez was also seized. 
Responsibility for the kidnapping was claimed by Islamic Jihad, who demanded the 
suspension of France's triangular barter deal with Saudi Arabian oil and the Mirage F 1's 
for Iraq. Although Perez was soon released, any hope that it might be an isolated 
incident evaporated when other French nationals were seized two months later. Noted 
researcher Michel Seurat and journalist Jean-Paul Kauffman were seized in separate 
parts of Beirut on May 22 1985. French policy in the region would remain a prisoner to 
the hostage taking for the next three years as Iran's tussle with France over France's 
support for Iraq was increasingly played out in Lebanon and via terrorism in France 
itself. 
Another Frenchman, Gilles Sydney Peyrolles had been kidnapped the day after Carton 
and Fontaine, on 23.3.85. His capture was claimed by a group by the name of Fractions 
armees revolutionnaires libanaises (FARL) Peyrolles was released two weeks later after 
negotiations via Algerian intermediaries. In exchange for this promises appear to have 
been made on the release of George Ibrahim Abdullah, a Lebanese held on terrorism 
charges in France ". While Peyrolles was released, the kidnapping of Kauffmann in 
particular increased pressure on the French authorities. From June 1985 campaigns in 
France, notably via Kauffmann's wife Joelle greatly increased the public profile of the 
hostage issue. It is now clear that Roland Dumas and his entourage entered into detailed 
negotiations with Iranian, Syrian and Lebanese intermediaries in order to secure the 
release of the hostage during autumn 1985, and that a detailed mechanism to exchange 
Anis Nakkash and almost certainly French arms supplies to Tehran, for the hostages was 
1 Favier, P. Martin-Roland, M. La deciennie Mitterrand. Seuil 1991, vol 2 les epreuves (1984-88), 
p. 523. 
11 Peyrolles, cultural attache in Tripoli is the son of noted French author, Gilles Perrault (see 
introduction, fn 17). Promises apparently made but not honoured during the release of Abdullah would 
greatly complicate the Franco: Irani an-Syrian dossier the following year. 
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in place in January 1986 12. As will be explained in section 4 below, these attempts 
failed. This was due in part to the complexity of the negotiations and the unreliability of 
the intermediaries used, who failed to fully master the fraught Iranian-Syrian channels of 
communication. In addition, it subsequently became clear that right wing politicians in 
France, mindful that legislative elections were due in March 1986, successfully managed 
to persuade Iranian and Lebanese interests not to release the hostages to Dumas. 
3 The continuation of arms sales to Iraq 
The agreement hammered out between Tariq Aziz and the French authorities early in 
1983 established the principles and framework which guided relations over the 
subsequent five years. The deal allowed Iraq to continue to receive French armaments 
in exchange for repayment of at least some of Iraq's growing debts to French interests, 
primarily via oil supplied to and sold by Elf and Total. Notwithstanding the reopening 
of relations with Tehran under Roland Dumas, these triangular Franco-Iraqi ties (arms- 
debt-oil) continued. Iraq's vice-president Yassine Ramadan came to Paris in February 
1984 in an attempt to secure further concessions on debt repayment. Edith Cresson, who 
took over from Michel Jobert as minister of external trade in March 1983 visited Iraq in 
July 1984 in order to negotiate payment of arrears owed to French civil contractors and 
bolster a French bid for the upgrading of Baghdad airport. In September 1985 Dassault 
signed an agreement to supply Iraq a further 24 Mirage F1 planes. A month later, as if 
to re-emphasise to the Iraqi authorities that France's reopening of ties with Iran was not 
to be at the expense of its relations with Iraq, Roland Dumas himself went to Baghdad. 
Thus it must be stressed that, while Mitterrand and Dumas strove to re-establish ties 
with Iran from 1984 (a policy which would initially be adopted and reinforced by 
Chirac's government from March 1986), this was not at the expense of Franco-Iraqi ties. 
These continued largely unchanged, most particularly in the military sphere. It was 
evident at the time, and is more starkly so with the benefit of hindsight, that this led to a 
series of grave policy inconsistencies. The violence against French interests, first in 
12 Favier, P. Martin-Roland, 1991, vol 2, p. 535. 
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Lebanon, and then in mainland France via a series of terrorist attacks from late 1985 to 
autumn 1986 were the product of these contradictions. The inconsistencies themselves 
in part stemmed from the long-term nature of the arms supply relationship. This raises 
the question of the degree to which links with France's leading aeronautical companies 
were actually driving policy. This in turn links to the broader debate as to the power and 
influence of "military industrial" interests in the formulation of Fifth Republic policy, 
to which I'll return in the conclusion. 
The blurring of France's military and diplomatic stance 
France's supply of Super Etendard planes to Iraq in 1983, the circumstances of which 
were narrated in chapter six, clearly assisted Iraq's position in the war with Iran, 
allowing Baghdad to strike deeper into Iran and reach its offshore oil platforms in the 
Gulf, thus partially depriving Tehran of the ability to export oil and earn foreign 
exchange. Evidently the "loan" of these Super Etendards was in place of the delivery of 
Mirage F1s ordered by Iraq in the late seventies. Specially equipped long-range Mirage 
F1 strike aircraft were delivered to Iraq by early 1986. 
By the period 1984-86, despite the nuances of diplomacy and the desire of President and 
ministers to try and minimise the destructive fall-out from the Franco-Iraqi relationship 
by improving relations with Iran, practical policy appeared to be beyond their immediate 
control. This was for two interrelated reasons linked to the nature of arms supplies. 
Firstly arms deals have a very long lead time, particularly the increasingly sophisticated 
weapons systems ordered by Iraq from 1980 onwards. The increased computerisation 
and sophistication of weapons systems, notably Mirage planes and their associated 
missile systems, meant ever-longer research, development and production times. The 
versions of the Mirage F1s made for the Iraqis had not been produced for the French air 
force. Added to the sophistication of the weaponry, the sheer volume of armament 
systems and advanced munitions meant that France's military-industrial sector had a 
very substantial presence in Iraq by the mid-eighties. Its presence greatly outnumbered, 
and thus largely overshadowed France's formal diplomatic presence in the country. 
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Even if the diplomats in Baghdad had wanted to scale back the military links - and there 
is no evidence to suggest they did, rather the contrary - it is clear this would have been 
practically difficult. Dozens of missions and many hundreds of technicians from 
Dassault, Matra, Aerospatiale and their multitudinous subcontractors were in Iraq at any 
one time in the mid-eighties; many were expressly forbidden from having contact with 
the French embassy. The arms companies, and those who, in the DGA and other state 
bodies charged with coordinating arms sales, exports and research in Paris, were usually 
far more numerous, powerful, better connected and indeed better informed than 
individuals attached to the Quai d'Orsay or presidency. Those in the French embassy in 
Baghdad, acknowledged the power and influence of the military interests, stating to 
Angeli "we were waging war without admitting it. The government was poorly 
informed. They didn't always know what was going on the ground". Even the 
ambassador conceded that "those in the arms industry perhaps went beyond the limits 
fixed by the politicians" 13. 
During this period a growing volume of increasingly sophisticated and expensive 
weaponry was being sold to Iraq. Clearly the French were not alone in this. While this 
text dwells on the French dimension of the arming of Iraq, it should not be forgotten that 
this was just one facet of what became an increasingly sophisticated and voracious 
military procurement programme in the mid-eighties, making Iraq the largest single 
importer of military goods in the world 14. Yet France had two advantages over their 
European and other competitors. Firstly, as narrated in earlier chapters, they already had 
good and longstanding ties with Iraq's military. Secondly, France could offer the 
advanced technology, particularly in guided weapons systems, not available from Asian 
or South American competitors. Thus in 1982 a decision was taken that the Mirage F1 
ordered by Iraq two years previously, should be reconfigured from their general combat 
specifications and be transformed into air-to-surface attack planes. No French air force 
planes had these specifications and the contract for these alterations signed in 1982 
required three years R&D. It was for this reason that the Super Etendard planes were 
" Angeli 1992, p. 152. Though not named in the text, the ambassador in question is Paul Depis. 
14 Timmerman, K. The death lobby, Houghton-Miflin, Boston 1992. Darwish, A. Alexander C. 
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"lent" in 1983. The modified Iraqi Mirage F1 had more sophisticated electronic 
communications equipment (manufactured by Thomson) and a far greater missile 
carrying capacity than the standard French model. It was able to fire two Exocet 
missiles as well as the advanced laser-guided AS30L (laser) missile manufactured by 
Aerospatiale. As with the Mirage planes, the complexity of the AS30L was such that 
the research, development and production of the missile took two years. AS30Ls were 
ordered by Iraq in 1982 and first delivered in 1984. A total of 596 such missiles were 
ordered, although only 240 had been produced and delivered by the time of the end of 
the Iran: Iraq war in 1988. As well as Aerospatiale's Exocet and AS30L, Iraq was also a 
key client for their Roland ground to air system as well as Milan and Hot anti-tank 
missiles. Thomson sold Crotale ground to air missiles and Matra air to air Magic 
missiles. 
France also supplied Iraq with the artillery piece which was regarded by many analysts 
as being the critical element in reversing Iranian ground assaults. Iran's superiority in 
its numbers of total ground troops was checked by Iraq's extensive use of the French 
high velocity CGT 15 5 (CGT standing for (Canon ä) Brande cadence de tir). French 
military personnel regularly visited Iraq to demonstrate, test and maintain weapons 
systems. In June 1985 four French soldiers were killed when a CGT155 prototype 
exploded during a firing demonstration in Iraq. French trainers evidently flew 
innumerable flights with Iraqi pilots in both the Etendard and Mirage F1 planes. It is not 
just the question of division between French and Iraqi technical capacity which is 
blurred. When, during 1986, Iraqi Mirage F1 planes struck deep into Iran, hitting Iranian 
oil platforms in the Gulf up to 1000km from Baghdad, in-flight refuelling for the F1s 
was undertaken under French supervision from bases in the Emirates, where Dassault 
had extensive links, having supplied planes and technical assistance to Kuwait, UAE 
and Qatar. The Mirage F1s enabled Iraq to strike far deeper into Iran. The escalation of 
the air campaign against Iran, conducted in large part with French technology, occurred 
between early 1986 and October. The Kharg terminal was hit in February 1986 and by 
October towns in south west Iran, notably the terminal of Larrak and oil installations in 
Unholy Bablyon, Gollanz, London, 1991. 
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the Gulf itself had been damaged by bombing raids. Dassault, Thomson and Matra 
were able to use the combat tested Iraqi experience to market and sell both hardware and 
munitions to other potential clients, using combat video footage shot during Iraqi raids 
in their sales pitches, rather than simulations used by British, US and other competitors 
15 
4 1986-88; cohabitation in France, hostages in Lebanon 
The period early 1986 to mid-1988 is one of the most convoluted and confused of any in 
the four decades of Fifth Republic policy in terms of the ramifications of various Middle 
Eastern dossiers stemming from relations with Iraq. This is primarily because foreign 
and domestic policy became increasing. dominated by two primary, and numerous 
subsidiary, by-products of Franco-Iraqi ties. The two primary effects were the closely 
inter-linked objectives of releasing French hostages from Lebanon and re-establishing 
relations with Iran during the period. Before providing what can be little more than an 
outline sketch of the key elements of these policies it is worth highlighting what appear, 
in retrospect to be three observations on French policy in the period which have bearing 
on the overall themes of this thesis. 
" Prior to the mid-i 980s, French Middle Eastern policy had not been a major 
issue on the French domestic political stage. As narrated in chapters two and three, the 
only partial exception to this was over the Israeli-Palestinian issue, notably in the late 
sixties. In the mid-1980s this public indifference to, or ignorance of the importance of 
policy in the Middle East, was abruptly shattered. This was because there was an 
increasingly explicit overlapping of foreign and domestic politics stemming from French 
policy in the Middle East. This was largely due to the role of public opinion, inflamed by 
publicity over the plight of French hostages in Lebanon and bomb attacks on civilians in 
France. 
15 As already noted, the battle proven efficiency of the Exocet missiles during the 
Malvinas/Falklands war of 1982 had been one of its chief selling points. Curiously, though 
unsurprisingly, following the 1990 war, in public French producers fell silent about the Iraqi successes of 
their supplies. 
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" The merging of foreign and domestic policy dossiers greatly complicates 
the task of analysis and evaluation. Public opinion meant that considerable political capital 
came to be invested in the hostages. Therefore attempts by French politicians to release, 
and block the release, of French hostages held in Lebanon, as well as to obtain an end or 
respite to the bombing campaigns in mainland France, came to be perceived by rival 
French politicians and their advisors as a means of winning votes. This was deftly 
exploited by France's partners in the Middle East. Factions in or seeking power in Iran, 
Syria and Lebanon were all able to exploit such internal political rivalry in France. As 
already noted, there were divisions between different arms of French state, notably the 
foreign and interior ministries, but also the judiciary (responsible for the investigation of 
attacks in France, and the conditions of detention and release of Middle Eastern prisoners 
whose release was sought by those in Lebanon and Iran) and the diverse intelligence 
services. In addition the numerous personal envoys of French political factions - some of 
themselves French nationals of Middle Eastern origin - both facilitated and further 
complicated communication between France and the region. 
Evidently this text concentrates on and attempts to isolate French policy from Middle 
Eastern issues. However, a more nuanced and complete picture of French policy would 
emerge by examining France's relations with its western allies over diverse Middle 
Eastern issues in the mid-1980s. For example the manner in which France differentiated 
itself from the US, Britain and other European allies over policy towards Syria, notably in 
mid-1987, and the role of France's refusal to allow US jets to use French airspace en-route 
to attack Libya in April 198616. Evidently there is also the broader issue from mid-1987 of 
attempts within the UN Security Council to secure a ceasefire in the Gulf war. 
Elections and cohabitation; February-March 1986 
16 
. Raimond, 
J. -B. Le Quai d'Orsay ä 1'epreuve de la cohabitation, 
Flammarion, Paris, 1989, p. 74. 
Raimond presents the US raid on Libya as the first real test of cohabitation foreign policy; stressing that 
Chirac and Mitterrand had little difficulty in agreeing policy, and shared the same 
frustration over 
contradictory US policy towards Libya, particularly given France's own engagement 
in Chad. 
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March 1986 marks a watershed in both the constitutional history of the Fifth Republic and 
the making of French foreign policy as, following the victory of the right-wing RPR-UDF 
group in the legislative elections of March 1986, a left-wing President, Mitterrand, had to 
cohabit with a right-wing administration. Yet, as when Mitterrand came to power in 1981, 
this unprecedented break with previous practice, led not to a significant change, but 
essentially to continuity in the direction of foreign policy. 
Continuity was in part due to personnel, whereas in 1981 there were completely new teams 
of presidential and ministerial advisors, in March 1986 presidential advisors stayed and the 
incoming right-wing government was composed on the whole of Gaullist politicians who 
had extensive ministerial experience. This was true not only of foreign affairs in general, 
but of oil, arms, Arab and Iraqi dossiers in particular. The role of Jacques Chirac in 
cementing the special relationship with Saddam Hussein via reciprocal visits in 1974-76 
was noted in chapter five. In addition, two key members of his administration, Andre 
Giraud as minister of defense, and Jean-Bernard Raimond at foreign affairs, were both 
influential members of the oil milieu. 
In terms of Middle Eastern policy, the final days of the socialist government were 
marked by increasingly frantic attempts to secure the release of the four French hostages 
from Lebanon. Joelle Kauffmann's campaigning on behalf of her husband and co- 
detainees had successfully raised the profile of the hostages. The faces of the hostages 
were broadcast nightly prior to the evening news and their plight had been elevated to a 
major issue in the campaign during February. In early February, Paris was shaken by 
the first of what was to be a series of terrorist attacks. These were claimed by a group 
calling itself the Comite de solidarite avec les prisonniers politiques arabes et du 
Moyen-Orient (CPPSA). This convoluted nomenclature was necessitated by its aims, 
the release of George Ibrahim Abdullah and two non-Arab colleagues, Anis Nakkash, 
and a colleague of his by the name of Varabidjan. In a pre-electoral climate increasingly 
dominated by concerns of "terrorism" and security, interior minister Pierre Joxe and his 
internal intelligence service (DST) subsequently arrested a series of suspected Middle 
Eastern militants living in France. Over 50 people were arrested on February 12. 
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However, in what proved one of the more contorted and highly contested "errors" ever 
made in the murky world of French police and intelligence work, two of those arrested 
were Iraqis opposed to the government in Baghdad with established connections to those 
in power in Tehran. Threatened with expulsion the two men, Fawzi Hamza and Hassan 
Kheireddine requested to be sent to Britain and Paraguay respectively. London and 
Montevideo refused to allow the men to enter and on February 19 the men were instead 
put on a plane to Baghdad. Thus, at the very moment when the French authorities were 
seeking to placate Tehran and win their assistance to release French hostages from 
Lebanon, they sent two men with close links to Iran into the hands of their worst enemy, 
Iraq... As the most comprehensive historical overview of the period notes; "plus qu'une 
bavure administrative, ces expulsions constituent une enorme erreur politique et 
diplomatique. Elles font 1'effet d'une provocation a' 1'egard de l'Iran" ". Shortly 
afterwards, Amnesty International announced, incorrectly, that one of the two had been 
executed in Baghdad. Meanwhile in Beirut on March 8 four additional French hostages 
were seized, members of an Antenne 2 film crew who had been sent to investigate the 
fate of Seurat. When the death of Michel Seurat was made public on March 10, it was 
generally believed, wrongly, to have been in retaliation for the expulsion of the two 
Iraqi opponents; Seurat's wife publicly blamed Pierre Joxe, the interior minister, of his 
murder 18. The degree of domestic French outrage over the hostage issue further 
17 Favier, P. Martin-Roland, 1991, vol 2, p. 542. This incident not only provoked a storm of protest 
at the time, and very serious problems for the incoming government, but also a host of analyses and 
conjecture. The most prevalent and pertinent of these suggests that right-wing elements within the 
security services deliberately sent the two Iraqis to Baghdad. There is insufficient evidence to 
categorically evaluate, the conspiracy vs monumental police cock-up hypotheses. However, on the cock- 
up side, it is worth noting that a similar scenario occurred in early 1988 when Charles Pasqua expelled a 
very mixed bag of Iranians to ... 
Gabon. The group did include some members of Rajavi's Mujahidin el- 
Khalq. Their subsequent return to France further complicated Franco-Iranian ties, see Le Monde 15.1.88. 
Even more confusingly, one au-pair of Iranian origin had asylum status in the UK. This created a minor 
diplomatic incident between Paris and London and meant that UK-based refugees were subsequently 
officially warned against travelling to France by the British government, on the basis that London was 
powerless to stop France arbitrarily deporting them either to their country of origin, or indeed Gabon. 
18 According to his colleagues, Seurat, a 38 year old researcher who had spent much of the 
previous ten years in Beirut and Damascus had died due to maltreatment and lack of medication several 
months earlier; "mais la guerre du mesonge demandait que la mort de Seurat füt mise en scene. Annoncee 
aux medias en temps utile pour influencer les elections legislatives d'alors, eile se travestissait en 
"execution d'un espion" afin de s'arroger une justification morale" Gilles Kepel and Olivier Mongin, 
avant -propos, Seurat, M. L'Etat du barbarie, EspritlSeuil, Paris, 1989. Seurat, like so many of the French 
actors in the diverse "pro-Arab" milieux, was himself born in the Maghreb. His career and commitment, 
notably to the Palestinian cause, could be contrasted with the likes of Bitterlin and others in ASFA. 
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increased two days prior to the first round of voting when French television broadcast 
harrowing messages from the hostages. The week before, Mitterrand had despatched a 
series of emissaries to all the states thought possibly to hold keys to the release of the 
hostages. Eric Rouleau, then ambassador to Tunisia, flew secretly to Tehran after 
holding a series of talks with PLO officials 19. As the release of the hostages was 
repeatedly postponed by Tehran and Damascus, to Rouleau it became clear that French 
interests linked to Jacques Chirac in Beirut had effectively blocked the release by 
offering both the kidnappers and Iran a higher "reward" if they delayed the release until 
after the elections. This was subsequently confirmed by Iranian sources 20. According 
to Favier and Martin-Roland, Francois Mitterrand later stated that he was "convinced 
that there were interventions [to block the release of the hostages] it is certain there 
were envoys of the RPR in Damascus, Baghdad, Tehran and Beirut [although] what they 
said is less sure". 
Jean-Bernard Raimond pursues "normalisation" with Iran 
However, if the right did pay to have the release of the hostages delayed, their delivery 
after the election was not assured. Dumas' outgoing team of quit office convinced that 
the principal key to the hostages' release lay in Tehran. This analysis was shared by the 
new minister of foreign affairs, Jean-Bernard Raimond who doggedly pursued the 
normalisation strategy over the next 15 months 21. That it was necessary to urgently 
address the issue of the links between France's Middle Eastern policy and terrorism in 
France was starkly emphasised an hour after Jacques Chirac was formally confirmed as 
Prime Minister on March 20 1986. Two people were killed and 28 injured in a bomb 
attack in the Champs-Elysee. Raimond's suggestion that he personally go immediately 
to Damascus and Tehran was vetoed by Chirac, fearing - no doubt correctly - that such 
a move would be interpreted by Baghdad and other Arab states as heralding a significant 
19 Rouleau went to Tehran while diplomats Jacques Morizet and Jean-Claude Cousseran went to 
Baghdad in an attempt to get the two Iraqis returned to France. Meanwhile Dr Reza Raad was in Beirut. 
20 Favier, P. Martin-Roland, 1991, vol 2, p. 547 and 830. The role of Chirac and his entourage in 
this episode became the subject of a major polemic in January 1987 when Le Matin published a leaked 
copy of Rouleau's memo to Roland Dumas on the issue. 
21 The following text draws from the minister's own, terse account; Raimond, 1989. 
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shift in policy. However, initially at least, the incoming administration were able to 
prevent the recurrence of the February-March attacks in Paris 22. On May 20 1986 in 
Paris, Raimond and Chirac both received Ali Reza Moayeri. On May 7, after Moayeri's 
visit but before the arrival in Paris of Tariq Aziz the following week, France fulfilled a 
key Iranian demand and expelled Massoud Rajavi from France. The release of two of 
the Antenne 2 hostages in Damascus followed on June 20. Raimond continued his 
campaign to repair relations with Iran. In August Raimond reached an agreement with 
the Iranian charge d'affaires in Paris that hostages could be released in exchange for the 
repayment of the Eurodif loan, admitting to Jacques Chirac that this constituted "a sort 
of blackmail" 23. Yet when a meeting was scheduled between Raimond and his Iranian 
counterpart in Geneva on August 14 1986, Chirac refused any financial concessions to 
the Iranians without first securing the release of the hostages. Raimond had no option to 
accept this, but nevertheless held secret negotiations with Velyati at the United Nations 
General Assembly meeting in New York in September. Despite detailed preparations 
and documentation, and continued resistance from Jacques Chirac in Paris, after two 
meetings in New York this time the Iranians backed out, deferring a decision for a 
further meeting in Paris. France's position vis-a-vis Syria also caused considerable 
problems at this time, Britain pushing for comprehensive sanctions against Syria within 
the EU due to the links established between Nizar Hindawi, Syrian intelligence agents 
and a failed attack on an El Al plane in the UK in October 1984. With negotiations with 
Iran, and thus necessarily Syria, at a delicate stage, France did not want to jeopardise 
relations with Damascus. Britain eventually broke diplomatic ties with Syria on October 
24. 
During September 1986 in Paris, the terrorist attacks which had scarred the electoral 
campaign in February and then Chirac's inauguration as premier on March 20 resumed. 
On September 1 the CPPSA resurfaced with a warning to AFP of further attacks unless 
Nakkash and Abdullah were released. On the 8`h a bomb in Paris' Hotel de Ville killed 
one and injured 11; the following day a large bomb was defused on a Parisian RER 
22 How this was achieved remains unclear. Yet the mechanism, probably involving the increased 
supply of weapons to Iran, is important given that attacks resumed in September. 
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train. On the 11" over 40 people were injured as a bomb wrecked a cafe at La Defense; 
the following day two people were killed in an explosion in the Pub Renault on the 
Champs-Elysees. Paris appeared to be at war. In the face of such carnage, the threat of 
Chirac's bluff, tough interior minister Charles Pasqua to "terrorise the terrorists" 
appeared to ring increasingly hollow. Rather the bombers appeared to have calculated 
how best to humiliate the government; on September 16 a bomb devastated the 
Prefecture de Police itself, killing one and injuring over 50 people. As the justice 
minister and intelligence chiefs went to Algiers to try and stop the carnage, in public the 
authorities continued to accuse the clan of George Ibrahim Abduallah of being behind 
the attacks. Wanted posters were issued and rewards offered. However, by this time it 
is clear that there were serious divisions within the administration over the identity of 
the perpetrators of the attacks. The violence peaked on Wednesday the 17t", a bomb 
thrown from a car exploding in front of the Tati department store on the Rue de Rennes, 
killing six people and maiming a further 50. The following day Mitterrand, then on a 
tour of SE Asia, returned to Paris, immediately conferring with Pasqua, Pandraud and 
Chirac. The following week a series of envoys were sent by Chirac and Pasqua to 
Damascas. The attacks ceased. 
While a further French hostage was freed in December, foreign minister Raimond 
continued to favour restoration of ties with Iran. Yet between late 1987 and early 1988 
policy was increasingly driven by Charles Pasqua 24. On March 21 1987 a series of 
police raids led to arrests in connection with the 1986 bombings. Evidence uncovered 
during these raids appeared to link a figure in the Iranian embassy, Wahid Gordji, to the 
attacks. In essence this led to a stand-off initially within Chirac's government, and then 
between France and Iran over the role of Gordji. Gordji was officially called as witness 
in the case on June 29, prompting a crisis within the government. By this time, a 
23 Raimond, 1989, p. 101. 
24 George Ibrahim Abdullah was sentenced initially to four years on a charge of firearms offences 
in July 1986. He then appeared before a Paris court in February 1987 on a series of charges of terrorism 
against US and Israeli targets in Paris in during 1981-82. At this second trial he received a life sentence. 
Abdullah was defended by Jacques Verges. Against the background of pressure on France over hostages 
in Lebanon, and ongoing Franco-Iranian rapprochement the trial was perceived by the US as a litmus test 
of the extent of French "flexibility" over terrorism. See Liberation, 2.3.87. 
220 
derailment of "normalisation" and serious crisis appeared unavoidable. For the first time 
president Mitterrand, who had been kept away from day to day decision making (and 
ministerial divisions) intervened. Interestingly, as in August 1981 Mitterrand's primary 
concern appears to have been in large part motivated by the fear of the seizure of French 
hostages in Iran, i. e. a replay of the 1980 US hostage drama. Within Chirac's 
government, foreign minister Raimond and justice minister Pandraud appear to have 
doubted the Iranian role in the attacks, while Charles Pasqua appeared determined to 
prove it 25. Over the following week Tehran and Paris fought what the press dubbed the 
"battle of the embassies"; each surrounding each others' diplomatic premises. On July 
7, Raimond on a trip to Amman, Jordan announced that the government's policy of 
attempting to "normalise" relations with Tehran was at an end. The sense of rupture was 
reinforced when on July 15 Iranian forces attacked a French vessel, the Ville d'Anvers, 
in the Gulf. This, coming after the problems with Gordji, led Raimond and Chirac to 
agree to the suspension of all diplomatic ties with Iran on July 17 26. Gordji was finally 
"released" on November 29 1987. Gordji left the embassy, having agreed to a token 
appearance before the magistrate investigating the 1986 Paris bombings, for Tehran Z'. 
His departure came two days after the return to France of two of the Antenne 2 hostages, 
Normindin and Auque 21. Thus, although relations remained exceedingly fraught for the 
25 Raimond, 1989, p. 145. Raimond's measured, defensive account is important given that it was 
widely believed that there was a fundamental battle over the issue between the foreign and interior 
ministries. Raimond predictably but somewhat obliquely denies this, but goes on to say that in the face of 
the total collapse of his "Iranian" policy, he serious considered resigning. 
26 Pean, P. La Menace, Fayard, 1987. See ch. 10 "Gordji". As noted in the opening paragraph of 
this section, in fact the denouement of this stage of the French saga with Iran cannot be fully appreciated 
abstracted from the wider international context. In the days following France's break with Tehran, the 
UN security council was debating a motion to lead to a cease-fire in the Gulf war. Equally, there were 
attacks on Iranian opponents abroad, notably in London on July 18. A month earlier ties between 
London and Tehran had been downgraded; the arrest of an Iranian diplomat for shoplifting in Manchester 
having swiftly degenerated into mutual expulsions of diplomats 
27 The hypercritical spirit of Gordji's judicial "interrogation" was best captured by the cartoonist 
Plantu in Le Monde of 29.11.88; In a scene entitled "Gordji's appearance before the judge" the judge asks 
a smiling Gordji "destination Beirut or Tehran? With or without bags? Corridor or aile? Smoking or 
non-smoking? " 
28 Auque published an account of his time in capitivity; Auque, R. (with Forestier, P. ) Un otage ä 
Beyrouth Filipacchi, Paris, 6988. See also Coudari, M., 257 jours de detention au Liban. Jacques 
Grancher, Paris, 1987. Also Loiseau, Y. Le grand troc : le labyrinthe des otages francais au Liban. 
Hachette, Paris 1988. Kauffman has since produced two books on the nature of solitude; on the 
Antartican archipelago of Kerguela, and Napoleon's last days in Saint Helana 
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remainder of 1987, communication, negotiation and bartering between French and 
Iranian authorities over the hostages continued. 
This communication continued during the first half of 1988, which in France was 
dominated by the run-up to the presidential elections, with the first round of voting on 
April 24. The second round, a run-off between Mitterrand and Chirac, was on May 8. 
With pictures of the remaining hostages still broadcast nightly over the credits 
introducing the evening news, the issue of the French hostages remaining in Lebanon 
remained a key electoral issue 29. Tension between Mitterrand and Chirac over the 
handling of relations with Iran also surfaced during the head to head televised debate 
between the two candidates on April 28. What had hitherto been a relatively calm 
exchange of positions degenerated sharply when the two clashed over Chirac's 
mishandling of the Gordji affair 30. The hostages issue rebounded spectacularly the 
following week. On May 5, three days before the final vote, Chirac melodramatically 
interrupted a party rally in Strasbourg to announce the news that the remaining French 
hostages had been released. Kauffmann, Carton and Fontaine arrived at Orly the 
following day. 
Their release was finally secured via a series of deals in West Africa, Tehran and Beirut. 
The complexity of these negotiations reflected the extent of Pasqua's networks. These 
alone could be the subject of a thesis. The reverberations and repercussions of the 
clandestine deals which eventually got the final three French hostages released 
continued over several years, having grave implications for French governments' 
subsequent relations with Iran, Syria and Shia leaders in West Africa and the Levant. A 
bitter polemic erupted between Pasqua and Roland Dumas in July 1989 over who had 
promised what to whom over the release of Nakkash 31. There is also considerable 
29 It is important to stress to non-French readers the degree to which the nightly roll-call of 
hostages, followed by the intonation "... n'ont toujours pas ete liberes "I was an indelible, emotive feature 
of the French political and media landscape during these years. Evidently this stands in stark contrast to 
the official stance in the UK. Jill Morrell, the catalyst for the Friends of John McCartney, was in part 
spurred and inspired by the very different tactics followed in France. 
30 Favier, P. Martin-Roland, 1991, vol 2, p. 913. 
31 Le Monde 4.7.89. 
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evidence to suggest that the failure to honour payoffs and promises made to Shia leaders 
in Senegal as part of the May 1988 hostage releases led to the explosion of a UTA DC- 
10 flight in West Africa on 19 September 1989, with the loss of 171 lives 32. 
Nevertheless, it was the success of Charles Pasqua's aides, notably Jean-Charles 
Marchiani and Iskander Safa, which proved that Pasqua's parallel foreign policy had 
finally wrested control of the hostages dossier from the foreign ministry 33. The role of 
Charles Pasqua during the first period of cohabitation highlights both the artificiality of the 
domestic: foreign dichotomy in this context, and the primacy of personal networks in the 
making of French foreign policy. Although Pasqua appears to have had little direct 
bearing on Franco-Iraqi relations, his career epitomizes these two facets of Fifth Republic 
policy. In addition, in a further twist which well illustrates the convoluted nature of the 
role of politics and personalities during the 1986-88 period of cohabitation, President 
Mitterrand and Pasqua appear to have established a good working relationship. Mitterrand 
clearly admired the toughness of Pasqua and during 86-87 took pleasure in hinting to 
journalists that their improbable entente was due to links forged forty years earlier in the 
resistance 34 
4 Franco-Iraqi relations during cohabitation; oil, debt and arms. 
32 Dossier by Pierre Pean, Liberation, 28.2.90 
33 The most detailed analytical account of the French negotiations to release hostages in Lebanon is 
provided in Ranstorp, M. Hizb'allah in Lebanon; the politics of the western hostage crisis, Macmillan, 
1997. This has the twin-merit of providing a comparative analysis of the diverse US and European 
initiative to secure the release of hostages, and provide a perspective from the point of view of Lebanese 
and Iranian groups. 
34 More importantly, Pasqua's son, Pierre, whose views and friendships are even further to the right than his 
father's, and the president's son, Jean-Christophe Mitterrand (who by now had taken over from Guy Penne as 
his father's Africa advisor) were friends. On this see Carton, D. La deuxieme vie de Charles Pasqua, 
Flammarion, Paris, 1995, especially ch. 10 "Le masque africain", p. 189. Pasqua's role in the Gaullist 
movement, his links with Jacques Foccart, De Gaulle's Rassemblement [de] Peuple Francois [CHK] and 
the murky Service d'Action Civique (SAC) the formation of the RPR, and his ambivalent relationship 
with Chirac can be traced via secondary literature. In addition to Daniel Carton's 1995 book, see: Boggio, 
Ph. Rollat, A., Ce terrible Monsieur Pasqua, Olivier Orban, Paris, 1988, probably the most detailed 
account of Pasqua's background. Also, Pelliser, P, Charles Pasqua, J. C. Lattes, Paris, 1987. The 
overlapping networks of both Foccart and Pasqua in Africa, are in turn inextricably linked to those of the 
oil giant Elf. On Foccart, see Pean, P. L'homme d'ombre.. Fayard, Paris, 1990. Foccart, who died in 
1994 (? ) refused to cooperate with Pean, both the ambition and constraints of the book summed up in its 
frustrated subtitle; "elements of an enquiry into the most mysterious and powerful man in the Fifth 
Republic" See also the two volume "authorised version", Gaillard, Ph., Foccart, J. (entretiens avec), 
Foccart Parle, Fayard & Jeune Afrique, Paris, 1995/97. 
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As explained in section two above, the principal elements of Franco-Iraqi relations during 
the mid-eighties were established following Tariq Aziz's trip to Paris in January 1983. 
These consisted of continued French arms supplies in exchange for a mutually agreed, 
renegotiated schedule of limited debt repayments by Iraq. These repayments were made 
via a complex triangular arrangement whereby Iraqi oil was supplied to the French oil 
companies, Elf and Total. Receipts from oil sales by these companies went to the French 
treasury, who paid Iraq's creditors. In practice the official export credit guarantee agency, 
COFACE, had already been obliged to reimburse many French creditors for unpaid Iraqi 
debts, thus receipts went to COFACE. This arrangement clearly left vast scope for 
disagreement, both between Iraq and the French government (notably due to the shifts in 
the price of oil), and between rival French agencies, both in government and the private 
sector. The dossiers were further complicated by the fact that Iraq, still at war, was 
constantly placing additional arms orders with French companies. With Baghdad so far in 
arrears, these transactions became both increasingly fraught and complex. Companies were 
eager to sell to Baghdad, but required COFACE and thus government agreement to 
proceed with any new orders. What evolved was an exceedingly complex game with all 
actors effectively engaging in fraught strategies of leverage. Iraq argued that without 
additional arms supplies they might lose the war and thus be unable to repay any debts. 
Tariq Aziz in Paris, June 1986 
The Iraqi leadership was undoubtedly concerned over France's desire to "normalise" 
relations with Iran and the fact that, faced with French hostages in 
Lebanon and 
continued attacks in France, Jacques Chirac's government had endorsed this policy. 
The 
48 hour visit to Paris of Tariq Aziz on June 9 1986 provided the occasion 
for a public 
clarification of French policy towards the Gulf. Chirac's cabinet 
had met to discuss 
relations with Iraq on April 16, a month after coming to office 
35. The meeting 
concluded by agreeing that, despite its intention to re-establish ties with 
Tehran, the 
35 On Tariq Aziz's June 1986 trip to Paris, see Liberation, 9& 11.6.86, and Le Monde, 
11 & 
12.6.86 [t2, pp 16-19]. Subsequent quotes are drawn from these articles. 
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government should "demonstrate to Iraq that France remains by her side" and that 
France should indicate, via political gestures, "her fidelity to the friendship with 
Baghdad and her confidence in [Iraq's] future" 36. While seemingly straightforward, 
this was in practice an exceedingly complex and contradictory policy position. In 
reality, for the reasons outlined above, there was never any real questioning that arms 
sales to Iraq would not continue. However, Chirac's government had to demonstrate to 
Iraq, and be seen to be demonstrating, to other Gulf Arab states, and indeed the US, 
thatdespite ongoing negotiations with Iran, solidarity with and arms sales to Iraq would 
continue. 
Tariq Aziz's reception in Paris in June effectively achieved this. Iraq's vice-premier met 
with Chirac, as well as his ministers of finance, defence and foreign affairs. He was also 
received by President Mitterrand. During each meeting, and in numerous interviews 
during the trip, both French and Iraqi officials were at pains to point out that there was 
not the slightest question of any shift in France's policy of support for Iraq. As Aziz 
arrived, Prime Minister Jacques Chirac made a special appearance on France's principal 
television channel TF 1, in which he spelled out France's policy towards the Middle East 
and the terrorist attacks at home. Chirac declared that "it would be in the general interest 
and vocation of France to normalise our relations with Iran ... 
[but] I naturally exclude 
the idea, that in order to achieve this normalisation, France would change its policy 
towards the Middle Eastern or Iraq". Tariq Aziz declared that "We are totally reassured 
having heard Jacques Chirac on TF 1... [he has] excluded any change [in policy] towards 
Iraq during the process of normalising relations with Iran". Standing alongside Chirac 
on the Matignon lawn before the press corps on June 10, Aziz affirmed that "the 
friendship between Baghdad and Paris is strong and will remain so". For his part, 
Chirac stressed the continuity in relations; "This policy of friendship and solidarity does 
not date simply from yesterday, [and as such] it has never been undermined, irrespective 
of the changes in French governments, which clearly shows that [the relationship] is 
grounded in reality 37 ". 
36 Angeli, 1992, p. 173 and annex, p. 245. 
37 "est une realite ". Trying to translate some of Chirac's truncated utterances one is reminded of 
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Such support was not confined to the right wing government; after a 30 minute meeting 
between Tariq Aziz and Mitterrand meeting on June 10, the Elysee stated that the 
President had reaffirmed "the solidarity and the loyalty of France towards Iraq". Despite 
the acute uncertainty surrounding the conduct of foreign policy in the untested waters of 
cohabitation, in practice President Mitterrand and his entourage endorsed both Chirac's 
policy towards Iraq, and the "normalisation" of ties with Iran. They were, after all, the 
policies followed by the Presidency and successive Socialist governments since 1981 31. 
As stated above, on May 7, a month before the arrival of Tariq Aziz, France had met one 
of Iran's demands and expelled Massoud Rajavi and his wife. This prompted much 
discussion during Aziz's time in Paris, in part became the Rajavi couple had gone to 
Baghdad, in part because of the speculation that their departure would trigger the release 
of one or more French hostages from Lebanon. 
In public, both Tariq Aziz and his French interlocutors stressed that his trip to Paris was 
primarily "political", concerned with clarifying and publicising French policy in the 
Gulf in the light of the new conjuncture of an incoming French government faced with a 
terror campaign at home which was clearly linked to its policy stance in the Middle 
East. However, in reality much of the time and technical aspects of the trip was taken 
up with the ongoing, largely intractable, issue of how Baghdad could pay for both the 
weapons already delivered, and the new orders which it claimed it urgently needed if it 
was to be successful in repelling the Iranians. Just prior to the Iraqi deputy leader's 
arrival in Paris, details of Iraq's outstanding debts to France were leaked to and 
published by Le Canard Enchaine 39. These stressed that under the 1983 "oil-for-debt" 
agreement, Iraq had honoured its commitments to France during 1985. However, 
payments in early 1986 had ceased and the subsequent decline in oil prices made it 
impossible for Iraq to continue payments. Indeed disagreement over the price at which 
one of the arguments Mitterrand put forward for standing against Chirac in 1988 was that "cet komme n'a 
pas de parole ". 
38 Vedrine, H. Les Mondes de Mitterrand, Fayard, Paris, 1996, p. 319. 
39 Le Canard Enchaine, 28.5.86. 
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oil should be paid meant that the accord, due to lapse in July 1986, had stalled. At this 
point total Iraqi arrears to France were put at FFr23bn, with FFr10bn for military debts. 
During the June 1986 trip, Aziz made it clear that Iraq urgently required additional arms 
supplies from France. Detailed contracts for additional (Puma and Super Dauphin) 
helicopters from Aerospatiale had been under discussion from March, as were a large 
contract for mortars from Thomson-Brandt, known by the name "Jupiter". Beneath the 
apparent calm, mutual public statements suggesting "business as usual", in fact there 
deep-seated divisions within Chirac's cabinet over how to handle Iraq. In mid-July an 
inter-ministerial meeting was held on Iraq. Chaired by one of Chirac's advisors, it was 
made clear to minister of finance Balladur, and his minister of external trade Michel 
Noir, that Chirac was determined that trade with Iraq, including the supply of weapons 
so urgently sought by Baghdad, should continue. The fact that, in the judgement of the 
ministry of finance, Iraq was technically insolvent and would be unable to pay for the 
French goods, was waived aside. This position was confirmed on 11 December when a 
note from Chirac marked "Confidentiel Defense" was distributed to the ministers 
concerned, but pointedly kept from Mitterrand. This confirmed that arms would be 
supplied to Iraq on relaxed credit terms, regardless of Iraq's arrears during 1986 40. Not 
only could the Thomson-Brandt's mortar and Aerospatiale helicopter contracts be 
supplied, but this encouraged those in Dassault to redouble their efforts to negotiate 
sales for the Mirage2000 to Iraq. 
Relations between, Iraq and France under Chirac's cohabitationiste administration thus 
continued to be excellent up until the presidential elections of summer 1988. Having 
decided to press ahead with additional arms sales in 1986, in early July 1987 a new 
accord on debt repayment was hammered out. By this time it was clear that, despite the 
ongoing arms sales, notably in spare parts, the total volume of Franco-Iraq trade was 
declining, although considerable optimism was expressed as to future trade links if, as 
and when the war ended 41. This was the case for most of Iraq's commercial partners, as 
40 Angeli, 1992, p. 176 and annexes, p. 245-254 
41 Le Monde, 29.7.87. Around 30 French companies had been present in the November 1986 
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Iraq's financial situation deteriorated due to war and declining oil prices 
In August 1987 the Canard Enchaine opened a polemic as it revealed that Michel Noir 
had visited Baghdad in June as Chirac's personal envoy. The Canard suggested, 
`though failed to prove conclusively, that Noir had been authorised to discuss the 
rebuilding of Tammuz with Saddam Hussein. Earlier in June, a French diplomat in 
Kuwait had also stated in a newspaper interview that France was willing to help 
reconstruct Tammuz - although the Quai d'Orsay subsequently denied this. Chirac and 
his entourage strongly denied any association between Noir's visit and nuclear 
cooperation. However, news of Noir's visit had been kept from Mitterrand and almost 
everyone in the foreign ministry. Eric Desmarest, a confidant of Chirac's who headed 
foreign minister Jean-Bernard Raimond's cabinet in the Quai d'Orsay, had directly 
relayed the message for translation to the French ambassador in Baghdad, Maurice 
Courage. 
The premier subsequently insisted that the obliquely worded "personal message" which 
Noir had conveyed had been concerned uniquely with the rescheduling of debts. The 
publicity and polemic surrounding Noir's trip and message created a spat between 
Mitterrand and Chirac, to whom Mitterrand apparently addressed a sharply worded 
criticism. Chirac duly apologised and issued a series of "clarifications", stressing in 
particular to Israel that France was not intending to reconstruct Tammuz. These leaks 
highlighted numerous subsidiary paradoxes in French dealings with Iraq. The most 
notable was that while France granted far more lenient credit terms to Iraq than other 
OECD countries, debts to Paris were also being repaid far later, and less regularly than 
her competitors. It also reopened the polemic, which had resurfaced the previous year, 
over Chirac's responsibility in granting Iraq nuclear facilities in the 1970s. 
Despite controversy surrounding the nature of Chirac and Michel Noirs' contacts with 
Baghdad, in both Paris and Baghdad, the long-term nature of Franco-Iraqi ties continued 
to be stressed. Speaking to French admirers in Baghad in mid-1987, Saddam Hussein's 
Baghdad trade fair, which was attended by Chirac's minister of external trade, Michel Noir. 
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vocabulary about the "special relationship" between France stuck firmly to the script 
first established between Chirac and himself fifteen years earlier 42 Similarly, Chirac's 
letter to Saddam, conveyed by Noir, was affective in tone, speaking of "our joint- 
personal initiative of long-date". In September 1987 Edouard Balladur was addressing a 
strongly worded note of criticism to Chirac about the government's contradictory stance 
towards new arms orders and Iraq's unpaid debts. In this Balladur explicitly criticised 
Andre Giraud in the ministry of defense for allowing the arms companies to engage 
themselves well beyond the limits fixed by the ministry of finance and COFACE. 
Balladur explicitly warned that any new Dassault contracts should not exceed FFr3bn. 
The outcome of the disagreement between Chirac and his minister of finance was that, 
during the meeting in Paris of the Franco-Iraqi joint-commission in March 1988, the July 
1987 oil for debt agreement was extended, and France agreed to provide FFr300m of new 
trade credits. Yet despite Balladur's reservations, by December 1987 it was clear that the 
government was prepared to allow Dassault to enter into serious discussions with Iraq 
over the supply of a dozen Mirage F1 to replace some of those lost during the war, while 
exploring the longer term option possibility of selling the M2000, the F1s successor, to 
Iraq. By this time Iraq was operating 109 Mirage F1s, supplied under the 1977 and 
1980 contracts 
6 France's "Iraqi" lobbies in the mid-eighties 
At the same moment that Balladur was vainly trying to curb the enthusiasm of Dassault's 
salesmen for Baghdad, in Iraq itself the "Festival of Babylon" celebration of September 
1987 provided the occasion for many of the diverse interests and groups involved in 
Franco-Iraqi relationship to cross paths. An official delegation was headed by Camille 
Cabana and Francois Bujon 43. Bujon, one of France's senior diplomats, was at this point 
defense advisor to premier Chirac. These two envoys overlapped with a series of groups 
from the milieu of pro-Arab and pro-Iraqi lobbies which were introduced in chapter five 
42 See the interview with Saddam Hussein by Charles Saint-Prot, Le Matin, 31.7.87. 
43 Cabana would later head the Institut du Monde Arabe in Paris. IMA opened in November 1987, 
Edgard Pisani being its first head. Nicolas Beau's Paris Capitale Arabe, Seuil, Paris, 1995 contains a partial 
insight into the politics of IMA. 
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44 By the autumn of 1987 French economic dossiers and stakes in Iraq were so large that 
the kind of lobbying initially undertaken by ASFA and the "pro-Arab" milieu of the 
seventies had become largely redundant to diplomacy. This didn't stop such groups and 
their publications from operating. In 1985 several individuals who already had long but 
diverse experience of relations with Iraq formed a new solidarity group, the Association 
des amities franco-irakienne (AAFI). This was brought together by Gilles Munier, who 
already had an established track record of lobbying on behalf of Franco-Iraqi trade, notably 
from his home base of Brittany which as a consequence had developed a considerable 
agricultural trade with Baghdad. Also members of AAFI were the Gaullist thinker and 
writer Philippe Saint-Robert, the orientalist Jacques Berque, Michel Lelong (a Catholic 
priest charged with christian: islamic relations in France), the politician Alain Mayoud 
(UDF) and the veteran Gaullist Georges Gorse, as well as Jean Dresch, Pierre Rossi, 
Helene Touraine and the Le Monde journalist Paul Balta, who had already written 
extensively on Iraq. Jean-Pierre Chevenement, a long-time friend of Berque, and at that 
point minister of education, became honorary president. Paul Depis, who was. replaced as 
ambassador to Baghdad by Maurice Courage in 1984, joined the group later, becoming its 
president 45. AAFI sporadically produced publications, organised parliamentary lobbying, 
via Iraqi friendship and solidarity groups in both the assembly and Senat, and public 
meetings, operating initially out of the premises of ASFA. A 34 page magazine "Paris- 
Baghdad" was published in May 1987 following the group's inaugural general assembly 
and a national tour was arranged for the Iraqi ambassador Mohamed al-Mashat 46 
44 The indefatigable Philippe Saint-Robert (see ch. 4, section 5) provides an insightful vignette of the 
French in Baghdad at this moment. See his Le Secret des jours, J. C. Lattes, Paris, 1995, p. 392. 
45 Interviews with Baita, Munier, Depis, in Paris & Lyon 1986. See Beau, 1995 and Angeli 1992, 
p. 186. Much was made of AAFI in the autumn of 1990, when Munier and Berque in particular mounted a 
defense of Saddam Hussein. In the 1980s Munier regularly went to Baghdad to promote trade with Brittany 
and Rennes. Media attention briefly focussed on him when he returned from Baghdad in September 1990 
with nine French nationals, see Le Monde, 3.10.90. Both Munier and Meynoud and many of those active on 
behalf of Iraq in the 1980s subsequently spearheaded the post-1991 anti-sanctions campaign in France. By 
late 1995 Munier was the secretary general of Association franco-irakienne de cooperation economique 
(AFICE). The president was none other than Roland Bareilles, the CFP/Total representative in Baghdad in 
the 1960s-70s (See ch. 4), while five ex-French ambassadors were on the board of AFICE. See also the 
edited collection of essays by Meynoud, A. Irak, La Faute, Cerf, Paris, 1999. 
46 The magazine includes pieces by Berque, Saint-Robert, Balta, Pierre Rossi, Philippe Rondot etc. 
as well as interviews with al-Mashat and Iraq's minister of culture and information, Latif Nsayef Jassem. 
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Just as several of the members of AAFI were also members of ASFA, so some joined yet 
another new "pro-Arab" grouping with Iraqi leanings which was formed in 1987. The 
Cercle France-Pays Arabes was formed by a RPR depute from the Dordogne, Yves Guena 
in more or less direct rivalry with ASFA. This was apparently at the instigation of Gilles 
Munier and the Iraqi ambassador of the time, El-Machat. The need for a new body was 
apparently due to the fact that Lucien Bitterlin, the head of ASFA had written an overly- 
complementary biography of Hafez Al-Assad . 
7 "Post-war ... pre-war" relations, 1988-90; Jean-Pierre Chevenement and 
Dassault. 
Despite securing the liberation of the remaining French hostages three days prior to the 
second round of the 1988 presidential election, Jacques Chirac was nevertheless beaten by 
Mitterrand. In the ensuing legislative elections, Mitterrand's Socialist Party was returned 
to power, bring 26 months of cohabition to an end. As with the earlier changes in 
government, a shift in political orientation and personnel made little difference to the 
direction of French policy in the Middle East. Paradoxically, given the effort that Jean- 
Bernard Raimond had put into re-establishing relations with Iran prior to the Gordji affair, 
diplomatic ties between Paris and Tehran were finally restored only in mid-1988. In 
releasing the hostages into the hands of Chirac, Tehran appeared to have sided with the 
right. Yet now it was Roland Dumas, reappointed as foreign minister under Michel 
Rocard's first government, who was able to complete the strategy that he himself had set 
in motion four years earlier. This long awaited "normalisation" of Franco-Iranian ties 
came as progress was made within the UN to broker agreement as to the implementation 
of resolution 598 voted in 1987 to bring the Iran: Iraq war to a close. France claimed that 
its own close diplomatic ties with Iraq assisted in getting agreement at the UN. 
The change of government brought with it a shift in the relative power of the ministers and 
ministries who had been divided over what attitude to take towards Iraq's debts during 
cohabitation. With Chirac out of office and a new French administration in place, those 
within the finance ministry who had been demanding a halt to new trade with Iraq until the 
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debts were settled gained the upper hand. New premier Michel Rocard had no particular 
relationship with Iraq and the former prime minister's resolute defense of ties with 
Baghdad were lost. There was therefore a shift towards a far more cautious approach to 
Iraq, stressing the necessity of Iraq's strict adherence to debt repayments. By the time of 
the November 1988 Baghdad trade fair, COFACE export credit guarantees remained 
suspended for Iraq, and the new minister of external trade, Jean-Marie Rausch, was far 
more prudent than his predecessors as to the possibility of signing new contracts in 
Baghdad. French companies complained bitterly of being in a paradoxical and untenable 
position. Because French companies had invested so heavily in Iraq during the seventies 
and eighties, there was substantial debt, and thus a block on new credits. Yet German and 
UK companies, who were not as well established in Iraq were able to gain official credit 
guarantees from their governments and thus were far better placed to win post-war 
reconstruction contracts 47. 
In the two years between mid-1988, (the change of government in France and the end of 
the Iran: Iraq war) and Iraq's August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, the formal French position 
remained one of financial prudence dominated by a desire to retrieve debts that Iraq had 
accumulated during the war. Yet despite the reticence of the ministry of finance, headed 
by Pierre Beregovoy, now fully backed by the prime minister and the bulk of the 
government, one sector of the government and state nevertheless remained strongly 
attached to a special relationship with Iraq. This was the military, under its new minister, 
Jean-Pierre Chevenement. To the surprise of some, Chevenement immediately got on 
excellently with the military top brass, who saw in him a more pliable minister than Andre 
Giraud had proved. Chevenement equally had close and long standing relations with well- 
placed individuals in France's aeronautical industry 48. Chevenement's longstanding 
engagement with Iraq has already been noted. Dassault, who with possible contracts for 
both Mirage F1 and Mirage 2000 in the offing from Baghdad, in particular ensured that 
they were able to lobby via Chevenement. In 1985 Dassault, whose PDG Serge Dassault 
was close to Chirac, had already cultivated ties with Mitterrand's entourage via the 
47 Liberation, 17.11.88, La tribune de 1'expansion, 16.11.88. 
48 Schwartzbrod, A. Le president qui n'aimait pas la guerre; dans les coulisses du pouvoir militarie 
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appointment of Francois de Grossouvre as an advisor 49. De Grossouvre, General 
Benouville, Dassault himself as well as the ever present Hughes de L'Estoile all appear to 
have attempted to reduce the ministry of finance's reticence to fund new aircraft purchases 
by Iraq. Mitterrand's brother, Jacques Mitterrand also visited Baghdad in late 1989. 
Jacques Mitterrand, although 72 years old, headed the Office generale de V air and GIFAS, 
the official commission which acted as a lobbying group for France's main aeronautical 
exporters. 
Thus, despite the fact that there appeared to be little flexibility in the French position, there 
was nevertheless a significant French presence at the Baghdad air show in April 1989. 
Chevenement sent his chief of staff, Maurice Schmitt. Dassault was present in the shape 
of Serge Dassault, head of foreign sales Hughes de L'Estoile, accompanied by two 
demonstration versions of the Mirage2000 and three Alphajet trainers. Following this 
display, Dassault appears to have embarked discussions on the possibility of constructing 
production and maintenance facilities in Iraq for the Alphajet. In April-May 1989 Iraq 
received just eight Mirage F 1's and associated missiles and spare parts which had been 
negotiated for during 1987. The delivery of these began in the autumn of 1989 and was 
continuing in July 1990. Meanwhile what was widely viewed as a major breakthrough in 
relations was achieved in September 1989. On September 15 a comprehensive agreement 
was reached over the rescheduling of Iraq's post-1988 debts to France. Since the end of 
the war with Iran, Baghdad had essentially ceased payment to many creditors, including 
France. The agreement provided for the immediate repayment of FFrl. 5bn, with a 
rescheduling of a further FFr7bn. In announcing the agreement, Le Monde warned, in 
what in retrospect can be seen as somewhat prophetic tones, of the dangers of assisting 
Iraq's plans for militarisation and Dassault's hopes of selling the Mirage 2000 50. Yet the 
debt agreement did not substantially improve relations, or lessen Chevenement's relative 
isolation within the government. When Iraq's vice-prime minister Saadoun Hammadi 
visited Paris on January 23 1990, Mitterrand delegated an advisor to see him and 
1981-1995, Plon, Paris, 1995. See ch. 4. 
49 See Schwatrzbord, Dassault, le dernier round, O. Oban, 1991. De Grossouvre was a close 
confidant of Mitterrand's. He committed suicide in the L'Elysee in 1993, see fn 9 in the conclusion. 
50 Le Monde, 17-18.9.89. 
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Hammadi's audiences with Rocard, Dumas and Beregovy were reportedly largely 
confined to discussions on debt. Only Chevenement went out of his way to welcome the 
Iraqi with a formal dinner. Curiously, Chevenement himself flew to Iraq shortly 
afterwards, being received at length by Saddam Hussein, and his wife and family, before 
flying on to Egypt. On his return to France, the Minister of Defense argued strongly, but 
to little avail, that France should be investing more substantially and aggressively in Iraq. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to briefly trace some of the key incidents and effects of 
French policy towards Iraq in the mid-1980s. During this period, relations with Iraq 
increasingly intermeshed and overlapped with France's antagonistic ties with Iran, 
notably via the holding of French hostages in Lebanon, and successive bombing 
campaigns in metropolitan France. These were derived from, and served to partially 
eclipse, earlier ties with Baghdad. Six issues appear to merit further consideration: 
"1 The cause of deeper divisions within successive French governments 
over the relative merits of policy towards both Iraq and Iran. Chapter six briefly 
explored this issue for the period 1981-83. Yet this is more particularly the case during 
Chirac's 1986-88 cabinet as policy towards the belligerents divided premier Chirac, 
Balladur (finance), Michel Noir (external trade), Pandraud (justice) and Pasqua 
(interior). To what degree was Chirac's determination to back trade with Iraq due to his 
personal links with Dassault? Beyond 1988, did Dassault and other aeronautical 
producers' "capture" the DGA and ministry of defence help explain both the "pro-Iraqi" 
stance and subsequent degree of relative isolation of Chevenement in the post-June 1988 
socialist government?. What was the influence of key individuals such as Hughes 
d'Estoile, the president's brother Jacques Mitterrand and Serge Dassault himself, upon 
decision making? 
"2A more precise evaluation of the arms supply dimension of Franco-Iraqi 
ties would have to examine to what extent French supplies were as necessary and 
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decisive as the Iraqi claimed in checking Iranian assaults. How did French supplies fit 
within the wider Iraqi arms procurement programme and the evolution of the war with 
Iran? Equally important are broader geo-political shifts; the manner in which the US, 
from late 1983, acquiesced in French supplies during the war and after 1988 how OECD 
states' differing attitudes to commercial trade - in both civilian and military goods - was 
viewed by the Iraqis. 
3 Iraq's ability, at least until 1988, to continually extract arms supplies 
from France, despite unpaid bills, is striking. Despite being in the position of the 
supplicant, Iraq appears to have understood and manipulated the French policy process 
far more successfully than French policy makers were able to influence events in 
Baghdad, where despite the much-vaunted "special relationship", by the mid-1980s 
French companies faced ever stiffer commercial competition in securing contracts. 
"4. While this chapter has attempted to touch on the armaments dimensions 
of the relationship, it has neglected the oil sector, which earlier chapters argued was 
central to the relations with Iraq in the 1970s. Elf and Total were clearly instrumental in 
enabling the triangular "arms-debt-oil" repayment system to operate from 1983. A 
better understanding of the political powers underlying this could be gained from a 
closer investigation of the oil companies' strategies towards Iraq, as well as broader 
Middle Eastern oil price and production issues. This in turn ultimately needs to be 
linked to the longer term debates over the restructuring of the state's holdings in the oil 
and arms sectors, the roots of which can be traced back to the Chirac government's 
partial privatisations of 86-88 51. 
"5 Linked to point three above, clearly Iraq was not the only Middle Eastern 
actor to successfully manipulate ties with Paris. The degree of leverage which virtually 
all the Middle Eastern "partners" exercised over France during the protracted hostage 
51 Clearly this aspect is even more pressing post-1991. Both because France's attitude towards 
sanctions and post-sanctions Iraq appears to have been underpinned by oil interests, and because of the 
accelerated restructuring of the economy from the early 1990s. In the autumn of 1999, Total effectively 
took over Elf, bringing the rivalry narrated earlier to an end; ch. 3 section 7. 
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and domestic bombing campaigns requires far more research. Indeed the evidence 
suggests that the skill of Middle Eastern actors in successfully understanding and then 
manipulating to their own ends the French policy process is of far greater interest than 
the internal "contradictions" of the French policy process which this text has attempted 
to highlight. This would be the case for most Middle Eastern actors involved in the 
hostage negotiations, the successive waves of bombings in France, as well as the attacks 
on French and other western interests in Lebanon. The latter is most dramatically so 
following the October 1983 attacks on American and French bases in Beirut 52. 
"6 The role of export credit guarantees and COFACE remains little 
understood. How COFACE interacted with the ministry of finance and whether Iraqi 
debts, one of largest outstanding portfolios, was "politicised" or evaluated from a 
technocratic and financial stand point requires further thought. An identical dilemma 
faced most OECD government who both extensively exported to Iraq during early 1980s 
and then hoped to benefit from post-war reconstruction; hence the focus on UK's ECGD 
in the Scott enquiry and report. Evidently the broader issue of Iraqi debts, to both 
OECD states and other Arab Gulf countries is also of relevance in evaluating Iraq's 
motivations in August 1990. 
Inescapably, the evaluation of these points within their proper context, that the closing 
years of the 1980s, is rendered both impossible, and probably historically 
irrelevant, in 
the shadows cast by the Iraqi army's invasion of Kuwait in the dawn of August 
2 1990. 
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52 Writing ten years later, Robert Fisk cogently argued that the Beirut bombings could 
be viewed in 
retrospect as the beginning of a new form of conflict. He suggests that the role of western 
public 
opinion, and the righteous rhetoric of "terrorism" adopted in the wake of the 
bombings by Reagan in 
particular, clumsily played into the hands of those who sought to 
foster a myth of confrontation. Fisk 
argues that it was this which, by late 1993, had led to the neutering of 
American power in Somalia and 
Haiti, Independent on Sunday (London), 23.10.93. 
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Epilogue 
vc 
Jeudi 9 aoüt: ... il ya quelques semaines, personne n'avait dit un mot sur l'Irak. 
Comme en 1989, a Paris, oü personne n'avait parle du mur de Berlin, Jamais les 
puissants n'ont ete aussi myopes. Comme leur myopie leur profite, cela ne va pas les 
inciter a chercher a voir loin. 1 
Samedi 4 aoüt: Recapitulation: depuis le debut de la guerre Iran/Irak, la France a 
vendu pour 16 milliards de dollars a l'Irak (contre 13 milliards pour l'URSS); l'Irak 
est notre second fournisseur en petrole; l'Irak nous doit 30 milliards de francs 2 
Many Parisians had already left the capital for les grandes vacances, when on 
Wednesday August 1 1990 president Mitterrand, premier Michel Rocard and 
ministers held a final cabinet meeting. The president and most cabinet members then 
followed their citizens' lead, quitting Paris that afternoon. Mitterrand was awoken 
abruptly at six the following morning; the tranquillity of his Latche country retreat 
broken by the news that Iraqi troops had invaded Kuwait. 
The French response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is not the subject of this thesis. 
Yet neither the profound impact of the invasion itself, nor the long-term implications 
of France's subsequent participation in the war on French foreign and military policy 
can be fully understood without reference to the long relationship between French 
and Iraqi elites which this text has sought to examine. 
Retrospectively, three aspects of August 1990 and its aftermath can be seen to have a 
bearing on the preceding texts: 
" Firstly the war helped partially lift the veil of limited information and 
publicity about France's longstanding ties with Iraq and other Middle Eastern states. 
The introduction highlighted the near total lack of serious analytical literature on 
France's ties with Iraq and other Gulf Arab states prior to 1990. Extensive press 
I Attali, J. Verbatim, Vol. 111,1988-91, Fayard, Paris, 1995, p. 556. 
2 Attali, 1995, p. 550. 
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coverage of the scope of Franco-Iraqi ties was then triggered by the outbreak of war. 
Claude Angeli and Stephanie Mesnier's book Notre ami Saddam, from which this 
text has frequently drawn, followed in 1992 3. 
Information and debate about France's ties with Iraq were accentuated after August 
1990 as divisions widened within France over the government's attitude to the 
conflict. Many individuals with long-established links to pro-Arab and pro-Iraqi 
campaigning groups, whose genesis and activities were chronicled earlier in these 
4 text, gained far more public attention . This is not to argue that such groups had a 
determinant impact upon policy. The conclusion which follows argues that the 
opposite was the case. However, even `though such groups and opinions were not 
influential during the war, their longer-term impact is more complex 5 
" Secondly a continuity of similar policy mechanisms, process and personnel 
as had been deployed in the eighties was evident in Mitterrand's handling of the 
crisis. This was most obviously so in the early stages of the confrontation with Iraq; 
notably the initial despatch of envoys to "explain" the French position to Arab allies, 
and the numerous parallel attempts to use France's "privileged" links to Iraq to 
achieve a negotiated end to the crisis 6. Equally the stress at several key points in the 
text of a left-right foreign policy consensus over key issues concerning Middle 
Eastern policy clearly holds for 1990/91. 
3 See introduction, footnotes 8,9 and 10. However, this change should not be exaggerated, as 
noted in fn 3 and 7 of the introduction, despite the war and focus on the Franco-Iraqi relationship, 
there remains a dearth of literature on French policy towards, Iran, Saudi Arabia or the Emirates. 
4 "France-Irak; l'argent et la corruption" (dossier, pp. 8-18), L'Evenement du Jeudi, 13.9.90. 
"Vingt ans d'irakophilie francaise", Le Monde 23.8.90 (Laurent Greilsamer). "Les acteurs du lobby 
pro-irakien", Quotidien du Paris, 10?. 9.90 (J-M Kalfleche). Commentaire sur un virage, Liberation 
14.8.90 (Michel Tibon-Cornillot). For Gilles Munier, attention was greatly increased due to his 
involvement in attempts to secure the release of French citizens detained in Iraq. 
5 Particularly in the light of the post-sanctions debate in France and the UN, and the manner in 
which, by the late 1990s French opposition to US and UK policy over Iraq had merged with a 
resurgence of wider French misgivings over American hegemony. This is clearly the case in terms of 
Chevenement's impact. Notable figures publicly against the war at the time included Couve de 
Murville (de Gaulle's foreign minister), Michel Debre, Cheysson, Andre Giraud, Michel Jobert, as 
well as Jacques Berque. See also Jacques Berque's piece from May 1991, republished in his 
posthumous collection, Une cause jamais perdue, Albin Michel, Paris, 1998, pp. 258-263. 
6 On August 13 1980 Mitterrand decided to send 12 special envoys to various Arab, Latin 
American and Asian states to "explain" France's position in the conflict. These included Claude 
Cheysson to the PLO in Tunis, and Jean-Louis Bianco to Saudi Arabia and Egypt. 
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" The third relevant aspect of the 1990/91 war is the manner in which it 
generated far greater information about and debate over France's foreign policy 
making and objectives 7. As such it was a catalyst for the far-reaching military 
reforms and the broader reassessment of military role, rank and notions of grandeur 
which form the backbone of France's foreign and defence policy reforms in the 
1990s. This was more pointedly so in that the 1990 Gulf crisis came in the wake of 
the uncertainty which marked French reactions to the end of Cold War and 
reunification of Germany 8 
vc 
Josette A., Christine C., La Guerre de Mitterrand : la derniere grande illusion, Olivier Orban, 
Paris, 1991. Genestar, A. Les Peches du prince, Grasset, Paris, c1992, pp. 19-93. Details of the 
"Pisani" initiative are given in; Howorth, J. "French policy in the conflict", pp. 175-200, Danchev, A. 
Keohane, D. International perspectives in the Gulf conflict 1990-91, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1994. 
8 Heisbourg, F. "France and the Gulf crisis" pp. 17-38 in Western Europe and the Gulf, 
Gnesotto, N. Roper, J. Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 1992. Howorth, J. "France: national 
defence policy, an illusion inside a chimera" 1994. Howorth, J. Menon, A. (eds) The European Union 
and national defence policy, Routledge, London, 1997. Cohen, S. (ed) Mitterrand et la sortie de la 
guerre froide, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1998, esp. 321-327. This volume resumes what 
was a particularly intense conference-debate between many of the foreign policy actors during 
Mitterrand's second septennat. Hubert Vedrine in particular was outspoken; weeks later the 1997 
legislatives bounced him back into office. 
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Conclusion. Iraq and the specificities of French foreign policy. ,, C 
This thesis has attempted to provide an analysis of the making of French foreign 
policy towards Iraq, while charting the evolution of France's broader relationship 
with Arab Gulf states during the Fifth Republic. The bulk of the text has focussed on 
an analysis of foreign policy decision making in successive Fifth Republic 
governments, as revealed via the evolution of relations between France and Iraq. 
This conclusion makes seven broad observations, drawing together the objectives 
and themes identified in the introduction with the historical narratives established 
through the diverse chapters. 
1 Firstly, in the introduction the thesis set itself the task of evaluating 
the extent and impact of economic interests in shaping this bilateral relationship. 
How far did economic interests determine foreign policy? Was France's concern to 
secure oil supplies and increase exports of defence and aeronautical equipment the 
driving force beneath the development of relations between successive 
administrations in Baghdad and Paris? Broadly speaking, it was clear, most 
particularly in chapters 3 and 4, that France's oil requirements were a determinant 
factor in shaping policy towards the Middle East. It was firstly the need to secure oil 
supplies, particularly as "nationally controlled" supplies from Algeria became 
unavailable (following revision of the economic aspects of the Evian agreement in 
1965, then Algeria's nationalisations of 1971), which drove France to develop 
relations with Arab Gulf states. Iraq was premier among these due to the Compagnie 
francaise des petroles (CFP)'s origins in, and longstanding links with, Iraq (chapter 
1). Secondly, the need to pay for oil, and attempt to partially offset commercial 
deficits with Arab oil suppliers, meant that France energetically exported arms and 
large civil engineering projects to the Gulf. In the 1970s Iraq offered France the 
most lucrative opportunities in this respect, and from 1975 cooperation was extended 
to include nuclear issues. We saw in chapters 3 and 4 that oil supplies were 
uppermost in French policy makers' considerations, most notably during the 1973 oil 
crisis. In both cases France's privileged ties with Iraq and Saudi Arabia helped 
ensure supplies. However, from 1979 onwards, oil supplies declined in importance. 
Oil supplies from Iraq declined due both to the Iran-Iraq war and changes in the 
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international oil market. From 1983 French oil giants TOTAL (as CFP had become 
know) and Elf were required to purchase Iraqi oil by the state as a means of Iraq 
paying her mounting debts to France, rather than because France was unable to 
obtain oil from other sources. This aspect of the thesis undoubtedly requires 
additional analysis, as well as the provision of additional statistical data. An 
overview of overall trade and oil flows, as well the fluctuations in and profile of Iraqi 
debts would allow the grounding of the arguments more solidly within international 
political economy, and would enable the placing of the narrative format of the text in 
a clearer economic context. This in turn would enable better comparative study 
(with British, German and other countries' trade with Iraq) and a clearer 
understanding of France's overall role in Iraq's external commerce. 
2 Secondly, overall, the text attempted to analyse the notion that French 
foreign policy making is somehow "different"; that it has unique characteristics 
differentiating both the policy process and its objectives from those of comparable 
states. This has been examined by looking at two aspects of this alleged specificity; 
the broad framework and vocabulary of Fifth Republic foreign policy on the one 
hand, and the often personalised and apparently secretive mechanisms of policy on 
the other. 
Policy objectives: It has been clear that, since de Gaulle established both the broad 
lines of Fifth Republic policy, and the specific attitude and vocabulary used in 
Middle Eastern policy, then his successors have extensively used and adapted this 
framework. This is wrapped-up with the problematic notion of a "pro-Arab" stance 
taken by de Gaulle and his successors after 1967. As chapter 2 demonstrated, at the 
time this notion was largely a myth, reflecting chiefly a "normalisation", or 
reorientation of policy in the mid-sixties, following the particularly close links with 
the nascent Israeli state forged under the Fourth Republic, notably in the realm of 
arms supplies. However, as chapter 5 showed, although the vocabulary of policy 
remained, de Gaulle's successor, George Pompidou, significantly extended and 
refined France's policy towards the Arab states of the Middle East. Policy was 
reformulated within the framework of an overarching "Mediterranean policy". This 
incorporated a close post-1969 relationship with Libya, as well as tighter commercial 
relations with the Gulf states. This latter policy, and the composition of a more 
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coherent stance involving French and European energy policy, was honed under 
Pompidou's last foreign minister, Michel Jobert, in 1973/74. 
Policy process: In terms of the personalised and secretive mechanisms of foreign 
policy, the thesis has shown that these factors were abundant throughout the 
formulation of Middle Eastern policy. Indeed it is noteworthy that two recent, 
serious studies of French foreign policy both posit this characteristic as an issue for 
those interested in the study of French Fifth Republic policy 1. Several examples of 
this have been used: it would seem probable that non-official channels were used to 
open France's relationship with both Saudi Arabia and Libya in the late sixties (see 
chapter 5). Secondly, beneath the relationship with Iraq were a series of private and 
commercial advisors who were constantly present in Middle Eastern arms and oil 
policy circles over the seventies and eighties 2. The third, and most public examples 
of the use of personal networks was over the hostages issue (see ch. 7 section 4). 
This again requires a far deeper understanding of the links between French and 
Iranian, Syrian and Shia movements; both in Lebanon and West Africa. Yet a key 
issue, beyond the scope of this thesis, is whether this trait is really unique to France. 
Given the overlapping interests of state, oil an arms companies, did not other 
countries with which France was competing in the Middle East similarly use private 
and parallel channels of communication with Arab leaders? Certainly the middle- 
men and go-betweens of Arabian princes feature heavily in the fragmentary literature 
on Britain's relationship with the region 3. It also raises the issue of the division 
between state and non-state actors and the problems this poses for the analysis of 
international relations. This comparative consideration has a bearing on the third 
issue. 
' Destremau, B. Le Quai d'Orsay derriere la facade, Plon , 
Paris, 1994, and Cohen, S. La 
monarchie nucleaire, les coulisses de la politique etrangere sous la Ve republique, Paris, Hachette, 
1986, both open on this issue. Destremau's point stemming from Francois Mitterrand's extensive use 
of personal emissaries to explain his position in the 1990/91 Gulf war, which mirrored the use he had 
made of such tactics after coming to power in 1981. 
2 See the end of ch. 3. This version of the text had been unable to sufficiently highlight the 
personal tracjectoires of key individuals in the oil and petroleum sectors. This requires further 
illustration. Viewed from the end of the 1990s, it is clear that continuity extends well beyond the 
watershed of August 1990. See ch. 7 section 6. Yet another aspect of this personalised dimension is 
the manner in which Jacques Chirac maintained his "personal" foreign policy as mayor of Paris 
during 1977-1986, and the degree to which links beyond France played a role for rivals within the 
context of the divided Gaullist movement. 
3 Styan, D. "French and British trade and arms sales to Iraq, 1980-91; contrasting attitudes and 
raising questions", paper to the EURASMES conference, Aix, July 1996, pp. 21. 
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3 Thirdly, a subsidiary objective of the thesis has been to evaluate the 
interplay of private and state interests influencing Fifth Republic foreign policy. In 
particular the way in which both private and state oil and armaments companies 
interacted with the foreign policy milieu has been examined. Here two separate 
spheres of French industry and policy have been important; arms and oil, the 
interests of individuals in both sectors overlapping considerably in dealings with 
both Iraq and other states of the Gulf. The text has tried to show, by tracing the 
careers of men such as Pierre Guillaumat (CEA, minister, Elf), Andre Giraud (DICA, 
CEA, minister) or Hughes de L'Estoile (DGA, Dassault) that narrow groups of 
political and technical experts (all of them men) occupied a succession of influential 
posts in successive Fifth Republic administrations linking the spheres of formal 
government offices (ministries, ministerial cabinets etc. ), para-statal entities, be it 
state-owned companies such as Elf or "advisory" bodies such as the powerful 
delegation generale pour l 'armement (DGA, involved in arms research and export 
promotion). Companies in the private sector, notably Dassault Aviation have at times 
been more closely involved with foreign policy than entities in the state sector 4. The 
text has tried to show the degree to which the shared values and background of 
personnel in these entities, and their frequent shifting of jobs within and between 
spheres that have provided the coherence to French policy vis-a-vis Iraq over almost 
three decades. 
4 Analytically this third point (French public/private interests) can be 
linked to two broader debates. The first is in terms of the fairly well established 
body of writing on French elites and the related nature of "technocratic" power in 
the highly centralised and hierarchical French Fifth republic 5. The second is the less 
well-established question of the existence and power of a "military-industrial lobby" 
in France. The question of the power of the DGA, its relationship with major 
4 On Dassault and Chirac's entourage, see Schwatrzbord, Dassault, le dernier round, O. Oban, 
1991. Schwartzbrod's Le president qui n'aimait pas la guerre; dans les coulisses du pouvoir militarie 
1981-1995, Plon, Paris, 1995 also contains insights into this. A more recent view of Chirac's foreign 
policy is Coudurier, H. Le Monde selon Chirac; les coulisses de la diplomatie francaise, Calman- 
Levy, Paris, 1998, especially ch. 4 "Chirac superstar du monde arabe". 
5 Howorth, J, Cerny, P. G. Elites in France: origins, reproduction and power, Pinter, London, 
1981. Serls, E. "ministerial cabinets and elite theory", ch. 10 in Howorth, 1980. Suleiman, E. N. Elites 
in French society, Princeton U. P. Princeton, 1978. Birnbaum, P. (ed) Les elites socialistes au pouvoir, 
1981-85, puf, Paris, 1985. 
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aeronautical interests, notably the "gang of four" in the late seventies and early 
eighties (Dassault, Thompson, Matra, Aerospatiale 6) have become the subject of 
considerable debate amongst French academics and policy makers 7. This text has 
attempted to provide a view on this subject via the lens of relations with Iraq. This 
prompts two, contradictory observations. Firstly it is clear that such interests were 
crucial in the inception and evolution of relations with Baghdad. However, it is 
much less clear that they were beyond the control of politicians. The relationship 
was much more complex and nuanced than that, politicians and technocrats 
essentially sharing the belief system and culture and thus pursuing common 
strategies g. While this was presented as being the interest of "France", it is equally 
clear that private gain and managerial success played their part, as in all probability 
did the funding of political campaigns 9. Secondly, as with the point about personal 
envoys above (item 3), it is very unlikely that this was something specifically 
6 The links, - liason and ownership of these have undergone considerable transformation since 
the early 1980s, when their roles in Iraq were examined by this text. 
Marion, P. Le Pouvoir sans visage : le complexe militaro-industriel, Calmann-Levy, Paris, 
19.90. Guisnel, J. Les Generaux : enquete sur le pouvoir militaire en France, la Decouverte, Paris, 
1990. Cohen, S. La defaite des generaux : le pouvoir politique et l'armee sous la Ve Republique, 
Fayard, Paris, 1994. 
8 The evidence presented in the this thesis could fairly easily be configured to suggest that 
there is a specific French Fifth Republic orientation or belief system in IR terms, ala Little, R. & 
Smith, S. Belief systems and international relations, Smith. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1988. 
9 As in the UK, the literature and evidence on the links between commissions on Middle East 
contracts and the funding of domestic politics remains sparse. Although this text has not been able to 
sufficiently document it, it is probable that some of the action narrated here can only be fully 
understood in the context of occult financial flows which were helping to fund parties or presidential 
campaigns at home. Neither Angeli and Mesnier's enquiry, nor obviously this text, were able to 
document Iraqi funding of French politicians and parties. Yet it is certain that many of the acts, linkages 
and "friendships" underpinning the Franco-Iraqi relationship can only be fully understood in the context 
of commissions to individuals and parties on contracts to French companies. This is particularly so given 
the fragmented and personalised nature of both party and presidential electioneering in France; see 
Angeli's conclusion, p. 226. Saddam Hussein, replying in writing to Angeli's questions, remained silent 
over party-funding, no doubt mindful of its use in the future... To my knowledge, neither has el-Machat, 
Iraq's ambassador to France for much of the 1980s, now reportedly exiled in Canada, shed any light on 
the subject. 
Yet even with the partial insights presented here into the links between the aeronautical orders (notably 
from Iraq and Saudi Arabia), and figures such as Jacques Mitterrand, Hughes de l'Estoile and Dassault, 
for whom Miterrand's confidant Francois de Grossouvre worked from 1985, it seems clear that Iraq and 
other Gulf states were a source of funding for French politicians across the spectrum. 
Francois de Grossouvre - formally simply head of the presidential hunt, but a key confidant and 
PS 
financier - committed suicide in the L'Elysee on April 7 1994. This and the suicide of 
Pierre Beregovoy 
the previous May, prompted some closer scrutiny of occult political funds in France. See Montaldo, J, 
Mitterrand et les 40 voleurs, Albin Michel, Paris, 1994 (on Pelat, Pechinay and de Grossouvre). 
Montaldo, J, Lettre ouverte d'un chien ä Francois Mitterrand au nom de la liberte d'aboyer, Albin Michel 
1993 (on Beregovoy). The whole France-Iraq story could be usefully reviewed in the context of these 
studies and that of recent investigations into Elf and Roland Dumas' affair(e)s. 
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French. Elites involved in British, German or Japanese business and politics almost 
certainly behaved in a similar manner, even if the common elites and ethos were 
founded on different values. 
5 As demonstrated throughout the thesis, the burgeoning Franco-Iraqi 
relationship was just one element in a broader renaissance of Franco Arab relations 
from the late sixties onwards. The thesis therefore attempts to situate Franco-Iraqi 
ties within the context of what it terms the "reinvention of French Arab policy". It 
should be noted that here the term "reinvention" is not at all construed in the 
"constructivist" sense of international relations theory 10. Rather it was simply a 
complete reconstruction and representation of France's policy stance in the region, 
built over the discredited ruins of France's image in the wake of the Algerian war 
and the Suez debacle of 1956. It should be noted that, notwithstanding the polemics 
over the existence and/or end of this "Arab policy", certainly for Jacques Chirac in 
the mid-nineties the policy remained an important element in his foreign policy 
projection 11 
6 As such, one of the themes of (and indeed a key practical problems in 
terms of planning and editing ... 
) this work has been the need to tease out France's 
bilateral relations with individual states from the broader framework of the 
relationship with the Middle East as a whole. This was clearly crucial, albeit it 
highly problematic, given the pan-Arab stance of many partners. (Although it should 
also be noted that the cosmopolitanism, in terms both of origin and outlook of key 
decision makers in France, undoubtedly played a role 12. ) At least four separate 
spheres could be identified here: 1. the Arab: Israeli conflict, as during the '67 and 
1973 wars. 2. French attitudes to Palestine in particular, internecine Palestinian 
10 Barnett, M. Dialogues in Arab politics : negotiations in regional order, Columbia University 
Press, NY, 1998. However, it should be noted that a recent French work partially but convincingly 
apply such a reading to French policy; Cherigui, Hayete. La politique mediterraneenne de la France 
entre diplomatie collective et leadership, L'Harmattan, Paris, 1997. 
11 Chirac re-presented Gaullist Arab and Mediterranean policy in keynote speeches during a 
Middle Eastern tour in April 1996: See "l'Orient complique de Jacques Chirac" Le Monde, 18.4.96; 
"L'impossible politique arabe de la France gaulliste", Liberation, 16.4.96. 
12 Several key French players were themselves born in the Empire, perceiving themselves for 
example as much Maghrebian as French, Michel Jobert being a good example. Others were not 
French by birth, Paul Depis for example. In addition the pivotal role of Algerian diplomats for the 
French needs emphasising. 
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struggles included, both in France and the Lebanon 13.3. The Iran Iraq war, where 
France's support for Iraq clearly prompted conflict with Iran (chapter 6). 4. Finally 
the degree to which French stances towards Palestine, or the Iran: Iraq war, 
influenced other Arab states and leaders' attitudes to France. French military support 
for Iraq was very explicitly linked by conservative Arab Gulf states to their trade 
with France in the 1980s. This was clear both in terms of the Saudi oil barter deals 
to pay Iraqi debts from 1983 onwards, and France's impressive export record of 
military equipment to smaller Gulf states. Clearly such inter-linkages pose problems 
for IR theory and attempts to separate out individual state interests. The particular 
characteristics of the Middle East (pan-Arabism, Arab: Iranian rivalry etc. ) clearly 
contribute to this, but yet again, these are issues faced by all states dealing with the 
region, and further comparative work would be required before we could definitively 
demonstrate that the French approach to the region was radically different to that of 
14 their competitors 
7A factor somewhat neglected in this version of the text, is the degree 
to which there were, almost entirely at the rhetorical level, supposed "ideological 
affinities" between French and Iraqi leaders. However improbable this may seem, 
the notion of a common political outlook between Gaullism and Iraqi Baathism 
proved to be a perennial feature of speeches and articles for twenty years. It was 
seen in chapter 5 that as early at 1972 France was praising the Baathist leadership for 
their political outlook. This notion of ideological affinity, real or imagined, was 
developed by Jacques Chirac when praising Saddam Hussein's "nationalism and 
socialism" in 1974 and 1975 (chapter 5). Yet this notion of Saddam Hussein as an 
"Arab de Gaulle" 15 was developed extensively by both right and left wing 
politicians in the late 1970s. The latter included in particular Cheysson and 
Chevenement 16. This notion was accelerated from 1979 as French opinion 
(particularly in terms of the state being laique - secular) turned against Iran, seeing it 
13 Particularly as Iraq supported rejectionist factions such as Abu Nidal in the late seventies, 
see ch. 5. 
14 In terms of FPA, there is also the issue that by 1984 different factions in both Iranian and 
French foreign policy apparatuses were struggling over bilateral relations. This was very different 
from the Franco: Iraqi relationship, where consensus had been quickly, and in the Iraqi case, 
ruthlessly, established. 
15 Saint-Prot, C. Saddam Hussein : un gaullisme arabe?, Albin Michel, Paris 1987. 
16 Chevenement, J. -P. Le vert et le noir: integrisme, petrole, dollar, B. Grasset, Paris, 1995. 
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as a religious, fundamentalist and thus backward power. Evidently hostage taking 
and terrorism by Iran or its proxies of 1983-88 greatly exacerbated such a view. 
The thesis has thus attempted to link together a series of themes crucial to the 
understanding the making of contemporary French foreign policy. It has 
demonstrated how the evolving Franco-Iraqi relationship was central to the broader 
reinvention of Franco-Arab relations from the late sixties onwards. Although the 
thesis focuses entirely on the period prior to 1990, clearly the alliances and beliefs 
within the French foreign policy establishment which it analyses had an impact upon 
attitudes in France following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. This was 
true not only during the military campaign against Iraq in 1990/91, but also 
subsequently in terms of diverse French attitudes towards sanctions on Iraq over the 
subsequent decade. It is clear that the diverse and contradictory reactions among 
French actors to Iraq since August 1990, and the literature and debates that this has 
spawned, can only be fully understood in the light of the histories narrated in this 
thesis. 
vc 
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Appendix A 
Abbreviations 
AAFI Association des amities franco-irakiennes 
VC 
AFICE Association franco-irakienne de cooperation economique 
ASFA Association de solidarite franco-arabe 
ASMP (missile) air-sol de moyenne portee 
BFA Banque franco-arabe 
BRP Bureau de recherches de petrole 
CCFA Chambre de commerce franco-arabe 
CEA Commissariat al 'energie atomique, nuclear energy and exports 
regulator 
GCT (Canon ä) grande cadence de tir (155 artillery) 
CFP Compagnie francaise des petroles (formed 1924, became TOTAL) 
CGP Comite general du petrole, 1917 domestic oil regulatory body 
CIEEMG Commission interministerielle pour l'etude des exportations de 
materiels de guerre 
CNIM Constructions navales et industrielles de la Mediterranee 
CSPPA Comite de solidarite avec les prisonniers politiques arabes et du 
Moyen-Orient (front claiming responsibility for 1986 attacks in 
France) 
DMA Delegue ministeriel pour l'armement (head of DGA) 
DGA Delegation generale pour l'armement 
DICA Directeur de carbons (of ministry of industry) 
DSGE Direction generale de la securite et de la defense 
DST Direction de la surveillance du territoire 
ERAP Enterprise de recherches et d'activites petrolieres 
FARL Fractions armees revolutionnaires libanaises (Lebanese/Syrian group 
demanding release of George Ibrahim Abdullah) 
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FLN (Algerian) Front de liberation nationale 
GRPA Gouvernement provisoire de la republique algeriennne 
GIFAS Groupement des industries francaises aeronautiques et spatiales 
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 
ICP Iraqi Communist Party 
IFP Institut francais des petroles 
INOC Iraq National Oil Company 
IPC Iraq Petroleum Company (1928-1972) 
OGA Office generale de lair 
ONCL Office national des combustibles liquides, 1925 regulatory body 
OFEMA Office francais d'exportation de materiel aeronautique 
OAPEC Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries 
OPEC Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
PS (French) Parti socialiste 
RCC (Iraqi) Revolutionary Command Council 
SGDN Secretariat general de la defense nationale 
TPC Turkish Petroleum Company (name of IPC's predecessor 1912-1928) 
UAR United Arab Republic 
UBAF l'Union des banques arabes et francaises 
UGP Union generales des petroles 
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Appendix B Cartoons and illustrations 
These are just a small selection of the dozens of cartoons which could be used to 
illustrate the episodes narrated in the thesis. Constraints of reproduction and time 
mean that many other cartoons, illustrations and the numerous photos of ministerial 
visits etc. have been omitted from this version. There are numerous photos of the 
1968,1972 and 1975 Iraqi leaders' visits to France, and French ministerial trips to 
Baghdad. These could be supplemented by cartoons from Middle Eastern 
publications. 
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during his visit to Paris in May 1978. Le Monde 1.6.78. 
Le Matin 11.7.79. 
DO 
(DcJSIn de CIIENEZ. ) 
Premier Raymond Barre's 1979 "oil crisis" trip to the Gulf 
There are also numerous images of both Michel Jobert and Giscard in Arab dress. 
Jobert's trips to the Middle East in 1974-74 also prompted predictable cartoons in 
Middle Eastern publications. 
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The running polemic over Chirac's responsibility in ne otiating Iraq's nuclear programme vi 
resurfaced in a spat between Chirac and Michel d'Ornano. Giscard's (UDF) former industry 
minister, in mid- 1986, and then in when Michel \oir visited Baghdad in August 1987. 
REPUBLIQUE FRANQAISE 
MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES ETkA GERES 
Dicret n' 76-524 du 14 juin 1976 portant publication de I'accord 
de cooperation entre le Gouvernement de Ia Republique 
francaise at le Gouvernement de la Ripubliquo irakienn" 
pour I'utilisation de I'energie nucleaire l des fins pacifiques, 
ensemble une annexe, signe 1 Bagdad 1s 18 novembre 1975 (1). 
Le Presülcnl (1V la Ri"1)uhlique. 
Sur le rapport iiu 11reinicr rninistre cl du minixlro TICS nITalres 
ctrangcres, 
Vu Ics articles 52 a 55 c1c la Constitution ; 
Vii lc dccret n" 53.192 (irr 14 mars 1953 rclatit a la ratification 
et ä la publication des engagements intcrnationaux souseriLs 
par la France, 
Dccrele : 
Art. 1". - L'accord kle. cooperation entre Ir Goovertirment 
plc In RRrpublique francaisc el Ic Gouvernement sic la Rcpuhliquo 
irakirnne pour 1'ulilisation (le 1'6nergie nuck'aire ä des lins 
{)aciflques, cnsen blc uric nnnt'xe, sign, A Ua., dad IV 18 novem- 
bre 1975, seta public au Jo-irrunl o(f icir! ddc la ltt<jmhliquc (ran.. 
saisc. 
Art. 2. - Le Premier ministre et le ministre des aaaires etrant; cres sonl charges de 1'ex6cution. du present dccret. 
Fait A Paris, lc 14 join 1976. 
VALERY GISCARD li KSTAING. 
Par le President de la Republique 
Le Premier 'ninistre, , JACQUES CmRAC. 
Lt ministre des affaires etrangeres 
JEAN SAUVAGNARGUES. 
LETEXTEDU« JOURNAL OFFICIEL '. DU18JUIN 1876 PORTANTLA 
SIGMATUREDEJACQUES CHIRAC 
Le Canard enchaine, 12.8.87 
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Appendix C. The interlinked backgrounds and careers of key figures in France's 
oil, energy and arms policies. `, C 
The introduction suggested that continuity in French policy towards Iraq can be 
understood in part via the shared outlooks and backgrounds of a relatively small number 
of men involved in decision making, notably experts who occupied a succession of 
influential posts in France's oil, arms and nuclear industries during successive Fifth 
Republic administrations. Key figures had a shared educational background; many were 
graduates of the Ecole polytechnique and its elite Corps des mines. Such a background 
enabled men such as Pierre Guillaumat and Jean Blancard and their proteges from the 
corps to move between and within the key ministries and industrial bodies central to this 
text. These included the Commissariat a l'energie atomique (CEA), the Delegation 
generale pour l'armement (DGA) and the various organisations constituting France's oil 
milieu. The latter include the oil industries strategic research body, the Institut francais 
des petroles (IFP), as well as both the various companies amalgamated in the sixties as 
Elf/ERAP, and CFP/Total, whose roots in Iraq were traced in chapter one. 
A similar-pattern emerges when one looks at key personnel of the DGA and the main 
aeronautical companies, Dassault, Aerospatiale, Matra etc. Many younger figures, 
notably diplomats, also shared a background in Paris' Institut d'etudes politiques (IEP) 
and the Ecole nationale d'administration (ENA). Several were also colleagues in 
ministerial cabinets, notably during Pompidou's presidency, in the sixties and seventies '. 
The thumbnail biographies of the following eleven figures who featured repeatedly in the 
preceding chapters serve to partially illustrate manner in which their careers overlapped at 
differing points in the Fifth Republic. 
Jean Blancard, born 1914 in Paris. Ecole polytechnique, ingenieur general au corps des 
mines, Directeur des carburants, when DICA was part of the ministry of industry and 
commerce, 1951-59. He then became president of the Bureau de recherches de petrole 
(BRP) until 1965, also serving as delegue ministeriel for the air force during 1959-61 
(under Pierre Guillaumat). In 1961 he was also involved in the Commissariat a l'energie 
atomique (CEA) as head of its industrial plan committee. When Elf was created by fusing 
BRP in 1965, Blancard became vice-president and head of exploration and production. He 
held this post until 1968. During this period he was also president and director general of 
the aeronautical engine manufacturer, SNECMA. In 1968 he then switched from oil to 
arms, becoming the Delegue ministeriel pour l'armement at the Delegation genegale pour 
l'armement (DGA) until 1973. In the period 1974-77 Blancard gained a clutch of 
directorships; presiding over the board of Gaz de France (from 1975), and getting seats on 
the boards of SNCF, as well as both Elf-Aquitaine and CFP. He died in 1990(? ). 
Serge Boidevaux, Born 1928, educated at Louis-le-Grand, then IEP, he graduated from 
ENA in 1953 and entered the diplomatic service. Under Pompidou's presidency he became 
technical advisor to defense minister Michel Debre 1969-73 before being appointed 
director of Michel Jobert's cabinet. Unlike his boss Jobert, Boidevaux then joined Chirac, 
becoming the young prime minister's advisor for international affairs 1974-76. Following 
Chirac's resignation he was named ambassador to Poland in 1977, and then became the 
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director of the North Africa & Middle East section of the Qua' d'Orsay 1980-82. After a spell as ambassador to India 1982-85, he returned to Paris as joint secretary general of the Quai 1985-86, was ambassador to Germany between 1986-92, before briefly acting as Secretary General of the Quai. 
Marc Bonnefous, born 1924, Bordeaux, graduated from ENA in 1947. A diplomat, he was in the cabinet of Yves Guena in 1967, thence named ambassador to Congo-Brazzavile 
1970-72, where Elf had key mineral deposits. Was ambassador to Israel between 1978-82, 
and then became director of the North Africa & Middle East section of the Qual d'Orsay 
1982-8.6, replacing Serge Boidevaux. He was then promoted to deputy Secretary-General 
1986-87. During cohabitation he was named ambassador to the OECD. Since retiring he 
has written two books, one on the Maghreb (1991) one on north: south relations (1997). 
Francois Bujon, (also called Bujon dEstang). Born 1940, graduated from ENA in 1966. 
After spells in the USA and UK, he became advisor for international affairs at the 
delegation general de l'energie 1975-77. He was then director of international relations at 
the CEA between 1978-80, before becoming the director Andre Giraud's cabinet when the 
latter was minister of industry under Raymond Bane. He was president of Cogema 
1982-86, briefly ambassador to Mexico 1986. On Jacques Chirac's election as prime 
minister in 1986, Bujon became the premier's advisor on political, diplomatic and defense 
affairs. After cohabitation ended, he became France's ambassador to Canada and, in 1995, 
the USA. 
Eric Desmarest, Born 1942, IEP then ENA in 1969. After serving in Morocco, in 1971 he 
became a diplomatic advisor to the ministry of defense, rising to becoming Director of 
Diplomatic Affairs in the ministry between 1974-78. Between 1978-81 he shifted to 
become a technical advisor to the Quai d'Orsay. Between 1981-86 he was simply charge 
de mission in the Quai, while apparently also retaining close links with the entourage of 
Jacques Chirac, then mayor of Paris. With the return of a right-wing government, 
Desmarest was appointed as Directeur de cabinet of foreign minister, Jean-Bernard 
Raimond. Following the defeat of the right, between 1988 and 1990 he switched to become 
head of Dassault's international affairs. In 1990 he returned to the Quai d'Orsay. In 1993 
he became a personal envoy, particularly for international issues, for Charles Pasqua. In 
1995 founded a private consultancy company, Strategies et synergies internationales. 
Andre Giraud, born 1925, Bordeaux. From the Ecolepolytechnique he joined the Institut 
frangais des petroles, then becoming Directeur des carburants, in the ministry of industry 
1964-69. He was also vice-president of Renault 1965-71. He became directeur de cabinet 
for Olivier Guichard, minister of education, 1969-70. Between 1970-78 he was the French 
government's representative on the board of the CEA 70-78. Promoted to Ingenieur 
general des mines in 1973, he then headed the Ecole Polytechnique's council of 
administration, 1974-78. President of the Compagnie generale des matieres nucleaires 
1976-78, he was minister of industry 1978-81. After a spell as an academic (writing the 
sole standard French text book on the oil industry) at Paris Dauphine, when Chirac came to 
power he became minister of defense 1986-88. Subsequently he took several directorships 
(St Gobain, Banque Arjil, head of Elf s international council). Giraud died on 27.7.97 
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Pierre Guillaumat, born 1909, son of Adolphe, France's minister of war. Educated at the Ecole polytechnique, becoming Ingenieur au corps des mines. He was chief of 
service of mines in Indochine, then Tunisia, before becoming Directeur des carburants in the ministry of industry 1944-51. He was the government's representative on the board of the CEA 1951-58, and president of the board of Bureau de recherches de 
petrole (BRP) 1945-51 and 1954-59. On coming to power in 1958, de Gaulle made him 
minister for armed forces, a position he held in the cabinet of Michel Debre until 1960. 
Between 1962-66 he was head of Union generales des petroles (UGP), and after the 
French oil industry restructuring in the mid-1960s, headed Elf-Aquitaine, a post he held 
until 1977. He was also on the board of CFP between 1971-74. Like Andre Giraud, he 
also presided over the Ecole Polytechnique's council of administration. One of the 
acknowledged "barons" of Gaullism, he died on 28.08.91. 
Michel Jobert, Was born in Meknes, Morocco in 1921, ENA 47-48, Had administrative 
role in Mendes France's governments 1954-6, then French West Africa, before becoming 
directeur de cabinet of De Gaulle's premier Pompidou. When the latter became president 
in 1969, Jobert became the secretaire general of the Elysee. He was minister of foreign 
affairs between April 1974 and Pompidou's death. While in charge of the Quai, he formed 
the Centre d'analyse et de prevision (CAP). Despite his breif tenure as foreign minister, his 
highly public argument with US secretary of state Kissenger over energy policy, and 
frequent visits to the Middle East, meant Jobert remains one of the most remembered 
French foreign ministers in both France and the Arab world. Having little sympathy with 
Giscard or Chirac, in 1974 Jobert then returned to the Cour des Comptes. He then founded 
his own party, the Mouvement des democrates, and wrote extensively. Following 
Mitterrand's election, Jobert became minister of state for external commerce. As explained 
in chapter six, his appointment, coupled with cordial relations with fellow ministers 
Chevenement and Cheysson, served to reassure Arab states as to the continuity of French 
policy towards Arab states. As minister, he was again active in promoting trade with the 
Middle East. He resigning in March 1984, again writing extensively. Like Cheysson and 
Chevenement, he was publicly opposed to French participation in the 1990/91 war, on 
which he published a book Journal du Golfe Aout 1990-Aout 1991. 
Hughes de L'Estoile (de), born 1931. Educated in the Ecole Polytechnique, and then ecole 
nationale superieure de l'aeronautique ("aerosup"). Created the Centre de prospective et 
devaluation du ministere des armees in the Ministry of Defense. Between 1964-70 he was 
technical advisor to Pierre Messmer and then Michel Debre in the Ministry of Defense. He 
then moved to the Delegation generale pour l'armement where from 1970 he was directeur 
des affaires internationales. Promoted Ingenieur general de le classe de l'armement, 
between 1974-77 he was in the ministry of industry, as well as on the boards of both the 
CEA 74-77, and Renault 74-77. In 1979 he joined the board of the Office franqais 
d'exportation de materiel aeronautique (OFEMA) and in 1986 also joined Groupement des 
industries frangaises aeronautiques et spatiales (GIFAS). From 1977 he was director- 
general, and then from 1986 vice-president of the international affairs section of Dassault 
Aviation, presumably working with both Eric Desmarest and president Mitterrand's 
confidant, Francois de Grossouvre (see conclusion, fn 9). Actively pushing sales of 
Mirage2000 to Baghdad for Dassault in 1990, curiously, his "Who's Who in France" entry 
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states that in 1990/91 he acted as a personal envoy for president Mitterrand. He died on 23.11.1993. 
Jacques Mitterrand, born 1918, two years after his brother Francois. Followed a military 
career after St-Cyr. Left the army to become the head of Aerospatiale, a post he held 1975- 
83. He also sat on the board of the CEA in 1975. Between 1981-85 he was the overall 
president of the Groupernent des industries francaises aeronautiques et spatiales (GIFAS) 
and also headed GIFAS's export committee. He was also president of the Office generale 
de fair (OGA) 
Jean-Bernard Raimond, born 1926, graduated from ENA 1956-58. Served in the Quai 
d'Orsay 1956-66 and was deputy director of the ministry in 1967. He was technical advisor 
to Pompidou firstly as prime minister 1968-69, then president 1970-73. In 1973 he became 
ambassador to Morocco, returning in 1977 to head the North Africa and Levant section of 
the Quai d'Orsay. He was briefly directeur de cabinet for the minister of foreign affairs 
1978-79, then head of cultural affairs in the Quai, thence ambassador to Poland (1982-84), 
the Soviet Union (1985-86). When Chirac became premier, Raimond returned to become 
foreign minister. Thereafter he was named to the Vatican. He was elected an RPR depute 
in 1993, and has served as a vice-president of the commission of foreign affairs in the 
national assembly. While a diplomat, unlike many of his peers in this milieu, Raimond did 
not have a technical background in oil or armaments. 
Sources: 
For works on Guillaumat's life and influence, the volume of essays by Soutou, G. -M. et al 
(eds), Pierre Guillaumat, la passion des grandes projets industrielles, eds. rive droit, 
Paris 1995. Pean P, Sereni, J-P, Les Emirs de la republique, Seuil, Paris, 1982, traces the 
links between Guillaumat, Blancard and Giraud. See also the contributions by Guillaumat 
and Blancard themselves, pp. 222-226 in vol. 3 of De Gaulle en son siecle : actes des 
Journees internationales tenues a l'Unesco, La Documentation francaise & Plon, Paris, 
1992. 
1 As noted in chapter five (section four) several of these figures also formed the rump of France's 
strategic studies and international relations community, See Schwartzbrod, 1995. 
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Appendix D French ambassadors to Iraq; 1963-1990 
Le Gourriere / Dumarcay 16.2.63 
Pierre Gorce 21.3.67 
(Pierre) Cerles 11.2.70 
Jacques Morizet 9.10.75 
Pierre Rocalve 27.3.80 
Paul Depis 26.11.81 
Maurice Courage 7.12.84 
Relations formally broken 8.2.91 
? 55 
Appendix E Theses written by Iraqis in French universities 
As noted in the introduction, as part of the technical and educational exchanges 
between France and Iraq, several hundred Iraqis wrote theses in French universities 
during the 1980s. While many were in natural sciences, of those in social sciences, 
only a handful dealt with aspects of Franco-Iraqi relations. 
Al Dahir, Samir, La politique exterieure de la Veme republique au proche orient 
arabe; le cas de 1'Irak et du Liban, Rennes, 1990. 
Ahmad, Hameed, Les relations diplomatiques de la Verne republique francaise avec 
1'Irak, Montpellier, 1986. 
Ahmad al-Samarrae, Khalil, La politique exterieure de 1'Irak, Paris III (? ), 1984 
Omar Fatteh, Haifa, Les Kurdes de 1'Irak vus pas l'opinion francaise 1968-79, Paris 
III, 1982. 
Khatab, Alika, L'Irak dans l'opinion et de la vie intellectuelle francaise, 1968-78, 
Paris III, 1981. 
Ghafour, Khaliq, Transferts de technologies nucleaires dans un pays en voie de 
developpement; le cas de 1'Irak, Paris IX, 1979. 
Tawfiq, Saad, Essai sur la politique etrangere de 1'Irak, (depuis 1958? ), Lyon(? ), 
1978. 
Al-Hiti, Abdul Jali, Relations petrolieres entre l'Irak et la France, Lyon II, 1977. 
As discussed in the introduction, relatively few French theses and other works deal 
with Iraq. Several archaeological studies were undertaken, notably under the 
supervision of Jean-Louis Huot in the Sorbonne. Pierre-Jean Luizard, who 
subsequently became an Iraq specialist with CNRS wrote his thesis on Iraqi Shia 
history. He also edited the excellent special edition of "Monde Arabe; memoires 
d'Irakienes", No. 163, Jan-Mar 1999. Documentation Francaise, Paris. 
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Appendix F: Selected statistics 
Table 1 Major arms suppliers to Iraq, 1951-85 
Table 2 Share of suppliers of major conventional weapons to the Middle East, 
1951-85 
Table 3 Value of imports of major weapons by Iraq, 1951-85 
Table 4 Iraq, principal supplies, imports by country, 1960-1990 
Table 5 Iraq, principal export markets, 1969-1990 
vc - four pages (numbered I-IV) 
Table 1: Major arms suppliers to Iraq, 1951-1985, % shares 
USSR I France UK Total 1985 $ 
1951 to 55 0 0 100 71 
1956 to 60 78 0 10 257 
1961 to 65 75 0 25 729 
1966 to 70 88 4 2 787 
1971 to 75 97 2 0 2042 
1976 to 80 85 10 0 5559 
1981 to 85 55 22 0 15170 
Source: Brozska, M. Ohlson, T. Arms transfers to the Third World, 1971-85, 
Sipri-OUP, Oxford, 1987 
Table 2: Share of suppliers of major conventional weapons 
to the Middle East, 1951-85 
USSR USA France UK Other Total in 
1985 $ m. 
1951 to 55 5 15 20 43 15 761 
1956 to 60 48 14 11 7 19 2760 
1961 to 65 49 29 1 11 9 1 4946 
1966 to 70 49 35 48 4 16392 
1971 to 75 45 41 39 0 35217 
1976 to 80 27 54 10 3 4 39510 
1981 to 85 33 32 1 16 14 15 56510 
Source: Brozska, M. Ohlson, 1987. 
Table 3: Value of imports of major weapons by Iraq, 1951-85, Sm. 
1951 2 
1952 0 
1953 20 
1954 18 
1955 31 
1956 27 
1957 19 
1958 45 
Revolution 
1959 90 
1960 76 
1961 55 
1962 188 
1963 157 
1964 202 
1965 127 
1966 107 
1967 128 
1968 172 
1969 183 
1970 196 
1971 233 
1972 106 
Oil nationalisa tion 
1973 659 
1974 744 
1975 300 
1976 792 
1977 1008 
1978 1218 
1979 806 
Iran-Iraq war 
1980 1734 
1981 2314 
1982 1837 
1983 2809 
1984 4718 
1985 3492 
Source: Brozska, M. Ohlson, T, 1987. 
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